sources.bib

@Inbook{Garay2015,
author="Garay, Juan
and Kiayias, Aggelos
and Leonardos, Nikos",
editor="Oswald, Elisabeth
and Fischlin, Marc",
title="The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications",
bookTitle="Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2015: 34th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Sofia, Bulgaria, April 26-30, 2015, Proceedings, Part II",
year="2015",
publisher="Springer Berlin Heidelberg",
address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
pages="281--310",
isbn="978-3-662-46803-6",
doi="10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_10",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_10"
}
@inproceedings{groth2006perfect,
  title={Perfect non-interactive zero knowledge for NP},
  author={Groth, Jens and Ostrovsky, Rafail and Sahai, Amit},
  booktitle={Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques},
  pages={339--358},
  year={2006},
  organization={Springer}
}
@inproceedings{fiat1986prove,
  title={How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems},
  author={Fiat, Amos and Shamir, Adi},
  booktitle={Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques},
  pages={186--194},
  year={1986},
  organization={Springer}
}
@article{kalodner2015empirical, title={An empirical study of Namecoin and lessons for decentralized namespace design}, author={Kalodner, Harry and Carlsten, Miles and Ellenbogen, Paul and Bonneau, Joseph and Narayanan, Arvind}, year={2015} }
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013:734,
    author = {Joppe W. Bos and J. Alex Halderman and Nadia Heninger and Jonathan Moore and Michael Naehrig and Eric Wustrow},
    title = {Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice},
    howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/734},
    year = {2013},
}
@incollection{ben2013snarks,
  title={SNARKs for C: Verifying program executions succinctly and in zero knowledge},
  author={Ben-Sasson, Eli and Chiesa, Alessandro and Genkin, Daniel and Tromer, Eran and Virza, Madars},
  booktitle={Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO 2013},
  pages={90--108},
  year={2013},
  publisher={Springer}
}
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013:879,
    author = {Eli Ben-Sasson and Alessandro Chiesa and Eran Tromer and Madars Virza},
    title = {Succinct Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge for a von Neumann Architecture},
    howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/879},
    year = {2013},
}
@incollection{damgaard1999commitment,
  title={Commitment schemes and zero-knowledge protocols},
  author={Damg{\aa}rd, Ivan},
  booktitle={Lectures on Data Security},
  pages={63--86},
  year={1999},
  publisher={Springer}
}
@inproceedings{boneh2003aggregate,
  title={Aggregate and verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear maps},
  author={Boneh, Dan and Gentry, Craig and Lynn, Ben and Shacham, Hovav},
  booktitle={International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques},
  pages={416--432},
  year={2003},
  organization={Springer}
}
@inproceedings{saxena2014increasing,
  title={Increasing anonymity in bitcoin},
  author={Saxena, Amitabh and Misra, Janardan and Dhar, Aritra},
  booktitle={International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security},
  pages={122--139},
  year={2014},
  organization={Springer}
}
@inproceedings{miers2013zerocoin,
  title={Zerocoin: Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin},
  author={Miers, Ian and Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Rubin, Aviel D},
  booktitle={Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on},
  pages={397--411},
  year={2013},
  organization={IEEE}
}
@inproceedings{sasson2014zerocash,
  title={Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin},
  author={Sasson, Eli Ben and Chiesa, Alessandro and Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Tromer, Eran and Virza, Madars},
  booktitle={2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
  pages={459--474},
  year={2014},
  organization={IEEE}
}
@article{kokorisposter,
  title={Poster: Bitcoin Meets Collective Signing},
  author={Kokoris-Kogias, Eleftherios and Jovanovic, Philipp and Gailly, Nicolas and Khoffi, Ismail and Gasser, Linus and Ford, Bryan}
}
@inproceedings{castro1999practical,
  title={Practical Byzantine fault tolerance},
  author={Castro, Miguel and others}
}
@inproceedings{eyal2016bitcoin,
  title={Bitcoin-NG: A scalable blockchain protocol},
  author={Eyal, Ittay and Gencer, Adem Efe and Sirer, Emin G{\"u}n and Van Renesse, Robbert},
  booktitle={13th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 16)},
  pages={45--59},
  year={2016}
}
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013:881,
    author = {Yonatan Sompolinsky and Aviv Zohar},
    title = {Accelerating Bitcoin's Transaction Processing. Fast Money Grows on Trees, Not Chains},
    howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/881},
    year = {2013},
}
@article{DBLP:journals/corr/ChepurnoyLO16,
  author    = {Alexander Chepurnoy and
               Mario Larangeira and
               Alexander Ojiganov},
  title     = {A Prunable Blockchain Consensus Protocol Based on Non-Interactive
               Proofs of Past States Retrievability},
  journal   = {CoRR},
  volume    = {abs/1603.07926},
  year      = {2016},
  url       = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07926},
  timestamp = {Sat, 02 Apr 2016 11:49:48 +0200},
  biburl    = {http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bib/journals/corr/ChepurnoyLO16},
  bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, http://dblp.org}
}
@misc{stewart2012proof,
  title={Proof of burn. bitcoin. i t},
  author={Stewart, I},
  year={2012},
  publisher={December}
}
@article{king2012ppcoin,
  title={Ppcoin: Peer-to-peer crypto-currency with proof-of-stake},
  author={King, Sunny and Nadal, Scott},
  journal={self-published paper, August},
  volume={19},
  year={2012}
}
@misc{kiayias2016provably,
  title={A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol},
  author={Kiayias, Aggelos and Konstantinou, Ioannis and Russell, Alexander and David, Bernardo and Oliynykov, Roman},
  year={2016}
}
@inproceedings{douceur2002sybil,
  title={The sybil attack},
  author={Douceur, John R},
  booktitle={International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems},
  pages={251--260},
  year={2002},
  organization={Springer}
}
@misc{back2002hashcash,
  title={Hashcash-a denial of service counter-measure},
  author={Back, Adam and others},
  year={2002}
}
@inproceedings{boneh2006strongly,
  title={Strongly unforgeable signatures based on computational Diffie-Hellman},
  author={Boneh, Dan and Shen, Emily and Waters, Brent},
  booktitle={International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography},
  pages={229--240},
  year={2006},
  organization={Springer}
}
@article{schneier1996one,
  title={One-Way Hash Functions},
  author={Schneier, Bruce},
  journal={Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, 20th Anniversary Edition},
  pages={429--459},
  year={1996},
  publisher={Wiley Online Library}
}
@inproceedings{decker2014bitcoin,
  title={Bitcoin transaction malleability and MtGox},
  author={Decker, Christian and Wattenhofer, Roger},
  booktitle={European Symposium on Research in Computer Security},
  pages={313--326},
  year={2014},
  organization={Springer}
}
@inproceedings{Taylor:2013:BAB:2555729.2555745,
 author = {Taylor, Michael Bedford},
 title = {Bitcoin and the Age of Bespoke Silicon},
 booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems},
 series = {CASES '13},
 year = {2013},
 isbn = {978-1-4799-1400-5},
 location = {Montreal, Quebec, Canada},
 pages = {16:1--16:10},
 articleno = {16},
 numpages = {10},
 url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2555729.2555745},
 acmid = {2555745},
 publisher = {IEEE Press},
 address = {Piscataway, NJ, USA},
 keywords = {bitcoin, dark silicon, specialization},
} 


@article{Beekman2016,
abstract = {Bitcoin supports complex transactions where the recipient of a transaction can be programmatically determined. Using these transactions, multi-party computation protocols that aim to ensure fairness among participants have been designed. We present a Denial of Service attack against these protocols that results in a net loss for some or all of the honest parties involved, violating those fairness goals.},
author = {Beekman, Jethro G.},
doi = {10.1016/j.ipl.2015.09.009},
issn = {00200190},
journal = {Information Processing Letters},
keywords = {Bitcoin,Cryptography,Denial of Service,Safety/security in digital systems,Secure multiparty computation,bitcoin,smc,smp},
