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prompt_pytho_claude_answer.txt
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Here are the requirements:
1. You are a military essay writing assistant who writes long essays.
2. Try to formulate the essay using the set of <context> I have given.
3. Use your own knowledge to improve the essay.
4. If you use any of the <context> that I provided, please put their enclosed <id> tags at the end of the sentences.
5. Make your essay as long as possible, the longer the better. Wrap it inside <essay> tags.
6. Do not use the phrase "based on the contexts provided" in your essay.
7. Do not repeat the question.
8. Generate three followup questions inside three separate <question> tags.
Here is a sample essay:
<essay>
The government and private sector face deeply complex challenges in coordinating defensive and offensive cyber operations, but enhancing collaboration is imperative for bolstering cyber deterrence and resilience. There are no quick fixes to align differing priorities, capabilities, legal restrictions and organizational cultures, but several areas hold promise for forging stronger partnerships between public and private entities on cyber operations.
First and foremost, governments should establish clear legal frameworks and policies for sharing classified cyber threat intelligence with trusted private sector partners in a timely manner. The classified nature of the most critical threat reporting often hinders rapid dissemination to companies that own and operate vulnerable critical infrastructure. Carefully crafted information-sharing laws could enable expedited distribution of cyber threats to designated critical infrastructure sectors without compromising sensitive sources. These legal adjustments should include liability protections for companies that share threat data with the government in good faith. The US Cyberspace Solarium Commission has proposed targeted reforms along these lines to expand real-time sharing of actionable cyber threats while protecting privacy. Codifying such threat intelligence sharing frameworks in law would allow more agile, thorough distribution of early warnings on imminent cyber attacks being prepared against US companies and infrastructure. Tapping into the government's immense signals intelligence capabilities and rapidly relaying insights to vulnerable potential targets in the private sector would bolster prevention and preparedness. But companies may hesitate to participate without clearly defined legal guardrails and liability protections.<id>80745</id>
In addition to threat information sharing, governments should significantly expand public-private cybersecurity partnerships to jointly train personnel and conduct sophisticated exercises. Both Canada and the US have pioneered cooperative models that embed government cyber teams with companies in critical infrastructure sectors to share expertise and exchange best practices on assessing vulnerabilities, shoring up defenses and responding to incidents. For example, the US National Guard has established partnerships under its Cyber Mission Assurance Teams (CMATs) program, which joins Guard cyber units with private companies in the defense industrial base, finance, electricity and communications sectors to collaboratively identify risks, train personnel and plan and execute large-scale cyber crisis simulations. Such partnerships build mutual understanding of threats and foster direct peer relationships between government and industry cyber professionals. Expanding similar cooperative training initiatives would help align private sector cyber readiness with government responses under realistic exercise conditions across a diverse array of sectors. These collaborative exercises should include war-gaming of sophisticated cyber attacks and crisis scenarios at the highest level of government and industry leadership to identify friction points and improve decision-making.<id>80420</id>
Furthermore, governments should establish clearly defined processes and coordination frameworks for responding collaboratively with the private sector to significant cyber attacks. Pre-negotiated arrangements that outline escalation thresholds for incident severity, delineate associated military and private sector responses, and codify command and control mechanisms would enable more seamless public-private coordination during fast-moving crises. For instance, the US Cyberspace Solarium Commission has proposed establishing a National Cyber Response Framework to be invoked by the President during a sufficiently severe cyber attack. This framework would designate lead federal agencies, lay out escalation levels to guide government responses, and delineate processes for requesting support or offensive action from partner companies. Pre-defining such strategies avoids over-reliance on ad hoc coordination during the fog of a rapidly escalating cyber attack. However, these plans should retain flexibility given the inherent uncertainty of cyber crises. Prior coordination and exercising of the framework with all parties would help identify procedural gaps and areas of misalignment.<id>79633</id>
Attracting cutting-edge private sector talent into supporting offensive cyber missions poses another hurdle governments must overcome. Bureaucratic acquisition processes, contracting technicalities and lack of incentives often deter smaller firms and skilled private sector cyber operators from bidding on offensive cyber work. Most offensive cyber operations rely on ingenuity in developing and executing sophisticated, customized capabilities against adversaries. But much of that creativity resides with small startups dissuaded from pursuing government contracts by red tape or within large tech firms restricted by their boards. To access unique offensive skills, governments should enhance outreach and streamline procurement channels for trusted startups with niche cyber capabilities useful for tailored offensive operations. Granting research funding to companies that competitively bid for select offensive cyber projects could provide added incentive for participation. The US DoD in particular should expand and simplify pathways for promising cyber startups and small businesses to bring innovative offensive capabilities into the military’s cyber arsenal.<id>8959</id>
Finally, as more governments look to contract private sector companies for offensive cyber missions, internationally accepted norms and guardrails will be needed on responsible state use of private capabilities. Militaries relying on contractors or cyber proxies for offensive operations risks blurring lines of accountability. Clear red lines are essential regarding targeting of civilian critical infrastructure. The United Nations and other multilateral forums should propose transparency mechanisms, confidence-building measures and behavioral guardrails around government relationships with and use of private offensive cyber forces. However, any such norms must also acknowledge that many multinational corporations own and operate the majority of critical infrastructure at risk. Incentivizing the responsible participation of those global companies in defensive and deterrence-oriented government cyber initiatives should constitute an equal priority. In essence, international rules should aim to enhance collective security in cyberspace through multilateral restrictions that incentivize public-private collaboration on cyber operations.
In conclusion, bolstering cyber deterrence against escalating threats requires governments and companies to jointly expand defenses, pool intelligence, coordinate responses and enhance resilience. This hinges on bridging differing priorities, legal barriers and organizational cultures to enable complementary offensive and defensive cyber capabilities of the public and private sectors. The specific policy, legal, procedural and partnership changes proposed above offer initial steps toward maturing public-private collaboration on operations in cyberspace. But ultimately, envisioning more resilient models of government-industry cyber cooperation necessitates sustained open dialogue and building mutual understanding of the multidimensional cyber threat environment. Absent stronger partnerships and collective action, the growing cyber menace to national and economic security will continue to outpace the isolated capabilities of either governments or the private sector on their own.
</essay>
I really need your help to write long essays.
Now, write a long essay on the following topic: