1071

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CFJ 1071 

  "Rule 1558 prevents a Player who is the Speaker from nominating in an 
   Election for the Office of Speaker-Elect." 

Relevant Rules: 1558, 1647 

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Judge:       General Chaos
Judgement:   TRUE

Eligible:    Andre, Calabresi, Chuck, Crito, elJefe,
	     General Chaos, Kolja A., Michael, Murphy,
	     Oerjan, Swann

Ineligible:  Vlad (declined) 
Caller:      Steve
Barred:      Morendil
On request:  Vanyel
On hold:     Harlequin, Vir

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History:
  Called by Steve, 13 Nov 1997 12:20:21 +1100
  Dice rolls: ChrisM, Vir, Morendil, Vlad
  Assigned to Vlad, 13 Nov 1997 08:40:51 +0000
  Vlad declines, 13 Nov 1997 12:37:11 -0600
  Dice rolls: ChrisM, Gen. Chaos
  Reassigned to General Chaos, 14 Nov 1997 19:19:12 +0000
  Judged TRUE, 17 Nov 1997 23:00:57 -0500
  Injunction announced, as of this message


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Injunction: 

The Rulekeepor is hereby enjoined to annotate Rule 1558 with the Statement of
this CFJ and the list of Relevant Rules as noted in the CFJ.

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Caller's Arguments:

I'll take the unusual step of presenting arguments for both sides. I'm not
really advocating any particular Judgement. I just think the matter should be
resolved one way or the other. I'll leave it to the Judge to decide which e
prefers. Perhaps the Judge will find some new argument which I haven't thought
of to resolve the matter.

R1647 states: 

      The Speaker can never hold the Office of Speaker-Elect, even 
      temporarily. 

while R1558 states: 

      No Player may be Nominated who would not be permitted to hold 
      the Office which the Election is seeking to fill. 

On the side of a Judgement of TRUE, we have the observation that if a Player who
is the Speaker were still to be Speaker when e was Elected Speaker-Elected, e
would not be permitted to hold the Office, even temporarily. This seems to show
that the Speaker cannot nominate for Speaker-Elect.

On the other hand, however, how can we be sure that the Player who is Speaker
would still be Speaker when the Election for the Office of Speaker-Elect
concluded? If the Player had somehow ceased to be Speaker, nothing would prevent
em from holding the Office of Speaker-Elect, were e to win the Election. And it
is not difficult to imagine ways in which the a Player who is the Speaker might
cease to be Speaker in time take up the Office of Speaker-Elect. Here are three:

1. By proposal. From the call for Nominations to the announcement of the
results, an Election in which there are multiple Candidates takes at least two
weeks to complete. In that time, a high-Powered Rule might be be adopted
removing the Player from the position of Speaker.

2. By giving up the Speakership voluntarily. Although R681 prevents a Speaker
who gives up the Speakership voluntarily from nominating emself for the Office
of Speaker-Elect, the Rule does not say that the Speaker may not already be
nominated at the time e gives up the Speakership.

3. By going On Hold. Eir doing so would constitute the Crime of Speaker
Inactivity (see R1375), with the quite heavy penalties entailed by this, but
that would not make em ineligible to hold the Office of Speaker-Elect.

Whether the Judge finds these latter considerations persuasive will largely
depend on how e chooses to construct the phrase 'would not be permitted to hold
the Office'. If e chooses to read it 'would *certainly* not be permitted to hold
the Office', then I think a Judgement of FALSE is indicated, since I think I've
shown above that we cannot be certain that a Player who is the Speaker would not
be permitted to hold the Office of Speaker-Elect were e Elected to that Office.
On the other hand, if e chooses to read it as 'would not be permitted to hold
the Office, other things being equal' then a Judgement of TRUE is indicated,
since all of the possibilites I've raised fall into the category of other things
not being equal.

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Reasons and Arguments of Judge: 

This case presents the question of whether the sitting Speaker may be Nominated
in an Election for the Office of Speaker-Elect, on the basis of Rules 1558 and
1647.  Petitioner presents arguments both for and against holding such a
Nomination as legal.  This Court find that Rule 1558 is ambiguous on the
question, but categorically bars such Nominations on the grounds that failing to
categorically bar them would potentially require future knowledge in order to
distinguish legal Nominations.

This Court finds that the pertinent sentence of Rule 1558, "No Player may be
Nominated who would not be permitted to hold the Office which the Election is
seeking to fill," is insufficiently specified.  There appear to be two plausible
constructions of this sentence.  It could mean "No Player may be Nominated who
would not be permitted to hold the Office ... _if Elected_."  It could also mean
"No Player may be Nominated who would not be permitted to hold the Office ...
_at the moment of the attempted Nomination_."  The first construction seems
slightly slightly favorable to the second, but not compellingly so.  A
consideration of both is therefore in order.

The first construction would permit the Speaker to Nominate for Speaker-Elect,
as long as the Speaker ensures that e is not Speaker by the time the Election
ends.  Petitioner mentions several possible ways in which this might happen, but
neglects to mention the case of the Speaker being Tainted.  If the Speaker is
Tainted, then, should e be Elected, e would immediately cease to be Speaker (and
then immediately become Speaker again).  It becomes an argument of infinitesimal
moments as to whether the Speaker would be forced to be Speaker-Elect
simultaneously in this case, an argument this Court will not pursue at this
time.  In any case, the first construction would allow the Speaker to Nominate
for Speaker-Elect in some situations, and would therefore mandate a ruling of
FALSE.

However, this Court elects to repudiate this construction, because it would, in
many cases, make the legality of a Speaker's Nomination contigent on future
events.  Petitioner suggests that the Speaker could be made eligible by being
removed by Proposal, by surrendering the Speakership, or by going On Hold.  To
have the desired effect, one of these events would necessarily have to occur
after the Nomination, but before the end of the Election.  Most imporatantly, if
none of these were to occur before the end of the Election, the Speaker would be
ineligible to become Speaker-Elect.  Thus, the legality of the Nomination, and
thus of the Nominee's candidacy, would be contingent on the necessary event
occuring.  It is this Court's opinion that basing the legality of an action on
future events is neither consistent with commonsense nor in keeping with the
best interest of the Game, and so this construction should be disallowed if an
alternative exists.

The second construction, fortunately, is void of this need for precognition.
The legality of a Nomination, under this construction, can be determined at the
moment it is made.  In this Court's opinion, this advantage is more than
sufficient to outweigh the Court's admittedly minor concerns about the
obviousness of this construction.

Since this Court's preferred construction of Rule 1558 acts to categorically bar
any Nomination by the Speaker in any Election for the Officer of Speaker-Elect,
the question presented is categorically true.  Therefore:

Judgement of TRUE is entered.  The Injunction requested is GRANTED, and the
Rulekeepor is hereby enjoined to annotate Rule 1558 with the Statement of this
CFJ and the list of Relevant Rules as noted in the CFJ.

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