mendeley-tags = {bitcoin,smc,smp},
number = {2},
pages = {144--146},
title = {{A Denial of Service attack against fair computations using Bitcoin deposits}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/911},
volume = {116},
year = {2016}
}
@article{Bentov2013,
  title={Proof of Activity: Extending Bitcoin's Proof of Work via Proof of Stake},
  author={Bentov, Iddo and Lee, Charles and Mizrahi, Alex and Rosenfeld, Meni},
  journal={ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review},
  volume={42},
  number={3},
  pages={34--37},
  year={2014},
  publisher={ACM}
}
@misc{Bonneau2015,
abstract = {Bitcoin has emerged as the most successful cryptographic currency in history. Within two years of its quiet launch in 2009, Bitcoin grew to comprise billions of dollars of economic value despite only cursory analysis of the system’s design. Since then a growing literature has identified hidden-but-important properties of the system, discovered attacks, proposed promising alternatives, and singled out difficult future challenges. Meanwhile a large and vibrant open-source community has proposed and deployed numerous modifications and extensions. We provide the first systematic exposition Bitcoin and the many related cryptocurrencies or ‘altcoins.’ Drawing from a scattered body of knowledge, we identify three key components of Bitcoin’s design that can be decoupled. This enables a more insightful analysis of Bitcoin’s properties and future stability. We map the design space for numerous proposed modifications, providing comparative analyses for alternative consensus mechanisms, currency allocation mechanisms, computational puzzles, and key management tools. We survey anonymity issues in Bitcoin and provide an evaluation framework for analyzing a variety of privacy-enhancing proposals. Finally we provide new insights on what we term disintermediation protocols, which absolve the need for trusted intermediaries in an interesting set of applications. We identify three general disintermediation strategies and provide a detailed comparison.},
author = {Bonneau, Joseph and Miller, Andrew and Clark, Jeremy and Narayanan, Arvind and Kroll, Joshua A. and Felten, Edward W.},
booktitle = {Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
doi = {10.1109/SP.2015.14},
isbn = {9781467369497},
issn = {10816011},
keywords = {bitcoin,cryptocurrency},
mendeley-tags = {bitcoin,cryptocurrency},
pages = {104--121},
title = {{SoK: Research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and cryptocurrencies}},
url = {http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2015/papers-archived/6949a104.pdf},
urldate = {2015-12-21},
volume = {2015-July},
year = {2015}
}
@article{biryukov2016asymmetric,
  title={Asymmetric proof-of-work based on the Generalized Birthday problem},
  author={Biryukov, Alex and Khovratovich, Dmitry},
  journal={Proceedings of NDSS 2016},
  pages={13},
  year={2016}
}
@inproceedings{miller2015nonoutsourceable,
  title={Nonoutsourceable Scratch-Off Puzzles to Discourage Bitcoin Mining Coalitions},
  author={Miller, Andrew and Kosba, Ahmed and Katz, Jonathan and Shi, Elaine},
  booktitle={Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  pages={680--691},
  year={2015},
  organization={ACM}
}
@misc{cromanscaling,
  title={On Scaling Decentralized Blockchains},
  author={Croman, Kyle and Decker, Christian and Eyal, Ittay and Gencer, Adem Efe and Juels, Ari and Kosba, Ahmed and Miller, Andrew and Saxena, Prateek and Shi, Elaine and G{\"u}n, Emin},
  url = {http://fc16.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/CDE+16.pdf}
}
@misc{Chepurnoy,
author = {Chepurnoy, Alexander},
title = {{Interactive Proof-of-Stake simulation tools}},
url = {https://github.com/kushti/common-pos},
urldate = {2015-12-31}
}
@misc{bitcoind,
title = {{Bitcoin Core Code Repository}},
url = {https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/},
urldate = {2016-03-24}
}
@misc{ethyp,
title = {{Ethereum: A Secure Decentralized Generalized Transaction Ledger}},
url = {http://gavwood.com/Paper.pdf},
urldate = {2016-03-24}
}
@misc{cryptonite,
title = {{The Cryptonite Project Homepage}},
url = {http://cryptonite.info},
urldate = {2016-03-24}
}
@misc{snapshot,
title = {{Bitcoin Blockchain Data Torrent}},
url = {https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=145386.0},
urldate = {2016-03-24}
}
