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Schedule of Reading Presentations

Tuesday 14 January

Tuesday 21 January

Tuesday 28 January

Tuesday 4 February

  • Bewley (2005) – Gaspard Avat
  • Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2013) – Matt Ramos
  • Akerlof (1984) – Amishi Chokshi
  • Jacoby (1984) – This chapter analyzes the development of internal labor markets in American manufacturing firms. It explains how internal labor markets replaced spot labor markets, and how such replacement provided workers with an employment system that was more bureaucratic, more rule-bound, and more secure. In particular, wages paid to workers were much more rigid in internal labor markets.
  • Raff and Summers (1987) – Casey Orton
  • Mas (2006) – Matthew Choi

Tuesday 11 February

  • Shimer (2005) – Jumur Jamal
  • Hall (2005) – Matt Ramos
  • Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) – Bodi Dallas
  • Hall and Milgrom (2008) – Oscar Lin Tan
  • Blanchard and Gali (2010) – This paper blends the matching model of the labor market with a New Keynesian model of the product market. It then shows that under wage bargaining, unemployment and vacancies do not fluctuate at all in the model. This is a strong form of the Shimer puzzle. By contrast, when the real wage is a subproportional function of labor productivity, the model generates realistic fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies.
  • Eliaz and Spiegler (2013) – This paper insert reference-dependent preferences into a matching model. Because of these preferences, wage cuts relative to a reference point make workers feel that they have been treated unfairly, which dampens their intrinsic motivation and reduces their output. As a result, firms avoid cutting wages. Because wages are rigid downward, unemployment and vacancies respond more to shocks than under Nash bargaining.

Tuesday 18 February

  • Michaillat (2012) – Matthew Choi
  • Crepon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora (2013) – This paper reports the results from a randomized experiment designed to evaluate the direct and indirect effects of job-placement assistance on the labor market outcomes of young educated jobseekers in France. It finds that jobseekers who are given job-placement assistance find jobs more rapidly, while jobseekers in the same labor market who are not assisted take longer to find a job. This finding suggests that jobs are somewhat rationed, and that assisted jobseekers move ahead of non-assisted jobseekers in job queues. The spillovers of job-placement assistance are particularly strong in bad times, when jobs are scarcer.
  • Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen (1988) – Bodi Dallas
  • Michaillat and Saez (2015) – This paper adds aggregate demand to the model in Michaillat (2012). This is done by adding a product market to the labor market with a similar matching structure. Aggregate demand shocks generate fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies along the Beveridge curve. In that model, unemployment can be decomposed into three components: Keynesian unemployment (due to insufficient aggregate demand), classical unemployment (due to high real wages), and frictional unemployment (due to matching frictions).
  • Michaillat and Saez (2022) – This paper builds a dynamic version of the model in Michaillat and Saez (2015), which is static. In this model the central bank can influence aggregate demand and unemployment through interest rates.
  • Michaillat and Saez (2024) – This paper uses the dynamic model in Michaillat and Saez (2022) and generates a Phillips curve by introducing price competition through directed search. To ensure that unemployment fluctuates, the model assumes price rigidity through quadratic price-adjustment costs. The Phillips curve produced by the model guarantees divine coincidence: inflation is on target when unemployment is efficient.

Tuesday 25 February

Tuesday 4 March