We disclose all security vulnerabilities we find, or are advised about, that are relevant to Trusted Firmware-A. We encourage responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities and inform users as best we can about all possible issues.
We disclose TF-A vulnerabilities as Security Advisories, all of which are listed
at the bottom of this page. Any new ones will, additionally, be announced as
issues in the project's issue tracker with the security-advisory tag. You
can receive notification emails for these by watching the "Trusted Firmware-A"
project at https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/.
Although we try to keep TF-A secure, we can only do so with the help of the community of developers and security researchers.
If you think you have found a security vulnerability, please do not report it in the issue tracker. Instead send an email to [email protected]
Please include:
- Trusted Firmware-A version (or commit) affected
- A description of the concern or vulnerability
- Details on how to replicate the vulnerability, including:
- Configuration details
- Proof of concept exploit code
- Any additional software or tools required
We recommend using this PGP/GPG key for encrypting the information. This key is also available at http://keyserver.pgp.com and LDAP port 389 of the same server. The fingerprint for this key is:
1309 2C19 22B4 8E87 F17B FE5C 3AB7 EFCB 45A0 DFD0
If you would like replies to be encrypted, please provide your public key.
Please give us the time to respond to you and fix the vulnerability before going public. We do our best to respond and fix any issues quickly. We also need to ensure providers of products that use TF-A have a chance to consider the implications of the vulnerability and its remedy.
Afterwards, we encourage you to write-up your findings about the TF-A source code.
We will name and thank you in the change-log.rst distributed with the source
code and in any published security advisory.
| ID | Title |
|---|---|
| TFV-1 | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy of unexpectedly large data into secure memory |
| TFV-2 | Enabled secure self-hosted invasive debug interface can allow normal world to panic secure world |
| TFV-3 | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 |
| TFV-4 | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy or authentication of unexpected data in secure memory in AArch32 state |
| TFV-5 | Not initializing or saving/restoring PMCR_EL0 can leak secure world timing information |
| TFV-6 | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to speculative processor vulnerabilities using cache timing side-channels |
| TFV-7 | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to cache speculation vulnerability Variant 4 |
| TFV-8 | Not saving x0 to x3 registers can leak information from one Normal World SMC client to another |