@misc{minibc,
title = {{The Mini-Blockchain Scheme}},
url = {http://cryptonite.info/files/mbc-scheme-rev2.pdf},
urldate = {2016-03-24}
}
@article{Eyal2014,
abstract = {The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain. Its security rests critically on the distributed protocol that maintains the blockchain, run by participants called miners. Conventional wisdom asserts that the protocol is incentive-compatible and secure against colluding minority groups, i.e., it incentivizes miners to follow the protocol as prescribed. We show that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. This attack can have significant consequences for Bitcoin: Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish miners, and the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority. At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Selfish mining is feasible for any group size of colluding miners. We pro- pose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects against selfish mining pools that command less than 1/4 of the resources. This threshold is lower than the wrongly assumed 1/2 bound, but better than the current reality where a group of any size can compromise the system.},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
arxivId = {1311.0243},
author = {Eyal, Ittay and Sirer, Emin G??n},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5{\_}28},
eprint = {1311.0243},
file = {:home/kushti/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Eyal, Sirer - 2013 - Majority is not Enough Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {9783662454718},
issn = {16113349},
journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)},
keywords = {bitcoin,proof-of-work},
mendeley-tags = {bitcoin,proof-of-work},
month = {nov},
number = {Jan},
pages = {436--454},
title = {{Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/pdf/1311.0243v1.pdf},
volume = {8437},
year = {2014}
}
@incollection{garay2015bitcoin,
  title={The bitcoin backbone protocol: Analysis and applications},
  author={Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Leonardos, Nikos},
  booktitle={Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2015},
  pages={281--310},
  year={2015},
  publisher={Springer}
}

@inproceedings{luu2015demystifying,
  title={Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer},
  author={Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek},
  booktitle={Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  pages={706--719},
  year={2015},
  organization={ACM}
}
@inproceedings{merkle1987digital,
  title={A digital signature based on a conventional encryption function},
  author={Merkle, Ralph C},
  booktitle={Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’87},
  pages={369--378},
  year={1987},
  organization={Springer}
}
@misc{Maxwell2015,
author = {Maxwell, Greg},
keywords = {Pedersen commitment,anonymous transactions,commitment,cryptography,zero knowledge},
mendeley-tags = {Pedersen commitment,anonymous transactions,commitment,cryptography,zero knowledge},
title = {{Confidential Transactions}},
url = {https://people.xiph.org/{~}greg/confidential{\_}values.txt},
urldate = {2015-09-10},
year = {2015}
}
@misc{milleranonymous,
  title={Anonymous Byzantine Consensus from Moderately-Hard Puzzles: A Model for Bitcoin},
  author={Miller, Andrew and LaViola Jr, Joseph J},
  url = {https://socrates1024.s3.amazonaws.com/consensus.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{miller2014permacoin,
  title={Permacoin: Repurposing bitcoin work for data preservation},
  author={Miller, Andrew and Juels, Ari and Shi, Elaine and Parno, Bryan and Katz, Jonathan},
  booktitle={Security and Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on},
  pages={475--490},
  year={2014},
  organization={IEEE}
}
@article{Moran,
abstract = {We  introduce  a  new  cryptographic  primitive:  Proofs  of  Space-Time (PoSTs)   and  construct  a  practical  protocol  for  implementing  these  proofs.  A  PoST  allows  a  prover  to  convince  a  verifier  that  she  spent  a  ``spacetime''  resource (storing  data---space---over  a  period  of  time). 
Formally,  we  define  the  PoST  resource  as  a  linear  tradeoff  between  CPU  work   and  space-time (under  reasonable  cost  assumptions,  a  rational  user  will  prefer  to  use  the  lower-cost  space-time  resource  over  CPU  work).

