fix trailing whitespaces

draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits.md

@@ -155,13 +155,13 @@ parties. Any limits on the maximum length of inputs or encryption operations
 apply to that single key. The attacker's goal is to break security
 (confidentiality or integrity) of that specific key. However, in practice, there
 are often many parties with independent keys, multiple sessions between two
-parties, and even many keys used within a single session due to rekeying. This 
-multi-key security setting, often referred to as the multi-user setting in the 
-academic literature, considers an attacker's advantage in breaking security of 
-any of these many keys, further assuming the attacker may have done some offline 
-work (measuring time, but not memory) to help break security. As a result, AEAD 
-algorithm limits may depend on offline work and the number of keys. However, 
-given that a multi-key attacker does not target any specific key, acceptable 
+parties, and even many keys used within a single session due to rekeying. This
+multi-key security setting, often referred to as the multi-user setting in the
+academic literature, considers an attacker's advantage in breaking security of
+any of these many keys, further assuming the attacker may have done some offline
+work (measuring time, but not memory) to help break security. As a result, AEAD
+algorithm limits may depend on offline work and the number of keys. However,
+given that a multi-key attacker does not target any specific key, acceptable
 advantages may differ from that of the single-key setting.
 
 The number of times a single pair of key and nonce can be used might also be
@@ -174,10 +174,10 @@ AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV can tolerate a limited amount of nonce reuse.
 It is good practice to have limits on how many times the same key (or pair of
 key and nonce) are used.  Setting a limit based on some measurable property of
 the usage, such as number of protected messages, amount of data transferred, or
-time passed ensures that it is easy to apply limits.  This might require the 
-application of simplifying assumptions.  For example, TLS 1.3 and QUIC both 
-specify limits on the number of records that can be protected, using the 
-simplifying assumption that records are the same size; see {{Section 5.5 of 
+time passed ensures that it is easy to apply limits.  This might require the
+application of simplifying assumptions.  For example, TLS 1.3 and QUIC both
+specify limits on the number of records that can be protected, using the
+simplifying assumption that records are the same size; see {{Section 5.5 of
 TLS}} and {{Section 6.6 of RFC9001}}.
 
 Exceeding the determined usage limit can be avoided using rekeying.  Rekeying