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Inter-Process Communication (IPC) in Chromium: Security Considerations

This page documents potential security vulnerabilities related to inter-process communication (IPC) in Chromium, focusing on the BrowserChildProcessHostImpl class in content/browser/browser_child_process_host_impl.cc. IPC is crucial for communication between different browser processes, and vulnerabilities here could allow attackers to bypass process boundaries, inject malicious code, or cause denial-of-service conditions.

Potential Vulnerabilities:

  • Buffer Overflows: Insufficient input validation could lead to buffer overflows. The OnMessageReceived function needs to be reviewed for proper input validation and buffer size checks.
  • Race Conditions: Concurrent access could lead to race conditions. The asynchronous nature of IPC and the interaction with multiple processes require careful synchronization to prevent race conditions.
  • Message Tampering: Mechanisms should be in place to detect and prevent message tampering. The integrity of IPC messages needs to be ensured.
  • Injection Attacks: Insufficient input validation could allow injection attacks. The handling of messages and their contents needs to be reviewed for proper sanitization and validation.
  • Authorization Bypass: Insufficient authorization checks could allow unauthorized access. The OnMessageReceived function and other IPC-related functions should be reviewed for proper authorization checks.
  • Process Launching and Sandboxing: Incorrect sandboxing of child processes could allow a compromised process to affect the browser or system. The Launch and LaunchWithFileData functions in browser_child_process_host_impl.cc handle process launching and sandboxing and need careful review.
  • Mojo Message Handling: Vulnerabilities in Mojo message handling could allow malicious code execution or denial-of-service attacks. The OnMojoError function and its interaction with the termination process need to be analyzed.
  • Metrics and Resource Management: Improper handling of metrics or resource management during process termination could lead to information leakage or denial-of-service vulnerabilities. The CreateMetricsAllocator, ShareMetricsAllocatorToProcess, ForceShutdown, and OnChildDisconnected functions need review.

Further Analysis and Potential Issues:

  • Input Validation: All IPC messages should be validated. The validation should include checks for message types, sizes, and content to prevent buffer overflows and injection attacks.
  • Synchronization: Implement synchronization to prevent race conditions. Use appropriate synchronization primitives (e.g., locks, mutexes) to protect shared resources and prevent race conditions during concurrent access.
  • Data Integrity: Implement mechanisms to detect and prevent message tampering. Consider using message signing or encryption to ensure data integrity.
  • Authorization: Implement robust authorization checks. Verify that only authorized processes can access sensitive data or functionalities.
  • Error Handling: Implement robust error handling. Error messages should not reveal sensitive information. The error handling in IPC-related functions should be reviewed to prevent crashes, unexpected behavior, and information leakage.
  • Child Process Management: The lifecycle management of child processes, including their launching, connection, termination, and resource cleanup, needs further analysis to prevent vulnerabilities. The interaction with the ChildProcessHost and the SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate is crucial for security.

Areas Requiring Further Investigation:

  • Review all IPC message handlers.
  • Implement synchronization mechanisms.
  • Implement message tampering detection and prevention.
  • Implement robust authorization checks.
  • Implement robust error handling.
  • IPC Channel Security: The security of the IPC channel itself, including the transport mechanism and message handling, needs to be thoroughly analyzed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or injection attacks.
  • Message Filtering and Validation: The mechanisms for filtering and validating IPC messages should be reviewed for potential bypasses or weaknesses.

Files Reviewed:

  • content/browser/browser_child_process_host_impl.cc

Key Functions Reviewed:

  • OnMessageReceived, OnBadMessageReceived, OnChildDisconnected, Launch, LaunchWithFileData, ForceShutdown, OnChannelConnected, OnChannelError, CreateMetricsAllocator, ShareMetricsAllocatorToProcess, RegisterCoordinatorClient, OnMojoError