Compared  to  a  proof-of-work,  a  PoST  requires  less  energy  use,  as  the  ``difficulty''  can  be  increased  by  extending  the  time  period  over  which  data  is  stored  without  increasing  computation  costs.
Our  definition  is  very  similar  to  ``Proofs  of  Space''  [ePrint 2013/796, 2013/805]  but,  unlike  the  previous  definitions,  takes  into  account  amortization  attacks   and  storage  duration.  Moreover,  our  protocol  uses  a  very  different (and  simpler)  technique,  making  use  of  the  fact  that  we  explicitly  allow  a  space-time  tradeoff.},
author = {Moran, Tal and Orlov, Ilan},
file = {:home/kushti/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Moran, Orlov - Unknown - Proofs of Space-Time and Rational Proofs of Storage.pdf:pdf},
keywords = {Proofs of Space,Proofs of Space-Time,Proofs of Storage,bitcoin,crypto-currency,proofs of space,proofs of work},
mendeley-tags = {Proofs of Space,Proofs of Space-Time,Proofs of Storage},
title = {{Proofs of Space-Time and Rational Proofs of Storage}},
url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/035}
}
@misc{Nakamoto2008,
abstract = {A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
arxivId = {43543534534v343453},
author = {Nakamoto, Satoshi},
doi = {10.1007/s10838-008-9062-0},
eprint = {43543534534v343453},
isbn = {978-972-757-716-3},
issn = {09254560},
keywords = {bitcoin,whitepaper},
mendeley-tags = {bitcoin,whitepaper},
pages = {1--9},
pmid = {14533183},
title = {{Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System}},
url = {https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf},
urldate = {2016-03-24},
year = {2008}
}
@misc{Park2015,
abstract = {We  propose  a  decentralized  cryptocurrency  based  on  a  block-chain  ledger  similar  to  that  of  Bitcoin,  but  where  the  extremely  wasteful  proofs  of  work  are  replaced  by  proofs  of  space,  recently  introduced  by  Dziembowski  et  al. (CRYPTO 2015).  Instead  of  requiring  that  a  majority  of  the  computing  power  is  controlled  by  honest  miners (as  in  Bitcoin),  our  currency  requires  that  honest  miners  dedicate  more  disk  space  than  a  potential  adversary.$\backslash$r$\backslash$rOnce  a  miner  has  dedicated   and  initialized  some  space,  participating  in  the  mining  process  is  very  cheap.   A  new  block  is  added  to  the  chain  every  fixed  period  of  time (say,  every  minute),   and  in  every  period  a  miner  just  has  to  make  a  small  number  of  lookups  to  the  stored  space  to  check  if  she  ``wins",   and  thus  can  add  the  next  block  to  the  chain   and  get  the  mining  reward.  Because  this  check  is  cheap,  proof-of-space-based  currencies  share  some (but  not  all)  issues  with  currencies   based  on  ``proofs  of  stake'',  like  Peercoin.  Concretely,  a  na$\backslash$"ive  solution  that  simply  replaces  proofs  of  work  with  proofs  of  space  raises  two  main  issues  which  we  address:$\backslash$r$\backslash$r$\backslash$emph{\{}Grinding:{\}}  A  miner  who  can  add  the  next  block  has  some  degree  of  freedom  in  shaping  how  the  chain  looks,  e.g.  by  trying  out  different  sets  of  transactions  to  include  in  her  block.  The  miner  can  try  many  possible  choices  until  she  finds  one  which  results  in  a  chain  that  allows  her  to  also  mine  the  next  block,  thus  hijacking  the  chain  forever  while  dedicating  only  a  small  amount  of  the  space.  We  solve  this  problem  fully  by  ``decoupling"  the  hash  chain  from  the  transactions,  so  that  there  is  nothing  to  grind.  To  bind  the  transactions  back  to  the  hash  chain,  we  add  an  extra  signature  chain,  which  guarantees  that  past  transactions  cannot  be  altered  once  an  honest  miner  adds  a  block.  