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Fix for test case operator-install-status-no-privileges. #1665
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sebrandon1
merged 6 commits into
redhat-best-practices-for-k8s:main
from
greyerof:fix_operator_privileges_tc
Apr 10, 2024
Merged
Fix for test case operator-install-status-no-privileges. #1665
sebrandon1
merged 6 commits into
redhat-best-practices-for-k8s:main
from
greyerof:fix_operator_privileges_tc
Apr 10, 2024
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With this fix, the test case fails when resourceName's rules have been found in the CSV's clusterPermissions field and the operator was not cluster-wide installed. Also, minor refactor to use a helper pointer to the env.Operators[i].
edcdavid
reviewed
Nov 28, 2023
Apetree100122
approved these changes
Dec 27, 2023
Apetree100122
approved these changes
Jan 5, 2024
from change #1665: |
/dci-rerun |
from change #1665: |
The original motivation for this test case was checking whether the operator wasn't creating any SA with RBAC rules related to SCC. The implementation was wrong as it was (only) checking the resourceNames list to be empty to pass. But empty list means that any resourceName is allowed (as per k8s docs). Since it's impossible to predict all the "privileged" SCCs that might have been created in the cluster apart from the default ones, this new implementation is another "canary in the mine" check so we can flag operators that try to use/create cluster's SCCs. Operators will need to justify the SCC accesses in their SAs.
from change #1665: |
edcdavid
reviewed
Apr 4, 2024
edcdavid
approved these changes
Apr 4, 2024
Also, minor refactor to remove the need for the helper var securityResourceFound.
from change #1665: |
sebrandon1
approved these changes
Apr 10, 2024
sebrandon1
merged commit Apr 10, 2024
f1ce203
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redhat-best-practices-for-k8s:main
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from change #1665: |
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The original motivation for this test case was checking whether the
operator wasn't creating any SA with RBAC rules related to SCC.
The implementation was wrong as it was (only) checking the resourceNames
list to be empty to pass. But empty list means that any resourceName is
allowed (as per k8s docs).
Since it's impossible to predict all the "privileged" SCCs that might
have been created in the cluster apart from the default ones, this new
implementation is another "canary in the mine" check so we can flag
operators that try to use/create cluster's SCCs.
Operators will need to justify the SCC accesses in their SAs.