Our  solution  also  gives  a  simple   and  novel  way  to  solve  the  grinding  problem  in  currencies  based  on  proofs  of  stake.$\backslash$r$\backslash$r$\backslash$emph{\{}Mining  multiple  chains:{\}}  Since  checking  whether  one  can  add  a  block  is  cheap,  rational  miners  will  not  only  try  to  extend  the  so-far-best  chain,  but  also  try  other  chains,  in  the  hope  that  they  can  extend  one  of  them  which  will  ultimately  catch  up   and  overtake  the  currently-best  chain. (In  the  context  of  proof-of-stake-based  currencies  this  is  known  as  the  ``nothing-at-stake"  problem.)  This  not  only  gives  rational  miners  a  larger-than-expected  reward (compared  to  what  honest  miners  get),  but  also  makes  consensus  very  slow,  if  not  impossible.  Our  solution  to  this  problem  is  based  on  penalizing  miners  who  try  to  work  on  more  than  one  branch  of  the  chain.},
author = {Park, Sunoo and Pietrzak, Krzysztof and Alwen, Joel and Fuchsbauer, Georg and Gazi, Peter},
booktitle = {IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive},
keywords = {consensus algo,proof-of-space,spacecoin},
mendeley-tags = {consensus algo,proof-of-space,spacecoin},
pages = {1--26},
title = {{Spacecoin : A Cryptocurrency Based on Proofs of Space}},
url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/528.pdf},
urldate = {2015-10-03},
year = {2015}
}
@article{Sengupta,
author = {Sengupta, Binanda and Bag, Samiran and Ruj, Sushmita and Sakurai, Kouichi},
file = {:home/kushti/Downloads/Retricoin.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {9781450340328},
keywords = {bilinear pairings,bitcoin,mining,proofs of retrievability},
title = {{Retricoin: Bitcoin Based on Compact Proofs of Retrievability}}
}
@incollection{douceur2002sybil,
  title={The sybil attack},
  author={Douceur, John R},
  booktitle={Peer-to-peer Systems},
  pages={251--260},
  year={2002},
  publisher={Springer}
}
@inproceedings{heilman2015eclipse,
  title={Eclipse attacks on Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network},
  author={Heilman, Ethan and Kendler, Alison and Zohar, Aviv and Goldberg, Sharon},
  booktitle={24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15)},
  pages={129--144},
  year={2015}
}
@book{katz2014introduction,
  title={Introduction to modern cryptography},
  author={Katz, Jonathan and Lindell, Yehuda},
  year={2014},
  publisher={CRC press}
}
@book{antonopoulos2014mastering,
  title={Mastering Bitcoin: unlocking digital cryptocurrencies},
  author={Antonopoulos, Andreas M},
  year={2014},
  publisher={" O'Reilly Media, Inc."}
}
@misc{nielsen, 
  title={How the Bitcoin protocol actually works}, 
  url={http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/how-the-bitcoin-protocol-actually-works/}, 
  journal={DDI}, 
  author={Nielsen, Michael}
} 
@article{fischer1985impossibility,
  title={Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process},
  author={Fischer, Michael J and Lynch, Nancy A and Paterson, Michael S},
  journal={Journal of the ACM (JACM)},
  volume={32},
  number={2},
  pages={374--382},
  year={1985},
  publisher={ACM}
}
@inproceedings{sompolinsky2015secure,
  title={Secure high-rate transaction processing in Bitcoin},
  author={Sompolinsky, Yonatan and Zohar, Aviv},
  booktitle={International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security},
  pages={507--527},
  year={2015},
  organization={Springer}
}
@misc{stackexchange,
    author={StackExchange},
    title={Strongest vs Longest chain and orphaned blocks},
    url={http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/29742/strongest-vs-longest-chain-and-orphaned-blocks}
}
@book{odersky2008programming,
  title={Programming in scala},
  author={Odersky, Martin and Spoon, Lex and Venners, Bill},
  year={2008},
  publisher={Artima Inc}
}